BARAL v. UNITED STATES

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431 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
BARAL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 98–1667. Argued January 18, 2000—Decided February 22, 2000
Two remittances were made to the Internal Revenue Service toward peti-
tioner Baral’s income tax liability for the 1988 tax year: a withholding
of $4,104 from Baral’s wages throughout 1988 by his employer, and an
estimated income tax of $1,100 remitted in January 1989 by Baral. Bar-
al’s income tax return for 1988 was due on April 15, 1989. Though he
received an extension until August 15, he missed this deadline and did
not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, he claimed a $1,175
overpayment and asked the Service to apply this excess as a credit
toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The Serv-
ice denied the requested credit, concluding that the claim exceeded the
ceiling imposed by 26 U. S. C. § 6511(b)(2)(A), which states that “the
amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax
paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim,
equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the
return.” Since Baral filed his return on June 1, 1993, and received a
4-month extension from the initial due date, the relevant look-back pe-
riod under § 6511(b)(2)(A) extended from June 1, 1993, back to February
1, 1990 (i. e., three years plus four months). According to the Service,
Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax during that period, and
so faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral com-
menced this suit for refund in the Federal District Court, which granted
the Service summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, con-
cluding that both remittances were “paid” on April 15, 1989.
Held: Remittances of estimated income tax and withholding tax are “paid”
on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer’s income tax return. Sec-
tions 6513(b)(1) and (2) unequivocally provide that the two remittances
were “paid” on April 15, 1989, for purposes of § 6511(b)(2)(A), so that
they precede the look-back period, which began on February 1, 1990.
Subsection (1) resolves when the remittance of Baral’s employer’s with-
holding tax was “paid,” and subsection (2) determines when his remit-
tance of estimated income tax was “paid.” Because neither these re-
mittances nor any others were “paid” within the look-back period, the
ceiling on Baral’s requested $1,175 credit is zero, and the Service was
correct to deny that credit. Contrary to Baral’s claim, the withholding
tax and estimated tax are not taxes in their own right (separate from

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432 BARAL v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the income tax), that are converted into income tax only on the income
tax return. Rather, they are methods for collecting income taxes.
And the Tax Code directly contradicts Baral’s notion that income tax is
“paid” under § 6511(b)(2)(A) only when the income tax is assessed. See
§ 6151(a). His position also finds no support in Rosenman v. United
States, 323 U. S. 658, and would work to the detriment of timely taxpay-
ers, who would be denied interest for the time between filing a return
claiming a refund or credit and the Service’s assessment. Pp. 434–439.
172 F. 3d 918, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Walter J. Rockler argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Julius Greisman and Thomas Klein.
Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As-
sistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General
Wallace, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, and Charles Bricken.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Internal Revenue Code § 6511(b)(2)(A) imposes a ceiling
on the amount of credit or refund to which a taxpayer is
entitled as compensation for an overpayment of tax: “[T]he
amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the por-
tion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding
the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of
any extension of time for filing the return.” 26 U. S. C.
§ 6511(b)(2)(A). We are called upon in this case to decide
when two types of remittance are “paid” for purposes of this
section: a remittance by a taxpayer of estimated income tax,
and a remittance by a taxpayer’s employer of withholding
tax. The plain language of a nearby Code section, § 6513(b),
provides the answer: These remittances are “paid” on the
due date of the taxpayer’s income tax return.
I
The relevant facts are not disputed. Two remittances
were made to the Internal Revenue Service toward peti-

