Whitton v. Dixon

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GARY RICHARD WHITTON v. RICKY D. DIXON,
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–580. Decided June 1, 2026
PER CURIAM.
A Florida jury convicted petitioner Gary Richard Whitton
of murder and sentenced him to death. During his trial, the
State called several witnesses, including a jailhouse inform-
ant named Jake Ozio. Ozio was a high school student who,
on a spring-break trip in Florida, was arrested and jailed
for burglary and possession of a short-barrel shotgun. Ozio
testified that, while he was incarcerated with Whitton, he
overheard Whitton confess to “ ‘stabb[ing] the bastard.’”
Whitton v. Secretary, Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 2025 WL
1305158, *2 (CA11, May 6, 2025) (per curiam). Ozio also
testified that he had no criminal history prior to his spring-
break arrest. That last piece of testimony turned out to be
false. Ozio’s juvenile records—which the State had in its
possession at the time—showed that he had previously
been charged with “assault with bodily injury against his
father, terroristic threats against his mother, and at least
one other burglary.” Id., at *15.
After unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal and state
postconviction relief, Whitton filed an application for a writ
of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Among other
claims, he argued that Ozio’s criminal-history testimony
was false, that the prosecution knew the testimony was
false, and that there was a reasonable likelihood the testi-
mony affected the jury’s verdict. Whitton claimed that, as
a result, his due process rights had been violated under this
Court’s decision in Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150

2 WHITTON v. DIXON
Per Curiam
(1972). And he contended, as was additionally necessary
for federal habeas relief, that the Giglio error had a “‘sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 623
(1993). The District Court denied relief, finding that any
Giglio error “could not have made a difference” to the jury’s
verdict because Florida juvenile criminal records are gener-
ally inadmissible to attack a witness’s credibility. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 79a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
but on different reasoning.
1
The court agreed with Whitton
that Ozio’s criminal-history testimony was false, and that
the State knew it to be false. Moreover, the court disagreed
with the District Court’s conclusion that any Giglio viola-
tion was harmless because of Florida evidence rules about
juvenile records. That conclusion, the Court of Appeals ex-
plained, was “erroneous” because Florida courts admit such
records when a witness opens the door to prior convic-
tions—including by stating that he has none. 2025 WL
1305158, *16. And “impeachment concerning Ozio’s juve-
nile record,” the Court of Appeals concluded, “would have
undermined [Ozio’s] credibility.” Ibid. So the court “[could
not] affirm the district court’s decision on its finding of
harmless error.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals then considered whether to affirm
on another basis advanced by the State: that Whitton was
not prejudiced by any Giglio error because Ozio’s testimony
as a whole (not just the false part) was immaterial to the
jury’s verdict. The court explained that the Florida Su-
preme Court had made a determination relevant to that is-
sue during Whitton’s state postconviction proceedings.
There, the Florida Supreme Court had stated that, even
without Ozio’s testimony, the evidence against Whitton was
——————
1
We describe here only the brief part of the Court of Appeals’ lengthy
opinion relevant to the issue at hand.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
“overwhelming.” Whitton v. State, 161 So. 3d 313, 334
(2014). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, the Court of Appeals owed deference to
that state court determination unless it was “‘based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented.’” 2025 WL 1305158, *7 (quoting 28
U. S. C. §2254(d)(2)); see 2025 WL 1305158, *17. That
meant the key question for the Court of Appeals was
whether the Florida Supreme Court’s determination about
the rest of the evidence was a reasonable one.
To answer that question, the Court of Appeals did some-
thing peculiar: It considered not only the evidence that was
presented to the jury at Whitton’s trial, but also evidence
the jury never saw. The evidence in question relates to
blood stains on Whitton’s boots, which were seized the day
after the murder. At Whitton’s trial, an analyst from the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement testified that the
DNA in the blood stains matched neither the victim’s nor
Whitton’s. A decade after Whitton was convicted, however,
the State ran another DNA test on the blood stains—and
this time, the results revealed a match with the victim’s
DNA. Even though that new DNA evidence was not pre-
sented at Whitton’s trial, the Court of Appeals took account
of it when analyzing the Florida Supreme Court’s determi-
nation. In describing the evidence that supported that de-
termination, the Court of Appeals related that Whitton’s
boots “were stained with blood that, after later retesting,
matched [the victim]’s DNA.” Id., at *18.
2
And in rebutting
——————
2
The sentence describing the evidence refers in full to the following:
“the motel clerk saw Whitton’s car parked at the motel, and Whitton ad-
mitted he was at the motel; Whitton’s boots and his car were stained with
blood that, after later retesting, matched [the victim]’s DNA; the blood
stains on and inside Whitton’s boots are consistent with ‘a stabbing or a
beating’; Whitton could not explain the downward blood spatter on the
inside of his boots; and Whitton’s car contained a power and gas receipt
and a car wash ticket for 2:37 a.m. October 10, 1990, the night of the
murder.” 2025 WL 1305158, *18.

