HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO. v. UNION PLANTERS BANK, N. A.

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 1999
HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO. v.
UNION PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 99–409. Argued March 20, 2000—Decided May 30, 2000
During attempted reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, debtor Hen House Interstate, Inc., obtained workers’ compen-
sation insurance from petitioner Hartford Underwriters. Although
Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments
required by the policy, Hartford continued to provide insurance. The
reorganization ultimately failed, and the court converted the case to
a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Learn-
ing of the bankruptcy proceedings after the conversion, and recog-
nizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums
owed, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to respondent bank,
a secured creditor, pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 506(c). The Bankruptcy
Court ruled for Hartford, and the District Court affirmed, but the
en banc Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that § 506(c) could not be
invoked by an administrative claimant.
Held: Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a
bankruptcy estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim
from property encumbered by a secured creditor’s lien. Pp. 4–14.
(a) As an administrative claimant, petitioner is not a proper party
to seek recovery under § 506(c), which provides: “The trustee may re-
cover from property securing an allowed secured claim the . . . costs
1

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2 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Syllabus
and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property . . . .” The
statute appears quite plain in specifying who may use § 506(c)—“[t]he
trustee.” Although the statutory text does not actually say that per-
sons other than the trustee may not seek recovery under § 506(c), sev-
eral contextual features support that conclusion. First, a situation
in which a statute authorizes specific action and designates a partic-
ular party empowered to take it is surely among the least appropriate
in which to presume nonexclusivity. Second, the fact that the sole
party named—the trustee—has a unique role in bankruptcy proceedings
makes it entirely plausible that Congress would provide a power to him
and not to others. Further, had Congress intended the provision to be
broadly available, it could simply have said so, as it has in describing
the parties who could act under other sections of the Code. The Court
rejects as unpersuasive petitioner’s arguments from § 506(c)’s text:
that the use in other Code provisions of “only” or other expressly re-
strictive language in specifying the parties at issue means that no party
in interest is excluded from § 506(c), and that the right of a nontrustee
to recover under § 506(c) is evidenced by § 1109. Pp. 4–9.
(b) The Court also rejects arguments based on pre-Code practice
and policy considerations that petitioner advances in support of its as-
sertion that § 506(c) is available to parties other than the trustee. It is
questionable whether the pre-Code precedents relied on by petitioner
establish a bankruptcy practice sufficiently widespread and well recog-
nized to justify the conclusion of implicit adoption by Congress in enact-
ing the Code. In any event, where, as here, the meaning of the Code’s
text is itself clear, its operation is unimpeded by contrary prior practice.
Also unavailing is petitioner’s argument that its reading is necessary as
a matter of policy, since in some cases the trustee may lack an incentive
to pursue payment. It is far from clear that the relevant policy implica-
tions favor petitioner’s position, and, in any event, achieving a better
policy outcome—if what petitioner urges is that—is a task for Congress,
not the courts. Pp. 9–14.
177 F. 3d 719, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Patrick J. Trostle and Wendi
Alper-Pressman.

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3 Cite as: 530 U. S. 1 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Robert H. Brownlee argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was David D. Farrell.*
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether 11 U. S. C. § 506(c) allows
an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate to seek
payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured
creditor’s lien.
I
This case arises out of the bankruptcy proceedings of
Hen House Interstate, Inc., which at one time owned or
operated several restaurants and service stations, as well
as an outdoor-advertising firm. On September 5, 1991, Hen
House filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri. As a Chapter 11 debtor-
in-possession, Hen House retained possession of its assets
and continued operating its business.
Respondent had been Hen House’s primary lender.1 At
the time the Chapter 11 petition was filed, it held a secu-
rity interest in essentially all of Hen House’s real and
personal property, securing an indebtedness of over $4 mil-
lion. After the Chapter 11 proceedings were commenced, it
agreed to lend Hen House an additional $300,000 to help
finance the reorganization. The Bankruptcy Court entered
a financing order approving the loan agreement and author-
*Mark F. Horning, Sidney P. Levinson, Craig A. Berrington, and Phil-
lip L. Schwartz filed a brief for the American Insurance Association et al.
as amici curiae urging reversal.
Carter G. Phillips and Shalom L. Kohn filed a brief for the Commercial
Finance Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
1 Respondent Union Planters Bank is the successor of Magna Bank,
which is in turn the successor of Landmark Bank of Illinois. Hen House
was originally indebted to Landmark Bank. For simplicity, we will not
distinguish between the various entities.