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tioner David H. Baral’s income tax liability for the 1988 tax
year. The first, a withholding of $4,104 from Baral’s wages
throughout 1988, was a garden-variety collection of income
tax by the employer, see § 3402. The second, an estimated
income tax of $1,100 remitted in January 1989, was sent by
Baral himself out of concern that his employer’s withholding
might be inadequate to meet his tax obligation for the year,
see § 6654. In the ordinary course, Baral’s income tax re-
turn for 1988 was due to be filed on April 15, 1989. Though
he applied for and received an extension of time until August
15, Baral missed this deadline; he did not file the return until
nearly four years later, on June 1, 1993. The Service, on
July 19, 1993, assessed the tax liability reported on this be-
lated return.
On the return, Baral claimed that he (and his employer on
his behalf) had remitted $1,175 more with respect to the 1988
taxable year than he actually owed. Baral requested that
the Service apply this excess as a credit toward his outstand-
ing tax obligations for the 1989 taxable year. The Service
denied the requested credit. It did not dispute that Baral
had timely filed the request under the relevant filing dead-
line—“within 3 years from the time the return was filed or
2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such
periods expires the later.” § 6511(a); see § 6511(b)(1). But
the Service concluded that the claim exceeded the ceiling
imposed by § 6511(b)(2)(A). That provision states that “the
amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion
of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the
filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any
extension of time for filing the return.” Ibid.; see generally
Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U. S. 235, 240 (1996) (explaining
that § 6511 contains two separate timeliness provisions: (1)
§ 6511(b)(1)’s filing deadline and (2) § 6511(b)(2)’s ceilings,
which are defined by reference to that provision’s “look-back
period[s]”). Since Baral had filed his return on June 1, 1993,
and had earlier received a 4-month extension from the initial

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due date, the relevant look-back period under § 6511(b)(2)(A)
extended from June 1, 1993, back to February 1, 1990 (i. e.,
three years plus four months). According to the Service,
Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax during that
period, and so faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund
or credit.
Baral then commenced the instant suit for refund in Fed-
eral District Court. That court sustained the Service’s posi-
tion and granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–1, judgt.
order reported at 172 F. 3d 918 (CADC 1999). The Court of
Appeals looked to § 6513(b)(1), which states that amounts of
tax withheld from wages “shall . . . be deemed to have been
paid by [the taxpayer] on the 15th day of the fourth month
following the close of his taxable year,” and to § 6513(b)(2),
which makes similar provision for amounts submitted as esti-
mated income tax, and concluded that, under these subsec-
tions, both of the remittances at issue were “paid” on April
15, 1989. Accord, e. g., Dantzler v. United States, 183 F. 3d
1247, 1250–1251 (CA11 1999) (estimated income tax); Ertman
v. United States, 165 F. 3d 204, 207 (CA2 1999) (same); Ehle
v. United States, 720 F. 2d 1096, 1096–1097 (CA9 1983) (with-
holding from wages). In view of apparent tension between
this approach and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Ford v. United States, 618 F. 2d 357, 360–361,
and n. 4 (1980) (suggesting that a remittance respecting any
sort of tax is “paid” under § 6511 only when the Service as-
sesses the tax liability), we granted certiorari, 527 U. S.
1067 (1999).
II
The parties renew before us the contentions advanced
below. The Government submits that §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2)
unequivocally provide that the two remittances at issue were
“paid” on April 15, 1989, for purposes of § 6511(b)(2)(A), so
that they precede the look-back period, which, as noted, com-
menced on February 1, 1990. Baral, on the other hand,
urges that a tax cannot be “paid” within the meaning of

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§ 6511(b)(2)(A) until the tax liability is assessed (i. e., the
value of the liability is definitively fixed). According to
Baral, the requisite assessment might be made either when
the taxpayer files his return (here June 1, 1993) or when the
Service, under § 6201, formally assesses the liability (here
July 19, 1993), though he seems to prefer the latter date.
See Brief for Petitioner 9 (“Payment of the income tax . . .
occurred at the earliest on June 1, 1993, when the amount of
that tax first became known, and more precisely on July 19,
1993, when the income tax was assessed”).
We agree with the Government that §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2)
settle the matter. We set out these provisions in full:
“(b) Prepaid income tax
“For purposes of section 6511 or 6512—
“(1) Any tax actually deducted and withheld at the
source during any calendar year under chapter 24 shall,
in respect of the recipient of the income, be deemed to
have been paid by him on the 15th day of the fourth
month following the close of his taxable year with re-
spect to which such tax is allowable as a credit under
section 31.
“(2) Any amount paid as estimated income tax for any
taxable year shall be deemed to have been paid on the
last day prescribed for filing the return under section
6012 for such taxable year (determined without regard
to any extension of time for filing such return).”
Subsection (1) resolves when the remittance of withholding
tax by Baral’s employer was “paid”: Since Baral is a calendar
year taxpayer, the $4,104 withheld from his wages during
the 1988 calendar year was “paid” on April 15, 1989. Sub-
section (2) determines when Baral’s remittance of estimated
income tax was “paid”: Since the referenced § 6012 together
with § 6072(a) requires that a calendar year taxpayer like
Baral file his income tax return on the April 15th following
the close of the calendar year, the $1,100 remitted as an esti-
mated income tax in respect of Baral’s 1988 tax liability was

