Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 200–218
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 14, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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Syllabus
JULES v. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 25–83. Argued March 30, 2026—Decided May 14, 2026
This case presents the question whether a federal court that has pre-
viously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA) has jurisdiction to confrm or vacate a resulting arbi-
tral award on those claims, even when the motion to confrm under § 9
or the motion to vacate under § 10 does not independently present a
basis for federal jurisdiction on its face.
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Cha-
teau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended
his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in
New York, alleging that respondents unlawfully discriminated against
him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agree-
ment Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents
moved to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration under § 3 of the
FAA. The District Court held that the arbitration agreement covered
Jules's claims and stayed proceedings. Jules then commenced arbitra-
tion against respondents. The arbitrator issued a fnal award, ruling
against Jules on all claims and awarding approximately $34,500 in sanc-
tions to respondents. Back in the same District Court that had pre-
viously stayed Jules's claims pending arbitration, respondents moved to
confrm the award under § 9. Jules opposed confrmation while cross-
moving to vacate the arbitral award under § 10 on various grounds.
Jules argued that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to confrm the award because the § 9 and § 10
motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfed the require-
ments for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and con-
frmed the arbitral award. The Second Circuit affrmed, reasoning that
Badgerow involved a freestanding action commenced for the sole pur-
pose of vacating an arbitral award, but that the present action was dis-
tinct because it started as a federal-question suit before it was stayed
pending arbitration. The Second Circuit held that a court with the
power to stay an action under § 3 has the further power to confrm any
ensuing arbitration award, regardless of whether there is an independ-
ent jurisdictional basis for the § 9 and § 10 proceedings.
Held: A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action
under § 3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confrm or vacate a resulting

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as: 608 U. S. 200 (2026)
201
Syllabus
arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in § 9 and § 10 of the FAA;
noth
ing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdic-
tion regarding live claims pending before a federal court. Pp. 209–218.
(a) Unlike with the freestanding applications at issue in Vaden v. Dis-
cover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, and Badgerow, assessing jurisdiction over a
§ 9 or § 10 motion in a case originally fled in federal court does not
require “ `looking through' ” the fled action “to the parties' underlying
substantive controversy” outside of court. Vaden, 556 U. S., at 62. In-
stead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is
already before it. As Badgerow explained, “[ j]urisdiction to decide [a]
case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and
usually “there is no need to `look through' the motion in search of a
jurisdictional basis outside the court.” 596 U. S., at 15.
The District Court had original jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1331,
over Jules's federal claims, and it was that very jurisdiction which au-
thorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of Jules's claims under
the parties' contract before staying litigation pending arbitration pursu-
ant to § 3. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the
parties arbitrated. When the parties returned to court after arbitra-
tion with § 9 and § 10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to
decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that
it possessed from the start. Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 15.
This case therefore is not, as petitioner asserts, “Badgerow all over
again.” In Badgerow, the frst and only thing that had occurred in fed-
eral court was the confrm-or-vacate dispute under § 9 and § 10. In that
circumstance, there were only two places a court could look to fnd fed-
eral jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions or the underlying dispute
that “was not before” the court. Id., at 9. Here, however, there is an
obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original claims them-
selves, which were suffcient to establish the District Court's jurisdic-
tion under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
The fact that the arbitral award may have resolved Jules's original
claims only underscores why the District Court's original jurisdiction
extended to the parties' § 9 and § 10 motions. Those motions required
the District Court to assess whether there were grounds to vacate the
award. The motions were thus integral to determining whether the
award would continue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims
that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the
court confrmed the award.
Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an affrmative defense, a
§ 9 motion goes further and asks a court to convert an arbitral award
into a judgment of the court. That is correct, but federal courts have
the power to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court

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when resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements, as rec-
og
nized in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S.
375, as well as in the context of consent judgments and class-action
settlements.
The FAA's structure further confrms jurisdiction here. In Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, the Court held that § 3 requires a stay rather
than dismissal, which “comports with the supervisory role that the FAA
envisions for the courts,” including “assist[ing] parties in arbitration . . .
and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award.” Id., at 478. Under the
rule the Court adopts today, this scheme continues to work well: The
FAA requires a stay so that a court that has granted a § 3 stay can
superintend the arbitration to the end, including through confrmation
or vacatur under § 9 or § 10. Pp. 209–213.