4 WHITTON v. DIXON
Per Curiam
Whitton’s arguments (some of which it thought a jury “may
well find” “persuasive”), the court again commented on the
new DNA evidence. Ibid. Specifically, it observed that, “af-
ter retesting the DNA on Whitton’s boots,” the State “con-
firmed that the inside of Whitton’s right boot contained
blood” with DNA “matching the DNA profile of [the victim].”
Id., at *19 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In short,”
the court said, “the blood-splatter evidence ties Whitton di-
rectly and firmly to [the victim]’s murder.” Ibid. After con-
sidering that post-trial DNA evidence (in addition to the
trial evidence), the Court of Appeals held that it was not
“unreasonable for the State court to conclude” that even
without any of Ozio’s testimony “there was ‘overwhelming
evidence against Whitton.’” Ibid. (quoting Whitton, 161 So.
3d, at 334). And so the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial
of habeas relief.
We vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment because that
court should not have considered the post-trial DNA evi-
dence in assessing whether the Florida Supreme Court rea-
sonably determined that Ozio’s testimony was immaterial
to the jury’s verdict. Because the post-trial DNA evidence
was not presented to the jury (indeed, did not exist at the
time of the trial), that evidence could not have influenced
the jury’s verdict. It therefore sheds no light on whether (or
to what extent) Ozio’s testimony influenced that verdict.
See Brecht, 507 U. S., at 623 (“[T]he standard for determin-
ing whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the
[constitutional] error had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict” (emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted)). The Florida Su-
preme Court did not consider the post-trial DNA evidence
in making its determination, and the Court of Appeals
should not have done so in evaluating that determination
either. We express no view on whether the Florida Su-
preme Court’s determination was reasonable in light of the
evidence that was presented at trial. That is for the Court

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
of Appeals to assess in the first instance. We likewise ex-
press no view on the State’s argument that Whitton failed
to exhaust his Giglio claim in the state courts. The Court
of Appeals “[did] not address” that argument because it con-
cluded that “the claim fails on the merits,” 2025 WL
1305158, *15, n. 10, and we are “a court of review, not of
first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7
(2005). The Court of Appeals is of course free to address
that argument on remand. We therefore grant the petition
for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GARY RICHARD WHITTON v. RICKY D. DIXON,
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–580. Decided June 1, 2026
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins except
as to Part III–B, dissenting.
A Florida jury convicted Gary Whitton of stabbing his
friend to death. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected his
motion for a new trial because of the “overwhelming evi-
dence against” him. Whitton v. State, 161 So. 3d 314, 334
(2014) (per curiam). When Whitton challenged his convic-
tion in federal court, the District Court denied his habeas
petition, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a 64-page
opinion. This Court now vacates the Eleventh Circuit’s
judgment because of one-and-a-half sentences in its opin-
ion. In rejecting one of Whitton’s claims—which would fail
on other grounds anyway—the Eleventh Circuit mentioned
a fact that was notable but certainly not dispositive to its
analysis: DNA testing had since further confirmed that
Whitton is guilty. Because the Eleventh Circuit mentioned
that fact, this Court summarily vacates. I respectfully dis-
sent.
I
A
On the night of October 9, 1990, Gary Whitton murdered
his friend James Maulden. Maulden, who was intoxicated,
asked Whitton to drive him to a bank. Whitton helped
Maulden withdraw his account’s entire balance, $1,135.88,
and drove them to a motel. At check-in, Whitton gave the
motel clerk a false license plate number for his car, but the

