Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

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537
Syllabus
URIAS-ORELLANA et al. v. BONDI, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the rst circuit
No. 24–777. Argued December 1, 2025—Decided March 4, 2026
This case presents the question whether the courts of appeals must apply
substantial-evidence review to the Board of Immigration Appeals' de-
termination whether a given set of undisputed facts constitutes “perse-
cution” under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42).
Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana
Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G. are natives of El Salva-
dor who entered the United States without authorization in 2021.
After being placed in removal proceedings, petitioners applied for asy-
lum. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the U. S. Gov-
ernment “may grant asylum” to a noncitizen if it “determines” that he
“is a refugee.” § 1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifes as a “refu-
gee” if he “is unable or unwilling to return” to his country of nationality
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” § 1101(a)(42)(A).
In support of petitioners' applications for asylum, Urias-Orellana tes-
tifed that he was being targeted by a hitman in El Salvador. The Im-
migration Judge (IJ) found Urias-Orellana's testimony credible but con-
cluded that it did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution under the INA. The IJ accordingly denied peti-
tioners' asylum applications and ordered their removal. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affrmed. On petition for review, the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affrmed, holding that, under
the substantial-evidence standard of review, the record did not compel
a contrary fnding.
Held: The INA requires application of the substantial-evidence standard
to the agency's determination whether a given set of undisputed facts
rises to the level of persecution under § 1101(a)(42)(A). Pp. 543–551.
(
a)Sec
tion 1252(b)(4) sets forth the scope and standard of review
for
cour
ts of appeals evaluating IJ and BIA removal orders; subparagraph
(B
) prov
ides that “administrative fndings of fact are conclusive
unless
any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-
trary.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to pre-
scribe a deferential, “substantial-evidence standard,” Nasrallah v. Barr
,

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Syllabus
590 U. S. 573, 584, meaning “ `such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mi
nd might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' ” Biestek v. Ber-
ryhill, 587 U. S. 97, 103. The courts of appeals have split over the ex-
tent to which this standard applies to the agency's determination that
an asylum applicant has established persecution. Pp. 543–545.
(b) Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards, the Court
has already concluded that the persecution determination—including
both the underlying factual fndings and the application of the INA to
those fndings—receives substantial-evidence review. In INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U. S. 478, the Court held that to obtain judicial reversal
of the agency's persecution determination, an asylum applicant must
show that the evidence presented was “so compelling that no reasonable
factfnder could fail to fnd the requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at
484. Congress amended the INA shortly after the Court's decision, but
those amendments—and the addition of § 1252(b)(4)(B) in particular—
codifed the Elias-Zacarias standard. The statute as it reads today
therefore requires substantial-evidence review. Pp. 545–549.
(c) The Court rejects petitioners' arguments that de novo review
should apply because § 1252(b)(4)(B) requires deference only for “fnd-
ings of fact” and no subparagraph explicitly addresses the mixed ques-
tion of law and fact that is the determination of persecution. However,
Elias-Zacarias and the subsequent statutory history suggest that Con-
gress meant for the entirety of this “mixed” determination to receive
deference under § 1252(b)(4)(B). The Court's decisions in Wilkinson v.
Garland, 601 U. S. 209, and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221,
are not to the contrary. Those cases addressed whether a mixed ques-
tion qualifes as a “question of law” exempt from § 1252(a)'s bar on judi-
cial review, 601 U. S., at 212; 589 U. S., at 225; but whether a given
issue is treated as a question of law exempt from the INA's jurisdiction-
stripping provisions says nothing about the type of review the court
must afford to that issue under other provisions of the statute.
Pp. 549–550.
121 F. 4th 327, affrmed.
Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Nicholas Rosellini argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were S. Y. Jessica Hui, Gregory G.
Garre, and Christine C. Smith.
Joshua Y. Dos Santos argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sauer, Assist-