(b) Jules's remaining counterarguments are without merit. First,
Jules overreads Badgerow, which did not convert the nonjurisdictional
FAA into a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme that requires an inde-
pendent jurisdictional basis for all § 9 and § 10 motions. The problem
for the losing party in Badgerow was that, without the look-through
approach authorized by § 4, there was no federal jurisdiction to be found
in the case. See 596 U. S., at 9, 12. Because § 9 and § 10, unlike § 4,
did not provide a textual basis for applying the look-through approach,
the Court held that it was not available. Id., at 14. Respondents here,
to the contrary, are not asking for any “highly unusual” look-through
rule, id., at 12, but merely ask the District Court to use the tools pro-
vided by the FAA to fnally resolve the federal claims Jules fled in
federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
Second, Jules argues that § 9 and § 10 applications should be treated
as entirely “new federal actions” for purposes of assessing jurisdiction,
even when fled in pre-existing suits, because § 9 and § 12 of the FAA
require service and notice of such applications. That argument fails.
The Court has explained that § 3's mandatory stay is aimed at “avoid-
[ing] [the] costs and complications” of “bring[ing] a new suit.” Spiz-
zirri, 601 U. S., at 478. Jules concedes, moreover, that service of § 9
and § 10 motions is not required in all cases. The service provisions in
§ 9 and § 12 do not impose the strict jurisdictional rule he favors.
Third, Jules's reliance on § 8 of the FAA, which governs certain mari-
time arbitrations, is unavailing. Section 8 merely instructs that in one
class of admiralty cases involving in rem jurisdiction over a vessel, the
court holding the vessel must retain jurisdiction to confrm or vacate
such award. It does not shed light on how jurisdiction should function
in other FAA disputes.
Finally, Jules's policy concerns lack force. His concerns about en-
couraging parties to engage in useless federal litigation to create a juris-

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as: 608 U. S. 200 (2026)
203
Opinion of the Court
dictional anchor are conjectural, and there is no evidence suggesting
that
his concerns about manufactured federal jurisdiction will come to
pass. Moreover, it is not anomalous for federal jurisdiction to turn on
how litigation proceeded, as “actual litigation” generally “defne[s] the
parties' controversy.” Vaden, 556 U. S., at 68. In any event, counter-
vailing policy concerns favor the Court's rule. Jules's rule would sig-
nifcantly diminish “the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the
courts,” Spizzirri, 601 U. S., at 478, and would undermine the effciency
interests at the heart of the FAA by forcing parties to launch a fresh
state-court proceeding to secure confrmation or vacatur of an arbitral
award. Jules's approach could also lead to unnecessarily complex dual-
track litigation where confrm-or-vacate proceedings commence in state
court just as arbitrability appeals begin in federal court. Pp. 213–218.
Affrmed.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Adam G. Unikowsky argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs was Simon A. de Carvalho.
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Anne M. Voigts and Alekzandir
Morton.*
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case addresses whether a federal court that has pre-
viously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., has ju-
risdiction to confrm or vacate a resulting arbitral award as
to those claims under § 9 and § 10. The Court holds that it
does. Because a federal court in this scenario has jurisdic-
tion over the original claims and does not lose that jurisdic-
tion while the case is stayed pending arbitration, it retains
jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitral award resolv-
ing those claims is valid and should be confrmed. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is there-
fore affrmed.
*Peter B. Rutledge, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Jonathan D. Urick fled a
brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
amicus curiae urging affrmance.
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I
A
The
FAA “authorizes a party to an arbitration agreement
to seek several kinds of assistance from a federal court.”
Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, 4 (2022). At the front end,
§ 3 of the FAA directs federal courts to stay any lawsuit that
involves an issue that is “referable to arbitration,” and § 4
allows federal courts to compel arbitration if a party to an
arbitration agreement refuses to arbitrate. During arbitra-
tion, federal courts may facilitate the proceedings, including
by appointing an arbitrator under § 5 and enforcing subpoe-
nas under § 7. On the back end, and central here, after an
arbitral award has issued, federal courts may confrm, va-
cate, or modify such an award under § 9, § 10, or § 11. Under
§ 9, a court must confrm an award upon request “unless the
award is vacated, modifed, or corrected as prescribed in sec-
tions 10 and 11.” The grounds for vacatur and modifcation
are limited. See § 10(a) (allowing vacatur for “corruption,
fraud, or undue means,” “partiality” or “misconduct” by an
arbitrator, and “where the arbitrators exceeded their pow-
ers”); § 11 (allowing modifcation of “material miscalcula-
tion[s]” and in other narrow circumstances).
