Trump v. Cook

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES v.
COOK, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A312. Argued January 21, 2026—Decided June 29, 2026
In August 2025, President Trump purported to fire Lisa Cook, a member
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Cook was
the first Governor to be fired in the central bank’s 111-year history.
She promptly filed suit. She alleged that the attempted removal was
not “for cause,” as required by statute, and that the President had in
any event failed to comply with the statute’s (and the Constitution’s)
requirement that she receive pretermination process. The District
Court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent her removal. This
Court must decide whether the District Court’s order should remain in
effect pending the conclusion of litigation over the attempted removal.
The United States has a long tradition of independent central bank-
ing. The Nation’s first de facto central bank, the Bank of North Amer-
ica, predates even our Constitution. The structure of the Bank of
North America was unusual; it was owned in part by the Government
and in part by the public, run by directors accountable only to private
stockholders, and yet tasked with public purposes—specifically, the
maintenance of a sound national currency.
Although the Bank of North America was short lived, two more na-
tional banks soon followed in its footsteps. Both had similar goals to
the Bank of North America—and a similar degree of independence
from the Federal Government. The first came in 1791, when the First
Congress chartered a bank that came to be known as the First Bank
of the United States. After the charter for the First Bank was allowed
to expire in 1811, Chief Justice Marshall remarked that “a short expe-
rience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First
Bank] exposed the government”—severe financial instability following

2 TRUMP v. COOK
Syllabus
the War of 1812—“convinced those who were most prejudiced against
[a central bank] of the measure of its necessity.” McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 402. That necessity led to the Second Bank of the
United States, chartered in 1816. In 1832, however, President Jack-
son, unconvinced of the wisdom of an independent national bank, ve-
toed a bill passed by Congress to extend the Second Bank’s charter.
Eighty years later, after an era of ruinous financial panics, a bipar-
tisan congressional commission recommended the creation of another
central bank to assume “the serious duty of protecting public and pri-
vate interests at times when they are imperiled.” Report of the Na-
tional Monetary Commission, S. Doc. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 36.
What emerged is today’s central bank—called the Federal Reserve
System—first created in 1913, and then restructured in 1933 and
1935. The Federal Reserve consists of 12 “independent but affiliated
banks,” one for each region. C. Glass, An Adventure in Constructive
Finance 173. These regional banks, called Federal Reserve Banks, are
privately owned (and operated) by the commercial banks of the area.
See 38 Stat. 254, 12 U. S. C. §341. Above those banks sits the Board
of Governors, which supervises the system with an eye to the econ-
omy’s “long run growth.” §225a. The Board consists of seven members,
each appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. §241.
Like the directors of its three predecessors, the Federal Reserve’s Gov-
ernors do not serve at the President’s pleasure—they instead serve
staggered 14-year terms, and may be removed only “for cause.” §242.
Cook’s term on the Board of Governors was set to expire in 2038. On
August 20, 2025, the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Director
posted to social media a letter in which he accused Cook of mortgage
fraud. President Trump posted to social media that “Cook must resign,
now!!!” and he later told reporters that he would “fire her if she doesn’t
resign.” Complaint in No. 1:25-cv-02903 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1, p. 14.
Three days later, the President purported to fire Cook for cause. In a
letter to Cook, he stated that he had “reason to believe” that she “may
have made false statements on one or more mortgage agreements.”
ECF Doc. 1–4, p. 2. He told her that he lacked “confidence in [her]
integrity” and that he had determined that “faithfully executing the
law requires [her] immediate removal from office.” Id., at 3. After
Cook filed suit, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction to
prevent her removal. The Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunc-
tion, and the Government filed an application for stay in this Court.
Held: The Government’s application is denied. Pp. 8–27.
(a) The Government has not shown that it is likely to prevail on the
legal arguments advanced in its stay application. See Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (per curiam); Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418,
434. Acceptance of the Government’s position would in effect

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will em-
ployment—an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress
enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from
political interference. Pp. 8–16.
(1) The Government first contends that the President’s determi-
nation of “cause” is wholly unreviewable because the statute “commits
the determination of cause to” the President alone. Application 20.
The Court sees no such commitment. Whether a Governor should be
“removed for cause” is a decision only the President can make (short of
impeachment). 12 U. S. C. §242. But that does not mean that he may
make that decision for any reason, or no reason. Even when a statute
“delegates discretionary authority” to the Executive Branch, a court
must “independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of
Congress subject to constitutional limits.” Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 395. As the Government eventually
acknowledges, it falls to the courts to “discern the boundaries of the
President’s power” under the Federal Reserve Act. Supp. Brief for Ap-
plicant 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike the Government, the Court sees no indication that the com-
mon law forecloses all judicial review of removals. See State ex rel.
Hart v. Common Council of City of Duluth, 53 Minn. 238, 244, 55 N. W.
118, 120 (“The sufficiency and reasonableness of the cause of removal
are questions for the courts. . . . This has been the settled law ever
since Bagg’s Case, [11 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K. B. 1615)
(Coke, C. J.)], and we are not aware of any respectable authority to the
contrary.”). The cases the Government cites for its contrary view are
distinguishable because they addressed statutes that specified not
only causes for removal but also procedures for removal, which the re-
viewing courts interpreted to be exclusive. Pp. 9–11.
(2) Even if the President’s determination is judicially reviewable,
the Government contends, “cause” sets a very low bar—one that the
President easily cleared. Cook, by contrast, argues that “cause” sets a
very high bar that the President failed to meet. The Court rejects both
parties’ positions. Congress enacted this statute “against the backdrop
of the common law,” Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African Amer-
ican-Owned Media, 589 U. S. 327, 335, such that the Court must look
to the common law to decipher what “cause” (a term of art) requires.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that any definition of
“cause” in this context must reflect the Federal Reserve’s unique his-
torical status and role. Like its predecessors, the Federal Reserve op-
erates at a deliberate remove from the ordinary political process, in-
cluding a budget free of congressional control, §243, and policies set
not only by Governors, but also by representatives of the private re-
gional banks, §263. Not only the fact of independence but also the

4 TRUMP v. COOK
Syllabus
appearance of independence is key to the Federal Reserve’s design.
That counsels a substantial threshold for “cause.” Whether “cause”
for removal exists in any given situation will depend, at least in part,
on the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, and the extent of any
nexus that may exist to the Governor’s professional duties. The key
issue is whether “[t]he cause assigned” truly “impl[ies] an unfitness for
the place”—or whether it simply represents an effort to secure a “more
congenial” replacement. In re Nichols, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 474, 482. With-
out such constraints in place, any perceived or alleged misstep (past or
present) could provide a ready pretext for a Governor’s removal—a fact
that he would surely know, and that would surely weigh on him as he
decided what to say and how to vote. Nothing could be more corrosive
of the independence that Congress sought to preserve. Pp. 11–15.
(3) The Court rejects the Government’s contention that federal
courts cannot grant a preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement
during the pendency of litigation. Historically, a court of equity could
not finally determine whether a plaintiff was validly removed—that
was a question only a court of law could settle by quo warranto or man-
damus. In the meantime, however, equity could ensure that “the ac-
tual incumbents of an office may be protected, pending a contest as to
their title, from interference with their possession, and with the exer-
cise of their functions,” at least to the extent that they had a likely
meritorious claim. 2 J. High, Law of Injunctions §1315, p. 866. The
District Court sought to do just that here. Pp. 15–16.
(b) The Court decides this application on the narrow ground that the
President failed to afford Cook the procedural protections to which she
was entitled by statute. Without such protections, she could not
properly dispute the charges the President laid against her. The Court
need not address Cook’s constitutional due process argument, for the
statute alone makes it unlikely that the Government will prevail on
appeal as to the validity of the procedures used to fire Cook. Pp. 17–
27.
(1) Under the Court’s precedents, Cook was entitled to notice and
some opportunity to respond before her termination. When Congress
created the Federal Reserve, it gave Governors a set term in office and
permitted removal only “for cause.” That form of tenure—a term of
years limited only by removal “for cause”—carried with it a settled in-
terpretation at common law, one that the Court had expressly adopted
just a decade before. “[T]he rule,” the Court explained in 1901, is that
“notice and hearing are essential” before an officer’s removal “where
the term of office is for a fixed period.” Reagan v. United States, 182
U. S. 419, 425; see also Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 314.
Reagan and Shurtleff established the baseline against which Congress
legislated, and the Court must construe its work accordingly. That is

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
not to say that a Federal Reserve Governor is entitled to a full-blown
judicial trial. All that is required is “the right to support his allega-
tions by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however
informal,” before a final decision is made. Londoner v. City and County
of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 386. Pp. 18–21.
(2) The protection from removal enjoyed by Governors of the Federal
Reserve is consistent with the Constitution. The Founders knew from
experience the calamities that could arise from even the “suspicion” of
political manipulation of monetary policy. Report on a National Bank
(Dec. 13, 1790), in 7 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 305, 331. So when
they established the First Bank of the United States, they guaranteed
its independence from Presidential control, and their successors did
the same for the Second Bank. That enabled both banks to serve as
the “great regulating wheel” of the early American financial system.
E. Lomazoff, Reconstructing the National Bank Controversy 53.
The Federal Reserve follows in this tradition, with a similar degree
of independence from Presidential control. What matters is that the
Federal Reserve remains consistent with the principles that underpin
the First and Second Banks—namely, that monetary policy should not
be subject to political interference. In the Court’s view, the Federal
Reserve maintains the balance struck by the founding generation un-
der modern circumstances.
Although this extraordinary case arises on the Court’s interim
docket, the Court has had the benefit of not only amici and oral argu-
ment but months of internal consultation and deliberation. The Court
declines to sow doubt as to the status of one of the Nation’s (and the
world’s) most important financial institutions, and would not so
quickly unsettle this “special arrangement sanctioned by history.”
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Ser-
vices Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 467, n. 16 (A
LITO, J., dis-
senting). Pp. 22–24.
(3) The Court rejects the Government’s halfhearted contention that
Cook in fact received due process. At minimum, Cook was entitled to
some explanation of the evidence at issue, some avenue for a response,
and a deadline by which a response would be due. Cf. Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314–315. Only after
Cook has had the opportunity to respond to the charges made against
her may a final decision be made. And only then can the courts assess
the validity and sufficiency of such charges. Pp. 24–27.
Application for stay denied.
R
OBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
S
OTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH
and JACKSON, JJ., filed concurring opinions. THOMAS, J., filed a

6 TRUMP v. COOK
Syllabus
dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
GORSUCH, J., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Last August, for the first time in the Federal Reserve’s
111-year history, the President attempted to fire one of its
Governors. A few weeks later, a federal court issued an in-
junction to prevent him from doing so. We decide whether
that order should remain in effect pending the conclusion of
litigation over the attempted removal.
I
A
Our Nation’s first de facto central bank predates even our
Constitution. Through the early years of the Revolutionary
War, the Continental Congress had been forced to print so
much money to finance the war that its currency had be-
come all but worthless. See G. Wood, The American Revo-
lution 145–147 (2002). (“Not worth a Continental,” as the
saying goes.) “Duty . . . compells me,” General Washington
wrote to Congress in 1780, to request some solution to “the
great depreciation of the Money,” for fear of “mutiny” in the
ranks. Letter from G. Washington to S. Huntington (May

2 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
27–28, 1780), in 26 Papers of George Washington 202–206
(B. Huggins & A. Garbooshian-Huggins eds. 2018). To solve
the problem, Congress realized, it would have to tie its own
hands—to place the power to create money elsewhere, in an
entity that could credibly serve as “a principal Pillar of
American Credit . . . by the ties of private interest.” Letter
from R. Morris to B. Franklin (July 13, 1781), in 35 Papers
of Benjamin Franklin 262–266 (B. Oberg ed. 1999).
Thus was born the Bank of North America. Its structure
was unusual. It was to be owned in part by the Government
(at least at first) and in part by the public, run by directors
accountable only to private stockholders and yet tasked
with public purposes—specifically, the maintenance of a
sound national currency. See 20 Journals of the Continen-
tal Congress, 1774–1789, pp. 545–546 (G. Hunt ed. 1912);
21 id., at 1185–1190; see also E. Kaplan, The Bank of the
United States and the American Economy 10–14 (1999).
But it worked. See R. Wright & D. Cowen, Financial
Founding Fathers 127–131 (2006) (Wright & Cowen). Such
a bank was a “necessity,” Thomas Paine later wrote, “for
what with the depreciation of the currency, the slow opera-
tion of taxes, and the petitions to be exempt therefrom, the
treasury was moneyless, and the government creditless.”
Dissertations on Government, the Affairs of the Bank, and
Paper Money 21–22 (1786). Alexander Hamilton said the
same. “The aid afforded to the United States, by this insti-
tution, during the remaining period of the war,” he wrote,
“was of essential consequence.” Report on a National Bank
(Dec. 13, 1790), in 7 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 305, 323
(H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1963) (Report on a National
Bank). But the bank was short lived as a solely national
institution—it accepted state charters in 1782, and its na-
tional charter lapsed alongside the Articles of Confedera-
tion in 1789. See 1 J. Markham, A Financial History of the
United States 71–72 (2002) (Markham).

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Another national bank, however, quickly followed in its
footsteps. In 1791, at Hamilton’s urging, the First Congress
chartered a bank that came to be known as the First Bank
of the United States, with similar goals to the Bank of
North America—and a similar degree of independence from
the Congress that gave it life. Like the Bank of North
America, the First Bank would be owned in part by the Fed-
eral Government, but run by directors accountable only to
private stockholders. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, §4, 1 Stat.
192–193; see also Wright & Cowen 10–13; E. Perkins,
American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700–
1815, p. 236 (1994); E. Lomazoff, Reconstructing the Na-
tional Bank Controversy 33–38 (2018) (Lomazoff ). To
Hamilton, that was key. “To attach full confidence to an
institution of this nature,” he wrote, “it appears to be an
essential ingredient in its structure, that it shall be under
a private not a public Direction,” one that could resist “the
temptations of momentary exigencies.” Report on a Na-
tional Bank 331. Under a public direction, Hamilton
feared, “suspicion” of political manipulation “would contin-
ually corrode the vitals of the credit of the Bank, and would
be most likely to prove fatal in those situations, in which
the public good would require, that they should be most
sound and vigorous.” Ibid.
Although the charter for the First Bank was allowed to
expire in 1811, it took only five years for Congress to reverse
course. As Chief Justice Marshall remarked in our Court’s
first major decision on the breadth of the Federal Govern-
ment’s enumerated powers, “a short experience of the em-
barrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First Bank]
exposed the government”—severe financial instability fol-
lowing the War of 1812—“convinced those who were most
prejudiced against the measure of its necessity.” McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 402 (1819). That necessity led
to the Second Bank of the United States—encouraged even
by President Madison, previously an ardent foe. See J.

4 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
Madison, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1815), in 1 Com-
pilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789–1897, pp. 562, 564–566 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)
(Compilation). Like its predecessors, the Second Bank was
not to be controlled by the Federal Government that
brought it into existence. Of its 25 directors, only five were
appointed (and removable) by the President. The remain-
ing 20 were appointed by and accountable only to private
stockholders. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, §8, 3 Stat. 269–270.
The Second Bank’s independence, however, was to prove
its downfall. Unlike James Madison, Andrew Jackson had
not and would not change his mind on the wisdom of a na-
tional bank, at least one he could not control. He savaged
the Second Bank as a “[h]ydra of corruption” only he could
slay. Letter from A. Jackson to J. Hamilton (June 3, 1830),
in 8 Papers of Andrew Jackson 343 (D. Feller, T. Coens, &
L. Moss eds. 2010).
1
So in 1832, when Congress passed a
bill to extend the Second Bank’s charter, it met with Jack-
son’s veto and his famous veto message. He refused “to
make the rich richer and the potent more powerful” at the
expense of “the humble members of society—the farmers,
mechanics, and laborers.” Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in
2 Compilation 590. As Tocqueville observed, “the common
people” rallied “round the President,” Jackson easily won
reelection, and that was the end of the Second Bank. 1 A.
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 178 (H. Reeve transl.
1899).
——————
1
J. Hamilton (James) was in fact Alexander’s fourth child. He was an
avid supporter of and advisor to Jackson (and later Lincoln), and an ac-
complished yachtsman, a last-minute addition to the crew that won the
first America’s Cup. See J. Hamilton, Reminiscences of James A. Ham-
ilton 76–77, 400–403, 529–536 (1869). The wayward son would come to
rue Jackson’s decision “to destroy the Bank of the United States,” which
(he argued) led to “a most disastrous inflation of the currency, reckless
speculation, and the extended ruin of 1837.” Id., at 279–280.