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Opinion of the Court
ant Attorney General Shumate, Deputy Solicitor General
Ganno
n, John W. Blakeley, Melissa Neiman-Kelting, and
Bryan S. Beier.*
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife
Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G.
are Salvadoran natives who sought asylum after entering the
United States w ithout authorizati on. An Immigrati on
Judge (IJ) denied their applications and ordered their re-
moval, determining that they had neither demonstrated past
“persecution” nor established a “well-founded fear” of future
“persecution” as required under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
After unsuccessfully challenging their removal order with
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), petitioners sought
review in federal court. The Court of Appeals affrmed the
BIA's ruling, holding that “substantial evidence” supported
the agency's persecution determination. Urias-Orellana v.
Garland, 121 F. 4th 327, 335–338 (CA1 2024).
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of
Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review under
the INA. We conclude that the statute requires application
of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency's conclu-
sion that a given set of undisputed facts does not constitute
persecution. Accordingly, we affrm.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for
Individual Rights by Jonathan C. Bond, Trenton J. Van Oss, Lavi M. Ben
Dor, and Caleb Kruckenberg; for Former Executive Offce for Immigration
Review Judges by Richard W. Mark and Amer S. Ahmed; for Immigration
Law Professors by Minh Nguyen-Dang; and for Legal Services Providers
et al. by Ethan Nutter, Melissa Crow, Robert Pauw, and Matthew X. Et-
chemendy. Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for Immigra-
tion Law Scholars et al. by Peter E. Davis; and for Nancy Morawetz by
Eugene A. Sokoloff.

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I
A
P
etitioners entered the United States without authoriza-
tion in 2021. Soon after they arrived, the Government
served petitioners with notices to appear in federal immigra-
tion court for a removal hearing. When they appeared as
scheduled in an immigration court in Boston, petitioners con-
ceded their removability but claimed asylum (along with
other forms of relief from removal that are no longer at
issue).
Petitioner Urias-Orellana was the sole witness at the re-
moval hearing. He testifed that a “sicario” (i. e., hitman)
from his hometown had been targeting him since 2016.
That year, the sicario shot two of Urias-Orellana's half-
brothers and vowed to kill every member of his family. Id.,
at 332. To escape the sicario's threats, Urias-Orellana,
Gamez-Mejia, and G. E. U. G. relocated within El Salvador
several times over the next few years. After each move,
Urias-Orellana was threatened by men who demanded
money and warned that they would leave him like his broth-
ers if he did not pay up. One of the men even physically
assaulted Urias-Orellana when he returned to his hometown
for a brief visit. Id., at 333.
The last straw came soon after Urias-Orellana's fourth and
fnal move in 2021, when he learned that men had been ask-
ing around town about the arrival of any newcomers. It
was at this point that Urias-Orellana, Gamez-Mejia, and
G. E. U. G. left El Salvador for the United States.
Under the INA, the U. S. Government “may grant asylum”
to a noncitizen if it “determines” that he “is a refugee.” 8
U. S. C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifes as a
“refugee,” and is thus eligible for asylum, if he “is unable or
unwilling to return” to his country of nationality “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion.” § 1101(a)(42)(A). An asy-

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lum seeker can submit an affrmative application to the De-
par
tment of Homeland Security, see § 1158(a), or raise asylum
eligibility as a defense to removal proceedings before an IJ,
see § 1229a(c)(4). Urias-Orellana and his family chose the
latter path: When the Government initiated removal pro-
ceedings against them, they defended by asserting asylum
eligibility.
The IJ credited Urias-Orellana's account of the facts but
concluded that those facts were insuffcient to establish
either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per-
secution. The IJ explained that, under First Circuit prece-
dent, death threats may establish past persecution only when
they are “ `so menacing as to cause signifcant actual suffer-
ing or harm.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (quoting Bonilla
v. Mukasey, 539 F. 3d 72, 77 (CA1 2008)). The IJ concluded
that Urias-Orellana's past-persecution claim failed under
that standard, as he had not submitted any medical, psychi-
atric, or psychological evaluations indicating that he had ex-
perienced such suffering or harm. App. to Pet. for Cert.
31a–32a. The IJ further found the evidence regarding
Urias-Orellana's alleged fear of future persecution to be lack-
ing. He observed that Urias-Orellana had successfully es-
caped danger after many of his relocations and that any risk
resurfaced only when Urias-Orellana returned to his home-
town or nearby areas. Id., at 32a–35a.
Given the dearth of evidence establishing past or future
persecution, the IJ determined that Urias-Orellana did not
qualify as a refugee eligible for asylum under § 1101(a)(42).
See id., at 44a. The IJ determined that Gamez-Mejia and
G. E. U. G. were likewise ineligible for asylum, as their claims
were “derivativ[e]” of Urias-Orellana's. Id., at 28a. So, the
IJ ordered all three petitioners' removal. Id., at 44a.
B
Petitioners appealed the IJ's ruling to the BIA. See 8
CFR § 1003.1(b) (2025) (providing authority for such an ap-
peal). But the BIA affrmed the IJ's conclusion that Urias-