An FAA motion can arrive in federal court in one of two
ways. Sometimes (like in this case), an FAA motion arises
in a pre-existing lawsuit. In such cases, one party fles a
federal suit and the other responds by arguing that the dis-
pute is arbitrable and so should not go forward in court. If
the latter party is right, the court must stay proceedings
pending arbitration under § 3 and, upon request, must compel
arbitration under § 4.
1
(What else a court may do in this
scenario, including with respect to § 9 and § 10 motions fled
1
As discussed below, see in fra, at 212, this Court has held that § 3 does
not authorize a district court to dismiss a case after fnding it to be arbitra-
ble; the text of § 3 says that a federal court “shall . . . stay” proceedings,
so a stay is required. Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476 (2024).

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205
Opinion of the Court
after arbitration has concluded and the parties return to
cour
t, is the subject of this appeal.) In other cases, a “free-
standing ” FAA motion can arrive in federal court outside of
any pre-existing federal case. For example, the parties may
proceed directly to arbitration under their contract but need
assistance enforcing a subpoena, and so apply to a court for
aid under § 7. Or one party may refuse to respond to an
out-of-court arbitration demand at all, and the other side
may seek an order compelling arbitration under § 4.
Regardless of how an FAA dispute begins, federal juris-
diction is not always a foregone conclusion. For a federal
court to have jurisdiction over an arbitral dispute, it is not
enough that the dispute implicates the FAA. That is be-
cause the FAA is “ `something of an anomaly' in the realm of
federal legislation.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49,
59 (2009). Although the FAA is a federal statute that pro-
vides federal standards, it “does not itself create [federal]
jurisdiction.” Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 4. Instead, given the
FAA's “nonjurisdictional cast,” a federal court must have an
“ `independent jurisdictional basis' ” for granting FAA relief.
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. That could come, for example, in
the form of diversity jurisdiction if a dispute under the FAA
arises between citizens of different States with over $75,000
at issue. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a). Or a court may have
federal-question jurisdiction if an FAA motion implicates a
federal issue (other than one under the FAA). See § 1331.
In two prior cases, this Court has addressed how to assess
jurisdiction over FAA motions fled as “freestanding ” ac-
tions in federal court. First, in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the
Court held that § 4 permits courts to assess jurisdiction by
“ `looking through' ” a motion to compel arbitration to the
underlying dispute. 556 U. S., at 62. There, the parties
began with a contract dispute in state court, but after one
side fled counterclaims, the other side fled a § 4 motion in
federal court invoking the contract's arbitration agreement.
Id., at 54–55. The § 4 motion itself did not present a federal
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question; it invoked only a contractual right to arbitrate.
Id
., at 63. Nor was diversity jurisdiction available. Id., at
54, n. 1. Yet this was not the end of the matter. As the
Court observed, § 4's text authorizes relief if a court, “ `save
for [the arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction' ”
over the dispute. Id., at 62. The Court thus held that
courts should determine § 4 jurisdiction “by `looking
through' a § 4 petition to the parties' underlying substantive
controversy,” even though that controversy is not before the
federal court. Id., at 62–63. If that “ `controversy between
the parties,' as they have framed it, could be litigated in
federal court,” even if no such claim was ever fled in federal
court, a court has jurisdiction to compel arbitration. Id.,
at 66.
Second, in Badgerow v. Walters, the Court concluded that
Vaden's look-through approach does not apply to freestand-
ing motions to confrm or vacate arbitral awards under § 9 or
§ 10. 596 U. S., at 5. The parties in Badgerow began by
proceeding directly to an arbitration of federal claims with-
out fling suit in any court and without fling any § 3 or § 4
motion. Ibid. After the arbitration resolved the federal
claims at issue, one party sought confrmation of the award
in federal court, while the other sought vacatur. Ibid.