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4 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
izing Hen House to use loan proceeds and cash collateral to
pay expenses, including workers’ compensation expenses.
During the attempted reorganization, Hen House obtained
workers’ compensation insurance from petitioner Hartford
Underwriters (which was unaware of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings). Although the policy required monthly premium
payments, Hen House repeatedly failed to make them; Hart-
ford continued to provide insurance nonetheless. The re-
organization ultimately failed, and on January 20, 1993, the
Bankruptcy Court converted the case to a liquidation pro-
ceeding under Chapter 7 and appointed a trustee. At the
time of the conversion, Hen House owed Hartford more
than $50,000 in unpaid premiums. Hartford learned of Hen
House’s bankruptcy proceedings after the conversion, in
March 1993.
Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds
to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the pre-
miums to respondent, the secured creditor, by filing with the
Bankruptcy Court an “Application for Allowance of Admin-
istrative Expense, Pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 503 and Charge
Against Collateral, Pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 506(c).” The
Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford, and the Dis-
trict Court and an Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, In re Hen
House Interstate, Inc., 150 F. 3d 868 (CA8 1998). The
Eighth Circuit subsequently granted en banc review, how-
ever, and reversed, concluding that § 506(c) could not be in-
voked by an administrative claimant. In re Hen House In-
terstate, Inc., 177 F. 3d 719 (1999). We granted certiorari.
528 U. S. 985 (2000).
II
Petitioner’s effort to recover the unpaid premiums in-
volves two provisions, 11 U. S. C. §§ 503(b) and 506(c). Sec-
tion 503(b) provides that “the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries,
or commissions for services rendered after the commence-

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5 Cite as: 530 U. S. 1 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
ment of the case,” are treated as administrative expenses,
which are, as a rule, entitled to priority over prepetition un-
secured claims, see §§ 507(a)(1), 726(a)(1), 1129(a)(9)(A). Re-
spondent does not dispute that the cost of the workers’ com-
pensation insurance Hen House purchased from petitioner is
an administrative expense within the meaning of this provi-
sion. Administrative expenses, however, do not have prior-
ity over secured claims, see §§ 506, 725–726, 1129(b)(2)(A);
United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest As-
sociates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 378–379 (1988), and because
respondent held a security interest in essentially all of the
estate’s assets, there were no unencumbered funds available
to pay even administrative claimants.
Petitioner therefore looked to § 506(c), which constitutes
an important exception to the rule that secured claims are
superior to administrative claims. That section provides
as follows:
“The trustee may recover from property securing an
allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such prop-
erty to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such
claim.” § 506(c).
Petitioner argued that this provision entitled it to recover
from the property subject to respondent’s security inter-
est the unpaid premiums owed by Hen House, since its fur-
nishing of workers’ compensation insurance benefited re-
spondent by allowing continued operation of Hen House’s
business, thereby preserving the value of respondent’s col-
lateral; or alternatively, that such benefit could be pre-
sumed from respondent’s consent to the postpetition financ-
ing order. Although it was contested below whether, under
either theory, the workers’ compensation insurance consti-
tuted a “benefit to the holder” within the meaning of § 506(c),
that issue is not before us here; we assume for purposes of
this decision that it did, and consider only whether peti-

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6 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
tioner—an administrative claimant—is a proper party to
seek recovery under § 506(c).2
In answering this question, we begin with the under-
standing that Congress “says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat.
Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). As we have
previously noted in construing another provision of § 506,
when “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function
of the courts’ ”—at least where the disposition required by
the text is not absurd—“ ‘is to enforce it according to its
terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489
U. S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States,
242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)). Here, the statute appears quite
plain in specifying who may use § 506(c)—“[t]he trustee.”
It is true, however, as petitioner notes, that all this actually
“says” is that the trustee may seek recovery under the sec-
tion, not that others may not. The question thus becomes
whether it is a proper inference that the trustee is the only
party empowered to invoke the provision.3 We have little
difficulty answering yes.
Several contextual features here support the conclusion
that exclusivity is intended. First, a situation in which a
statute authorizes specific action and designates a particu-
lar party empowered to take it is surely among the least
appropriate in which to presume nonexclusivity. “Where a
2 In addition to seeking recovery under § 506(c), petitioner argued to
the Eighth Circuit en banc that it was entitled to recover under the terms
of the postpetition financing order itself. Petitioner sought to enforce
that order under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7071, which in-
corporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 (“When an order is made
in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, that person may
enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party . . .”).
The Eighth Circuit declined to address this issue, since it had not been
raised until the rehearing en banc, In re Hen House Interstate, Inc., 177
F. 3d 719, 724 (1999). We similarly do not reach the issue here.
3 Debtors-in-possession may also use the section, as they are expressly
given the rights and powers of a trustee by 11 U. S. C. § 1107.