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
It would take almost 80 years before Congress would try
again, and only after an era of ruinous financial panics—
the ones of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907. These crises
were in no small part attributable to Jackson’s crusade. See
R. Lowenstein, America’s Bank 11–28, 59–76 (2015). With-
out an independent central bank, there was no way to con-
tain the damage whenever a major institution fell—no
lender of last resort that could allow sound banks with good
but temporarily illiquid assets to access cash, no elastic cur-
rency that could expand to meet demand, and no mecha-
nism to ensure that small banks issued loans only within
their means in the first place. See 1 Markham 168–180,
330–333, 380. It was a system “devised for fair weather,
not for storms,” said President McKinley’s Secretary of the
Treasury. Dept. of Treasury, L. Gage, Ann. Rep. of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury 73 (Doc. No. 2238, 1901). It took the
Panic of 1907 to force action. A failed attempt by specula-
tors to corner the copper market led to the quick collapse of
two banks, and the contagion spread from there, ultimately
toppling some 2,000 firms and 130 banks. See 2 Markham
29–41. A bipartisan congressional commission eventually
recommended the creation of a central bank to assume “the
serious duty of protecting public and private interests at
times when they are imperiled.” Report of the National
Monetary Commission, S. Doc. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.,
36 (1912).
What emerged from these debates is today’s central
bank—called the Federal Reserve System—first created in
1913, and then restructured in 1933 and 1935. “[M]odelled
upon our federal political system,” the Federal Reserve con-
sists of two layers. C. Glass, An Adventure in Constructive
Finance 173 (1927) (Glass). At its base sit 12 “independent
but affiliated banks,” one for each region, with “their own
responsibility in local affairs.” Ibid. These regional banks,
called Federal Reserve Banks, are privately owned (and op-
erated) by the commercial banks of the area. See 38 Stat.

6 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
254, 12 U. S. C. §341. Above those banks are two national
bodies, the Federal Open Market Committee and the Board
of Governors. The former sets monetary policy nationwide.
See §263. And the latter supervises the system “from the
national point of view,” Glass 173–174, with an eye to the
economy’s “long run growth,” §225a. It consists of seven
members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. §241. Like the directors of its three predecessors,
however, the Federal Reserve’s Governors do not serve at
the President’s pleasure—they instead serve staggered 14-
year terms, and may be removed only “for cause.” §242.
B
Lisa Cook was appointed to the Board of Governors in
2022, at first to complete only the final two years of Janet
Yellen’s unexpired term. A year later, however, President
Biden nominated Cook to a full 14-year term, and the Sen-
ate again voted to confirm her. In the normal course, then,
Cook’s term on the Federal Reserve was set to expire in
2038.
Over the course of one week in August 2025, however, the
longevity of Cook’s tenure was to be called into question.
On August 20, the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Di-
rector, William Pulte, posted to social media a letter dated
a week before. The letter was addressed to Attorney Gen-
eral Pamela Bondi, and it accused Cook of mortgage fraud.
“According to mortgage documents obtained by” the
Agency, it stated, “it appears” that Cook “falsified bank doc-
uments and property records to acquire more favorable loan
terms” in 2021, by claiming two homes simultaneously as
her principal residence. Attachment to Complaint in No.
1:25–cv–02903 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1–2, p. 2. Less than 30
minutes later, President Trump posted to social media that
“Cook must resign, now!!!” and linked to a news article
about Pulte’s letter. ECF Doc. 1, p. 14. Two days later, the

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
President told reporters that “[w]hat [Cook] did was bad”
and that he would “fire her if she doesn’t resign.” Ibid.
Three days after that, President Trump purported to fire
Cook for cause. In a letter to Cook, he stated that he had
“reason to believe” that she “may have made false state-
ments on one or more mortgage agreements.” ECF Doc. 1–
4, p. 2. “The American people must be able to have full con-
fidence in the honesty of the members entrusted with set-
ting policy and overseeing the Federal Reserve,” he ex-
plained. Ibid. But he lacked “such confidence in [Cook’s]
integrity,” he continued, “[i]n light of [her] deceitful and po-
tentially criminal conduct,” which “[a]t a minimum” exhib-
ited “gross negligence.” Ibid. He thus determined that
“faithfully executing the law requires [Cook’s] immediate
removal from office.” Id., at 3.
Cook promptly filed suit, seeking relief at law and at eq-
uity to allow her to stay in office. She alleged that the re-
moval was not “for cause,” as required by statute. And in
any case, she alleged, the President had failed to comply
with the statute’s (and the Constitution’s) requirement that
she receive notice and some opportunity to respond to the
charges against her before being fired.
The District Court agreed, issuing a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent her removal. It noted first that the scope of
the dispute was narrowed by the Government’s concession
(for purposes of this proceeding) that the statute itself is
constitutional. It then turned to Cook’s two claims, both of
which it considered likely to succeed. As to the first, it held
that the President had failed to state “a legally permissible
cause,” because “cause” refers only to “an official’s in-office
conduct or performance”—a standard that could not be met
here, given that the mortgages at issue predated Cook’s ten-
ure at the Federal Reserve. 804 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26, 32 (DC
2025). And as to the second, it held that the Constitution
entitled Cook “to notice and a hearing before her termina-
tion”—process she had not received. Id., at 33. The District

8 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
Court finally concluded that Cook faced irreparable harm
without injunctive relief, and that the final two factors—
the balance of equities and the public interest—“strongly
cut” in her favor. Id., at 43.
The Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunction.
Judge Garcia, joined by Judge Childs, filed a concurrence
focused solely on Cook’s due process claim. As a public offi-
cial who may be removed only “for cause,” he contended,
Cook has a property interest in her position, and may not
be removed summarily. 2025 WL 2654786, *1 (CADC, Sept.
15, 2025). Judge Katsas dissented. He would have rejected
Cook’s due process claim on the basis that a public official,
unlike an employee, can have no property right in her posi-
tion. And he would have held that a termination “for cause”
merely requires some reference to a person’s “conduct, abil-
ity, fitness, or competence”—a requirement that the Presi-
dent “plainly” met here. Id., at *7.
The Government applied for a stay in this Court. We de-
ferred the application pending oral argument. 606 U. S.
1062 (2025).
II
This case comes to us not directly on the merits but on
the Government’s application for a stay—an order prevent-
ing the District Court’s ruling from going into effect pend-
ing appeal to the Court of Appeals and, if necessary, to this
Court. The standards for such relief are well established:
The applicant must show that it is likely to succeed on the
merits of its appeal, that we would likely grant certiorari to
review any decision to the contrary, that it will likely suffer
irreparable harm in the interim, and that the balance of eq-
uities tip in its favor. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S.
183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418,
434 (2009).
We start and stop with the first factor. In our view, the
Government has not shown that it is likely to prevail on the

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
various legal arguments advanced in its stay application.
The Government raises three alternative arguments: that
a removal for cause under the statute is not judicially re-
viewable; that even if the removal is reviewable, cause is a
low bar satisfied by any concerns about a Governor’s con-
duct, ability, fitness, or competence; and that even if the
Government did not show cause to remove Cook, she is nev-
ertheless not entitled to remain in office while litigation
over the removal is pending. We disagree on all three
points. To accept any one of those arguments would in ef-
fect transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection
into at-will employment—an interpretive leap out of step
with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradi-
tion of central banking protected from political interference.
We therefore deny the Government’s application.
A
The Government (but not J
USTICE THOMAS) contends
that the President’s determination of “cause” is wholly un-
reviewable. “The statutory ‘for cause’ language at issue,”
the Government argues, “commits the determination of
cause to” the President alone. Application 20.
We see no such textual commitment. The statute pro-
vides that each member of the Board of Governors “shall
hold office for a term of fourteen years . . . , unless sooner
removed for cause by the President.” 12 U. S. C. §242.
Whether a Governor should be removed, it is true, is a de-
cision only the President can make (short of impeachment).
But that does not mean that he may make that decision for
any reason, or no reason. Even when a statute “delegates
discretionary authority” to the Executive Branch, we have
explained, our role “is, as always, to independently inter-
pret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject
to constitutional limits.” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U. S. 369, 395 (2024). Congress could of course
afford the President the power to remove Federal Reserve

10 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
Governors at will. Or Congress could exempt the Presi-
dent’s removal of Governors for cause from judicial review.
But Congress has done neither.
The Government appears to concede that at least some
judicial review of a removal is available. It admits that
“federal courts may review the removal of a Federal Re-
serve Board member when, for instance, the President iden-
tifies no cause at all.” Application 20. But the only way for
us to tell whether the President has identified cause under
the statute is to interpret the statute, and decipher what
precisely it means by “cause.” As the Government acknowl-
edges in its supplemental brief, it is the task of a “[r]eview-
ing court[]” to “discern the boundaries of the President’s
power” under the Federal Reserve Act. Supp. Brief for Ap-
plicant 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Government relies on Reagan v. United States, 182
U. S. 419 (1901), but that case offers it no help. In Reagan,
as the Government explains, we said that the removal at
issue was “a matter of discretion and not reviewable,” id.,
at 425—but not because all removals are. Just the reverse.
The statute at issue in Reagan limited removal for certain
court officers to “causes prescribed by law.” Ibid. (emphasis
added). The trouble was that no “causes for removal . . .
were ever affirmatively specified by Congress.” Ibid. The
plaintiff thus argued that he was entitled to “hold office
during life,” or at least until “Congress passes a law defin-
ing such causes.” Ibid. We rejected his argument. We said
that we could not review the removal because no enumer-
ated causes were “defined” by law “nor removal for cause
provided for” by the statute. Ibid. (emphasis added). The
statute at issue here, by contrast, provides just that. See
12 U. S. C. §242 (removal may be made only “for cause”).
With no support in Reagan, the Government turns to the
common law, which (it says) forecloses all judicial review.
The common law, however, appears to cut the other way.
See State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of City of Duluth,

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
53 Minn. 238, 244, 55 N. W. 118, 120 (1893) (“The suffi-
ciency and reasonableness of the cause of removal are ques-
tions for the courts. . . . This has been the settled law ever
since Bagg’s Case, [11 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271
(K. B. 1615) (Coke, C. J.)], and we are not aware of any re-
spectable authority to the contrary.”). The Government’s
four cited cases do not persuade us otherwise. The first two
expressly declined to resolve the issue. See United States
ex rel. Garland v. Oliver, 6 Mackey 47, 56 (D. C. 1887) (is-
sue “not argued”); The Mayor and Council of the City of Ho-
boken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. 265, 287 (NJ 1859) (seriatim opinion
of Vredenburgh, J.) (“not a question upon review”). And the
last two addressed statutes that specified not only causes
for removal but also procedures for removal, which the court
interpreted to be exclusive. See Trimble v. People ex rel.
Phelps, 19 Colo. 187, 197, 34 P. 981, 985 (1893) (interpret-
ing “the lawmaking body” to have been “of the opinion” that
no other “check” was “necessary to prevent an arbitrary and
oppressive abuse of the power” of removal); People ex rel.
Platt v. Stout, 19 How. Pr. 171, 173, 181 (NY Sup. Ct. 1860)
(seriatim opinion of Sutherland, J.) (interpreting “the legis-
lature” to have “intended by the act to give, so far as it re-
gards the sufficiency . . . of the cause, the whole discretion-
ary power to the mayor and [the] board of aldermen,” which
must “consent” to the mayor’s decision for the removal to be
effective). We see no indication in the common law that the
President should have a free hand.
B
Even if the President’s determination is judicially review-
able, the Government (and J
USTICE THOMAS) contend,
“cause” sets a very low bar—one that the President easily
cleared. In the Government’s view, “cause” includes any
concern the President may have about a person’s “conduct,
ability, fitness, or competence.” Application 25–26 (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 508 (2d ed. 1910)); see also post, at

12 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
14–15 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). That excludes a “mere pol-
icy disagreement,” according to the Government, but it in-
cludes (among many other things) “concerns” about a per-
son’s “integrity”—precisely the cause given here.
Application 26, 31.
Cook, on the other hand, argues that “cause” sets a very
high bar—one that the President failed to meet. In her
view, Congress used “for cause” merely as a shorthand to
refer to “the existing causes for presidential removal of ex-
ecutive officers” as defined by various other statutes. Brief
in Opposition 20. And at the time of this statute’s reenact-
ment in 1935, she explains, those causes were few—either
poor performance in office (“inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,”
or “malfeasance”) or “ineligibility” for office in the first
place. Id., at 21–23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
But, she argues, the President alleged neither. Her “pri-
vate, pre-office conduct,” she concludes, can offer no cause
at all. Id., at 22–23.
We find neither explanation persuasive. Although nei-
ther the Government nor J
USTICE THOMAS say as much,
both seem to acknowledge that Congress enacted this stat-
ute “against the backdrop of the common law,” Comcast
Corp. v. National Assn. of African American-Owned Media,
589 U. S. 327, 335 (2020), such that we must look to the
common law to decipher what “cause” (a term of art) re-
quires. See Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U. S.
199, 211 (2019) (“[W]e ordinarily presume that Congress in-
tends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the com-
mon-law terms it uses . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Indeed, the one authority upon which the Gov-
ernment relies for its definition of “cause,” the second edi-
tion of Black’s Law Dictionary, itself defined “cause” based
on two cases—each of which sought (in the common-law tra-
dition) to distill “cause” from general principles, customs,
and judicial decisions across all States. See Board of Street
Comm’rs of Hagerstown v. Williams, 96 Md. 232, 236–239,

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
53 A. 923, 924–925 (1903) (discussing decisions from Maine,
Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, as well as various trea-
tises); In re Nichols, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 474, 479–495 (NY Sup.
Ct. 1879) (discussing decisions from Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, and Ohio, as well as various treatises).
Neither one of those cases, however, nor Black’s itself, sug-
gested that any reason would do. Contra, post, at 15
(T
HOMAS, J., dissenting). They instead emphasized that the
cause identified must be “substantial, reasonable and just,”
Nichols, 6 Abb. N. Cas., at 480 (internal quotation marks
omitted), a “disqualification” akin to “inefficiency” or “in-
competency,” Board of Street Comm’rs, 96 Md., at 239, 53
A., at 925.
If the Government’s (and J
USTICE THOMAS’s) test is too
lenient, however, Cook’s is too stringent. Cook argues that
we should interpret “cause” to refer only to the specific
causes provided in other statutes as bases “for presidential
removal”—specifically, as of 1935, inefficiency, neglect of
duty, malfeasance, and ineligibility. Brief in Opposition 20.
But we see no reason why that should be so. It is true, of
course, that some statutes by their terms incorporate an
“external body of law,” as when a statute refers generally to
defenses “available by law.” Jam, 586 U. S., at 210 (empha-
sis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). That infer-
ence, however, works only if the statute actually references
that body of law. The statute here does not. It refers to
“cause” generally, 12 U. S. C. §242, a concept familiar to the
common law. It does not refer to “causes that Congress has
otherwise recognized as adequate.”
Having rejected both parties’ positions, we need not fully
demarcate the contours of “cause” today. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to observe that any definition of
“cause” in this context must reflect the Federal Reserve’s
unique historical status and role. See supra, at 1–6; cf., e.g.,
Board of Street Comm’rs, 96 Md., at 237–238, 53 A., at 924
(focusing upon “the nature of the service to be performed”

14 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
and “the duties of the office”); Hart, 53 Minn., at 244, 55
N. W., at 120 (similarly focusing upon “the character of the
office” and “the qualifications necessary to fill it”). Like its
predecessors, the Federal Reserve operates at a deliberate
remove from the ordinary political process. It sets its own
budget, free of congressional control. §243. It consists in
large part of privately owned (and operated) entities,
namely, the regional banks. §222. And its policies are set
not only by Governors, but also by representatives of the
private regional banks. §263. Indeed, it is the Federal Re-
serve’s independence that allows it to pursue its mandate
of “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates,” §225a, goals that may be
thwarted if (to quote Hamilton) “suspicion” arose that its
operations were “at the disposal of the Government,” which
often may favor ephemeral short-term gains over long-term
growth, Report on a National Bank 331. Not only the fact
of independence but also the appearance of independence is
key to the Federal Reserve’s design.
That counsels a substantial threshold for “cause.” It is
true, of course, that “cause” cannot be reduced to a precise
set of rules, and some close calls are inevitable. Whether
“cause” for removal exists in any given situation will de-
pend, at least in part, on the seriousness of the alleged mis-
conduct, and the extent of any nexus that may exist to the
Governor’s professional duties. The key issue is whether
“[t]he cause assigned” truly “impl[ies] an unfitness for the
place”—or whether it simply represents an effort to secure
a “more congenial” replacement. In re Nichols, 6 Abb. N.
Cas., at 482. “Our review is deferential, but we are not re-
quired to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are
free.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752,
785 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without
such constraints in place, any perceived or alleged misstep
(past or present) could provide a ready pretext for a Gover-
nor’s removal—a fact that he would surely know, and that