Like in Vaden, the FAA motions presented no (non-FAA)
federal question on their face, and the parties were not di-
verse. 596 U. S., at 9. The Court thus considered whether
Vaden's “ `look-through' approach to jurisdiction applies to
requests to confrm or vacate arbitral awards under the
FAA's Sections 9 and 10.” 596 U. S., at 5.
The Cour t held that it does not. The look-through
approach, the Court emphasized, is a “highly unusual” “juris-
dictional outlier.” Id., at 12, 14. That is because the look-
through approach “locates jurisdiction not in the action actu-
ally before the court, but in another controversy neither
there nor ever meant to be.” Id., at 12; see id., at 9 (similar).
Vaden grounded its anomalous approach largely in § 4's
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“ `save for' ” language, whereas “Sections 9 and 10,” the
Cour
t observed, “contain none of the statutory language on
which Vaden relied.” 596 U. S., at 10–11. Accordingly,
Badgerow held that a court presented with a freestanding
§ 9 or § 10 motion may not look through that motion to a
controversy involving a federal issue that is “not before the
court” in order to establish jurisdiction. Id., at 5.
B
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at
the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. In
March 2020, the hotel ended his employment, citing staffng
issues related to the COVID–19 pandemic. Jules then sued
in Federal District Court in New York (where several re-
spondents are domiciled), alleging, among other things, that
respondents unlawfully discriminated against him in viola-
tion of federal and state law.
Jules, however, had signed an arbitration agreement be-
fore beginning work at the hotel, which stated that any dis-
putes related to his employment or termination thereof that
could not be resolved by negotiation or mediation must be
resolved by arbitration. Citing this agreement, respondents
moved, as relevant here, to stay federal proceedings pending
arbitration under § 3. In 2021, the District Court held that
the arbitration agreement covered Jules's claims and stayed
proceedings.
Jules then commenced arbitration against respondents.
In 2023, the arbitrator issued a fnal award ruling against
Jules on all claims. In addition, the arbitrator awarded
about $34,500 in sanctions to respondents based on Jules's
and his attorney's misconduct (which included Jules refusing
to participate in the arbitral hearing on Jules's claims).
Back in District Court, before the same court that had
previously stayed Jules's claims pending arbitration, re-
spondents moved to confrm the award under § 9. Jules op-
posed confrmation while cross-moving to vacate the arbitral
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award under § 10 on various grounds. Relevant here, Jules
arg
ued that, under Badgerow, the District Court lacked ju-
risdiction to confrm the award because the § 9 and § 10 mo-
tions did not present federal questions or satisfy the require-
ments for diversity jurisdiction, given that the parties to the
arbitration and award were nondiverse and the amount in
controversy was less than $75,000.
The District Court disagreed and confrmed the arbitral
award. The Second Circuit affrmed. Badgerow, the Sec-
ond Circuit emphasized, “involved [a freestanding] action
commenced . . . for the sole purpose of vacating an arbitral
award.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a (Pet. App.). That made
it fundamentally “unlike the present action, which started as
a federal question suit before it was stayed pending arbitra-
tion.” Ibid. In the latter situation, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, “the Supreme Court has held that a `court with
the power to stay the action under § 3 has the further power
to confrm any ensuing arbitration award,' ” regardless of
whether there is an independent jurisdictional basis for the
§ 9 and § 10 proceedings. Ibid. (quoting Cortez Byrd Chips,
Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U. S. 193, 202 (2000);
alteration omitted). Because nothing in Badgerow under-
mined this principle, the Second Circuit held that the Dis-
trict Court had jurisdiction to confrm the award. See Pet.
App. 7a.
Jules fled a timely petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of the Second Circuit's conclusion that Badgerow's
holding is limited to freestanding § 9 and § 10 applications
without a pre-existing federal lawsuit. Two other Courts of
Appeals have agreed with the Second Circuit after Bad-
gerow, but the Fourth Circuit has held that Badgerow's hold-
ing applies to all § 9 and § 10 motions, regardless of whether
claims were fled in federal court before they were resolved
in arbitration. Compare George v. Rushmore Serv. Center,
LLC, 114 F. 4th 226, 238, n. 16 (CA3 2024), and Kinsella v.