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Opinion of the Court
statute . . . names the parties granted [the] right to invoke
its provisions, . . . such parties only may act.” 2A N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.23, p. 217 (5th ed.
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Federal
Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 486 (1985). Second, the fact that the
sole party named—the trustee—has a unique role in bank-
ruptcy proceedings makes it entirely plausible that Congress
would provide a power to him and not to others. Indeed,
had no particular parties been specified—had § 506(c) read
simply “[t]here may be recovered from property securing an
allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses, etc.”—the trustee is the most obvious party who
would have been thought empowered to use the provision.
It is thus far more sensible to view the provision as answer-
ing the question “Who may use the provision?” with “only
the trustee” than to view it as simply answering the question
“May the trustee use the provision?” with “yes.”
Nor can it be argued that the point of the provision was
simply to establish that certain costs may be recovered from
collateral, and not to say anything about who may recover
them. Had that been Congress’s intention, it could easily
have used the formulation just suggested. Similarly, had
Congress intended the provision to be broadly available, it
could simply have said so, as it did in describing the parties
who could act under other sections of the Code. Section
502(a), for example, provides that a claim is allowed unless
“a party in interest” objects, and § 503(b)(4) allows “an en-
tity” to file a request for payment of an administrative ex-
pense. The broad phrasing of these sections, when con-
trasted with the use of “the trustee” in § 506(c), supports the
conclusion that entities other than the trustee are not en-
titled to use § 506(c). Russello v. United States, 464 U. S.
16, 23 (1983).
Petitioner’s primary argument from the text of § 506(c) is
that “what matters is that section 506(c) does not say that

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8 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
‘only’ a trustee may enforce its provisions.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 29. To bolster this argument, petitioner cites other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that do use “only” or
other expressly restrictive language in specifying the parties
at issue. See, e. g., § 109(a) (“[O]nly a person that resides or
has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United
States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title”);
§ 707(b) (providing that a case may be dismissed for substan-
tial abuse by “the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States trustee, but not at the request or sug-
gestion of any party in interest”). Petitioner argues that in
the absence of such restrictive language, no party in interest
is excluded. This theory—that the expression of one thing
indicates the inclusion of others unless exclusion is made
explicit—is contrary to common sense and common usage.
Many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that do not con-
tain an express exclusion cannot sensibly be read to extend
to all parties in interest. See, e. g., § 363(b)(1) (providing
that “[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell,
or lease . . . property of the estate”); § 364(a) (providing that
“the trustee” may incur debt on behalf of the bankruptcy
estate); § 554(a) (giving “the trustee” power to abandon prop-
erty of the bankruptcy estate).
Petitioner further argues that § 1109 evidences the right
of a nontrustee to recover under § 506(c). We are not per-
suaded. That section, which provides that a “party in inter-
est” “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue
in a case under [Chapter 11],” is by its terms inapplicable
here, since petitioner’s attempt to use § 506(c) came after the
bankruptcy proceeding was converted from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7. In any event, we do not read § 1109(b)’s general
provision of a right to be heard as broadly allowing a creditor
to pursue substantive remedies that other Code provisions
make available only to other specific parties. Cf. 7 L. King,
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1109.05 (rev. 15th ed. 1999) (“In gen-
eral, section 1109 does not bestow any right to usurp the