15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
would surely weigh on him as he decided what to say and
how to vote. Nothing could be more corrosive of the inde-
pendence that Congress sought to preserve.
C
Even if the determination of cause is judicially reviewa-
ble and the definition of cause imposes a substantial thresh-
old, the Government (joined by J
USTICE THOMAS) contends
that federal courts cannot grant a preliminary injunction
ordering reinstatement during the pendency of litigation.
On their view, all that a court may do is wait, and perhaps
award backpay later—even if the President fires a member
of the Board for an absurd reason, or no reason, and even if
the court holds that he broke the law in doing so. See Ap-
plication 31–32; post, at 30–31 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting).
The law does not require such a result. The very treatise
upon which the Government and J
USTICE THOMAS rely, in
fact, rebuts their argument. At least as a historical matter,
as the Government and J
USTICE THOMAS explain, courts of
equity would “not interfere by injunction to determine ques-
tions concerning the appointment of public officers or their
title to office.” Application 33 (quoting 2 J. High, Law of
Injunctions §1312, p. 863 (2d ed. 1880) (High)); post, at 30
(T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (same). But such courts “fre-
quently recognize[d] and protect[ed] the possession of offic-
ers de facto, . . . pending a litigation” at law “to determine
their title.” 2 High §1315, at 866. Put another way, a court
of equity would not and could not finally determine whether
a plaintiff was validly removed—that was a question only a
court of law could settle (again, historically) by quo war-
ranto or mandamus. See S. Bray, Remedies in the Officer
Removal Cases, 17 J. Legal Analysis 236, 241–246 (2025)
(Bray). In the meantime, however, equity could ensure that
“the actual incumbents of an office may be protected, pend-
ing a contest as to their title, from interference with their
possession, and with the exercise of their functions,” at

16 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
least to the extent that they had a likely meritorious claim.
2 High, §1315, at 866; see also, e.g., 1 J. Pomeroy, Equitable
Remedies §335, pp. 591–593 (1905). The District Court
sought to do just that here. See App. to Application 23a.
No equitable bar stood in its way.
Neither In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888), nor White v.
Berry, 171 U. S. 366 (1898), says otherwise. Both cases
stand for the far more limited proposition, already dis-
cussed, that “a court of equity has no jurisdiction over the
appointment and removal of public officers,” for such juris-
diction “belongs exclusively to the courts of law.” Sawyer,
124 U. S., at 212; White, 171 U. S., at 376–377. Neither
case holds that equity is unavailable in the interim. As Pro-
fessor Bray has explained, Sawyer and White reflect “eq-
uity’s overriding concern about the adequacy of legal reme-
dies.” Bray 246. Because the plaintiffs in those cases had
“effective legal remedies” (like mandamus and quo war-
ranto) to finally settle title to their offices—the only relief
they sought—“equity could not intervene.” Ibid. But that
was not to preclude equitable remedies for de facto officers,
like Cook, who required immediate relief “to protect [their
status] during the course of th[e] litigation” at law. Ibid.
In sum, a court may order that a removed Governor re-
main in office during the pendency of litigation if the Gov-
ernor is otherwise entitled to a preliminary injunction.
Otherwise, a President could remove a Governor even while
litigation over the removal was ongoing—and could do so
for very lengthy periods of time without substantial cause
for removal. That would significantly interfere with the in-
dependence of the Federal Reserve.
2
——————
2
As a final procedural roadblock, JUSTICE THOMAS contends that Cook
may not herself “enforce the terms of the Federal Reserve Act,” for “[n]o
plaintiff . . . can sue without a right of action” that “come[s] from Con-
gress.” Post, at 28. That is mistaken. We have often held that plaintiffs
may sue “in equity” without a congressionally-provided cause of action
“ ‘to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.’ ” Armstrong v.

17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
III
Having rejected the Government’s view that the courts
are to play no role in assessing the validity of a Governor’s
removal, we may decide this application on narrow
grounds. No matter the precise definition of cause, or the
scope of our review of any such determination, the Presi-
dent failed to afford Cook the procedural protections to
which she was entitled by statute. Without such protec-
tions, she could not properly dispute the charges the Presi-
dent laid against her. We thus need not address Cook’s con-
stitutional due process argument, for the statute alone
makes it unlikely that the Government will prevail on ap-
peal as to the validity of the procedures used to fire Cook.
3
——————
Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U. S. 320, 327 (2015) (quoting Carroll
v. Safford, 3 How. 441, 463 (1845)); see also W. Baude, J. Goldsmith, J.
Manning, J. Pfander, & A. Tyler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 1348–1350 (8th ed. 2025) (noting “the
availability of Ex parte Young-style litigation to challenge the legality of
federal official action”). We see no reason why Cook may not pursue such
a challenge here.
3
Perhaps dissatisfied with the responses offered by the Government
(and J
USTICE THOMAS), JUSTICE ALITO would ignore the statute alto-
gether. We should do so, he contends, because the lower courts did so,
ruling in Cook’s favor based solely on the Due Process Clause. See post,
at 4–5 (dissenting opinion). But we “revie[w] judgments, not statements
in opinions.” California v. Rooney, 483 U. S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is why the question before us
is whether we would likely “reverse the judgment below,” Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (emphasis added), not
whether we would likely disagree with some of the reasons given by the
lower courts. J
USTICE ALITO does not contend that we would have to re-
verse the judgment below even if Cook were to prevail as to the statute.
Nor does he contend that the statute was somehow waived or forfeited;
it was, after all, one of Cook’s lead points below, see Brief for Appellee in
No. 25–5326 (CADC), pp. 1, 11–13, and in this Court, see Brief in Oppo-
sition 1–2, 30–33; Reply Brief 5–8. What he says instead is that the ques-
tion is “complicated and novel,” post, at 4, a concern we of course share.
When a party comes to us for interim relief, however, we “cannot hide in
the tall grass.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S. 831, 874 (2025)
(K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring). Ultimately, “we must grant or deny.” Ibid.

18 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
A
Under our precedents, Cook was entitled to notice and
some opportunity to respond prior to her termination. That
comes down to the words Congress chose, first in 1913, and
then again in 1935. When Congress created the Federal
Reserve, it gave Governors a set term in office and permit-
ted removal only “for cause.” At that time, and indeed af-
terward, that form of tenure—a term of years limited only
by removal “for cause”—carried with it a settled interpreta-
tion at common law, one that we had expressly adopted just
a decade before. “[T]he rule,” we explained in 1901, is that
“notice and hearing are essential” before an officer’s re-
moval “where the term of office is for a fixed period.”
Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425. We said the same in 1903. See
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 314. Reagan and
Shurtleff established the baseline against which Congress
legislated, and we must construe its work accordingly. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 434 (2000).
Of course, that is not to say that a Federal Reserve Gov-
ernor is entitled to an audience with the President or a full-
blown judicial trial. But cf. A. Bamzai, Taft, Frankfurter,
and the First Presidential For-Cause Removal, 52 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 691 (2018) (describing the formal “committee of in-
quiry” convened by President Taft to assess whether he had
cause to fire two members of the Board of General Apprais-
ers).
4
Instead, all that is required is notice “to the officer of
the charges made against him” and “an opportunity to be
heard in his defense.” F. Mechem, Law of Public Offices
and Officers §454, p. 287 (1890) (Mechem); see also 2 J. Dil-
lon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations
§§473, 477, pp. 792, 798–802 (5th ed. 1911) (similarly
——————
That means resolving (at least tentatively) the legal issues properly be-
fore us—and not just the easy ones.
4
This is a prime example of the view that Taft was our “most judicial
president,” as he was our most “presidential chief justice.” J. Rosen, Wil-
liam Howard Taft 137 (2018).

19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
emphasizing the necessity of a particular “formulated
charge against the officer” and “an opportunity given to the
party of making defence”). We see no reason why that op-
portunity “may not be had on written materials only,” with
no oral presentation. H. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,”
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1270 (1975). All that is required is
“the right to support his allegations by argument however
brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal,” before a
final decision is made. Londoner v. City and County of Den-
ver, 210 U. S. 373, 386 (1908).
The Government (joined by J
USTICE THOMAS) resists
even this minimal process. It contends that we may not
“read atextual requirements into statutes” and instead
must focus only on “the plain language.” Supp. Brief for
Applicant 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is hardly
atextual, however, to read text in context, or to examine
how this Court interpreted such language at the time of the
statute’s enactment. If anything, it would be atextual to do
otherwise.
Indeed, even the Government concedes that Congress, at
least sometimes, should be taken to have implicitly incor-
porated these procedural requirements. The Government
acknowledges, for instance, that a statute limiting removal
to “specified causes”—like inefficiency or malfeasance—
would require pretermination “notice and a hearing,” be-
cause “this Court expressly recognized” as much in “both
Shurtleff and Reagan.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30; see also id., at
58 (reiterating the point). But Shurtleff and Reagan said
the same about statutes, like the one at issue here, that
promise officeholders a term of years—indeed, they said so
in the exact same sentence. See Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 314
(“[W]here causes of removal are specified by Constitution or
statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period,
notice and hearing are essential.” (quoting Reagan, 182
U. S., at 425; emphasis added)). The Government’s conces-
sion all but gives up its case.

20 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
That disposes, too, of the Government’s related argument
that Congress “knows how to impose notice-and-hearing re-
quirements”—that is, “expressly”—and did not do so here.
Supp. Brief for Applicant 7–8; see also post, at 22–23, and
n. 4 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (cataloging examples of such
laws). Again, what is true for a statute with “specified
causes” is true for this statute, too—in both instances, “no-
tice and hearing are essential.” Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425;
Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 314. And in any case, as we have
said many times before, Congress not infrequently legis-
lates in a “hyper-vigilant way, to remove any doubt as to
things not particularly doubtful in the first instance.”
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund,
583 U. S. 416, 435 (2018) (internal quotation marks and al-
teration omitted). That Congress acted “out of an abun-
dance of caution” in other statutes (most enacted decades
after the one at issue here) hardly permits us to ignore the
default rule our precedent had already made clear. Fort
Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 646 (1990).
Perhaps recognizing the Government’s bind, J
USTICE
THOMAS would simply discard the rule announced in
Reagan and Shurtleff as “a single line of dicta.” Post, at 20.
A single line, yes; dicta, no. Reagan and Shurtleff could
hardly have been clearer about “the rule” they applied—
that (to repeat once more) “notice and hearing are essential”
if “the term of office is for a fixed period.” Reagan, 182 U. S.,
at 425; Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 314. Thus (as J
USTICE
THOMAS emphasizes) the officers in Reagan and Shurtleff
ultimately lost, because neither one enjoyed a fixed tenure.
Reagan, 182 U. S., at 426; Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 316. That
does not make the rule “dicta.”
Even so, J
USTICE THOMAS insists, we cannot presume
that Congress intended to incorporate Reagan and
Shurtleff ’s rule in the absence of some broader “judicial
consensus.” Post, at 18. We are not sure what more
J
USTICE THOMAS wants. It is true, of course, that we have

21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
required “broad and unquestioned” “consensus” in the
Courts of Appeals before presuming that Congress intended
to incorporate into new legislation the lower courts’ inter-
pretation of a particular word or phrase. Jama v. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349 (2005).
(The one case cited by J
USTICE THOMAS on this point,
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229 (2026),
stands for just that proposition. See id., at 252–253.) We
have never said the same, however, about our own cases, of
which Congress presumptively is aware. See, e.g., Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 700–701 (2022) (find-
ing that Congress implicitly relied upon an interpretation
offered in just one of our prior opinions). Indeed, as a mat-
ter of vertical stare decisis, the lower courts have no choice
but to follow our lead. When we define a term or establish
a background rule, we need not repeat ourselves—once is
enough.
5
——————
5
JUSTICE THOMAS acknowledges that our rule applies only to officers
with a term of years who are not removable at will. See post, at 17–18.
He notes that “hundreds” of federal officers with a term of years do not
fall under this rule, because they are removable at will. Post, at 20. So
far, so good. J
USTICE THOMAS errs, however, in suggesting that we have
“rephrase[d]” Reagan and Shurtleff to arbitrarily exclude such officers,
because (he says) they have “fixed terms” too. Post, at 20–21. But with-
out some form of protection from removal—whether “for cause,” “during
good behavior,” or something else entirely—an officer’s “term” is not “for
a fixed period” at all. Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425; Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at
314. He may be fired at any time for any reason. The “expiration” date
set by statute (whether one, two, or more years) merely serves as a ceil-
ing on his time in office, not a floor. Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S.
324, 338–339 (1897). Reagan and Shurtleff made just this distinction,
see Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425; Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 317–318, as did the
common law, see M. Throop, Law Relating to Public Officers §364, pp.
359–360 (1892) (“settled law” that notice and hearing required for offic-
ers “appointed for a fixed term, and removable only for cause,” but not
those removable “at pleasure”). Contra, post, at 15, 18 (T
HOMAS, J., dis-
senting) (contending that no “eminent common-law authorities” support
our interpretation, while citing Throop for a different point).

22 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
With no support in Reagan and Shurtleff, JUSTICE
THOMAS goes for broke. Once again far outflanking the
Government, which “does not contest the constitutionality
of the” statute, Application 2, n. 1, J
USTICE THOMAS de-
clares the statute “unconstitutional,” an infringement on
the President’s power to “remove his subordinates at will,”
post, at 24–25.
We disagree, as did “the founders of our Government and
framers of our Constitution” when they “were actively par-
ticipating in public affairs.” Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52, 175 (1926). They knew from experience (and Ham-
ilton reminded them) of the calamities that could arise from
even the “suspicion” of political manipulation of monetary
policy. Report on a National Bank 331. So when they es-
tablished the First Bank of the United States, they guaran-
teed its independence from Presidential control. Their suc-
cessors did the same for the Second Bank. That enabled
both banks to serve as the “great regulating wheel” of the
early American financial system. Lomazoff 53; see also id.,
at 51–68, 142–146 (discussing the banks’ role as a “watch-
dog over state banks and the economy”). The Federal Re-
serve follows in this lineage. See supra, at 1–6. Contra,
post, at 3–6, 26–27 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (contending
that the First and Second Banks, unlike the Federal Re-
serve, served no regulatory function).
It is true, of course, that this tradition has not stood still;
as J
USTICE THOMAS notes, the Federal Reserve is more
powerful than its predecessors, managing a vastly more
complex economy in a vastly more complex world. See post,
at 27.
6
We see no reason, however, why our central bank
ought to be “trapped in amber” any more than any other
aspect of our constitutional scheme. United States v.
——————
6
In upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve as currently
structured and with its existing enforcement authorities, we do not sug-
gest that Congress could assign the Federal Reserve additional regula-
tory powers that are attenuated from monetary policy.

23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 691 (2024); see also NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 524 (2014); id., at 572–573 (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment). What matters is that the Fed-
eral Reserve remains “consistent with the principles that
underpin” the First and Second Banks—namely, that mon-
etary policy should not be subject to political interference.
Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 692. In our view, the Federal Reserve
maintains the “balance struck by the founding generation”
under “modern circumstances.” Ibid. We thus look to his-
tory not as an end in itself, but (as we often do) to give “es-
sential content to undefined provisions in the frame of our
government.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7
J
USTICE BARRETT objects that we discuss this issue at all,
even if only in response to J
USTICE THOMAS. See post, at 1–
2 (dissenting opinion); see also post, at 2–4 (A
LITO, J., dis-
senting) (similarly contending that we should not issue a
“comprehensive opinion at this juncture”). How much to
say on our interim docket—and how much to say in
——————
7
In the absence of actual unconstitutionality, JUSTICE THOMAS appeals
to the canon of constitutional avoidance. See post, at 26. That move fails
too. For one, the canon applies only in cases of “ambiguit[y],” where
“text, context, and structure” leave us with two plausible interpretations
of a statute. Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U. S. 458, 484 (2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, however, we see no ambiguity. For an-
other, as J
USTICE THOMAS has ably explained elsewhere, “the force of con-
stitutional-avoidance principles is inherently limited where, as here, the
choice of interpretations is tangential to the constitutional questions at
stake.” United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources,
Inc., 599 U. S. 419, 452, n. 3 (2023) (dissenting opinion). All agree that
the Federal Reserve Act limits the President’s power—the only question
is how much. See Application 3–4 (acknowledging that the “ ‘for cause’
provision rules out removal for no reason at all, or for policy disagree-
ment”); post, at 15 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (adopting the Government’s
view). But if any limitation on the President’s power to remove Gover-
nors “is constitutionally problematic,” as J
USTICE THOMAS contends, then
his interpretation “does not cure the problem” at all. Polansky, 599 U. S.,
at 452, n. 3 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). Either way, the constitutional ques-
tion remains.

24 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
response to a dissent—is not reducible to any mechanical
formula; it is ultimately a matter of prudence, upon which
reasonable minds can (and often do) disagree. See Mira-
belli v. Bonta, 607 U. S. 492, 501 (2026) (B
ARRETT, J., con-
curring) (“Interim applications routinely require the Court
to balance the lock-in risk of saying too much against the
transparency cost of saying too little”); compare Trump v.
Illinois, 607 U. S. ___ (2025), with id., at ___ (K
AVANAUGH,
J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6), and id., at ___
(G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 2). In this extraordi-
nary case, we have had the benefit of not only amici and
oral argument but months of internal consultation and de-
liberation. We see no reason to leave the public in limbo, or
to sow doubt as to the status of one of our Nation’s (and the
world’s) most important financial institutions. Although
we appreciate that others may see matters differently, we
would not so quickly unsettle this “special arrangement
sanctioned by history.” Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America,
Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 467, n. 16 (2024) (A
LITO, J., dissenting).
B
As a last resort, the Government halfheartedly contends
that Cook in fact received due process after all. In its view,
the President gave Cook notice and an opportunity to be
heard when he first posted about the matter on social me-
dia. That is despite the fact that the President’s post did
not suggest that a response from Cook would be appropri-
ate, nor did it even provide a clear account of the charge
made against her. It instead read simply “Cook must re-
sign, now!!!” and linked to a news article about Pulte’s let-
ter. ECF Doc. 1, p. 14.
That will not do. At minimum, Cook was entitled to some
explanation of the evidence at issue, some avenue for a re-
sponse, and a deadline by which a response would be due.
Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S.

