Alabama v. California

1 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ALABAMA, ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF COMPLAINT
No. 158, Orig. Decided March 10, 2025
The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied.
J
USTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, dis-
senting from the denial of motion for leave to file complaint.
The Court once again denies leave to file a complaint in a
suit between States. Alabama and 18 other States moved
for leave to file a complaint against California, Connecticut,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. The plaintiff
States allege that the defendant States are attempting to
“dictate interstate energy policy” through the aggressive
use of state-law tort suits. Bill of Complaint 1–3. On the
plaintiff States’ account, these suits seek to “impos[e] ruin-
ous liability and coercive remedies on energy companies . . .
based on out-of-state conduct with out-of-state effects,” for
the purpose of placing a “global carbon tax on the tradi-
tional energy industry.” Id., at 1–2. The plaintiff States
contend that this practice violates the horizontal separation
of powers, the Federal Government’s exclusive authority
over interstate emissions, and the Commerce Clause. I
would grant the plaintiff States leave to proceed.
As I have previously explained, the Court’s assumption
that it has “discretion to decline review” in suits between
States is “suspect” at best. Arizona v. California, 589 U. S.
___, ___ (2020) (opinion dissenting from denial of motion for
leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 1); accord, Nebraska v.
Colorado, 577 U. S. 1211, 1211–1213 (2016) (same). “The
Constitution establishes our original jurisdiction in manda-
tory terms.” Arizona, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of T
HOMAS,
J.) (slip op., at 1). Article III states that, “[i]n all Cases . . .
in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall

2 ALABAMA v. CALIFORNIA
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
have original jurisdiction.” §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). And,
Congress has made our original jurisdiction “exclusive” in
“all controversies between two or more States.” 28 U. S. C.
§1251(a). Given our “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to
exercise the jurisdiction given” to us, our jurisdiction in this
context would seem to be compulsory. Colorado River Wa-
ter Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817
(1976).
Yet, the Court routinely “decline[s] to exercise its exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in state-versus-state cases.” Texas
v. California, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (A
LITO, J., dissenting from
denial of motion for leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 6)
(collecting cases). It has done so as part of a broader policy
of making only “sparing use” of our original jurisdiction,
wherein we restrict our review to “appropriate” cases. Illi-
nois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 93–94 (1972).
This discretionary approach is a modern invention that
the Court has never persuasively justified. See Texas, 593
U. S., at ___–___ (opinion of A
LITO, J.) (slip op., at 3–6)
(chronicling history). For example, in Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493 (1971), the Court admitted
that “it may initially have been contemplated that this
Court would always exercise its original jurisdiction when
properly called upon to do so.” Id., at 497. But, the Court
declared, “changes in the American legal system” and the
“development of American society” had rendered the man-
datory exercise of original jurisdiction “untenable, as a
practical matter.” Ibid. Wyandotte was a case falling under
our nonexclusive original jurisdiction, but the Court has
made the same judgment with respect to our exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction, including in cases between States: Limit-
ing our exercise of original jurisdiction is necessary, the
Court has claimed, “‘so that our increasing duties with the
appellate docket will not suffer.’” Arizona v. New Mexico,
425 U. S. 794, 797 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Illinois, 406
U. S., at 93–94).

3 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
In my view, such prudential decisions are not ours to
make. The Constitution and Congress have set the bounds
of our original jurisdiction. Those parameters should be
conclusive: “We have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court).
The Court’s reluctance to accept jurisdiction in cases be-
tween the States is also troubling because this Court is the
only court that can hear such cases. “If this Court does not
exercise jurisdiction over a controversy between two States,
then the complaining State has no judicial forum in which
to seek relief.” Nebraska, 577 U. S., at 1212 (opinion of
T
HOMAS, J.). Accordingly, the Court today leaves the 19
plaintiff States without any legal means of vindicating their
claims against the 5 defendant States.
We should revisit this discretionary approach. Our ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over suits between States re-
flects a determination by the Framers and by Congress
about the need “to open and keep open the highest court of
the nation” for such suits, in recognition of the “rank and
dignity” of the States. Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111
U. S. 449, 464 (1884); see Texas, 593 U. S., at ___ (opinion
of A
LITO, J.) (slip op., at 7). Yet, this Court has—essentially
for policy reasons—assumed a power to summarily turn
away suits between States. The Court today exercises that
power to reject a suit involving nearly half the States in the
Nation, which alleges serious constitutional violations. Be-
cause I would at least allow the plaintiff States to file their
complaint, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of
leave to file.