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likewise “paid” on April 15, 1989. And both of these statu-
torily defined payment dates apply “[f]or purposes of section
6511,” the provision directly at issue in this case. This
means that, under § 6511(b)(2)(A), both remittances at issue
(the withholding and the estimated income tax) fall before,
and hence outside, the look-back period, which commenced
on February 1, 1990. Because neither these remittances nor
any others were “paid” within the look-back period (Febru-
ary 1, 1990, to June 1, 1993), the ceiling on Baral’s requested
credit of $1,175 is zero, and the Service was correct to deny
the requested credit.
Baral disputes this reading of § 6513(b). He claims that
§§ 6513(b)(1) and (2) establish a “deemed paid” date for pay-
ment of estimated tax and withholding tax, but in no sense
prescribe when the income tax is “paid,” which is the crucial
inquiry under § 6511(b)(2)(A). According to Baral, withhold-
ing tax and estimated tax are taxes in their own right (sepa-
rate from the income tax), and are converted into income tax
only on the income tax return. (On this view, payment of
the income tax occurred no earlier than June 1, 1993, when
Baral filed the return.) This reading is evident, he says,
from the significance that the Treasury Regulations place on
the filing of the return, see 26 CFR § 301.6315–1 (1999) (“The
aggregate amount of the payments of estimated tax should
be entered upon the income tax return for such taxable year
as payments to be applied against the tax shown on such
return”); § 301.6402–3(a)(1) (providing that “in the case of an
overpayment of income taxes, a claim for credit or refund of
such overpayment shall be made on the appropriate income
tax return”), and from the fact that the Code’s provisions
regarding withholding and estimated tax are found in differ-
ent subtitles (C and F, respectively) from the provisions gov-
erning income tax (A).
We disagree. Withholding and estimated tax remittances
are not taxes in their own right, but methods for collecting
the income tax. Thus, § 31(a)(1) of the Code provides that

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amounts withheld from wages “shall be allowed to the recipi-
ent of the income as a credit against the [income] tax,” and
§ 6315 states that “[p]ayment of the estimated income tax,
or any installment thereof, shall be considered payment on
account of the income taxes imposed by subtitle A for the
taxable year.” Similarly, one of the regulations cited by
Baral explains that a remittance of estimated income tax
“shall be considered payment on account of the income tax
for the taxable year for which the estimate is made.” 26
CFR § 301.6315–1 (1999) (emphasis added). Baral’s reading
fails, moreover, to give any meaning to 26 U. S. C. § 6513.
That section exists “[f]or purposes of section 6511,” and
§ 6511 concerns credits and refunds, which result only when
the aggregate of remittances (such as withholding tax and
estimated income tax) exceed the tax liability, see § 6401.
Thus, the concepts of credit or refund have no meaning as
applied to Baral’s notion of withholding taxes and estimated
taxes as freestanding taxes. Not surprisingly, the caption
to § 6513(b) describes withholding and estimated income tax
remittances as “[p]repaid income tax.”
Taking a more metaphysical tack, Baral contends that
income tax is “paid” under § 6511(b)(2)(A) only when the
income tax is assessed—here, June 1 or July 19, 1993, see
supra, at 434–435—because the concept of payment makes
sense only when the liability is “defined, known, and fixed by
assessment,” Brief for Petitioner 9. But the Code directly
contradicts the notion that payment may not occur before
assessment. See § 6151(a) (“[T]he person required to make
[a return of tax] shall, without assessment or notice and
demand from the Secretary, pay such tax . . . at the time
and place fixed for filing the return” (emphasis added));
§ 6213(b)(4) (“Any amount paid as a tax or in respect of a tax
may be assessed upon the receipt of such payment” (empha-
sis added)). Nor does Baral’s argument find support in our
decision in Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658 (1945),
where we applied § 6511’s predecessor to a remittance of esti-

