Callais v. Louisiana

Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

A
LITO, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 25A1197 (24–109 and 24–110)
_________________
PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL., APPLICANTS v.
LOUISIANA,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION TO ISSUE THE JUDGMENT FORTHWITH
[May 4, 2026]
To permit the losing party time to file a petition for re-
hearing, the Clerk of Court ordinarily waits 32 days after
the entry of the Court’s judgment to send the opinion and a
certified copy of the judgment to the clerk of the lower court.
Sup. Ct. Rule 45.3. This period is subject to adjustment; the
default applies “unless the Court or a Justice shortens or
extends the time.” Ibid. The Callais appellees have asked
for the Clerk to issue the judgment forthwith so that “in the
event of a judicial remedy,” the District Court may “oversee
an orderly process.” App. 3. Appellant Louisiana does not
oppose this application. And while the Robinson appellants
oppose it, they have not expressed any intent to ask this
Court to reconsider its judgment. Thus, the application to
issue the judgment forthwith presented to J
USTICE ALITO
and by him referred to the Court is granted.
J
USTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
J
USTICE GORSUCH join, concurring.
The dissent in this suit levels charges that cannot go un-
answered. The dissent would require that the 2026 con-
gressional elections in Louisiana be held under a map that
has been held to be unconstitutional.* The dissent does not
claim that it is now too late for the state legislature or the
District Court to adopt a new map that complies with the
——————
*That constitutional question was argued and conferenced nearly
seven months ago.

2 CALLAIS v. LOUISIANA
A
LITO, J., concurring
Constitution. Nor does the dissent assert that it is not fea-
sible for the elections to be held under such a map. Instead,
the dissent offers two reasons for its proposed course of ac-
tion. One is trivial at best, and the other is baseless and
insulting.
The first is compliance with the 32-day default rule set
out in this Court’s Rule 45.3, but as the Court’s order ex-
plains, there is good reason to depart from the default rule
here. The principal reason for the 32-day default rule is to
give a losing party time to prepare a petition for rehearing.
But here, the Robinson appellees have not expressed an in-
tent to file such a petition, much less set out any ground on
which a petition might be based. And the need for prompt
action by this Court is clear. The date scheduled for the
beginning of early voting in the primary election has al-
ready passed. The congressional districting map enacted
by the legislature has been held to be unconstitutional, and
the general election will be held in just six months.
The second reason offered by the dissent is that we should
allow the 32-day period to run out in order to “avoid the
appearance of partiality.” Post, at 3 (opinion of J
ACKSON,
J.). But the dissent does not explain why its insistence on
unthinking compliance with Rule 45.3’s default rule does
not create the appearance of partiality (by running out the
clock) on behalf of those who may find it politically advan-
tageous to have the election occur under the unconstitu-
tional map.
The dissent goes on to claim that our decision represents
an unprincipled use of power. See post, at 4 (“And just like
that, those principles give way to power”). That is a ground-
less and utterly irresponsible charge. What principle has
the Court violated? The principle that Rule 45.3’s 32-day
default period should never be shortened even when there
is good reason to do so? The principle that we should never
take any action that might unjustifiably be criticized as
partisan?

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., concurring
The dissent accuses the Court of “unshackl[ing]” itself
from “constraints.” Post, at 4. It is the dissent’s rhetoric
that lacks restraint.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A1197 (24–109 and 24–110)
PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL., APPLICANTS v.
LOUISIANA,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION TO ISSUE THE JUDGMENT FORTHWITH
[May 4, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
The Court’s decision in these cases has spawned chaos in
the State of Louisiana.
Louisiana’s primary elections were scheduled to take
place on May 16, 2026. Accordingly, the State mailed bal-
lots to overseas and military voters on April 1, and to other
voters who qualified to vote by mail on April 26. By April
29—the date on which the Court released its decision hold-
ing that Louisiana’s current congressional map is an uncon-
stitutional gerrymander, see Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S.
___ (2026)—some Louisiana voters had already mailed back
their filled-in ballots.
The very next day, Louisiana’s Governor declared that
Callais “effectively revives” the lower court’s prior injunc-
tion against the current electoral map, and suspended the
ongoing primary elections for seats in the U. S. House of
Representatives. La. Exec. Order No. JML 26–038 (Apr. 30,
2026). For its part, the three-judge court below declared
that, due to Callais, “Louisiana will be afforded the oppor-
tunity to enact a Constitutionally compliant map” right
now—for the election in progress—and ordered the State to
file a brief “outlining how [it] intends to comply with” the
Callais decision within three days. Order in Callais v.
Landry, No. 24–cv–122 (WD La.), ECF Doc. 261, p. 1. Ap-
parently, neither the Governor nor the three-judge court
viewed themselves as limited by the fact that this Court had