25 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
306, 314–315 (1950). Because Cook did not receive such
process, her removal was “erroneous and void” from the
start, M. Throop, Law Relating to Public Officers §364,
p. 360 (1892), a principle recognized succinctly by Lord
Coke as early as 1615, see Bagg’s Case, 11 Co. Rep., at 93b,
77 Eng. Rep., at 1272 (“A removal, without hearing the
party removed, is bad.”).
Of course, that is not to say that a response from Cook
necessarily would have changed the President’s mind. But
as the Government rightly acknowledges, “the right to a
hearing does not depend on demonstration of certain suc-
cess.” Application 18–19 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). It at least remains an open question what precisely
happened here, and indeed whether Cook committed “gross
negligence,” let alone “deceitful and potentially criminal
conduct,” as the President’s letter alleges. ECF Doc. 1–4,
p. 2. Those are factual issues that we cannot determine in
the first instance, and certainly not on the sparse record
here (which does not even include the mortgage documents
at issue nor any other evidence that the Government or
Cook may consider relevant). Only after Cook has had the
opportunity to respond to the charges made against her “by
argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however
informal,” may a final decision be made. Londoner, 210
U. S., at 386. And only then can the courts assess the va-
lidity and sufficiency of such charges.
8
——————
8
JUSTICE BARRETT suggests that the injunction in fact goes far beyond
process, forbidding the President from removing Cook “for her alleged
mortgage fraud” no matter what. Post, at 4. Neither party agrees, and
neither do we. See Application 10 (explaining that the Court of Appeals
“relied solely on” Cook’s “procedural claim,” holding only that she is en-
titled “to notice and opportunity for a hearing before her removal”); Brief
in Opposition 8–9. Like the parties, we read the injunction to forbid the
implementation of “the President’s letter of August 25” in which he pur-
ported to fire Cook—but not to forbid the President from trying again, if
he chooses to do so. App. to Application 23a. At that point, Cook may
seek judicial review under the framework described in this opinion,

26 TRUMP v. COOK
Opinion of the Court
***
As the Government concedes, Congress limited the Pres-
ident’s power to remove Governors for good reason—“[t]o
preserve the independence of the Federal Reserve” and to
continue the “long tradition” of “monetary policy . . . exer-
cised independent of . . . executive influence.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 48 (statement of the Solicitor General).
Any change in that scheme must come from Congress, not
the courts. That is why we cannot accept the Government’s
contentions in this case. To do so would allow the President
to remove a member of the Federal Reserve at any time, for
any reason, without any notice before, and without any ju-
dicial check after. That would turn for-cause protection into
little more than at-will employment.
To be clear, the ultimate question of whether the Presi-
dent can remove Cook for cause will depend in part on the
underlying facts. In this opinion, we have not addressed
the facts, as they have yet to be found or analyzed under
the relevant legal standards. Rather, we have simply ad-
dressed the parties’ arguments about the appropriate legal
standards under which the facts must be evaluated.
The application for a stay is denied.
It is so ordered.
——————
without the “broad” prohibition on removal “for mortgage fraud” that
JUSTICE BARRETT fears, post, at 5. (Indeed, even if the injunction were
overbroad, that still would not warrant J
USTICE BARRETT’s proposed
course of action—granting the Government’s application in full, and thus
removing Cook from office immediately, as opposed to merely clarifying
the injunction’s limited scope. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,
Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994) (relief must be “no broader than necessary”
to prevent irreparable harm to applicant).)

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full and write separately to
emphasize two points.
First, today’s interim ruling does not decide whether the
President may lawfully remove Governor Cook for cause.
The ultimate decision about whether the President may
remove Governor Cook for cause will largely depend on the
facts regarding the Governor’s actions. And those facts
have yet to be determined. The Court’s opinion today
simply settles some of the legal and procedural ground rules
under which (i) the Executive Branch may determine and
assess the facts and (ii) courts may then “assess the validity
and sufficiency” of any asserted grounds for removal. Ante,
at 25.
Second, in establishing some of those legal and
procedural ground rules, the Court confirms the
longstanding historical practice and understanding that
the Federal Reserve is an independent agency whose
Governors enjoy for-cause removal protection consistent
with Article II of the Constitution. The Government itself
expressly “acknowledge[d]” and did “not disput[e]” that
point in this case, even as the Government simultaneously
(and successfully) argued that the for-cause removal
protections for most independent agencies violate Article II.

2 TRUMP v. COOK
K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 48; see Trump v. Slaughter, ___ U. S. ___
(2026). Specifically, the Government recognized the “long
tradition of having this exercise of monetary policy be
exercised independent of . . . executive influence.” Tr. of
Oral Arg. 48. The Government further “acknowledge[d]
what the Court said in Wilcox, which is that” the Federal
Reserve is “a quasi-private, uniquely structured entity that
stands in the distinct historical tradition of the First and
Second Banks of the United States, and, therefore, we have
not challenged the—the removal restriction in this case.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6 (referring to Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S.
922, 923 (2025)). The Government also stated that the
purpose of the Federal Reserve’s independence is to
“protec[t] the governors from removal for policy
disagreement or for no reason at all.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 47.
And it added that it does not “dispute the importance of
that” independence “for many of the reasons that [Cook’s]
amici say.” Id., at 48.
I agree with the Court, moreover, that we should not
leave open the question whether the Federal Reserve can
remain an independent agency in the wake of Slaughter.
After Slaughter, there is a clear choice: Either the Federal
Reserve may remain independent (with the Governors
removable for cause, not at will), or it may not. Leaving
that question open would create significant uncertainty
about whether the Court might soon eliminate the Federal
Reserve’s independence, and thereby expose the Federal
Reserve to political influences and jeopardize the efficacy of
U. S. monetary policy. Even temporary uncertainty about
the status of the Federal Reserve could spark political
upheaval, including confusion about whether the President
could immediately remove multiple Governors at will, as
well as turmoil in the U. S. and world economies.
I would not go down that road. I would not risk
destabilizing the U. S. economy just so that we can further
mull over an issue that, in various permutations, we have

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring
been thinking about for many years. As the Court’s opinion
explains and the Government agrees, the Federal Reserve
occupies a unique role in the U. S. Government and
maintains critical responsibility for the stability and
success of the U. S. and world economies. See ante, at 1–6.
Most importantly for constitutional purposes, the Federal
Reserve follows in a distinct historical tradition of central
bank independence that has long coexisted with Article II.
That history of course carries great weight in Article II
cases. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 610–611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id.,
at 634–638 (Jackson, J., concurring). In my view, in light
of that historical practice and precedent, the Federal
Reserve may continue as an independent agency after
Slaughter. If the Federal Reserve’s for-cause removal
protections are to be eliminated, that change must occur
through the legislative process.
1
In short, like the Court, I see no good reason here to
unsettle a critical constitutional question that has long
been settled and that should remain settled.
***
With those additional comments, I join the Court’s
opinion in full.
——————
1
Only JUSTICE THOMAS contends that, under Article II, the Federal
Reserve may not remain an independent agency and that the Governors
therefore should be removable at will. See post, at 24–27 (dissenting
opinion).

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
Whether to issue a stay is fundamentally an equitable de-
termination. Fairness concerns compel courts to ask, in es-
sence, whether a stay applicant “can be made to wait until
the conclusion of the litigation to vindicate their purported
legal rights, or whether irreparable harm will befall the ap-
plicant in the interim such that the court must act early to
stave off that damage, for equity’s sake.” Noem v. Doe, 605
U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (J
ACKSON, J., dissenting from grant of
application for stay) (slip op., at 3). Because the authority
to grant a stay is “justified by the perceived need ‘to prevent
irreparable injury to the parties or to the public’ pending
review,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 432 (2009) (quoting
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 9 (1942)),
the most important considerations are “whether the appli-
cant will suffer irreparable harm absent emergency inter-
vention, as well as the relative harm to the parties and the
public interest in the grant or denial of a stay.” Trump v.
Orr, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (J
ACKSON, J., dissenting from
grant of application for stay) (slip op., at 2).
I write separately to explain that, in this case, the Gov-
ernment falls far short with respect to these equitable fac-
tors. I have joined the Court’s opinion because I also agree

2 TRUMP v. COOK
J
ACKSON, J., concurring
that the Government’s merits arguments are unlikely to
succeed.
On the equities, the Government has not identified any
injury whatsoever beyond the harm that a President pur-
portedly suffers when a Governor of the Board of the Fed-
eral Reserve exercises power “over [his] objection.” Appli-
cation to Stay Preliminary Injunction 36; see also post, at
32 (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of application for
stay) (insisting that the Government is harmed simply be-
cause the District Court “allow[ed] a removed officer to con-
tinue exercising the executive power” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). But “that assertion is just another species
of the far-fetched contention that the President [is] injured
whenever he is prevented from doing as he wishes.” Orr,
607 U. S., at ___ (J
ACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 10).
As such, it does not amount to the sort of tangible harm that
warrants setting the interim status of a dispute in the Pres-
ident’s favor.*
Even if the Government had alleged an irreparable in-
jury, the stay inquiry still requires consideration of
“whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding” and “where the
public interest lies.” Nken, 556 U. S., at 426 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). On the facts presented here, the
public interest unmistakably weighs against the Govern-
ment’s application.
Economic experts of all stripes agree that “[t]he Federal
Reserve’s independence is critical to fostering the long-term
——————
*If the President were able to point to a real-world injury that flows
from Governor Lisa Cook’s continued service during the pendency of this
litigation, the equitable harm assessment might be different. But having
to maintain an officer the President wants to fire does not count, because
whether he is entitled to fire Cook is the subject of the pending lawsuit.
If, as it turns out, the law does not permit this firing, the President is not
injured at all—much less irreparably—by having to retain Cook during
the litigation.

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
J
ACKSON, J., concurring
health and stability of the national economy.” Brief for For-
mer Treasury Secretaries et al. as Amici Curiae 6. That is
because “effective monetary policy requires a commitment”
to the often politically unpopular “long-term goals of price
stability and steady growth.” Id., at 10, 14. But those long-
term goals are not served if the officials responsible for the
Nation’s monetary policy are subject to the whims of politi-
cians—many of whom “have an incentive to respond to their
constituents’ immediate interests by prioritizing short-term
economic growth.” Id., at 11.
Put differently, the public’s interest is not served if a
President can intimidate members of the Federal Reserve
into doing his bidding. Experience has taught that high in-
flation, price variability, and, ultimately, financial panic
can result when the Federal Reserve is subjected to rank
politicization. See id., at 14–16; ante, at 5. Indeed, even
the mere perception of partisan influence over that body can
trigger these disastrous consequences. See Brief for Former
Treasury Secretaries et al. as Amici Curiae 9. Allowing
Governor Lisa Cook “to be removed now, without even full
merits review, would send an unmistakable signal that the
Federal Reserve is vulnerable” to exactly this kind of influ-
ence. Brief for Former Government Officials et al. as Amici
Curiae 10.
When it comes to the President’s ability to fire members
of the Federal Reserve, the public’s interest in the contin-
ued viability of our Nation’s economy is at stake. The
thought that the President suffers a comparable level of
harm simply because he is temporarily unable to remove
Cook from office is “facially absurd.” Department of Home-
land Security v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from grant of application for
stay) (slip op., at 11).

4 TRUMP v. COOK
J
ACKSON, J., concurring
***
In my view, today’s application could be resolved by eval-
uating the equities alone. But we have had the benefit of
multiple rounds of briefing, oral argument, and the time to
consider carefully the legal issues this particular applica-
tion presents, unlike in many other consequential emer-
gency-docket cases we have decided recently. See, e.g., Lab-
rador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (J
ACKSON, J.,
dissenting from grant of application for stay) (slip op., at 7).
So, I join the Court in reaching a merits conclusion in this
case. Still, on the most important stay considerations (the
risk of irreparable harm and the equities) this application
is not a close call. The Government misses the mark by a
mile.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The President of the United States seeks relief from a
court order that restores a principal executive officer to her
position after the President removed her. President Biden
appointed Lisa Cook to the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in 2022. The Board, unlike the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks, is a federal executive agency that reg-
ulates much of the Nation’s economy. After President
Trump was elected, he learned that Cook may have com-
mitted mortgage fraud, a federal crime punishable by up to
30 years in prison, shortly before she took office. He thus
removed Cook from the Board. He did so pursuant to his
authority to remove principal executive officers under Arti-
cle II of the Constitution and a statute that expressly au-
thorizes him to remove officers on the Board for “cause.”
Cook sued in federal court to reclaim her office. She ar-
gued that her office was her “property,” which the President
could not deprive her of without “due process of law.” She
also argued that her apparent mortgage fraud was not a
“cause” to remove her, and that the statute authorizing the
President to remove her for “cause” implicitly required that
the President provide her with notice and a hearing before
any such removal. The District Court entered an injunction

2 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
against Cook’s removal. Today, this Court denies the Pres-
ident a stay of that injunction, allowing Cook to continue to
exercise executive power after being removed by the Presi-
dent.
The Court’s decision is incorrect. Cook’s office was not
her “property” because, in this country, government offi-
cials do not own the public offices in which they serve. Ap-
parent mortgage fraud was a “cause” to remove Cook. And,
the statute authorizing the President to remove Cook for
“cause” says nothing about notice or a hearing, so it does
not require notice and a hearing. Any other result would
violate Article II of the Constitution, under which the Pres-
ident may remove executive officers at will. The Court
makes many policy arguments for an “independent” bank-
ing agency that exercises executive power free from ac-
countability, ante, at 5, but those are ultimately arguments
against the Constitution.
The federal courts also lack the authority to enter the re-
lief that the Court upholds today. This Court has held that
a plaintiff cannot obtain relief against anyone, let alone the
sovereign, without a right of action, but now it rules that
Cook may obtain such relief without identifying one. It has
held that federal courts lack equitable authority to interfere
with the removal of public officers, but it recognizes an ex-
ception to that rule for Cook. And, it has held that Congress
and the Judiciary cannot encroach on the President’s exclu-
sive and preclusive powers, which include his power to re-
move executive officers, but it prevents the President from
exercising that power here. Although the Court expresses
concern that the President removed a Board member for
“the first time in the Federal Reserve’s 111-year history,”
ante, at 1, it expresses no such concern that it today upholds
an injunction against the President’s removal of an execu-
tive officer for the first time in the Constitution’s 237-year
history.
I respectfully dissent.

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
I
A
When President Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act
in 1913, few would have described it as following in a “‘long
tradition.’” Ante, at 26. Before the Federal Reserve Act,
the American tradition of central banking consisted mainly
of the First and Second Banks of the United States, two
short-lived corporations. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1
Stat. 191; Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266. Congress
chartered the First and Second Banks of the United States
to provide banking services to the Federal Government.
See ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191–196; ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266. These banks
possessed no sovereign power. See ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191; ch.
44, 3 Stat. 266. “Unlike modern central banks,” the First
and Second Banks of the United States “did not officially
set monetary policy” and did not “regulate, hold the re-
serves of, or act as a lender of last resort for other banks.”
Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, The First Bank of the
United States 8 (2021) (emphasis deleted); accord, Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia, The Second Bank of the United
States 9 (2021). Alexander Hamilton defended the First
Bank of the United States precisely because its capabilities
would “only concern the disposition of its own property” and
“essentially resemble the rules of a private mercantile part-
nership.” Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitution-
ality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 The Papers of Al-
exander Hamilton 110 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1965).
The advocates of the Federal Reserve Act did not take
themselves to be following in this tradition. Instead, they
ridiculed it, describing the United States before the Federal
Reserve Act as “at about the same point that had been
reached by Europe at the time of the Medicis, and by Asia,
in all likelihood, at the time of Hammurabi.” P. Warburg,
Defects and Needs of Our Banking System, N. Y. Times,
Jan. 6, 1907, p. 14 (Defects and Needs). Paul Warburg, the
architect of the Federal Reserve Act and himself a German

4 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
citizen at the time, began advocating in 1907 for this coun-
try to follow the model of the German Reichsbank, which he
described as “the most perfect organization of its kind.”
Ibid.; see Warburg a Leader in Banking Reform, N. Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1932, p. 5. The Reichsbank and other Eu-
ropean banks could, unlike American banks, rediscount
notes, serve as a lender of last resort, and adjust the money
supply. See Defects and Needs 14. In Warburg’s view, “the
system of all other important nations has proved to be ex-
cellent and ours has proved to be defective.” Ibid.
The champion of the Federal Reserve Act in Congress
shared this understanding. Senator Nelson Aldrich, “the
most influential figure in Congress on financial matters,”
joined forces with Warburg to enact banking legislation. M.
Whitehouse, Paul Warburg’s Crusade to Establish a Cen-
tral Bank in the United States, 3 The Region 7, 9 (May
1989) (Whitehouse). Aldrich too “envisioned a European-
type central bank for the United States.” Id., at 10; accord,
1 P. Warburg, The Federal Reserve System: Its Origin and
Growth 33, 56 (1930) (Warburg). Aldrich, like Warburg,
wanted “to transplant the system of one of the great Euro-
pean banks . . . bodily to America.” N. Stephenson, Nelson
W. Aldrich: A Leader in American Politics 378 (1930) (Ste-
phenson).
Warburg and Aldrich formulated the “Aldrich Plan” that
would eventually lead to the Federal Reserve Act. They met
in 1910 with “representatives of three extremely significant
New York banks,” id., at 373, “to formulate a plan for U. S.
banking and currency reform that Aldrich could present to
Congress,” Whitehouse 11. According to Warburg, “Senator
Aldrich pledged all participants to secrecy.” 1 Warburg 60,
and n. 2; accord, Whitehouse 11; Stephenson 373, 484. In
1911, Senator Aldrich published the eventual plan, which
proposed new reserve banks with the capabilities of Euro-
pean banks. See The Aldrich Plan for Banking Legislation
(1911); Whitehouse 11–12; 1 Warburg 42, 61–62, 178–423.

