Smith v. Kind

1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANTONIO M. SMITH v. JOHN KIND, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–943. Decided June 29, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari.
In late November in Green Bay, Wisconsin, two prison
officials intentionally locked petitioner Antonio Smith in a
freezing-cold prison cell, naked and without any way to
keep warm for 23 hours. The Seventh Circuit held that the
officers violated Smith’s Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment but nevertheless
granted them qualified immunity, reasoning that the Cir-
cuit “had never held it unconstitutional on closely analo-
gous facts to house an inmate in a cell that ranged in tem-
perature from 25 to 57 degrees over a 23-hour period
without clothes or a way to keep warm.” 140 F. 4th 359,
372 (2025). The Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity is
clearly wrong, and I would summarily reverse.
I
This case was resolved by the courts below on the officers’
motion for summary judgment, so the facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to Smith as the nonmoving
party. City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575
U. S. 600, 603 (2015). In October 2017, when Smith was an
inmate at the Green Bay Correctional Institution in Wis-
consin, he began a hunger strike to protest prison condi-
tions. For the first 45 days of the hunger strike, Smith re-
ported to the prison’s health unit daily but declined to
submit to a wellness check once there. Starting on day 46,

2 SMITH v. KIND
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Smith declined to leave his cell at all and instead laid on his
bed in a “‘surrendering ritual.’” 140 F. 4th, at 363. As a
result, on that day, and for the following three days, correc-
tional officers restrained Smith and lifted him into a wheel-
chair to transport him to the health unit. Ibid.
On day 50, which was in late November, Smith again re-
fused to leave his cell. This time, correctional officer Cap-
tain Jay Van Lanen told his team that the prior method of
extracting Smith from his cell was “no longer suitable” and
that he believed it necessary to change their approach by
using pepper spray. Ibid. Van Lanen added that Security
Director John Kind had authorized the use of pepper spray
even though Smith has asthma and pepper spray can cause
severe complications for those with asthma. When Van
Lanen arrived at Smith’s cell, he told Smith he would use
the pepper spray to “gain compliance” if Smith did not stand
and walk to the health unit and reminded Smith about his
asthma. Ibid. Smith did not respond and laid down in his
surrendering-ritual position. Van Lanen then deployed the
pepper spray. Video evidence shows that “for eight
minutes, Smith had difficulty breathing, seemed disori-
ented, and was drooling, coughing, spitting, and moaning.”
Ibid. “While Smith continued to gasp for air, Van Lanen
ordered him to remove his clothes and comply with a strip
search.” Ibid. Smith obeyed. Van Lanen and four other
officers then handcuffed Smith (who was still naked), cov-
ered his genitals with a towel, and walked him to the health
unit, where Smith declined a shower and wellness check.
Afterwards, instead of returning Smith to his cell and
permitting him to put his clothes back on, the officers
placed Smith, still naked, in a “‘control cell’ used for disrup-
tive inmates.” Id., at 364. A vent in the cell “blew air equiv-
alent to the outside temperature, which, during his stay in
the cell, ranged from 25 to 57 degrees Fahrenheit.” Ibid.
The cell itself had no mattress or bedding, and Van Lanen
did not give Smith any clothing, even though his past

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
practice had been to provide a smock and other clothing re-
gardless of whether the inmate had requested it.
When Smith was first placed in the cell around noon, Van
Lanen told Smith that Smith could request a shower any
time and that he would come back to discuss “‘clothing and
stuff,’” but he never returned. Ibid. Three and a half hours
later, Smith requested clothing, bedding, and a mattress
from Lieutenant Timothy Retzlaff and asked to be moved to
a warmer cell given the cold. Retzlaff said he would check
with Van Lanen. Twelve additional hours went by with no
word from Van Lanen or Retzlaff. Then, around 3 o’clock in
the morning, a different officer told Smith that if he sub-
mitted to future wellness checks, he could have a smock,
but that otherwise, “he would remain naked and cold.” Ibid.
Smith declined. Another eight hours came and went with-
out any word from Van Lanen or Retzlaff. Smith remained
naked and frigid overnight as the temperature dropped be-
low freezing to 25 degrees. After 23 hours, prison staff re-
moved Smith from the cell. Smith later stated that he
stayed on his feet for most of those 23 hours because it was
too painful to sit, lie down, or sleep.
Smith sued Van Lanen and Retzlaff under 42 U. S. C.
§1983, alleging three Eighth Amendment claims: first, that
the use of pepper spray was excessive force; second, that the
conditions of his confinement in the control cell constituted
cruel and unusual punishment; and third, that the officers
used excessive force while escorting him from his cell to the
health unit. The only claim at issue in Smith’s petition for
a writ of certiorari is Smith’s second claim regarding his
confinement in the control cell.
II
A
To begin, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
correctly held that a reasonable jury could find that the of-
ficers violated Smith’s Eighth Amendment right by