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9 Cite as: 530 U. S. 1 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
trustee’s role as representative of the estate with respect
to the initiation of certain types of litigation that belong
exclusively to the estate”).
III
Because we believe that by far the most natural reading
of § 506(c) is that it extends only to the trustee, petitioner’s
burden of persuading us that the section must be read to
allow its use by other parties is “ ‘exceptionally heavy.’ ”
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U. S. 753, 760 (1992) (quoting
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 156 (1991)). To support
its proffered reading, petitioner advances arguments based
on pre-Code practice and policy considerations. We address
these arguments in turn.
A
Section 506(c)’s provision for the charge of certain admin-
istrative expenses against lienholders continues a practice
that existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see, e. g.,
In re Tyne, 257 F. 2d 310, 312 (CA7 1958); 4 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra, ¶ 506.05[1]. It was not to be found in the text
of the Act, but traced its origin to early cases establish-
ing an equitable principle that where a court has cus-
tody of property, costs of administering and preserving the
property are a dominant charge, see, e. g., Bronson v. La
Crosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 1 Wall. 405, 410 (1864); Atlantic
Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U. S. 360, 376 (1908). It was the
norm that recovery of costs from a secured creditor would
be sought by the trustee, see, e. g., Textile Banking Co. v.
Widener, 265 F. 2d 446, 453–454 (CA4 1959); Tyne, supra,
at 312. Petitioner cites a number of lower court cases, how-
ever, in which—without meaningful discussion of the point—
parties other than the trustee were permitted to pursue such
charges under the Act, sometimes simultaneously with the
trustee’s pursuit of his own expenses, see, e. g., First Western
Savings and Loan Assn. v. Anderson, 252 F. 2d 544, 547–548
(CA9 1958); In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897, 898

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10 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
(WD Ky. 1936), aff ’d, 93 F. 2d 1008 (CA6 1938), but sometimes
independently, see In re Chapman Coal Co., 196 F. 2d 779,
780 (CA7 1952); In re Rotary Tire & Rubber Co., 2 F. 2d 364
(CA6 1924). Petitioner also relies on early decisions of this
Court allowing individual claimants to seek recovery from
secured assets, see Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson,
138 U. S. 501, 506 (1891); Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776,
779, 783 (1884); New York Dock Co. v. S. S. Poznan, 274 U. S.
117, 121 (1927). Wilson and Burnham involved equity re-
ceiverships, and were not only pre-Code, but predate the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that the Code replaced; while New
York Dock was a case arising in admiralty.
It is questionable whether these precedents establish a
bankruptcy practice sufficiently widespread and well rec-
ognized to justify the conclusion of implicit adoption by the
Code. We have no confidence that the allowance of re-
covery from collateral by nontrustees is “the type of ‘rule’
that . . . Congress was aware of when enacting the Code.”
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S., at
246. Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, 418 (1992) (re-
lying on “clearly established” pre-Code practice); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 46 (1986) (giving weight to pre-Code
practice that was “widely accepted” and “established”). In
any event, while pre-Code practice “informs our under-
standing of the language of the Code,” id., at 44, it cannot
overcome that language. It is a tool of construction, not
an extratextual supplement. We have applied it to the
construction of provisions which were “subject to inter-
pretation,” id., at 50, or contained “ambiguity in the text,”
Dewsnup, supra, at 417. “[W]here the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s text is itself clear . . . its operation is unim-
peded by contrary . . . prior practice,” BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 546 (1994) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). See, e. g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub-
lic Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 563 (1990); United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., supra, at 245–246.

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11 Cite as: 530 U. S. 1 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
In this case, we think the language of the Code leaves
no room for clarification by pre-Code practice. If § 506(c)
provided only that certain costs and expenses could be re-
covered from property securing a secured claim, without
specifying any particular party by whom the recovery could
be pursued, the case would be akin to those in which we
used prior practice to fill in the details of a pre-Code concept
that the Code had adopted without elaboration. See, e. g.,
United States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535, 539 (1996) (looking
to pre-Code practice in interpreting Code’s reference to
“principles of equitable subordination”); Midlantic Nat.
Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474
U. S. 494, 501 (1986) (codification of trustee’s abandonment
power held to incorporate established exceptions). Here,
however, it is not the unelaborated concept but only a spe-
cifically narrowed one that has been adopted: a rule allowing
the charge of costs to secured assets by the trustee. Pre-
Code practice cannot transform § 506(c)’s reference to “the
trustee” to “the trustee and other parties in interest.”
B
Finally, petitioner argues that its reading is necessary
as a matter of policy, since in some cases the trustee may
lack an incentive to pursue payment. Section 506(c) must
be open to nontrustees, petitioner asserts, lest secured credi-
tors enjoy the benefit of services without paying for them.
Moreover, ensuring that administrative claimants are com-
pensated may also serve purposes beyond the avoidance of
unjust enrichment. To the extent that there are circum-
stances in which the trustee will not use the section although
an individual creditor would,4 allowing suits by nontrustees
4 The frequency with which such circumstances arise may depend in
part on who ultimately receives the recovery obtained by a trustee under
§ 506(c). Petitioner argues that it goes to the party who provided the
services that benefited collateral (assuming that party has not already
been compensated by the estate). Respondent argues that this read-