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Newly elected President Woodrow Wilson agreed with
much of the Aldrich Plan, but “insist[ed] upon” an executive
agency that would exercise “governmental control” over the
banking economy. A. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Pro-
gressive Era, 1910–1917, p. 48 (1954) (Link); see also 1
Warburg 81–91. Wilson, in this respect, was also departing
from tradition. He had long believed that “bureaucrats
might more effectively govern the country than the Ameri-
can people.” Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92,
130, n. 6 (2015) (T
HOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Wil-
son’s ideal system of government was not the tripartite and
limited one enshrined in our Constitution, but the German
Empire’s system of unified administrative power, which he,
echoing Warburg, saw as “nearly perfected.” W. Wilson,
The Study of Administration, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 197, 204 (1887);
see id., at 207, 214–219. Wilson disliked the American sys-
tem of government because it ultimately depended on the
will of the people, whom Wilson believed were “selfish, ig-
norant, timid, stubborn,” and “foolish.” Id., at 208; see also,
e.g., id., at 214; W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in
the United States 4–5, 56–57 (1908); 1 W. Wilson, College
and State 106–107, 111–129, 396–415 (1925). America,
Wilson said, did “too much by vote” and too little by expert
administrative bodies (or, in his words, “executive expert-
ness”). Wilson, 2 Pol. Sci. Q., at 207, 214. So, when Wilson
learned of the Aldrich Plan, he asked for it to include a
novel executive agency to govern the banking economy. See
Link 47–48; 1 Warburg 421–423; R. Cushman, The Inde-
pendent Regulatory Commissions 151 (1941) (Cushman).
Thus was born the Federal Reserve Board. The Board
was the “second independent regulatory commission” in
American history, following the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. Id., at 146. Unlike the First and Second National
Banks, which possessed no sovereign power, the Federal
Reserve Board would be a “new federal agency” with “broad
powers affecting the entire banking and currency system.”

6 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Id., at 153; see also Link 43–53. The Board would regulate
the newly created reserve banks, private commercial banks,
and private individuals. See infra this page and 7. War-
burg saw the Board as an “expert government body” for “the
state of the future.” 2 Warburg 494, 502; see id., at 491.
Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act into law in Decem-
ber 1913. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251. He ap-
pointed Warburg to the Federal Reserve Board the follow-
ing year. 1 Warburg 144. Warburg would soon reflect that
“[t]he Federal Reserve Act brought about a most radical
change.” 2 id., at 447.
B
The Federal Reserve Act authorized the incorporation of
up to twelve Federal Reserve Banks and created the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. §§2, 4, 10–11, 38 Stat. 251–257, 260–
263. The Federal Reserve Banks were “private corporations
in which the government has an interest.” Emergency Fleet
Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 426
(1928). The reserve banks had the capabilities, like the Eu-
ropean banks after which they were modeled, to rediscount
notes, serve as a lender of last resort, and adjust the money
supply. See §§4, 13, 14, 19, 38 Stat. 254–257, 263–265, 270–
271. They had corporate boards and the ordinary powers of
private corporations, such as to contract, and to sue and be
sued. §4, id., at 254–257; 12 U. S. C. §§301, 341. They were
owned by “national banks,” a class of private commercial
banks required by the Federal Reserve Act to purchase
stock in the reserve banks. Ch. 6, §2, 38 Stat. 251–253.
The Federal Reserve Board, by contrast, was an executive
agency. The Board, now called the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, was the “keystone” of the Act.
E. Kemmerer, The ABC of the Federal Reserve System 84
(5th ed. 1920); see 12 U. S. C. §241. At its inception, as to-
day, the Board had the power to regulate most of the bank-

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
ing economy. The “Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System” has thus always been understood as “an
agency of the United States Government.” 9 to 5 Org. for
Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of Fed. Re-
serve, 721 F. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 1983); see also Who We Are, The
Federal Reserve, www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fed-
explained/who-we-are.htm (archived at perma.cc/AT2P-
MT3W) (“a federal agency located in Washington, D. C.”);
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 603 U. S. 799, 806
(2024) (“agency”).
The original Federal Reserve Act gave the Board a wide
range of powers that this Court has held to be executive.
See Trump v. Slaughter, 609 U. S. ___, ___ (2026); Seila
Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591
U. S. 197, 218–219 (2020). The Act granted the Board the
power to, among other things, impose “rules and regula-
tions” on ordinary commercial banks, §9, 38 Stat. 259; “ex-
amine at its discretion” the papers and effects of reserve
banks and national banks, §11(a), id., at 261; regulate na-
tional banks in establishing foreign branches, §25, id., at
273–274; set rates to be charged by reserve banks, §14(d),
id., at 265; fix “by rule” national bank check-clearing
charges, §16, id., at 266–268; and impose penalties on na-
tional banks, §19(c), id., at 270–271.
1
Over the years, Con-
gress has given the Board more powers, including the power
——————
1
This list of powers is far from comprehensive. The Federal Reserve
Act also gave the Board the power to “adopt and promulgate rules and
regulations governing the transfers of . . . stock,” §2, 38 Stat. 253; impose
“rules and regulations” on the boards of the reserve banks, §3, id., at 254;
impose “orders” on the boards of the reserve banks, §4, id., at 255; order
banks that violate the law or its own regulations to “surrender [their]
stock,” §9, id., at 260; levy semiannual assessments on the reserve banks,
§10, id., at 261; “require” any “statements and reports” deemed necessary
from reserve banks and national banks, §11(a), ibid.; require reserve
banks to rediscount at fixed interest rates, §11(b), id., at 262; suspend
reserve requirements, §11(c), ibid.; “establish a graduated tax” on re-
serve deficiencies, ibid. “suspend or remove” reserve bank officers and

8 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
to issue fines of $1 million per day on banks that violate
Board reporting requirements, 12 U. S. C. §324; to author-
ize persons to act as law enforcement officers, §248(q); and
to regulate nonbank financial companies and bank holding
companies, §5365. This Court recently heard a challenge to
a Board regulation that set the fees on consumer debit-card
transactions. See Corner Post, 603 U. S., at 805–806; 76
Fed. Reg. 43394 (2011). The Board also regularly issues or-
ders prohibiting private individuals from working for
banks, enforceable with civil and criminal penalties. See
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Enforcement
Actions (July 28, 2023), www.federalreserve.gov/supervi-
sionreg/enforcementactions.htm (archived at
perma.cc/UVQ4-99ZR); see 12 U. S. C. §1818(g).
The Federal Reserve Act authorizes the seven members
of the Board to serve 14-year terms unless the President
dismisses them for “cause.” §242. Congress included the
“cause” requirement in the original 1913 Act, see §10, 38
Stat. 260, inadvertently removed it in 1933, and restored it
in 1935. See Cushman 167–169; Act of June 16, 1933, §6(a),
48 Stat. 166–167; Act of Aug. 23, 1935, §10, 49 Stat. 704–
705. In full, the Act’s relevant provision, which is the sole
basis for the Court’s decision today, states that “each mem-
ber shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the
expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner re-
moved for cause by the President.” 12 U. S. C. §242. Unlike
——————
directors, §11(f ), ibid.; suspend, liquidate, and reorganize reserve banks,
§11(h), ibid.; adopt “rules and regulations” for the purchase and sale of
cable transfers, bankers’ acceptances, and bills of exchange eligible for
rediscount, §14, id., at 264–265; prescribe “regulations” for the substitu-
tion of collateral, §16, id., at 265–268; “make and promulgate . . . regula-
tions governing the transfer of funds and charges therefor” among re-
serve banks and their branches, §16, id., at 268; require reserve banks
to exercise the functions of a clearing house and to purchase bonds, §§16,
18, id., at 265–268, 268–270; and order examination of state banks and
trust companies, §21, id., at 271–272.

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
many other contemporaneous statutes that provided for re-
moval only after “notice and a hearing,” see infra, at 19–21,
the Act does not mention notice or a hearing.
C
In 2022, President Biden appointed and the Senate con-
firmed Lisa Cook to the Board. President Biden reap-
pointed Cook to serve a full 14-year term in 2023. She re-
mained in office after President Trump’s election and
inauguration.
In 2025, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency referred evidence to the Department of Justice sug-
gesting that, shortly before taking her position on the
Board, Cook committed mortgage fraud. On June 18, 2021,
Cook obtained a $203,000 mortgage to purchase a property
in Michigan. In the mortgage agreement, Cook indicated
that she would use the Michigan property as her “principal
residence for at least one year” starting shortly after sign-
ing. Complaint in No. 1:25–cv–02903 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1–
2, Exh. A, p. 3. Just 14 days later, Cook obtained a second
mortgage of $540,000 for a property in Georgia. Ibid. In
her agreement for that mortgage, she also said that she
would use the Georgia property as her primary residence
for one year. Ibid. These commitments were relevant be-
cause primary-residence mortgages are often eligible for
lower interest rates than other mortgages. See Fannie
Mae, Getting It Right—Reverification of Occupancy 1 (June
2021). For that reason, the Federal Government can crim-
inally prosecute mortgage applicants for falsely claiming
that a property is a principal residence, with penalties of up
to 30 years in prison. See 18 U. S. C. §§1014, 1344; K. Har-
ney, A Little Lie on Mortgage Application Can Cost You
Big, Wash. Post, July 1, 2015, p. SS1–9.
The President responded by removing Cook from office.
He wrote to her: “Pursuant to my authority under Article II

10 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
of the Constitution of the United States and the Federal Re-
serve Act of 1913, as amended, you are hereby removed
from your position on the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, effective immediately.” ECF Doc. 1–3, Exh. B,
p. 2. He explained that “there is sufficient reason to believe
that you may have made false statements on one or more
mortgage agreements” because “you signed one document
attesting that a property in Michigan would be your pri-
mary residence for the next year,” then “[t]wo weeks later,
you signed another document for a property in Georgia stat-
ing that it would be your primary residence for the next
year.” Ibid. “It [was] inconceivable that you were not aware
of your first commitment when making the second,” the
President said, and “[i]t [was] impossible that you intended
to honor both.” Ibid.
The President explained why, in his view, Cook should
not remain on the Board. The Board “has tremendous re-
sponsibility for setting interest rates and regulating reserve
and member banks.” Ibid. “The American people must be
able to have full confidence in the honesty of the members
entrusted with setting policy and overseeing the Federal
Reserve.” Ibid. Thus, the President explained to Cook that
because of “deceitful and potentially criminal conduct in a
financial matter,” neither he nor the American people could
any longer “have such confidence in your integrity.” Ibid.
“At a minimum,” the President concluded, “the conduct at
issue exhibits the sort of gross negligence in financial trans-
actions that calls into question your competence and trust-
worthiness as a financial regulator.” Ibid. The President
informed Cook that he had “determined that faithfully exe-
cuting the law requires your immediate removal from of-
fice.” Ibid.
D
Cook sued President Trump, then-Board Chairman Je-
rome Powell, and the Board. As relevant here, she brought

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
three claims. First, she argued that the President’s re-
moval violated her rights under the Due Process Clause,
which forbids the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law,” Amdt. 5, because the public of-
fice was her “property,” ECF Doc. 1, p. 20. Second, she ar-
gued that the President’s removal violated the Federal Re-
serve Act’s provision authorizing him to remove her for
“cause,” 12 U. S. C. §242, because he “did not cite appropri-
ate cause for removing her,” ECF Doc. 1, p. 18. Third, she
argued that the President’s removal violated the same pro-
vision because the term “for cause” is a “term of art” that
includes a “right to notice and a hearing.” Id., at 19–20.
Cook presented no evidence that the allegations against her
were false.
For a right of action, Cook invoked the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, the All Writs Act, and the District Court’s “tradi-
tional equitable jurisdiction.” Id., at 18–22. As to relief,
Cook sought an injunction against Powell and the other of-
ficers of the Board ordering that they refrain from “effectu-
ating” her removal and that they “treat” her as if she were
not removed. Id., at 23. She sought a writ of mandamus
commanding the same. She also sought a declaration that
the removal was void and that she is “an active member of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.” Ibid.
The District Court entered an injunction restoring Cook
to her position. It “requir[ed] Defendants Powell and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to allow Cook to
remain a member of the Board during the pendency of this
litigation.” 804 F. Supp. 3d 14, 44 (DC 2025). The District
Court held that Cook’s removal likely violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Id., at 33. It reasoned that Cook had a “prop-
erty” right to “her continued position as a member of the
Board of Governors,” so the President’s removal deprived
her of property without due process of law. Ibid. It also
held that President Trump did not remove Cook for “cause”

12 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
because he removed her for conduct preceding her appoint-
ment. Id., at 22–30. It did not address Cook’s argument
that she was statutorily entitled to notice and a hearing.
The District Court concluded that the harms and equities
favored Cook because she was prevented from “discharging
her duties as a Federal Reserve Governor” and the Presi-
dent’s removal harmed “the agency’s independence.” Id., at
40, 43. The District Court did not hold that Cook satisfied
the heightened standard for ultra vires or mandamus relief.
The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit denied a stay
pending appeal. Although there was no opinion for the
court, Judge Garcia, joined by Judge Childs, wrote a con-
curring opinion. Judge Garcia relied solely on the Due Pro-
cess Clause, explaining that the President’s removal of
Cook likely deprived her of her “property interest in her po-
sition.” 2025 WL 2654786, *1 (Sept. 15, 2025). He did not
address Cook’s argument that the President’s removal was
not for “cause” under the Federal Reserve Act or that a “for
cause” removal provision implicitly requires notice and a
hearing. He also did not hold that Cook satisfied the
heightened standard for ultra vires or mandamus relief.
Judge Katsas dissented. He explained that Cook lacked
a right of action to sue government officials otherwise enti-
tled to sovereign immunity, so she could succeed only if she
satisfied “the demanding standards for raising an ultra
vires claim,” which this Court has described as “‘essentially
a Hail Mary pass’” that requires showing an extreme legal
error. Id., at *6 (quoting NRC v. Texas, 605 U. S. 665, 681–
82 (2025)). Judge Katsas then explained that the Presi-
dent’s removal of Cook was not unlawful at all, let alone so
extremely unlawful as to warrant ultra vires relief. As to
the process for the removal, Judge Katsas explained that
President Trump did not deprive Cook of property without
due process, because, under this Court’s precedents, “‘pub-
lic offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as
such.’” 2025 WL 2654786, *8 (quoting Taylor v. Beckham,

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
178 U. S. 548, 577 (1900)). As to the basis for the removal,
Judge Katsas explained that “[f]raud is an excellent reason
for removal, not merely a permissible one.” 2025 WL
2654786, *7 (internal quotation marks and brackets omit-
ted).
President Trump applied to this Court for a stay. The
President is entitled to a stay if he is likely to succeed on
the merits and the balance of the harms and equities favors
him. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009). This
Court deferred its decision on the application pending oral
argument. Today, citing the need to maintain “the inde-
pendence of the Federal Reserve,” ante, at 16, the Court de-
nies the President’s application. It holds that the Federal
Reserve Act provision authorizing the President to remove
Cook for “cause” prohibited him from removing her for
cause unless he first provided notice and a hearing. It also
holds that federal courts can enter injunctive relief restor-
ing a principal executive officer to her position after the
President removes her.
II
The President is likely to succeed on the merits. The
President’s removal complied with the Due Process Clause
because, in our system of government, officials do not own
the public offices that they hold. The President’s removal
likewise complied with the statute because he removed
Cook for “cause” and because the statute does not require
notice and a hearing. Were there any doubt about what the
statute requires, the canon of constitutional avoidance
counsels strongly against reading it to implicitly restrict the
President’s Article II removal power. Finally, federal courts
lack the power to grant the relief that Cook received.
A
The President is likely to succeed as to each of Cook’s
three claims.