2 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
clerk noticed that Whitton was lying and recorded the cor-
rect number. Because Maulden was still intoxicated when
they arrived, Whitton helped him from the car to his room.
The next morning, the police found Maulden dead in his
room. He had suffered a fractured skull, three fatal stab
wounds to his chest, and stab wounds to his shoulder,
cheek, neck, scalp, and back. Blood had sprayed all over
the floor, furniture, walls, and ceiling.
The license plate from the car at the motel led the police
to Whitton. He told the police that he had dropped Maulden
off at the motel, but he initially denied having returned
later that night. He eventually admitted that this story was
a lie and that he had returned to the room, but he then
claimed that Maulden was already dead when he arrived.
The police arrested Whitton and seized, among other
things, his boots.
Whitton’s boots had blood spatter in them consistent with
a stabbing that created “‘forceful bloodshed.’” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 4a; see Tr. of State Court Proceedings in Whitton
v. Secretary, Fla. Dept. of Corrections, No. 4:15–cv–00200
(ND Fla.), ECF Doc. 73–2, p. 927. Whitton hypothesized
that the blood had seeped upwards into his socks through
the bottom of his boots when he happened upon Maulden’s
already-dead body. But, the blood spatter showed that
Maulden was again lying: The blood had flowed downward.
See ibid.; App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a.
1
At trial, the State introduced even more evidence against
Whitton. At 2:37 a.m. on the night of Maulden’s murder,
Whitton purchased a car wash ticket. The day after the
murder, Whitton paid off hundreds of dollars’ worth of debt.
And, two witnesses—Jake Ozio and Kenneth McCullough—
testified that Whitton confessed to the murder. When Ozio
——————
1
The police could not examine Whitton’s socks because, as
Whitton admitted, he had thrown them out the window of his car
after he left the motel.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
gave that testimony, he denied that he had been arrested
before.
The evidence at trial also included the blood spatter that
the police discovered. The blood found in Whitton’s boots
matched Maulden’s blood type but not Whitton’s. Whitton’s
car also contained blood that matched Maulden’s blood
type. But, Whitton called a DNA analyst who said that the
blood on the boots did not match Maulden’s DNA.
Whitton took the stand in his own defense. He testified
that he gave a false license plate number to the motel be-
cause he was worried about being held liable for any dam-
age that Maulden caused. He testified that he did not know
how much money Maulden had withdrawn and that he re-
ceived $200 from someone else around the same time. He
testified that he returned to the motel late that night be-
cause a friend had told him that Maulden’s mother was
looking for him. And, he testified that he fled the scene af-
ter only a minute, without calling the police, because he was
in shock and did not want to get involved. As to the blood
in his boots, Whitton continued to claim that he “assume[d]
that it would have gotten on the bottom of [the boots]
through the holes in the bottom of them.” ECF Doc. 73–3,
p. 127.
Whitton’s story to the jury quickly fell apart. When the
prosecutor asked why the blood had flowed downward in
the boots, Whitton testified, “I don’t know how it got there.”
Id., at 128. When the prosecutor asked about the blood
spots in his car, Whitton testified that they “could have
been there when [he] bought the car . . . I have no idea.” Id.,
at 141. When the prosecutor asked about the bank with-
drawal, Whitton admitted that he had signed Maulden’s
form to withdraw money and that he knew that Maulden
was withdrawing the entire account. And, although Whit-
ton testified that he had called Maulden’s mother repeat-
edly, she testified at trial that she was at home the entire