Baker Hughes Oilfelds Operations, LLC, 66 F. 4th 1099,
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as: 608 U. S. 200 (2026)
209
Opinion of the Court
1103 (CA7 2023), with SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG
Wirel
ess, LTD., 93 F. 4th 175, 183 (CA4 2024). This Court
granted certiorari to resolve the division among the Courts
of Appeals. 607 U. S. 1079 (2025).
II
This case asks whether a federal court with pre-existing
jurisdiction over claims that it stayed pending arbitration
under § 3 can adjudicate a § 9 or § 10 motion even if that mo-
tion does not present, on its face, an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. The answer is yes. “[A] court with
the power to stay the action under § 3 has the further power
to confrm [or vacate] any ensuing arbitration award.” Cor-
tez Byrd, 529 U. S., at 202 (addressing a different, venue-
related question under the FAA).
To start, unlike with the freestanding applications at issue
in Vaden and Badgerow, see supra, at 205–206, assessing ju-
risdiction over a § 9 or § 10 motion in a case originally fled
in federal court does not require “looking through” the fled
action. Instead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by
looking at the suit that is already before it. As Badgerow
explained, “[ j]urisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdic-
tion to decide [a] motion” within that case, and usually “there
is no need to `look through' the motion in search of a jurisdic-
tional basis outside the court.” 596 U. S., at 15.
Here, the District Court had original jurisdiction, under
28 U. S. C. § 1331, over Jules's federal claims. It was this
very jurisdiction that authorized the court to adjudicate the
arbitrability of Jules's claims under the parties' contract to
begin with, before staying litigation pending arbitration.
Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the
parties arbitrated. See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576, 581 (2008) (“As for jurisdiction
over controversies touching arbitration, the [FAA] does
nothing ”). So when the parties returned to court after arbi-
tration with § 9 and § 10 motions, the court had the same
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“jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to
decide
th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start.
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 15. “The court had federal question
subject matter jurisdiction and . . . never lost it.” 1 I. Mac-
neil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law
§ 9.2.3.1, p. 9:13 (1995).
The District Court's pre-existing jurisdiction means that
this case is not “Badgerow all over again.” Contra, Brief
for Petitioner 3. In Badgerow, the frst (and only) thing that
had occurred in federal court was the confrm-or-vacate dis-
pute under § 9 and § 10. See 596 U. S., at 5–6. In that cir-
cumstance, there were only two places a court could look to
fnd federal jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions, on the
one hand, or the underlying dispute that “was not before”
the court, on the other. Id., at 9. Here, however, there is
an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original
claims themselves. Because those claims were suffcient to
establish the District Court's jurisdiction in this case under
28 U. S. C. § 1331, they also established the District Court's
authority to resolve the motions to confrm or vacate the
arbitral award resolving those claims.
It is true that, by the time the parties fled the § 9 and § 10
motions here, the arbitrator had issued an award that
marked “a contractual resolution of the parties' dispute.”
596 U. S., at 9. As Jules argues, that out-of-court resolution
functioned like a release, which could serve as an affrmative
defense and be used to “resolve the original claim” fled in
court. Reply Brief 15 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8(c)(1), which lists “arbitration and award” as an “af-
frmative defense”). The fact that the arbitral award may
“resolve” Jules's original claims, however, only underscores
why the District Court's original jurisdiction extends to the
parties' § 9 and § 10 motions. Those motions required the
District Court to assess whether there were grounds to va-
cate the award. See § 9 (requiring confrmation “unless the
award is vacated . . . as prescribed in sectio[n] 10”). They
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were thus integral to determining whether the award would
conti
nue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims
that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District
Court until the court confrmed the award. Cf. Judgment in
No. 1:20–cv–10500 (SDNY), ECF Doc. 118, p. 1 (confrming
arbitral award against Jules and entering judgment on Ju-
les's claims).
Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an affrmative
defense, a § 9 motion goes further and asks a court to convert
an arbitral award into a judgment of the court. See § 13
(stating that an order confrming an arbitral award has the
“same force and effect” as a judgment in a federal action).
That is correct, but this Court has held that federal courts
have the power to incorporate private settlements into or-
ders of the court when resolving claims that are the subject
of those settlements. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375 (1994), for example, the Court
made clear that a federal “court is authorized to embody [a]
settlement contract in its dismissal order” and later “en-
forc[e]” that “settlement agreement.” Id., at 381–382.