4 SMITH v. KIND
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
“den[ying] him a human need and [doing] so with deliberate
indifference” when they placed him naked in a freezing cell
for nearly 24 hours without any clothing, bedding, or other
way to protect himself from the cold. 140 F. 4th, at 371.
The Seventh Circuit explained that a reasonable jury could
find that both officers acted with deliberate indifference to
Smith’s exposure to the extreme cold. Ibid. The evidence,
construed in Smith’s favor, showed that Van Lanen “placed
Smith naked in a cold cell surely knowing that it was No-
vember 28 in Green Bay, Wisconsin when the temperature
would (and did) drop below freezing,” and “did so with full
awareness of Smith’s weakened state and pepper spray-in-
duced asthma attack.” Ibid. He also “chose not to follow
his usual practice of making a smock and bedding availa-
ble” and never “return[ed] to the cell that night to discuss
clothing, even though he promised Smith he would.” Ibid.
As for Retzlaff, the Circuit held that the “analysis [was]
even more straightforward” because “Smith asked Retzlaff
to provide him with clothes and bedding or move him to a
warner cell,” and “Retzlaff did neither.” Id., at 371–372.
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is reinforced by the fact
that the officers did not assert in their briefs to the Seventh
Circuit or to this Court any legitimate penological reason to
subject Smith to such conditions. See Brief in Opposition
12–14; Brief for Defendants–Appellees in No. 22–2870
(CA7), ECF Doc. 15, pp. 33–38. Nor could they. The Court
has long held that prison officials violate the Eighth
Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to the
deprivation of a prisoner’s basic needs, that is, when they
“kno[w] of and disregar[d] an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837
(1994). It logically follows that prison officials also violate
the Eighth Amendment when they not only know of a dep-
rivation of a prisoner’s basic needs but intentionally deprive
him of those needs to force him to comply with an unwanted

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
medical evaluation or procedure when the prisoner poses no
threat to others.
B
Despite holding that a jury could find a violation of
Smith’s Eighth Amendment rights, the panel majority, over
Judge Hamilton’s dissent, nonetheless concluded that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the
Seventh Circuit “had never held it unconstitutional on
closely analogous facts to house an inmate in a cell that
ranged in temperature from 25 to 57 degrees over a 23-hour
period without clothes or a way to keep warm.” 140 F. 4th,
at 372; see id., at 378 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the case law “makes unequivocally clear that prisoners
have a right to adequate heat”). The Circuit erred in grant-
ing the officers qualified immunity simply because no prior
case had found an Eighth Amendment violation based on
subjecting prisoners to the exact same combination of cold
temperature and duration as occurred here.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from li-
ability if their actions do not “‘violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595
U. S. 1, 5 (2021). “‘[T]his Court’s case law does not require
a case directly on point for a right to be clearly estab-
lished’”; instead, “‘existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Ibid.
It is “beyond debate” that the officers’ actions here vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. Ibid. It is well established
that officers may not “deprive inmates of the minimal civi-
lized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U. S. 337, 347 (1981), or deny a prisoner an “identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise” by, for ex-
ample, subjecting him to “a low cell temperature at night”
while “fail[ing] to issue blankets,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S.
294, 304 (1991). Officers also may not inflict “‘unnecessary