4 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
afternoon and evening and never received a call from Whit-
ton.
The jury convicted Whitton of murdering and robbing
Maulden. It unanimously recommended a death sentence.
The trial court sentenced Whitton to death, and the Su-
preme Court of Florida affirmed. Whitton v. State, 649
So. 2d 861 (1994) (per curiam).
In 2002, the State retested the blood on Whitton’s boots
and confirmed that it belonged to Maulden. Contrary to
Whitton’s DNA analyst’s testimony at trial, the blood in the
right boot matched the “‘DNA profile of James Maulden.’”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a, n. 5. The testing also identified
Maulden as a DNA contributor to blood found on the left
boot.
B
Whitton filed a motion for postconviction relief in state
court in 1997. As relevant here, Whitton brought a claim
under Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972). To suc-
ceed on a Giglio claim, a defendant must prove that the
prosecutor presented false testimony against him; that the
prosecutor knew that the testimony was false; and that
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the false testimony
affected the verdict. Id., at 154 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Whitton’s Giglio claim was based on testimony
about his confession to Ozio. Whitton argued that Ozio had
falsely testified “that Whitton confessed to him in prison”;
that the State knew that the testimony was false; and that
the false testimony was material. Whitton, 161 So. 3d, at
323. He did not make any claims about Ozio’s description
of his own criminal record.
The Supreme Court of Florida denied Whitton’s motion
for postconviction relief. It concluded that Whitton had
failed to show either that Ozio’s testimony about Whitton’s
confession was false or that the prosecutor knew that it was
false. Id., at 323–324. The court also rejected a separate

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
claim regarding other testimony. In so doing, the court re-
lied on the “overwhelming evidence against Whitton” pre-
sented at trial even apart from his confessions. Id., at 334.
It did not rely on the DNA test results from 2002 confirming
that the blood on Whitton’s boot was Maulden’s.
C
Whitton then petitioned a federal court for a writ of ha-
beas corpus. A state prisoner generally cannot receive fed-
eral habeas relief based on claims that he did not present
in state court. Instead, before bringing a claim in habeas,
he must have “exhausted the remedies available” in state
court. 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A). And, for a “claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” the
federal court may not grant relief unless the state-court de-
cision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts.” §2254(d). Un-
der these strict standards, a federal court cannot grant ha-
beas relief unless the state court “blundered so badly that
every fairminded jurist would disagree with the decision.”
Klein v. Martin, 607 U. S. 213, 221 (2026) (per curiam) (in-
ternal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
As relevant here, Whitton again claimed that Ozio falsely
testified that Whitton had confessed to him. The District
Court allowed discovery and held an evidentiary hearing.
Ozio testified that he had not actually heard Whitton con-
fess. He also clarified in his May 17, 2021, deposition that,
although he had testified that he had not previously been
arrested, he did have a juvenile record. Ozio then testified
to the same effect at the evidentiary hearing.
In response to this clarification regarding Ozio’s juvenile
record, Whitton did not bring a new claim in state court
based on Ozio’s inconsistent statements. He instead added
a new federal habeas claim, arguing that Ozio’s testimony
about his prior record also entitled him to a new trial under