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mated estate tax. To be sure, a part of our opinion seems
to endorse petitioner’s view that payment only occurs at
assessment:
“It is [the] erroneous assessment that gave rise to a
claim for refund. Not until then was there such a claim
as could start the time running for presenting the claim.
In any responsible sense payment was then made by the
application of the balance credited to the petitioners in
the suspense account . . . .” Id., at 661.
But the remittance in Rosenman, unlike the ones here, was
not governed by a “deemed paid” provision akin to § 6513,
and we therefore had no occasion to consider the implications
of such a provision for determining when a tax is “paid”
under the predecessor to § 6511. See ibid. (noting that “no
extraneous relevant aids to construction have been called to
our attention”). Moreover, if the quoted passage had repre-
sented our holding, we would have broadly rejected the Gov-
ernment’s argument that payment occurred when the remit-
tance of estimated estate tax was made, instead of rejecting
the argument, as we did, only because it was not in accord
with the “tenor” of the “business transaction,” id., at 663.1
We observe, finally, that Baral’s position—to the extent he
submits that payment occurs only at the Service’s assess-
ment—would work to the detriment of taxpayers who timely
file their returns and claim a refund or credit as compensa-
1 Central to our analysis in this regard was a concern that the Service
should not be able to treat the same remittance as a payment for statute
of limitations purposes—disadvantaging the taxpayer by decreasing the
time in which a refund claim could be filed—and as a deposit for purposes
of accrual of interest on overpayments—disadvantaging the taxpayer by
starting the accrual of interest only at assessment. Rosenman, 323 U. S.,
at 662–663. Indeed, we suggested that an amendment to the Code disap-
proving of the Service’s treatment of remittances as deposits for interest
purposes might change the analysis. Id., at 663 (citing Current Tax Pay-
ment Act of 1943, § 4(d), 57 Stat. 140) (presently codified at 26 U. S. C.
§ 6401(c)).

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tion for an overpayment. The Service will not always as-
sess the taxpayer’s liability immediately upon receiving the
return; the Service generally has three years in which to do
so, see 26 U. S. C. § 6501(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Code
does allow for payment of interest to the taxpayer on over-
payments once the return has been filed and the tax paid, 26
U. S. C. § 6611 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), but under Baral’s
view no interest could accrue during the time between the
filing of the return and the Service’s assessment. Fortu-
nately for the timely taxpayer, the Code definitively rejects
Baral’s position in this setting. Section 6611(d) of 26 U. S. C.
explains that the date of payment is determined according
to the provisions of § 6513, which, as noted, supra, at 435–
436, plainly set a deemed date of payment for remittances of
withholding and estimated income tax on the April 15 follow-
ing the relevant taxable year.2
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
2 We need not address the proper treatment under § 6511 of remittances
that, unlike withholding and estimated income tax, are not governed by a
“deemed paid” provision akin to § 6513(b). Such remittances might in-
clude remittances of estimated estate tax, as in Rosenman, or remittances
of any sort of tax by a taxpayer under audit in order to stop the running
of interest and penalties, see, e. g., Moran v. United States, 63 F. 3d 663
(CA7 1995). In the latter situation, the taxpayer will often desire treat-
ment of the remittance as a deposit—even if this means forfeiting the
right to interest on an overpayment—in order to preserve jurisdiction in
the Tax Court, which depends on the existence of a deficiency, 26 U. S. C.
§ 6213 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), a deficiency that would be wiped out by
treatment of the remittance as a payment. We note that the Service has
promulgated procedures to govern classification of a remittance as a de-
posit or payment in this context. See Rev. Proc. 84–58, 1984–2 Cum.
Bull. 501.