14 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
1
The President’s removal of Cook did not violate the Due
Process Clause. That Clause prohibits the Federal Govern-
ment from depriving a person of “life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.” Amdt. 5. To succeed in her
due-process challenge, Cook must show that she “has been
deprived of a protected interest in ‘property.’” American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U. S. 40, 59 (1999).
Cook has no property right to hold power on the Board.
In our system of government, a “public office is not prop-
erty.” Taylor, 178 U. S., at 576. Cook’s claim that she has
a property right to exercise governmental power is “alien to
the concept of a republican form of government.” Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 50 (CADC 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
And, this Court’s precedents have “consistently recognized”
that “government employment [is] not property or [an] oth-
erwise cognizable interes[t] under the Due Process
Claus[e].” Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U. S. 305, 332 (2025)
(T
HOMAS, J., dissenting). Even “an officer appointed for a
definite time or during good behavior” lacks a “vested inter-
est or contract right in his office.” Crenshaw v. United
States, 134 U. S. 99, 104 (1890). “An unlawful denial” of
“political office is not a denial of a right of property or of
liberty secured by the due process clause.” Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 7 (1944).
Because the President did not deprive Cook of any pro-
tected interest in property, the Court rightly does not accept
Cook’s due-process claim.
2
The President’s removal of Cook was also for “cause.” 12
U. S. C. §242. By authorizing the President to remove Cook
for “cause” in the Federal Reserve Act, Congress gave Cook
the weakest available removal protection, which this Court
has described as weaker even than the relatively deferen-

15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
tial “inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office” stand-
ard. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 220, 255–256 (2021) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §41. The
“for cause” standard required nothing more than what the
plain meaning suggests—a cause. Any “cause relating to
the conduct, ability, fitness, or competence of the officer”
would do. Black’s Law Dictionary 796 (3d ed. 1933). A re-
moval was for-cause if it was based on the removed officer’s
“bad habits, slovenliness, want of discretion, incompetency,
or anything else which would show unfitness.” Fuller v. El-
lis, 98 Mich. 96, 106, 57 N. W. 33, 36 (1893). The standard
was so low as to be functionally unreviewable. See M.
Throop, The Law Relating to Public Officers §396, p. 387
(1892).
Cook’s alleged mortgage fraud is a “cause” for removing
her. Because Cook purports to bring a freestanding equita-
ble claim against the President, the Court’s precedents re-
quire it to presume “[t]he validity of the reasons” given by
the President for her removal and “the basis of fact on
which they rest.” United States v. Chemical Foundation,
Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 15 (1926); see also United States v. Arm-
strong, 517 U. S. 456, 464–465 (1996). The President deter-
mined that Cook, a principal executive officer, engaged in
“deceitful and potentially criminal conduct” that called into
question her “integrity,” “competence,” and “trustworthi-
ness.” ECF Doc. 1–3, Exh. B, p. 2. Cook’s job is to regulate
the banking economy, but she is alleged to have made fa-
cially contradictory representations to obtain her own mort-
gages by committing to primarily reside in two different
places at the same time. ECF Doc. 1–2, Exh. A, pp. 2–3.
The President determined that it was “inconceivable” that
she was unaware of the contradiction and “impossible” that
she “intended to honor both.” ECF Doc. 1–3, Exh. B, p. 2.
This alleged conduct would have been grounds to remove a
loan officer at a bank, let alone someone vested with “broad

16 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
powers affecting the entire banking and currency system.”
Cushman 153.
The Court rightly does not accept Cook’s claim that the
President lacked “cause” to remove her. The Court opines
that “cause” means a “ ‘substantial, reasonable, and just’”
reason, or a “‘disqualification’ akin to ‘inefficiency’ or ‘in-
competency.’” Ante, at 13. Given the presumption of regu-
larity, the accusation of mortgage fraud—a financial crime
punishable by up to 30 years in prison—satisfies that
standard. The Court does not hold otherwise.
3
The President’s removal of Cook complied with the stat-
ute regardless of whether he provided notice and a hearing.
The statute, as its plain text makes clear, did not require
the President to provide Cook with notice and a hearing.
The Court errs in concluding otherwise. Its interpretation
also renders the statute unconstitutional.
a
We, as courts, have no authority to change what statutes
say. “Our duty is to read the statute according to the natu-
ral and obvious import of the language, without resorting
to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either
limiting or extending its operation.” United States v. Tem-
ple, 105 U. S. 97, 99 (1882). We have no power to “assume
that Congress has omitted from its adopted text require-
ments that it nonetheless intends to apply.” Jama v. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341
(2005). When we do, we improperly assume the legislative
power.
In the Federal Reserve Act, Congress chose not to require
that the President provide notice or a hearing to officers on
the Board before removing them. The Federal Reserve Act
specifies “only causes for removal,” not “procedures for re-

17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
moval.” Ante, at 11 (emphasis in original). The Act estab-
lishes a maximum term of service for members of the Board
of Governors and sets only a substantive requirement for
removal. In full, the relevant provision states:
“[E]ach member shall hold office for a term of fourteen
years from the expiration of the term of his predeces-
sor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.”
12 U. S. C. §242.
Although some contemporaneous statutes required that an
officer be removed only “after notice and hearing,” Act of
July 11, 1919, ch. 6, §6, 41 Stat. 68, see also infra, at 20,
n. 2, the Federal Reserve Act conspicuously required nei-
ther notice nor a hearing.
b
The Court nonetheless interprets the Federal Reserve
Act to say what it obviously does not—that notice and a
hearing are required.
To justify its holding, the Court relies on the interpretive
principle that common-law terms bear their common-law
meanings. When “Congress borrows terms of art in which
are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu-
ries of practice,” those terms of art take on their common-
law meanings rather than their ordinary ones. Sekhar v.
United States, 570 U. S. 729, 733 (2013) (internal quota-
tions omitted); see ante, at 17. The term of art that the
Court posits “carried with it a settled interpretation at com-
mon law,” ante, at 18, is the Federal Reserve Act’s statutory
text providing that “each member shall hold office for a
term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his
predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the Presi-
dent.” 12 U. S. C. §242. According to the Court, by provid-
ing for a “term of years limited only by removal ‘for cause,’”
this statutory text is a common-law term of art that means

18 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
that a removed officer is “entitled to notice and some oppor-
tunity to respond prior to her termination.” Ante, at 18.
The Federal Reserve Act’s removal provision is not a com-
mon-law term of art that means perforce that a removed
officer is entitled to notice and a hearing. The Court’s in-
terpretation of the removal provision is not based on the
common law at all. In support of its notice-and-hearing re-
quirement, the Court cites no “eminent common-law au-
thorities” interpreting any of the terms of the Federal Re-
serve Act’s removal provision. Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S.
271, 279 (2020). The Court’s reasoning is instead based on
two statutory-interpretation decisions that said nothing
about the common law. See ante, at 18–21 (citing Reagan
v. United States, 182 U. S. 419 (1901); Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U. S. 311 (1903)).
The Court thus invokes, apparently in the alternative,
the principle that statutory terms should be interpreted
consistently with prior judicial constructions of those
terms. Under the prior-construction principle, “when judi-
cial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing
statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a
new statute is presumed to incorporate that interpreta-
tion.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575
U. S. 320, 330 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Earlier this Term, this Court held that the prior-construc-
tion principle does not permit a court to depart from the or-
dinary meaning of a statutory term, as the Court does here,
unless the earlier judicial constructions of that term were
ubiquitous and unanimous: “[T]o conclude that Congress
incorporated a judicial definition into a statutory term,” “we
have required” a “‘broad and unquestioned’ ‘judicial consen-
sus.’” Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229,
252–253, n. 5 (2026).
When Congress enacted the Federal Reserve Act, there
was no “‘broad and unquestioned’” judicial consensus that
a “term of years limited only by removal ‘for cause,’” ante,

19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
at 18, 21, forbade removals without notice and a hearing.
In point of fact, many courts held the opposite. A “for cause”
removal provision, courts explained, “not only fails to re-
quire any hearing or proceeding, but also strongly implies
that the removal shall be summary, and without any ante-
cedent proceeding.” In re Carter, 141 Cal. 316, 321, 74 P.
997, 998 (1903). When an officer was “removable for cause,”
a court had no power to “review his action for the purpose
of determining the sufficiency of the causes,” even when the
“order of removal” specified no cause. United States ex rel.
Garland v. Oliver, 17 D. C. 47, 56 (1887). “[W]here the ap-
pointing power may remove for cause,” it followed that the
removed officer was not “entitled to notice and to a trial.”
Patton v. Vaughan, 39 Ark. 211, 215 (1882); see also, e.g.,
State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, 32 N. M. 265, 291, 255 P.
1077, 1087 (1926) (“[N]either notice [n]or hearing is a nec-
essary condition precedent to a valid removal”).
The Court thus does not even attempt to muster the “re-
quired” “‘judicial consensus.’” Learning Resources, 607
U. S., at 252–253, n. 5. The Court instead relies on only two
opinions, each of which is an odd fit for the Court’s conclu-
sion. See ante, at 18–21. Both opinions, Reagan v. United
States, 182 U. S. 419, and Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U. S. 311, ruled against officers who were, like Cook, re-
moved without notice and a hearing. Reagan ruled against
a commissioner “subject to removal . . . for causes pre-
scribed by law” after he was removed for old age. 182 U. S.,
at 424; see id., at 427. The removed officer was “given no
notice of any charge against him,” and “no hearing.” Id., at
424. Shurtleff likewise ruled against an appraiser who
could be “removed . . . by the President for inefficiency, ne-
glect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 189 U. S., at 313; see
id., at 318–319. He was removed for no reason at all and
with no process at all. Id., at 312. Reagan and Shurtleff
are not typically invoked in support of removed officers like
Cook.

20 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
The Court’s entire argument is built on a single line of
dicta (which the Court repeats four times) from those opin-
ions. Ante, at 18, 19–20. In an aside, Reagan stated (and
Shurtleff repeated) that “notice and hearing are essential”
if “causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute,
as also where the term of office is for a fixed period.”
Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425; see Shurtleff, 189 U. S., at 314.
This one line does not interpret the “same language” that
the Federal Reserve Act’s removal provision used, so the
prior-construction canon “has no application here.” Arm-
strong, 575 U. S., at 330; contra, ante, at 20. The statute in
Reagan provided for removals for “causes prescribed by
law,” 182 U. S., at 424, and the one in Shurtleff provided for
removals “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office,” 189 U. S., at 313. None of those phrases appears
in the Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U. S. C. §242 (“shall hold
office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the
term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by
the President”).
Not even the underlying logic of the one line of dicta on
which the Court relies supports its conclusion. In the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, no “causes of removal are specified,” and
this Court has never interpreted a mere “fixed” “term of of-
fice,” Reagan, 182 U. S., at 425, to guarantee notice and a
hearing. After all, hundreds of statutes provide for fixed
terms of office, and nobody believes that all of those statutes
implicitly require notice and a hearing.
2
——————
2
In a footnote, the Court reasons that when officers are appointed for
a fixed term but can be removed freely, their terms are not truly “ ‘fixed’ ”
(and so the language in Reagan and Shurtleff does not apply to them).
Ante, at 21, n. 5. That reasoning contradicts both settled usage and this
Court’s precedents. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 190
(1926) (statute providing that each deputy postmaster “ ‘shall hold his
office for the term of four years, unless sooner removed by the President’ ”
gave the deputy postmasters “fixed terms”); Severino v. Biden, 71 F. 4th
1038, 1046 (CADC 2023) (“when Congress provided for a three-year term
of office, it did so with the settled understanding that its fixed term of

21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
The Court thus has to rephrase even the one line of dicta
to describe a new “form of tenure”: a “term of years limited
only by removal ‘for cause.’” Ante, at 18. This “form of ten-
ure” does not appear in either Reagan or Shurtleff; it is a
——————
service in no way limited the President’s removal power”); Parsons v.
United States, 167 U. S. 324, 328 (1897) (4-year term with no removal
restriction was “fixed”).
The language in Reagan and Shurtleff that the Court relies on thus
implicates hundreds of statutes. See, e.g., 2 U. S. C. §179n(c)(1) (“The
term of each member of the Board shall be 4 years”); accord, 2 U. S. C.
§§474(a), 476(d), 601(a)(3), 803(b), 1103(c), 1381(e), 1722(d)(1); 5 U. S. C.
§§424(b)(2)(B), 424(d)(2)(B), 595(b), 1102(a), 1211(b), 7104(c), 7702(d)(6),
8472(e), 8473(c); 6 U. S. C. §§191(c), 204(c)(4), 318(c)(4), 665e(c); 7
U. S. C. §§2, 1627b, 5331, 5843, 6005, 6407(b)(5), 7104, 7414(b)(5), 7444,
7804(b)(5); 10 U. S. C. §§152, 177(a)(5), 178, 183(b)(2), 942(b), 1114,
2113a(c), 7037, 7455, 8088, 8468, 9037, 9455, 10505; 12 U. S. C. §§302,
635a, 1427, 1441b(c)(2), 1701j–2, 1701y(b)(2), 1752a(c), 1812, 2242, 3013;
13 U. S. C. §21(b); 14 U. S. C. §§302, 318(a), 1903(b)(4); 15 U. S. C. §§41,
77cc, 78d, 78o–4, 78ccc(4), 278, 278g–4, 278k(m), 1275, 2053, 3717, 4102,
4603; 16 U. S. C. §§410y–4, 410cc–31, 410ww–21, 410yy–8, 410iii–7,
450jj–6, 460u–7, 460x–3, 460bb–4, 460cc–3, 460ii–5, 460ss–2, 460ss–3,
460zz–2, 460kk(q)(2), 590h, 773a, 792, 831a, 932, 953, 1055, 1401, 1852,
2105, 4004, 4403, 5003, 7002, 7003, 7004, 7005; 17 U. S. C. §802; 18
U. S. C. §3006A; 19 U. S. C. §§1330, 2605; 20 U. S. C. §§43, 76h, 76cc, 80,
80f, 80n, 954, 955, 956, 957, 1066f, 1134a, 2004, 2103, 3702, 4303, 4412,
4502, 4703, 5508, 5603, 9105a, 9578; 21 U. S. C. §379dd; 22 U. S. C.
§§283a, 286a, 290f, 290i–1, 1469, 1622c, 2131, 4605, 6203, 6205, 6431;
25 U. S. C. §§305, 2704; 26 U. S. C. §7443; 28 U. S. C. §§152, 541, 561,
581, 629, 631, 992; 29 U. S. C. §§153, 175, 49l–2, 780, 792, 1302; 30
U. S. C. §823; 31 U. S. C. §§703, 751, 5135; 33 U. S. C. §§857–14, 892c,
1128, 1363; 36 U. S. C. §§2302, 40702, 151703, 152403, 300104; 38
U. S. C. §§547, 7101, 7253; 39 U. S. C. §202; 41 U. S. C. §§1501, 8502; 42
U. S. C. §§218, 242c–1, 242k, 280e–11, 280i–2, 281, 282, 283k, 284a,
285c–4, 285d–7, 285m–4, 285q–2, 286a, 290b, 290aa–1, 291k, 294o, 294q,
300j–5, 300u–6, 300aa–19, 902, 903, 1395b–6, 1395ee, 1395oo, 1396,
1397k–1, 1863, 1864, 1975, 2000e–4, 2286, 2495, 2996c, 3934, 4273,
5841, 7171, 7412(r)(6)(B), 10262, 10703, 12651a; 44 U. S. C. §§301, 3616;
45 U. S. C. §§154, 231f; 47 U. S. C. §154; 48 U. S. C. §§1422, 1424b, 1614,
1821, 2121; 49 U. S. C. §§106, 114, 1111, 1301, 1325, 44946; 50 U. S. C.
§§1803, 3041a, 4216; 52 U. S. C. §§20923, 30106; 54 U. S. C. §304101.