6 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
Giglio. Whitton did not address his failure to present this
claim to the state courts, nor did he request a stay of federal
proceedings to rectify it. The District Court denied Whit-
ton’s federal habeas petition.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In federal habeas pro-
ceedings, when a prisoner raises an unexhausted claim, the
court cannot enter relief for the prisoner, but it can rule on
the merits against the prisoner without addressing exhaus-
tion. See §2254(b)(2). The Eleventh Circuit exercised that
discretion and rejected Whitton’s new Giglio claim on the
merits. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a, n. 10. That claim
failed, the Eleventh Circuit held, because the Supreme
Court of Florida had reasonably concluded that the State
had marshaled “overwhelming evidence” of Whitton’s guilt
apart from Ozio’s testimony. Id., at 36a–37a. That conclu-
sion was reasonable, the Eleventh Circuit continued, for
several reasons:
“[T]he motel clerk saw Whitton’s car parked at the mo-
tel, and Whitton admitted he was at the motel; Whit-
ton’s boots and his car were stained with blood that,
after later retesting, matched Maulden’s DNA; the
blood stains on and inside Whitton’s boots are con-
sistent with a ‘stabbing or a beating’; Whitton could not
explain the downward blood spatter on the inside of his
boots; and Whitton’s car contained a power and gas re-
ceipt and a car wash ticket for 2:37 a.m. October 10,
1990, the night of the murder.” Id., at 40a.
Two pages later, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Whit-
ton’s argument that “the DNA evidence” at trial supported
him. Id., at 42a. Relying on evidence presented to the jury,
the Eleventh Circuit explained why a fairminded jurist may
not be persuaded. The court cited evidence that traces of
blood can be washed off and that Whitton had purchased a
car wash ticket the night of the murder and told an officer
that he had attempted to wash his boots. The Eleventh

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
Circuit then added a single additional aside on a point that
some would find notable in this context: “Also, after retest-
ing the DNA on Whitton’s boots, the State confirmed that
the inside of Whitton’s right boot contained blood from a
‘mixture of two or more individuals,’ with the ‘major donor’
matching ‘the DNA profile of James Maulden.’” Ibid. (cita-
tions omitted). The Eleventh Circuit did not claim to as-
cribe any particular legal weight to this fact.
Whitton petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming that
the Eleventh Circuit erred in its analysis of his claim based
on Ozio’s testimony about his criminal record. He asked the
Court to resolve a purported Circuit split over whether
courts can assess prejudice based on evidence that the State
discovered only after trial.
The Court summarily vacates the judgment below be-
cause of the one-and-a-half sentences in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s opinion briefly mentioning the 2002 DNA test results.
II
I would not grant Whitton such relief. If the Eleventh
Circuit erred at all in mentioning the DNA test results, it
was harmless for at least two reasons. First, the court thor-
oughly examined the overwhelming evidence against Whit-
ton, which was more than sufficient to justify its decision.
Second, Whitton had not even exhausted his claim in state
court, so the Eleventh Circuit could not have ruled for him
anyway. Because we do not “tower above” lower courts as
an “impregnable citade[l] of technicality,” we should not
have exercised our summary powers to vacate here. Kottea-
kos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 759 (1946) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
First, the evidence against Whitton at trial more than
justified the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. The Supreme
Court of Florida concluded that, apart from Ozio’s testi-
mony and the 2002 test results, the State had presented
“overwhelming evidence against Whitton.” Whitton, 161

8 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
So. 3d, at 334. That conclusion, all agree, must be reviewed
by the federal habeas court deferentially under §2254(d).
Only if the Supreme Court of Florida’s conclusion “was so
lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement” could the
Eleventh Circuit have granted relief on Whitton’s Giglio
claim, which required a showing that Ozio’s allegedly false
testimony made a difference in his trial. Davis v. Ayala,
576 U. S. 257, 269–270 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit made clear that the testimony made
no difference even before its brief mention of the DNA evi-
dence. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Whitton admit-
ted to being at the motel; blood that matched Maulden’s
blood type had stained Whitton’s boots and car; “Whitton
could not explain the downward blood spatter on the inside
of his boots; and Whitton’s car contained a power and gas
receipt and a car wash ticket for 2:37 a.m. October 10, 1990,
the night of the murder.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. That
analysis more than establishes all that is necessary to re-
solve this claim: The Supreme Court of Florida’s conclusion
that the evidence presented at trial against Whitton was
overwhelming was not “so lacking in justification” as to
“preclud[e] even the possibility for fairminded dispute.”
Klein, 607 U. S., at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the Eleventh Circuit was not even allowed to rule
for Whitton regardless of the evidence because he failed to
exhaust this claim before the state courts. Federal courts
cannot grant habeas relief, no matter how meritorious the
underlying claim, unless “the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in” state court, if such remedies are
available and adequate. §2254(b)(1)(A). Whitton does not
deny that state-court remedies were available. Yet, he
never sought state remedies for his claim based on Ozio’s
characterization of his criminal record.