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12 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
could encourage the provision of postpetition services to
debtors on more favorable terms, which would in turn fur-
ther bankruptcy’s goals.
Although these concerns may be valid, it is far from clear
that the policy implications favor petitioner’s position. The
class of cases in which § 506(c) would lie dormant without
nontrustee use is limited by the fact that the trustee is
obliged to seek recovery under the section whenever his
fiduciary duties so require. And limiting § 506(c) to the
trustee does not leave those who provide goods or services
that benefit secured interests without other means of pro-
tecting themselves as against other creditors: They may in-
sist on cash payment, or contract directly with the secured
creditor, and may be able to obtain superpriority under
§ 364(c)(1) or a security interest under §§ 364(c)(2), (3), or
§ 364(d). And of course postpetition creditors can avoid
unnecessary losses simply by paying attention to the status
of their accounts, a protection which, by all appearances,
petitioner neglected here.
On the other side of the ledger, petitioner’s reading would
itself lead to results that seem undesirable as a matter of
policy. In particular, expanding the number of parties who
could use § 506(c) would create the possibility of multiple
administrative claimants seeking recovery under the sec-
ing, like a reading that allows creditors themselves to use § 506(c), upsets
the Code’s priority scheme by giving administrative claimants who bene-
fit collateral an effective priority over others—allowing, for example, a
Chapter 11 administrative creditor (like petitioner) to obtain payment via
§ 506(c) while Chapter 7 administrative creditors remain unpaid, despite
§ 726(b)’s provision that Chapter 7 administrative claims have priority
over Chapter 11 administrative claims. Thus, respondent asserts that a
trustee’s recovery under § 506(c) simply goes into the estate to be dis-
tributed according to the Code’s priority provisions. Since this case does
not involve a trustee’s recovery under § 506(c), we do not address this
question, or the related question whether the trustee may use the pro-
vision prior to paying the expenses for which reimbursement is sought,
see In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F. 3d 203, 207, 212 (CA4 1997).

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Opinion of the Court
tion. Each such claim would require inquiry into the ne-
cessity of the services at issue and the degree of benefit
to the secured creditor. Allowing recovery to be sought at
the behest of parties other than the trustee could therefore
impair the ability of the bankruptcy court to coordinate pro-
ceedings, as well as the ability of the trustee to manage the
estate. Indeed, if administrative claimants were free to
seek recovery on their own, they could proceed even where
the trustee himself planned to do so. See, e. g., In re Bluff-
ton Castings Corp., 224 B. R. 902, 904 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind.
1998).5 Further, where unencumbered assets were scarce,
creditors might attempt to use § 506(c) even though their
claim to have benefited the secured creditor was quite weak.
The possibility of being targeted for such claims by various
administrative claimants could make secured creditors less
willing to provide postpetition financing.
In any event, we do not sit to assess the relative merits
of different approaches to various bankruptcy problems. It
suffices that the natural reading of the text produces the
result we announce. Achieving a better policy outcome—if
what petitioner urges is that—is a task for Congress, not
5 We do not address whether a bankruptcy court can allow other in-
terested parties to act in the trustee’s stead in pursuing recovery under
§ 506(c). Amici American Insurance Association and National Union Fire
Insurance Co. draw our attention to the practice of some courts of allowing
creditors or creditors’ committees a derivative right to bring avoidance
actions when the trustee refuses to do so, even though the applicable
Code provisions, see 11 U. S. C. §§ 544, 545, 547(b), 548(a), 549(a), mention
only the trustee. See, e. g., In re Gibson Group, Inc., 66 F. 3d 1436, 1438
(CA6 1995). Whatever the validity of that practice, it has no analogous
application here, since petitioner did not ask the trustee to pursue pay-
ment under § 506(c) and did not seek permission from the Bankruptcy
Court to take such action in the trustee’s stead. Petitioner asserted an
independent right to use § 506(c), which is what we reject today. Cf. In re
Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F. 2d 198, 202–203 (CA7 1988) (holding
that creditor had no right to bring avoidance action independently, but
noting that it might have been able to seek to bring derivative suit).

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14 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO. v. UNION
PLANTERS BANK, N. A.
Opinion of the Court
the courts. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U. S. 57, 64 (1998);
Noland, 517 U. S., at 541–542, n. 3; Wolas, 502 U. S., at 162.
* * *
We have considered the other points urged by petitioner
and find them to be without merit. We conclude that 11
U. S. C. § 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant
an independent right to use the section to seek payment of
its claim. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.