22 TRUMP v. COOK
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
classification that the Court discovers for the first time to-
day. Ante, at 18. And, as far as I am aware, no court ever
before today (including the two courts below) has held that
any federal statute implicitly requires notice and a hearing
when it provides for a term of years limited by removal for
cause. The Court thus “falls well short” of the standard “re-
quired to conclude that Congress incorporated a judicial
definition into a statutory term.” Learning Resources, 607
U. S., at 252–253, n. 5.
3
The Court’s interpretation is also inconsistent with “con-
gressional practice.” Id., at 243 (opinion of R
OBERTS, C. J.).
Congress has enacted dozens of statutes that require notice
and a hearing before an officer can be removed. They all do
so “in explicit terms.” Ibid. These statutes, for instance,
provide that an officer “may be removed by the President
only upon notice and hearing,” 5 U. S. C. §7104(b) (empha-
sis added), or that “[a]ny such . . . removal may be made
only after notice and opportunity for a hearing,” 17 U. S. C.
§802(i) (emphasis added).
4
A month before the for-cause re-
moval protection was restored to the Federal Reserve Act,
——————
3
The Court characterizes the one line in Reagan and Shurtleff as not
dicta, but a holding. Ante, at 20. It was dicta. Both cases were decided
on other grounds: Reagan upheld a removal because the statute refer-
enced an empty set of statutory protections, 182 U. S., at 425–427, and
Shurtleff upheld a removal because the statute did not in “clear and ex-
plicit language” limit the President’s power to remove for reasons beyond
the statute, 189 U. S., at 315. The one line that the Court relies on con-
cerned two categories of statutes that were not before the Court in either
case.
4
Other examples abound. See 5 U. S. C. §7521 (limiting agency’s
power to effect “a removal” of an administrative law judge to “good cause
established and determined by the Merits Systems Protection Board on
the record after opportunity for hearing before the Board”); 10 U. S. C.
§942(c) (“Judges [of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces] may be
removed from office by the President, upon notice and hearing, for—(1)
neglect of duty; (2) misconduct; or (3) mental or physical disability”); 15
U. S. C. §7217(d)(3) (“The Commission may . . . remove from office . . . a
member of the Board, if the Commission finds, on the record, after notice

23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Congress provided that members of the National Labor Re-
lations Board would serve “for a term of five years” unless
“removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for ne-
glect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Act of July 5, 1935,
§3(a), 49 Stat. 451 (emphasis added). Congress also enacted
——————
and opportunity for a hearing, that such member” met certain criteria);
16 U. S. C. §1852(b)(6)(B) (“The Secretary may remove for cause any
member . . . found by the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for
a hearing . . . to have committed an act prohibited by section 1857(1)(O)
of this title”); 22 U. S. C. §4106(e) (“The Chairperson may remove any
other Board member, upon written notice, for corruption, neglect of duty,
malfeasance, or demonstrated incapacity to perform his or her functions,
established at a hearing, except where the right to a hearing is waived
in writing”); §4135(d) (“The Secretary of State may, upon written notice,
remove a Board member for corruption, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or
demonstrated incapacity to perform his or her functions, established at
a hearing (unless the right to a hearing is waived in writing by the Board
member)”); 26 U. S. C. §7443(f ) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be re-
moved by the President, after notice and opportunity for public hearing,
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other
cause”); 28 U. S. C. §152(e) (“Before any order of removal may be entered,
a full specification of charges shall be furnished to such bankruptcy judge
who shall be accorded an opportunity to be heard on such charges”);
§176(b) (“Before any order of removal may be entered, a full specification
of the charges shall be furnished to the judge involved, and such judge
shall be accorded an opportunity to be heard on the charges”); §631(i)
(“Before any order or removal shall be entered, a full specification of the
charges shall be furnished to the magistrate judge, and he shall be ac-
corded by the judge or judges of the removing court, courts, council, or
councils an opportunity to be heard on the charges”); 31 U. S. C. §703(e)
(“A Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General . . . may be re-
moved at any time by . . . joint resolution of Congress, after notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, only for” five specified causes); §751(d) (“A
member may be removed by a majority of the Board . . . only for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. A member subject to
removal shall be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the
Board unless the member waives the opportunity in writing”); 38 U. S. C.
§7101(b)(2) (“Any such removal may only be made after notice and op-
portunity for hearing”); §7253(f )(2) (“Before a judge may be removed
from office under this subsection, the judge shall be provided with a full
specification of the reasons for the removal and an opportunity to be
heard”).

24 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
many other statutes, including the Federal Reserve Act,
that do not require notice or a hearing.
5
Congress of course
has many reasons not to require notice and a hearing, in-
cluding that they can cause delay and uncertainty, can
waste resources, and can empower the Judiciary at the ex-
pense of the political branches.
It is thus difficult to rationalize the Court’s interpretation
of the Federal Reserve Act in terms of ordinary meaning,
the common law, or any statutory precedents. The more
obvious rationale for the Court’s interpretation today is not
any principle of law, but instead the Court’s view of “the
Federal Reserve’s unique historical status and role.” Ante,
at 13.
c
The Court’s interpretation is also inconsistent with Arti-
cle II and the canon of constitutional avoidance.
Limits on the President’s ability to remove executive of-
ficers are unconstitutional. “Under our Constitution,” “the
‘executive power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President.’”
Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 203 (plurality opinion). “To ‘dis-
charg[e] the duties of his trust,’ the President must have
——————
5
See 12 U. S. C. §3013(a) (“Any member appointed by the President
may be removed for cause by the President”); 14 U. S. C. §309(c)(1) (“An
officer may be removed from the position of Director for cause at any
time”); 39 U. S. C. §202(a)(1) (“The Governors . . . may be removed only
for cause”); §502(a) (“The Commissioners . . . may be removed by the
President only for cause”); 48 U. S. C. §1424b (“[A] judge for the District
Court of Guam . . . shall hold office for the term of ten years . . . unless
sooner removed by the President for cause”); §1614(a) (“[T]wo judges for
the District Court of the Virgin Islands . . . shall hold office for terms of
ten years . . . unless sooner removed by the President for cause”);
§1821(b)(1) (“[A] judge for the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands . . . shall hold office for the term of ten years . . . unless sooner
removed by the President for cause”); §2121(e)(5)(B) (“The President may
remove any member of the Oversight Board only for cause”); 49 U. S. C.
§49106(c)(6)(C) (“A member appointed by the President may be removed
by the President for cause”).

25 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
the assistance of officers he can trust.” Slaughter, 609
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 36). Thus, we explained in an
opinion also released today, “the President may remove his
subordinates at will,” without cause, without notice, and
without a hearing, so long as they exercise any executive
power. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). Any statute that limits
“[t]he President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—
those who wield executive power on his behalf ” is unconsti-
tutional. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 204 (plurality opinion).
This principle admits no exceptions: “The Constitution
places all Executive power in the hands of the President.”
Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). “He and he alone is vested with ‘[t]he
executive Power’ of the United States.” Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 36). “Subordinates who exercise the President’s power
are subject to removal by him.” Ibid. In recent decades,
this Court has without fail held restrictions on the Presi-
dent’s power of removal to be unconstitutional. See Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010); Seila Law, 591 U. S. 197; Collins,
594 U. S. 220; Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 25).
The Court has not upheld a removal restriction for a prin-
cipal officer, like Cook, for nearly seven decades. See Wie-
ner v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 356 (1958) (relying on
the “philosophy of Humphrey’s Executor”); but see Slaugh-
ter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21) (overruling Humphrey’s
Executor).
The Board “unquestionably exercises executive power,
and must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive, in
whom such power is vested.” Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 27). The Board “has the power to promulgate
substantive rules that carry the force of law.” Id., at ___
(slip op., at 25); see supra, at 6–7. Cook can use her regu-
latory power, for example, to change the fees on consumer
debit-card transactions. Corner Post, 603 U. S., at 805. The
Board also has the power to impose monetary penalties,

26 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
levy assessments, and examine private books and records.
See supra, at 6–7; Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 206–207, 219
(plurality opinion). Since Cook was restored to her position,
the Board has issued many orders banning private individ-
uals from banking, punishable with civil and criminal pen-
alties. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, En-
forcement Actions (July 28, 2023), www.federalreserve.gov/
supervisionreg/enforcementactions.htm (archived at
perma.cc/UVQ4-99ZR); Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 22) (“When an agency ‘executes’ a congressional
mandate against private parties, it exercises executive
power”). The President, therefore, may remove Cook for
any reason that he wants and by any procedure that he
wants.
The President invoked the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance in asking this Court to not interpret the Federal Re-
serve Act to require notice and a hearing. See Application
26–27; Reply Brief 8. Under the canon of constitutional
avoidance, this Court does “not read the statute in a way”
that renders it “unconstitutional if we can reasonably read
it otherwise.” Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.,
606 U. S. 748, 775 (2025). So, “where a statute is suscepti-
ble of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”
United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hud-
son Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909). Thus, if the Court’s in-
terpretation of the Federal Reserve Act would render it un-
constitutional, then the Court must avoid that
interpretation so long as another interpretation is “fairly
possible.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 781
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court today upholds the constitutionality of a limita-
tion on the President’s ability to remove a principal execu-
tive officer for only the third time in American history. Its
constitutional reasoning consists of two paragraphs. The

27 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Court does not dispute that members of the Federal Re-
serve Board exercise (a great deal of ) federal executive
power. It does not dispute that any person who exercises
federal executive power must be freely removable by the
President. And it does not dispute that its holding today
contravenes those principles by preventing the President
from freely removing members of the Federal Reserve
Board. Instead, the Court endorses a contradiction: “the
Constitution vests the whole executive power in the Presi-
dent alone,” Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted), but the Board can exercise
executive power “independen[t] from Presidential control,”
ante, at 22.
The Court’s constitutional reasoning depends entirely on
an ahistorical analogy between the Board and the First and
Second Banks of the United States. See ante, at 22–23. The
problem for the Court is that the First and Second Banks
were banks with no executive power, whereas the Board is
unquestionably a federal agency that wields considerable
executive power. See supra, at 3–9. The Board does not
follow in “our Nation’s tradition of central banking” at all.
Ante, at 9; see supra, at 3–6. It is not a “bank,” ante, at 23,
but a novel “federal agency” with “broad powers affecting
the entire banking and currency system,” Cushman 153;
see supra, at 4–5. The “‘founders of our Government,’”
ante, at 22, thought that distinction was significant. Alt-
hough the Court attempts to imply otherwise, ibid., it does
not deny that the First and Second Banks of the United
States exercised no executive power.
B
The President is also likely to succeed on an independent
ground: The injunction against Cook’s removal exceeds the
limits on federal judicial authority. “Observing the limits
on judicial authority . . . is required by a judge’s oath to fol-
low the law.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S. 831, 858

28 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
(2025). The Court’s holding that Cook was entitled to an
injunction based on the Federal Reserve Act contradicts
some of its foundational precedents on the authority of the
federal courts. The Court today holds that a plaintiff may
sue to enforce federal law without a congressionally-created
right of action, contra, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
275, 286 (2001); against the sovereign without its consent,
contra, Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U. S. 682, 693 (1949); for equitable relief restoring a re-
moved officer, contra, In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210
(1888); and in a manner that intrudes upon the President’s
exclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, contra,
Trump v. United States, 603 U. S. 593, 609 (2024).
Cook lacks a right of action to enforce the terms of the
Federal Reserve Act against government officials. No
plaintiff, of course, can sue without a right of action. See
Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 286. When seeking to enforce the
terms of a federal statute, such as the Federal Reserve Act,
that plaintiff ’s right of action must come from Congress, be-
cause “Congress determines who may sue to enforce federal
law.” FS Credit v. Saba, 608 U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op.,
at 3). When seeking to enforce the terms of a federal statute
against the Government, which is otherwise immune from
suit, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the Govern-
ment clearly consented to the suit. See Larson, 337 U. S.,
at 693.
The Court does not explain how Cook has overcome these
limits to enforce the Federal Reserve Act against the Exec-
utive Branch here. All agree that Cook cannot proceed un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act, the ordinary right of
action for lawsuits against the Executive Branch, because
she does not challenge any final agency action. See 5
U. S. C. §704. The Court does not accept Cook’s argument
that she has a nonstatutory ultra vires claim—likely be-
cause such an argument would implicate threshold require-
ments that Cook cannot satisfy and merits standards that

29 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
she cannot meet. See NRC, 605 U. S., at 681 (“‘Hail Mary
pass’”). The Court does not suggest that Cook satisfies the
extraordinary standards for mandamus relief. See United
States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 582 (1899) (“clear and indis-
putable”). Instead, the Court proceeds to the merits with-
out identifying a right of action to enforce the Federal Re-
serve Act at all, let alone one that overcomes sovereign
immunity. The Court appears satisfied that Congress did
not expressly “exempt the President’s removal of Governors
for cause from judicial review.” Ante, at 10. “But federal
courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive
Branch; they resolve cases and controversies consistent
with the authority Congress has given them.” CASA, 606
U. S., at 861.
6
——————
6
In a footnote, the Court hypothesizes that Cook can enforce the terms
of the Federal Reserve Act in “ ‘equity.’ ” Ante, at 16, n. 2. But federal
statutory terms do not by their own force create a right to bring free-
standing claims in equity. Instead, “[l]ike substantive federal law itself,
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Con-
gress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286 (2001).
To bring a pre-enforcement equitable claim of the sort that the Court
describes, Cook would have to show that her suit seeks to stop an official
from committing “tortious conduct” against her, such as an imminent
unconstitutional enforcement action. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S.
831, 846, n. 9 (2025). Cook made no such showing here, and the Court
does not suggest otherwise.
Likewise, when a plaintiff brings a claim in equity against federal of-
ficials, this Court requires the plaintiff to make four additional showings
that Cook cannot satisfy here: The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant “has taken action entirely in excess of its delegated powers,”
that the defendant’s action is “contrary to a specific prohibition in a stat-
ute,” that no “statutory review scheme provides aggrieved persons with
a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review,” and that no
“statutory review scheme forecloses all other forms of judicial review.”
NRC v. Texas, 605 U. S. 665, 681 (2025) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted; emphasis deleted). The Court has described such an equitable claim
as a “Hail Mary pass” that “rarely succeeds.” Id., at 681–682 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court also waives these requirements for
Cook.

30 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Even if Cook had a right of action that overcame sover-
eign immunity, this Court’s precedents would foreclose the
preliminary injunction that she obtained here. The District
Court issued a preliminary injunction, which is an equita-
ble remedy. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Al-
liance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 318–319 (1999). The
equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to “only
those sorts of equitable remedies traditionally accorded by
courts of equity at our country’s inception.” CASA, 606
U. S., at 841 (internal quotation marks omitted). Tradition-
ally, courts of equity could not grant injunctions to wrongly
removed officers to restore them to office. “No principle of
the law of injunctions, and perhaps no doctrine of equity
jurisprudence is more definitely fixed or more clearly estab-
lished than that courts of equity will not interfere by injunc-
tion to determine questions concerning the appointment of
public officers or their title to office.” 2 J. High, Law of In-
junctions §1312, p. 863 (2d ed. 1880).
This Court has therefore long held, in categorical terms,
that “a court of equity” “has no jurisdiction” over “the re-
moval of public officers.” In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., at 210.
“ ‘[A] court of equity will not, by injunction, restrain an ex-
ecutive officer from making a wrongful removal.’” White v.
Berry, 171 U. S. 366, 377 (1898); accord, Harkrader v.
Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 165 (1898) (“The general rule, both
in England and in this country, is that courts of equity have
no jurisdiction . . . over the appointment and removal of
public officers”). Under this Court’s precedents, the District
Court therefore lacked authority to enter the relief it pro-
vided: a “preliminary injunction” allowing Cook to exercise
official powers after the President removed her. 804
F. Supp. 3d, at 44.
The Court now reads the categorical statements in our
precedents to apply to only “fina[l]” injunctive relief, not “in-
terim” injunctive relief. Ante, at 16. The Court’s newfound

31 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
distinction does not make sense. “The standard for a pre-
liminary injunction is essentially the same as for a perma-
nent injunction.” Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480
U. S. 531, 546, n. 12 (1987); accord, Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 32 (2008). In-
terim injunctive relief is still an exercise of “jurisdiction” in
“equity,” so it does not reach “the removal of public officers.”
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., at 210. The Court’s distinction is
also foreclosed by our own precedent, which holds that “the
authority to issue interim injunctive relief . . . was held
lacking in cases such as White v. Berry.” Sampson v. Mur-
ray, 415 U. S. 61, 72 (1974) (emphasis added). White and
Sawyer govern “all equitable relief.” 415 U. S., at 83. The
Court is therefore incorrect that “[n]either case holds that
equity is unavailable in the interim.” Ante, at 16.
Finally, even if she had a right of action, a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, and a basis for equitable relief, Cook
would not be entitled to prevail because she challenges the
removal of an executive officer by the President. Just two
Terms ago, this Court said that both Congress and the Ju-
diciary lack the power to impede the President’s removal of
his own executive officers. The President’s “‘power to re-
move—and thus supervise—those who wield executive
power’” is within his “ ‘conclusive and preclusive’” constitu-
tional authority, no different from his power to issue par-
dons or Congress’s power to impeach. Trump, 603 U. S., at
608–609; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579, 638, and n. 4 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(describing the President’s “exclusive power of removal in
executive agencies” as “conclusive and preclusive”). Even
“Congress cannot act on” the “President’s actions on sub-
jects within his ‘conclusive and preclusive’ constitutional
authority,” including his removal decisions. Trump, 603
U. S., at 609. Likewise, “courts cannot examine” removal
decisions falling within that same authority. Ibid. Thus,
“once it is determined that the President acted within the