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
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HOMAS, J., dissenting
This exhaustion failure barred federal habeas relief, but
Whitton never addressed it in the District Court. Nor did
he ask for a stay of federal proceedings to enable him to cure
the problem. Cf. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 276–278
(2005). If he asked for a stay now, it would be an abuse of
discretion to grant it—Whitton discovered the factual basis
for this claim in May 2021, at the latest, and he has still not
exhausted his claim in state court, so it is likely too late for
him to even attempt to do so. See Mungin v. State, 320 So.
3d 624, 625–626 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam). In such circum-
stances, federal courts can and do simply deny the habeas
claim. See McBride v. Skipper, 76 F. 4th 509, 512–513 (CA6
2023) (federal court need not consider a stay when peti-
tioner does not ask for one); Banks v. Allison, 140 F. 4th
1181, 1185–1189 (CA9 2025) (federal court need not con-
sider a stay after petitioner fails to pursue state remedies
for over a year while federal petition is pending); Sears v.
Warden, GDCP 73 F. 4th 1269, 1306 (CA11 2023) (per cu-
riam) (federal court need not consider a stay when peti-
tioner’s claim would be procedurally barred in state court).
2
——————
2
Moreover, it is not even clear that the Eleventh Circuit lacked
the discretion to use the DNA test results as a basis for denying
relief. The only reason that the test results were before the Elev-
enth Circuit is that the State had argued that habeas relief could
be denied on an alternative ground: Given the new evidence con-
firming Whitton’s guilt, “law and justice” did not “require” relief.
28 U. S. C. §2243; see Answer Brief for Respondents-Appellees in
Whitton v. Secretary, Fla. Dept. of Corrections, No. 23–10786
(CA11), ECF Doc. 31, p. 72. Under this Court’s precedents, a state
prisoner cannot obtain relief unless he “ ‘persuade[s] a federal ha-
beas court that law and justice require’” relief. Shinn v. Martinez
Ramirez, 596 U. S. 366, 377 (2022). That inquiry turns on “equi-
table and prudential considerations,” such as “the States’ power-
ful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.” Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 132 (2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

10 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
We do not intervene based on “technicalit[ies]” that do
not “really affec[t]” the outcome of a case. Kotteakos, 328
U. S., at 759, 761. Instead, on a petition for a “writ of certi-
orari in any case,” this Court must ignore “errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28
U. S. C. §2111; see United States v. Lane, 474 U. S. 438, 444
(1986). This Court therefore, in most cases, declines to ex-
ercise its certiorari authority when it is “evident that the
resolution of the conflict could not change the result
reached below.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hart-
nett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice 4–18 (11th
ed. 2019). Yet, the Court today elects to intervene in that
exact posture.
Fortunately, though, the Court’s decision will have no
real-world effect. The Eleventh Circuit can reissue a virtu-
ally identical opinion after deleting one sentence on page 42
and one part of one sentence on page 40, where the Elev-
enth Circuit discussed the 2002 DNA tests. See App. to Pet.
for Cert. 40a, 42a. Or it can deny relief because Whitton
failed to exhaust a claim based on Ozio’s criminal record.
Or it might consider using its “equitable discretion” to deny
relief because of the conclusive evidence of Whitton’s guilt,
including the DNA test results. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593
U. S. 259, 289 (2021) (G
ORSUCH, J., concurring); see Shinn
v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. 366, 377 (2022).
III
This Court has increasingly granted summary relief in
certain cases based on lower court errors that seemingly
had no effect on the outcome of the case. See Pitts v. Mis-
sissippi, 607 U. S. 1 (2025) (per curiam) (granting summary
vacatur for man who sexually abused his daughter after
likely harmless trial error); Doe v. Dynamic Physical Ther-
apy, LLC, 607 U. S. 11 (2025) (per curiam) (granting sum-
mary vacatur after likely harmless state intermediate ap-
pellate court error). It would be one thing if this practice