2
Similarly, the Court has recognized federal courts' jurisdic-
tion to embody contracts “arrived at by negotiation between
the parties” as consent judgments in certain circumstances.
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223,
237, n. 10 (1975) (noting the “dual character” of such judg-
ments). Federal courts also routinely resolve disputes over
private settlements in class actions, which can be settled
“only with the court's approval.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e);
2
A court's original jurisdiction to embody a private settlement in a court
order is distinct from any ancillary-enforcement jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes that later arise out of such an agreement. The former falls
within a court's original jurisdiction to resolve still-pending claims under
conditions deemed proper by the court. The Court today does not ad-
dress respondents' argument that the § 9 and § 10 motions in this case fell
within the District Court's ancillary-enforcement jurisdiction. See Brief
for Respondents 26 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 380–381).
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see, e. g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F. 3d 273, 293 (CA3
2011)
(en banc) (addressing disputes over class settlement
that included an “agreed-upon injunction”). In each sce-
nario, as here, the parties reach a contractual resolution of
claims fled in federal court, and the federal court has juris-
diction to resolve disputes over that private settlement and
embody the settlement in a court order resolving the case.
The FAA's structure further confrms jurisdiction here.
This Court recently considered “whether § 3 permits a court
to dismiss [a] case instead of issuing a stay when the dispute
is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay pending
arbitration.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 474 (2024).
Given that § 3 dictates that courts in this situation “ `shall . . .
stay' ” proceedings, the Court easily concluded that “a stay,”
not dismissal, “is required.” Id., at 476–477. This conclu-
sion, the Court emphasized, “comport[ed] with the supervi-
sory role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” which in-
cludes “assist[ing] parties in arbitration by . . . appointing an
arbitrator, see 9 U. S. C. § 5; enforcing subpoenas . . . , see
§ 7; and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award, see § 9.”
Id., at 478. “Keeping [a] suit on the court's docket makes
good sense in light of this potential ongoing role, and it
avoids costs and complications that might arise if a party
were required to bring a new suit and pay a new fling fee
to invoke the FAA's procedural protections.” Ibid.
Under the rule the Court adopts today, this scheme contin-
ues to work well: The FAA requires a stay, rather than dis-
missal, so that a court that has granted a § 3 stay can su-
perintend the arbitration to the end, including through
confrmation or vacatur. On Jules's theory, however, things
would fall apart. Without an independent jurisdictional
basis (like complete diversity and more than $75,000 at
stake) on the face of a § 5, § 7, § 9, or § 10 motion, Jules con-
cedes that a court that grants a mandatory § 3 stay has little
to do but wait until the arbitration concludes and, fnally,
dismiss the claims. It would be curious for § 3 to mandate
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keeping cases on federal dockets for essentially no reason at
a
ll in the cases where federal interests are likely at their
highest: those, like this one, involving live federal questions.
More plausibly, a court that grants a § 3 stay retains jurisdic-
tion to see the case through and provide the FAA's “proce-
dural protections” along the way. Ibid.
III
Jules's remaining counterarguments are without merit.
First, and primarily, he points to Badgerow. In his view,
Badgerow makes clear that the FAA is a “reticulated” frame-
work whose “text,” alone, governs federal jurisdiction over
FAA disputes and requires an independent jurisdictional
basis for all § 9 and § 10 motions. Reply Brief 1–2. As ex-
plained, however, this overreads Badgerow, which nowhere
converted the “nonjurisdictional” FAA, Vaden, 556 U. S., at
59, into a “reticulated” jurisdictional scheme. The problem
for the losing party in Badgerow was that, without the look-
through approach authorized by § 4, there was no federal ju-
risdiction to be found in the case. See 596 U. S., at 9, 12.
Because § 9 and § 10 did not provide a textual basis for apply-
ing the look-through approach, the Court held that it was not
available. Id., at 14. Respondents here, to the contrary,
are not asking for any “highly unusual” look-through rule.
Id., at 12. Instead, the court in this case secured federal
jurisdiction, in one of the most usual ways imaginable, based
on the federal claims Jules fled in federal court under 28
U. S. C. § 1331. Respondents merely asked the District
Court to use the tools provided by the FAA to fnally resolve
those claims. Nothing in Badgerow or the FAA eliminates
the District Court's jurisdiction to do so.