6 SMITH v. KIND
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
and wanton’” pain, which is pain that is “‘totally without
penological justification.’” Rhodes, 452 U. S., at 346.
As Judge Hamilton explained in dissent, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has itself held that intentionally subjecting prisoners
to extreme cold conditions without any way to stay warm
violates the Eighth Amendment. 140 F. 4th, at 377–378.
In Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F. 3d 488 (CA7 2006), for example,
the Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that
prison officials violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
right when they deliberately left him naked in a cell blow-
ing cool air for five days as part of an effort to “conform [his
conduct] to the rules.” Id., at 490; see Del Raine v. Willi-
ford, 32 F. 3d 1024, 1031 (CA7 1994) (officers deliberately
strip-searched prisoner in cell for 15 to 30 minutes when
windchill was 40 to 50 degrees below zero).
1
The Seventh
Circuit has also held that, when cold conditions are the
product of heating-system failures, officers violate the
Eighth Amendment if they are aware of such conditions and
fail to take corrective measures such as providing an alter-
native way to keep warm. See Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F. 3d
640, 642, 644–645 (1997) (40 degrees all winter and pris-
oner was given only long underwear, cap, gloves, jacket, two
sheets, and blanket); Lewis v. Lane, 816 F. 2d 1165, 1166,
1171 (1987) (cell temperature allegedly around 53 degrees
for two months); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F. 3d 714, 720–721
(1995) (per curiam) (confined in cell without clothes, blan-
kets, or mattress in the middle of November for 1.5 weeks).
Based on the principles established by this Court and the
like precedent in the Seventh Circuit, no reasonable officer
could have concluded that intentionally placing Smith in
the control cell completely naked with no clothing, bedding,
or additional way of keeping warm for 23 hours in freezing
——————
1
The Fifth Circuit has also found Eighth Amendment violations on
similar facts. See, e.g., Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F. 3d 346, 349, 353 (1999)
(prisoners kept outside in temperature below 59 degrees for 17 hours
without “shelter, jacket, blanket, or source of heat”).

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
conditions was constitutionally permissible. The panel ma-
jority reached the opposite conclusion, however, by dis-
counting that body of law on the ground that each case in-
volved a temperature or a timeframe that did not perfectly
match the “25 to 57 degrees over a 23-hour period without
clothes” scenario here. 140 F. 4th, at 372. That was error.
This Court has emphasized that “‘clearly established law’
should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality’” and that
courts should look to prior cases involving “similar circum-
stances,” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 79 (2017) (per cu-
riam), but this analysis does not permit discarding every
case that presents any factual variation. On the contrary:
The core of the inquiry has always centered on whether the
“ ‘ “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a rea-
sonable official would understand that what he is doing vi-
olates that right.”’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 199
(2004) (per curiam). A “body of relevant case law” may
clearly establish those contours even if no single case, on its
own, presents identical facts. Ibid.; see District of Colum-
bia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 63 (2018) (law may be clearly
established by either “‘ controlling authority’ or ‘a robust
“consensus of persuasive authority”’ ”); cf. Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002) (“‘[A] general constitutional rule
already identified in the decisional law may apply with ob-
vious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though
“the very action in question has not previously been held
unlawful”’ ” (alteration omitted)).
From all this, the panel should have asked whether the
existing precedent collectively established and put the offic-
ers on sufficient notice that their actions violated the
Eighth Amendment. Here, even without a case matching
the exact conditions that Smith faced down to the exact de-
gree and minute, the body of case law on needless depriva-
tions of warmth in prisons made it abundantly clear, and
beyond debate, that the officers’ treatment of Smith vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.

8 SMITH v. KIND
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
***
Summary reversal is “‘a rare disposition, usually re-
served by this Court for situations in which the law is set-
tled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision
below is clearly in error.’” Andrus v. Texas, 596 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2022) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (slip op., at 23–24). This Term, however, the
Court has exercised its discretion to summarily reverse
supposed errors that were far less clear than the one here.
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Hernandez, 607 U. S. ___ (2026)
(per curiam); Zorn v. Linton, 607 U. S. ___ (2026) (per cu-
riam); see also Smith v. Scott, 608 U. S. ___ (2026) (sum-
marily vacating and remanding denial of qualified-immun-
ity in light of Zorn). If those cases were clear enough for
summary action, the Court here should have readily con-
cluded, based on precedent and basic human decency, that
it is beyond debate that it is cruel and unusual to lock some-
one intentionally in a freezing prison cell completely naked
for 23 hours.
The Court’s decision not to do so today exacerbates its
asymmetrical trend of declining to intervene when courts
wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity,
but unflinchingly summarily reversing when it believes
courts have wrongly denied officers the protection of quali-
fied immunity. See, e.g., Zorn, 607 U. S., at ___–___
(S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8–9); Kisela v.
Hughes, 584 U. S. 100, 121 (2018) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissent-
ing). Reversing only denials of qualified immunity sends
the regrettable message that, when choosing between
shielding government officials from liability and vindicat-
ing individuals’ constitutional rights, this Court will almost
always choose the former. Because this decision emboldens
government officials, like the correctional officers here, to
act with impunity, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s
refusal to summarily reverse.