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
reflected the Court’s consistent commitment to correcting
legal error in all cases. But, in reality, this Court routinely
declines to provide relief to law-abiding Americans when it
would actually matter, even after lower courts conspicu-
ously flout this Court’s precedents in ruling against them.
A
Consider Boston Parent Coalition for Academic Excel-
lence Corp. v. The School Committee, 604 U. S. ___ (2024).
In that case, the Boston School Committee implemented an
admissions policy to reduce the number of white and Asian
students at their elite exam schools. The committee made
its racist intent clear. One member said that she was
“ ‘[s]ick of . . . whites,’” while another mocked the names of
Asian students after forgetting to mute himself on a Zoom
hearing. Id., at ___ (A
LITO, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari) (slip op., at 2). Despite this clearly unconstitutional
race discrimination, the First Circuit ruled against parents
who had challenged the affirmative-action policy. And, in
a near-identical case, the Fourth Circuit did the same. Co-
alition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board, 601 U. S. ___
(2024). Yet, even when presented with multiple opportuni-
ties to vindicate the rights of families to pursue education
for their children on color-blind terms, this Court “refused
to correct a glaring constitutional error.” Boston Parent Co-
alition, 604 U. S., at ___ (A
LITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
5); see also Coalition for TJ, 601 U. S., at ___–___ (same)
(slip op., at 9–10).
B
Or consider Beck v. United States, 607 U. S. ___ (2025).
In that case, Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron Beck drove
home to lunch with his family in Missouri and was killed in
a car crash by a negligent driver. Because the driver was a
federal employee and Beck was serving in the military, the
lower courts had denied Beck’s widow any relief. They did

12 WHITTON v. DIXON
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
so based on an atextual exception to liability of this Court’s
creation, which has been widely acknowledged as “difficult
. . . to justify.” Id., at ___ (S
OTOMAYOR, J., statement re-
specting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1); see id., at ___–
___ (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip
op., at 3–5). Even worse, our own precedent had squarely
held that this exception did not apply to a case like Beck’s.
See Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49, 50–51 (1949).
Yet, this Court, as in many similar cases, refused to even
take Beck’s widow’s case. See, e.g., Carter v. United States,
604 U. S. ___ (2025) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Clendening v. United States, 598 U. S. ___
(2022) (same); Doe v. United States, 593 U. S. ___ (2021)
(same); Lanus v. United States, 570 U. S. 932 (2013) (same).
C
Or consider Speech First, Inc. v. Whitten, 604 U. S. ___
(2025). In that case, the Court declined to hear a student
association’s challenge to Indiana University’s “bias re-
sponse team,” which fields anonymous complaints about
student speech and considers whether to refer the accused
to campus offices or the police. Id., at ___–___ (T
HOMAS, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1–2).
“[O]ver 450 universities” reportedly had “similar bias-re-
porting schemes.” Speech First, Inc. v. Sands, 601 U. S. ___,
___ (2024) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2). Under
these university policies, an untold number of American
students with “unpopular” views had to “self-censor their
discussion of these views out of fear that others will likely
report them” to the bias response team. Speech First, Inc.
v. Whitten, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Lower courts had held that these stu-
dents did not even have standing to bring a lawsuit in fed-
eral court, in plain tension with this Court’s precedents.
See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 11 (1972). Yet, the Court
refused to hear these students’ case.

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., dissenting
***
It is unfortunate that the Court chose to intervene at the
request of a convicted murderer to correct the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s inconsequential foot fault. What makes it even worse
is that the Court does so even while it refuses to correct far
more consequential errors for law-abiding citizens, such as
the discriminated-against families in Boston, Staff Ser-
geant Beck’s widow, and the students seeking to challenge
university censorship.
I respectfully dissent.