3
3
Jules focuses on Badgerow's observation that confrm-or-vacate dis-
putes like this one typically “involve only state law, like disagreements
about other contracts.” 596 U. S., at 9. It is true that federal courts
ordinarily lack freestanding authority to adjudicate state-law claims.
See, e. g., Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 378–381. That has never prohibited

214 JULES
v. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES
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Second, Jules disputes whether § 9 and § 10 applications
shou
ld really be considered motions in a pending case. In-
stead, he argues, they should be treated as entirely “new
federal actions” for purposes of assessing jurisdiction, even
when fled in pre-existing suits, because § 9 and § 12 of the
FAA require service and notice of such applications. Brief
for Petitioner 22–23. This Court has explained, however,
that § 3's mandatory stay is aimed precisely at “avoid[ing]
[the] costs and complications” of “bring[ing] a new suit,”
Spizzirri, 601 U. S., at 478, and even Jules admits that nei-
ther service of process nor a whole new proceeding is always
necessary, see Reply Brief 6, n. 1. The service provisions in
§ 9 and § 12 (the latter of which, governing service of § 10
motions, does not even mention “jurisdiction”) do not impose
the strict jurisdictional rule Jules favors.
Third, Jules turns to § 8 of the FAA, which governs certain
maritime arbitrations. Section 8 provides that, when “the
basis of jurisdiction” is “in admiralty,” a party may “begin
his proceeding . . . by libel and seizure of the vessel.” Jules
notes that in such cases, § 8 also provides that “the court
shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed
with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its
decree upon the award.” To Jules, this shows that Congress
knew how to authorize the kind of “jurisdictional anchor”
respondents seek here, yet declined to provide such a basis
for jurisdiction in § 9 or § 10.
The Court disagrees. Section 8 merely instructs that, in
one class of admiralty cases where a plaintiff invokes in rem
jurisdiction over a vessel “as security for compliance with
any arbitral award,” The Anaconda v. American Sugar Re-
fning Co., 322 U. S. 42, 44 (1944), the court holding the vessel
must retain jurisdiction to confrm or vacate such award.
federal courts, however, from resolving disputes over, and giving force to,
private settlements when they resolve claims that are pending in federal
court. See id., at 381–382; supra, at 211–212.
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District courts would likely have jurisdiction over such pro-
ceedi
ngs even without § 8 under 28 U. S. C. § 1333, which pro-
vides “original jurisdiction” over admiralty cases. It ap-
pears, then, that § 8 does little more than provide specifc
procedural rules governing how courts ought to handle a dis-
tinct form of admiralty arbitration involving seized vessels.
It does not shed light on how jurisdiction, more broadly,
should function in other FAA disputes.
Finally, Jules resorts to policy. Allowing courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction in cases like this one, he worries, will en-
courage parties to “engage in useless federal litigation for
the sole purpose of creating a jurisdictional anchor” later on,
Brief for Petitioner 34, disrupting the “ `sensible . . . division
of labor' ” between state and federal courts that Badgerow
recognized, Brief for Petitioner 31 (quoting 596 U. S., at 18).
Even without such gamesmanship, he continues, respond-
ents' rule will make federal jurisdiction turn on the “happen-
stance” of whether one party to an arbitral dispute fled a
federal case before proceeding to arbitration. Brief for
Petitioner 14.
Setting aside that “ `[i]t is not for this Court to employ
untethered notions of what might be good public policy to
[determine] our jurisdiction,' ” Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 16,
Jules's policy arguments lack force on their own terms. For
one thing, his concerns about protective anchor suits are con-
jectural. Even in courts that have long embraced Badger-
ow's rule for freestanding § 9 and § 10 motions but agree with
the result the Court reaches today for pre-existing cases,
Jules identifes no epidemic of useless flings clogging up fed-
eral courts.
4
That may be because fling a precautionary
4
The Seventh Circuit has embraced both rules since at least 1998. See
Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R. Co. v. Wisconsin Central Ltd.,
154 F. 3d 404, 407 (1998) (adopting today's result for pre-existing suits);
Minor v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 94 F. 3d 1103, 1106–1107 (1996)
(adopting the Badgerow rule for freestanding actions). The Third Circuit
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federal anchor suit runs a serious risk of forfeiting the right
to
arbitrate. Cf. Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U. S. 411,
413, 418–419 (2022). Or it may be because securing a post-
arbitration federal forum is not all that valuable to parties
who, on the front end, do not know whether they will emerge
from arbitration a winner or loser and thus may not be able
to tell which forum's law might prove most advantageous.