2 CALLAIS v. LOUISIANA
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
yet to issue its certified judgment in these cases; in the or-
dinary course, we do not do so until at least 32 days after
the opinion is released. See this Court’s Rule 45.3.
1
So, new litigation followed. A candidate and Louisiana
voters who have already submitted their ballots filed suits
against the Governor and the Secretary of State, asserting
that, whatever might happen to Louisiana’s congressional
map in the future, this election is already underway and
must continue pursuant to the current maps. See, e.g.,
Complaint in Garcia v. Landry, No. 26–cv–471 (MD La.),
ECF Doc. 1; Emergency Petition for Injunctive Relief in Na-
tional Council of Jewish Women v. Landry, No. C–777814
(La. 19th Jud. Dist., May 1, 2026). Meanwhile, to facilitate
Louisiana’s midstream redistricting rush, appellees now
ask us to expedite release of the certified judgment in Cal-
lais. Application 2–3.
These post-Callais developments have a strong political
undercurrent. Louisiana’s hurried response to the Callais
decision unfolds in the midst of an ongoing statewide elec-
tion, against the backdrop of a pitched redistricting battle
among state governments that appear to be acting as prox-
ies for their favored political parties.
2
And as always, the
Court has a choice. By my count, we have granted an ap-
plication to issue the judgment forthwith over a party’s
——————
1
In today’s order, the Court offers that “Louisiana does not oppose [the
Callais plaintiffs’] application,” suggesting that this is a point in favor of
the Court’s decision to grant the request. Ante, at 1 (per curiam). But
the reason that Louisiana “takes no position on the Callais plaintiffs’ re-
quest” is that neither the Governor nor the Legislature views the State’s
ability to “immediately produce a constitutional map and electoral pro-
cess” as “contingent upon when this Court transmits its opinion and
judgment.” Louisiana’s Response to Application 1–2.
2
See D. Lieb, A Redistricting Battle Among States Has Reshaped the
US House Map Ahead of the Midterm Election, Associated Press, Apr.
30, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/redistricting-congress-gerrymander-
trump-4c5c98bec6af054d13b6275b6917bc86 (archived at https://perma
.cc/RVP9–MN3W).

Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

J
ACKSON, J., dissenting

objection only twice in the last 25 years. See Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A220, 2021 WL 5931622
(Dec. 16, 2021); Order in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No.
13A7, etc. (June 28, 2013). To avoid the appearance of par-
tiality here, we could, as per usual, opt to stay on the side-
lines and take no position by applying our default proce-
dures.
But, today, the Court chooses the opposite. Not content
to have decided the law, it now takes steps to influence its
implementation. The Court’s decision to buck our usual
practice under Rule 45.3 and issue the judgment forthwith
is tantamount to an approval of Louisiana’s rush to pause
the ongoing election in order to pass a new map.
3

And make no mistake: That course of action does not fol-
low from the Callais decision itself. The question whether
our decision should affect the map to be used in the ongoing
primaries raises a host of legal and political questions that
are entirely independent of the issue in Callais. Among the
legal ones, there is the Court’s previous insistence that—
even at the cost of letting partisan gamesmanship corrupt
our democracy, see Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684,
721 (2019) (K
AGAN, J., dissenting)—courts should not “ ‘risk
assuming political . . . responsibility for a [partisan map-
drawing] process that often produces ill will and distrust,’
”
——————
3
Contrary to JUSTICE ALITO’s charges, my conclusion here does not “re-
quire that the 2026 congressional elections in Louisiana be held under a
map that has been held to be unconstitutional.” Ante, at 1 (opinion con-
curring in grant of application to issue judgment forthwith). But he is
correct to observe that I am neither “claim[ing] that it is now too late for
the state legislature or the District Court to adopt a new map that com-
plies with the Constitution,” nor “assert[ing] that it is not feasible for the
elections to be held under such a map.” Id., at 1–2. Indeed, my prefer-
ence is for the Court to stay out of all this, and the best way to do that is
to stick with our default procedures. It is the majority that opts to do
otherwise, thereby seeming to endorse Louisiana’s efforts to change its
congressional map during this primary election, before the pending law-
suits have a chance to play out.

4 CALLAIS v. LOUISIANA

J
ACKSON, J., dissenting

id., at 704 (majority opinion). There is also the so-called
Purcell principle, which we invoked only five months ago to
chide a federal district court for “improperly insert[ing] it-
self into an active primary campaign.” Abbott v. League of
United Latin American Citizens, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(per curiam) (slip op., at 2).
The Court unshackles itself from both constraints today
and dives into the fray. And just like that, those principles
give way to power. Because this abandon is unwarranted
and unwise, respectfully, I dissent.