32 TRUMP v. COOK
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
scope of his exclusive authority,” as he did here, “his discre-
tion in exercising such authority cannot be subject to fur-
ther judicial examination.” Id., at 608.
Today’s decision is an unprecedented incursion on the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Neither the parties nor the Court can point
to a single time in American history that this Court has up-
held an injunction against the President’s removal of an ex-
ecutive officer. In the 237-year history of our Constitution,
this Court has, by all accounts, never done so. See Bessent
v. Dellinger, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (G
ORSUCH, J., dissent-
ing from order holding application in abeyance) (slip op., at
4) (recounting the lack of historical precedent for such an
order).
III
Finally, the balance of harms and equities also favors the
President. “[T]he Government faces greater risk of harm
from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exer-
cising the executive power than a wrongfully removed of-
ficer faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty.”
Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 1).
The equities in this case are relevantly similar to the equi-
ties in every removal case in which the Court has granted a
stay. See ibid.; Trump v. Boyle, 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(slip op., at 1); Trump v. Slaughter, 606 U. S. ___ (2025).
The Government also suffers irreparable harm from all “in-
junctions that likely exceed the authority” of the federal
courts. CASA, 606 U. S., at 860.
The Court offers many policy arguments for an “inde-
pendent” Federal Reserve Board. Ante, at 5; accord, ante,
at 23; ante, at 2 (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring) (explaining
that the “Federal Reserve’s independence” prevents “politi-
cal upheaval” and “turmoil in the U. S. and world econo-
mies” and promotes the “efficacy of U. S. monetary policy”).
As the Court tells it, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has for the past century served to provide

33 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
the American people with “‘stable prices,’” “‘maximum em-
ployment,’” no “ruinous financial panics,” and a banking
system free from “‘suspicion.’” Ante, at 3, 5, 14. The Court
credits this century of supposed success to the Board’s “in-
dependence” from the President, and, in turn, the voters—
the “‘common people’” who play the antagonist in the
Court’s account of the 19th century. Ante, at 4.
Many do not share the Court’s rosy appraisal of the past
century. But if the Court prefers an independent Federal
Reserve Board, then its issue is not with the President but
with the Constitution. Regardless of whether unaccounta-
ble executive officers like Cook would better govern the
economy, the Framers rejected such a “promised land of
technocratic governance.” Slaughter, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 24); see A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 86–
88, 233–235 (H. Mansfield & D. Winthrop transl. 2000).
They instead chose government by the people. As a court,
our duty is not to second-guess that decision, but to uphold
it.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of the stay applica-
tion.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dis-
senting.
This case presents many thorny legal questions. What is
the substance of the “for cause” removal standard as ap-
plied to Federal Reserve Governors? 12 U. S. C. §242. Do
Governors have an implied right of action to enforce that
removal protection? See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
275, 286–287 (2001). What degree of judicial review, if any,
applies to the President’s determination that cause exists?
See Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901).
What showing of “irreparable injury,” if any, can entitle a
removed executive officer to an interim reinstatement or-
der? See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 84, 92, n. 68
(1974). Does the President’s social-media post purporting
to remove Governor Cook give her standing to seek an in-
junction against parties who never attempted to effectuate
her removal? See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595
U. S. 30, 48 (2021). May courts, consistent with Articles II
and III of the Constitution, countermand the President’s at-
tempted removal of a principal executive officer? See
Trump v. United States, 603 U. S. 593, 608–609 (2024). Can
the President appeal an injunction that no enjoined party
challenges?

2 TRUMP v. COOK
A
LITO, J., dissenting
Some of these questions present issues of first impres-
sion, and many of them lack obvious answers. More im-
portant, the lower courts in this case have passed on very
few of these issues and have done so in a preliminary and
rushed fashion. We often say that “we are a court of review,
not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
n. 7 (2005), but the Court has strayed far from that oft-re-
peated maxim here.
What is before us is simply an application for a stay pend-
ing appeal, and the Court should have granted or denied
that application in a brief order last fall. The nascency of
this lawsuit and the novelty of the issues that it presents
militated against holding oral argument and issuing a com-
prehensive opinion at this juncture. Rather than resolving
several challenging and underdeveloped issues at this early
stage of the litigation, I would decide this application solely
on the two issues that the District Court addressed. And
because the District Court resolved those issues incorrectly,
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of a stay.
I
A summary of this case’s history illustrates the impru-
dence of how the Court has handled this application. The
President purported to remove Governor Cook from office
on August 25, and on August 28, she filed suit against the
President, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
and its chairman, Jerome Powell.
After 12 days, one round of temporary-restraining-order
briefing, and a single hearing, the District Court issued a
preliminary injunction that barred Powell and the Board of
Governors from effectuating the President’s attempted re-
moval of Cook. The court rested its order on two grounds:
The President’s allegations were not “cause” to remove
Cook because they pertained to “conduct before she began
serving on the Federal Reserve Board,” 804 F. Supp. 3d 14,
32–33 (DC 2025), and the President violated the Due

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., dissenting
Process Clause by failing to provide Cook sufficient preter-
mination process, id., at 33–39. The President appealed
and moved to stay the injunction in the Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit. Four days later, that court denied the
motion, relying only on Cook’s due process claim. Order in
No. 25–5326 (Sept. 15, 2025), App. 1a–7a (Garcia, J., joined
by Childs, J., concurring) (Order). The President then ap-
plied for a stay from this Court.
When that application arrived here, this litigation was
just 21 days old. There had been only two rounds of abbre-
viated briefing below and no meaningful development of a
factual record. Indeed, the record does not even contain
copies of Cook’s allegedly fraudulent mortgage applications.
Of course, parties may appropriately seek (and courts
may appropriately grant) stays early in a litigation. No
court, including this Court, should sit on its hands when
interim relief is appropriate. But this does not mean that
the Court must reach out to opine on each issue that could
conceivably arise in a case’s future. Here, the incipiency of
this case and the complexity of the issues that it presents
counseled in favor of a light touch by this Court, regardless
of whether we granted or denied the application. To that
end, the Court should have resolved the President’s appli-
cation shortly after we received it. And in doing so, we
should have focused on the few issues that the courts ad-
dressed below. If a majority had desired, we could have is-
sued a statement explaining our decision. That is exactly
how we have handled nearly all our stay applications in re-
cent years.
Had we adhered to this well-worn path and decided this
application in October, the parties could have continued lit-
igating this case in the lower courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Mills,
No. 21A83 (Oct. 19, 2021) (Breyer, J., in chambers) (denying
stay without prejudice to reapply after the lower court is-
sues a final decision). By now, the District Court might well
have granted summary judgment for one of the parties,

4 TRUMP v. COOK
A
LITO, J., dissenting
providing a fuller exposition of the relevant facts and legal
issues. Or perhaps the D. C. Circuit would have resolved
an expedited appeal. Although the panel performed admi-
rably given the four days that it had to decide the Presi-
dent’s stay motion, nobody can doubt that the panel would
have produced more comprehensive opinions if it had even
a fraction of the 280-plus days that this Court has spent
with the case. Either way, this Court could have reentered
the fray when we inevitably granted certiorari.
Instead, the Court departed from its normal practice and
“deferred” ruling on this application, bringing proceedings
in the lower courts to a 9-month standstill. 606 U. S. 1062
(2025). We then ordered the parties to submit more briefing
than they had filed at any other point in this litigation. In
January, we held oral argument, marking just the second
in-court proceeding in this entire suit. The Court now is-
sues a full-length opinion that purports to resolve many
complicated and novel legal questions on an underdevel-
oped record while ignoring lurking jurisdictional issues.
“Either out of humility or out of self-respect (one or the
other), the Court should decline to answer” these “incredi-
bly difficult” questions in this case’s current posture. PGA
TOUR, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U. S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
II
I would grant the application because, within the narrow
confines of this case’s posture, the President has satisfied
the traditional stay factors.
Consider first the President’s likelihood of success on the
merits. If the Court were to grant certiorari at this stage of
the litigation, we would normally limit our consideration to
the specific issues on which the courts below passed. See
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S.
155, 175 (2004). Those issues are (1) whether removal “for
cause” is limited to removal for in-office conduct, and

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
A
LITO, J., dissenting
(2) whether the President’s attempt to remove Cook vio-
lated the Due Process Clause.
On those two issues, the courts below were incorrect. As
the majority and J
USTICE THOMAS apparently agree, the
District Court erred in holding that removal “for cause”
means removal only for “events that have occurred while
[the officer is] in office.” 804 F. Supp. 3d, at 30; see ante, at
11–15; ante, at 14–16 (dissenting opinion). And as J
USTICE
THOMAS and Judge Katsas have explained, Cook lacks a
private property interest in her seat on the Board of Gover-
nors. See ante, at 14; Order 16a–19a (Katsas, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, the President’s attempt to remove her could not
have violated the Due Process Clause. See American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U. S. 40, 59 (1999) (“Only af-
ter finding the deprivation of a protected interest do we look
to see if the [defendant’s] procedures comport with due pro-
cess”).
Because the courts below resolved these two issues incor-
rectly, I would conclude that the President has shown a
likelihood that we would reverse at this preliminary stage,
leaving all other issues to be developed on remand in the
first instance.* As to the remaining stay factors, this Court
has held that they are satisfied when a lower court counter-
mands the President’s removal of a principal executive
——————
*The Court claims that this disposition would have left “the public in
limbo” and “sow[n] doubt as to the status of one of our Nation’s (and the
world’s) most important financial institutions.” Ante, at 24. See also
ante, at 2–3 (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring). But granting a stay on the
ground set out above would have had no such effect. It would have
simply returned the case to the courts below so that the ligation could
continue in the normal course. That disposition would not have signaled
any view on the question whether the Constitution permits Congress to
restrict a President’s authority to remove a member of the Federal Re-
serve’s Board of Governors. That question is indeed important and sen-
sitive, but it is not before us in this case because the Government does
not challenge the constitutionality of the statutory restriction on the
President’s power to remove Governor Cook.

6 TRUMP v. COOK
A
LITO, J., dissenting
officer. See Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip
op., at 1–2). A stay is therefore warranted here.
***
I respectfully dissent.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A312
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, APPLICANT v. LISA D. COOK, MEMBER
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 29, 2026]
JUSTICE BARRETT, dissenting.
The Court chooses to answer a series of difficult merits
questions, most of which were not addressed by the D. C.
Circuit below or almost any other court before today. See
ante, at 1 (A
LITO, J., dissenting). What kind of “cause” must
the President assert before he can remove Lisa Cook from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve? Does the
statute require that he afford her process? If so, what kind?
Can she challenge her removal by asserting an ultra vires
claim? May a court issue a preliminary injunction to keep
her in office during the litigation? And then, the biggest
issue: Is the removal restriction in the Federal Reserve Act
constitutional?
All these questions are complicated and important, but
the last is in a league of its own. And unlike the other is-
sues, the constitutional status of the Federal Reserve is en-
tirely outside the scope of this case. The Government ex-
pressly waived any constitutional challenge to the removal
restriction, so the parties did not brief it. Application 2, n. 1
(“This application does not contest the constitutionality of
the Federal Reserve Board’s for-cause removal provision”);
see also Reply Brief 13; Supp. Brief for Applicant 1. And
the lower courts approached this case from the start on the
assumption that the removal restriction is consistent with

2 TRUMP v. COOK
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
Article II. We ordinarily do not jump ahead of the lower
courts to decide waived issues. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005); cf. Trump v. Illinois, 607 U. S.
___ (2025) (reaching an issue of statutory interpretation de-
cided by the District Court and addressed by the parties in
supplemental briefing). Nonetheless, the Court raises and
settles the constitutional issue—and does so based on a con-
clusory analogy to the First and Second Banks of the United
States. Ante, at 22–23.
Even assuming that the Court is right on the merits, the
issue warrants much more than a few paragraphs. As
J
USTICE THOMAS points out, the differences between the
Federal Reserve and our early national banks are more sig-
nificant than the majority lets on. Ante, at 3–6, 27 (dissent-
ing opinion); see also A. Bamzai & A. Nielson, Article II and
the Federal Reserve, 109 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 905–908
(2024); L. Menand, The Unitary Executive and the Federal
Reserve, 94 Ford. L. Rev. 2089, 2119–2121 (2026). And the
Court’s holding is in serious tension with Trump v. Slaugh-
ter, which we also decide today. ___ U. S. ___ (2026).
Slaughter announces a categorical rule: Whenever “an
agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private
parties, it exercises executive power” and must be subject
to plenary executive control—“no ifs, ands, or quasis about
it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22). Yet here, the Court claims a
special exception “‘sanctioned by history’” and based on the
Federal Reserve’s role in setting monetary policy. Ante,
at 24. How can history support both a categorical rule and
a carveout? See Slaughter, ___ U. S., at ___ (S
OTOMAYOR,
J., dissenting) (slip op., at 46). Do all the Federal Reserve’s
existing regulatory powers have the requisite connection to
monetary policy? If not, are they grandfathered in? Cf.
ante, at 23, n. 6 (opinion of the Court) (“In upholding the
constitutionality of the Federal Reserve as currently struc-
tured and with its existing enforcement authorities, we do
not suggest that Congress could assign the Federal Reserve

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
additional regulatory powers that are attenuated from
monetary policy” (emphasis added)). And is the Federal Re-
serve unique, or might history sanction other exceptions
too? The Court does not say.
For present purposes, though, the most significant prob-
lem is that the Court decides this issue at all—not to men-
tion the many others covered in its opinion. While a modest
approach would have been appropriate, the Court chooses
to go big. Its opinion sets precedent on a series of important
issues, with implications that extend well beyond this case.
I agree with J
USTICE ALITO that the Court should have
limited itself to the issues supporting the District Court’s
injunction. Ante, at 4–5 (dissenting opinion). Addressing
these errors would have permitted the litigation to proceed,
and the lower courts could have taken first cut at the many
other difficult and novel legal issues. Had the Court de-
clined to go further, it may never have needed to reach
those other issues anyway. For instance, if the President
ultimately satisfied the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U. S. C.
§242, the Court may never have needed to address whether
Cook could assert an ultra vires claim.
Putting aside my difficulties with the opinion’s scope,
there is a disconnect between its holding and its disposition
line. The Court does not rule out mortgage fraud as suffi-
cient cause for removal under §242; instead, it denies a stay
on the “narrow groun[d]” that the President has not yet pro-
vided Cook enough process. Ante, at 17. The President re-
mains free to “tr[y] again,” the Court says, so long as he
gives Cook proper notice and an opportunity to respond.
Ante, at 25–26, and n. 8.
But if the Court wanted to leave the President in that po-
sition, it should not have denied the stay. Recall that the
District Court held that Cook’s alleged mortgage fraud, as
pre-office conduct, does not constitute cause for removal un-
der §242. 804 F. Supp. 3d 14, 30 (DC 2025) (“[T]he Court
finds that permissible cause for removal of a Federal

4 TRUMP v. COOK
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
Reserve Governor extends only to concerns about the Board
member’s ability to effectively and faithfully execute their
statutory duties, in light of events that have occurred while
they are in office”). So it entered a preliminary injunction
barring defendants Jerome Powell and the Board of Gover-
nors “from effectuating in any manner Plaintiff’s removal
from her position as a member of the Board of Governors on
the basis of the grounds stated in the President’s letter of
August 25, 2025.” App. to Application 23a (emphasis
added). The President’s letter clearly stated those
“grounds”: “[T]here is sufficient reason to believe you may
have made false statements on one or more mortgage agree-
ments.” See Attachment to Complaint in No. 1:25–cv–
02903 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1–3, p. 2. As it stands, then, the
President has no way to remove Cook for her alleged mort-
gage fraud. That is true even if he gives Cook a full-blown
judicial trial (process far exceeding what the Court re-
quires, ante, at 18–19), and satisfies the Court’s “substan-
tial threshold for ‘cause’” (by demonstrating that the mort-
gage fraud truly implies an unfitness for the office, ante,
at 14).
To get around this problem, the Court adopts an implau-
sibly narrow reading of the injunction: It interprets the in-
junction “to forbid the implementation of ‘the President’s
letter of August 25’ in which he purported to fire Cook—but
not to forbid the President from trying again, if he chooses
to do so.” Ante, at 26, n. 8. In other words, the injunction
stops the President from “firing her by that letter,” not “fir-
ing her for mortgage fraud.” But that is simply not what
the injunction says. It forbids Cook’s removal based on “the
grounds” stated in the President’s August 25th letter—i.e.,
mortgage fraud. And the D. C. Circuit’s order denying the
stay left that broad injunction in place—as does the Court’s.
We have repeatedly found that the President suffers ir-
reparable harm when he is barred from firing a subordi-
nate. See Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
op., at 1); Trump v. Boyle, 606 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op.,
at 1). In my view, that harm is somewhat lessened here
because the Government has conceded for purposes of this
litigation that the President cannot remove Cook or any
other member of the Board of Governors for policy reasons.
See Application 26. Still, the District Court’s order blocks
the President from removing Cook for mortgage fraud, and
that is so even if he satisfies the requirements that the
Court’s opinion sets out. Under our precedent, that signifi-
cant interference with the President’s removal authority
clears the “irreparable harm” threshold.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the denial
of the stay application.