Either way, there is no evidence suggesting that Jules's con-
cerns about manufactured federal jurisdiction will come to
pass. There thus seems to be little risk that confrm-or-
vacate litigation will food federal courts. The “typical FAA
application” under § 9 and § 10, after all, likely involves those
who adhered to their arbitration agreements to begin with.
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 15.
Nor is it anomalous for federal jurisdiction to turn, at least
in part, on the happenstance of how litigation proceeded.
“[A]ctual litigation” generally “defne[s] the parties' contro-
versy,” even if “events could have unfolded differently.”
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 68. “[A] party's ability to gain adjudica-
tion . . . in federal court often depends on how that question
happens to have been presented.” Ibid., n. 17; see, e. g.,
Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 380–382 (explaining that jurisdiction
may depend on whether a court happened to “retain jurisdic-
tion” expressly over a settlement agreement).
In any event, even if Jules's policy concerns had some
merit, there are countervailing concerns on the other side.
Jules's rule would signifcantly diminish “the supervisory
role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” Spizzirri, 601
U. S., at 478, by forcing them to stay proceedings under § 3
for essentially no reason in most cases. It would also under-
mine the effciency interests at the heart of the FAA by forc-
is similar. See Goldman v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 834 F. 3d 242,
252–255 (2016) (explaining that the Third Circuit has applied the Bad-
gerow rule for freestanding actions since at least 1994); Freeman v. Pitts-
burgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F. 3d 240, 246 (2013) (adopting today's result
for pre-existing suits).
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ing parties who were previously in federal court (often, as
here
, against their wishes) to launch a fresh state-court pro-
ceeding, complete with “a new fling fee,” to secure confr-
mation or vacatur of an arbitral award. Ibid.; cf. Hall
Street, 552 U. S., at 588 (noting that §§ 9–11 “substantiat[e] a
national policy favoring arbitration” by helping to “resolv[e]
disputes straightaway”).
Jules's approach could also lead to unnecessarily complex
dual-track litigation. Here, as is often the case when a § 3
stay is needed, the parties disputed not only whether the
arbitral award should be confrmed or vacated, but also
whether the dispute was arbitrable to begin with. See Pet.
App. 4a–5a. Because orders staying an action pending arbi-
tration under § 3 or compelling arbitration under § 4 can gen-
erally be appealed only after fnal judgment, see § 16(b), such
appeals will usually occur only after an arbitral award issues
and the claims pending in federal court are dismissed. That
process neatly unfolded here: The same District Court that
initially held Jules's claims to be arbitrable later confrmed
the resulting award and entered judgment; then, both the
arbitrability and confrmation issues went up to the Second
Circuit together. Under Jules's preferred rule, however,
confrm-or-vacate proceedings would likely commence in
state court just as the arbitrability appeal begins in federal
court. At that point, a state court may confrm an arbitral
award on claims that a federal court of appeals may ulti-
mately hold were never properly subject to arbitration in the
frst place.
5
It is unclear why Congress would have wanted
wasteful, bifurcated, and possibly inconsistent proceedings
like that.
5
Alternatively, a district court seeking to avoid such bifurcated proceed-
ings could continue holding the pending claims on its docket, precluding
an appeal of the arbitrability issue, until the state-court confrm-or-vacate
proceedings conclude, possibly months (or years) later. There is no appar-
ent reason why Congress would have preferred these pointless, extended
stays to a simple consolidated proceeding and appeal.
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***
In
Badgerow, the question was whether anything in § 9 or
§ 10 of the FAA affrmatively authorized an unusual ap-
proach premising jurisdiction on claims never fled before the
court. Here, the question is instead whether there is any-
thing in the FAA that precludes the normal operation of fed-
eral jurisdiction regarding live claims that are still pending
before a federal court. There is not. A federal court with
jurisdiction to stay claims pending arbitration under § 3 of
the FAA has the same jurisdiction to resolve motions to con-
frm or vacate a resulting arbitral award. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None