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Orellana's testimony “did not establish that he suffered past
har
m in the aggregate rising to the level of persecution.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. It also agreed that because
Urias-Orellana “only had problems when he returned to his
hometown,” his testimony did not establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution. Id., at 22a.
Petitioners then sought further review in the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(b)(2). See 121 F. 4th, at 331. Petitioners did not dis-
pute that death threats may establish past persecution only
when they are “so menacing as to cause signifcant actual
suffering or harm.” Opening Brief for Petitioners in No.
24–1042 (CA1), pp. 9–10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, they argued that the undisputed facts of this case
met that standard. The Court of Appeals emphasized that
its review was “cabin[ed]” to “whether the Agency conclu-
sion [that petitioners] had not demonstrated past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution was supported
by substantial evidence.” 121 F. 4th, at 335. Under that
standard, reversal was warranted only “if, in reviewing the
record as a whole, any reasonable adjudicator would be com-
pelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals ultimately affrmed, concluding that
Urias-Orellana's testimony did not compel a fnding of either
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.
See id., at 336–338. In particular, it determined that “[t]he
Agency reasonably concluded that the threats experienced
by Urias-Orellana” were not “so menacing as to cause sig-
nifcant actual suffering or harm.” Id., at 336 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). It similarly determined that, be-
cause “Urias-Orellana was able to live in towns across El
Salvador for years without harassment and only encountered
diffculties once he returned to his hometown,” a reasonable
factfnder would not be compelled to fnd a well-founded fear
of future persecution. Id., at 338.

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We granted certiorari, 606 U. S. 930 (2025), to evaluate
whether
the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate stand-
ard of review when evaluating Urias-Orellana's asylum
claim.
1
II
Section 1252(b)(4) does not use the phrase “substantial evi-
dence.” But it does specifcally address the “[s]cope and
standard for review” that the courts of appeals must apply
when evaluating IJ and BIA removal orders.
As relevant here, each of § 1252(b)(4)'s four subparagraphs
truncates the court's review in a particular manner. Sub-
paragraph (A) states that “the court of appeals shall decide
the petition only on the administrative record on which the
order of removal is based.” Subparagraph (C) says that “a
decision [by the agency] that [a noncitizen] is not eligible for
admission to the United States is conclusive unless mani-
festly contrary to law.” And, per subparagraph (D), “the
Attorney General's discretionary judgment whether to grant
relief under section 1158(a) of this title shall be conclusive
unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
discretion.”
This case involves subparagraph (B), which provides that
“the administrative fndings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” § 1252(b)(4)(B). This Court has previously
interpreted subparagraph (B) to prescribe a deferential,
“substantial-evidence standard” for review of agency factual
1
Because petitioners have not challenged the standard of persecution
that the agency applied—i. e., that death threats are suffcient to establish
past persecution only when they are so menacing as to cause signifcant
actual suffering or harm, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a—we consider only
the appropriate standard of review for the agency's application of that
standard to the facts. We note the Solicitor General agrees with petition-
ers that “purely legal questions about the appropriate standard” of perse-
cution are subject to de novo review. Brief for Respondent 40; see Tr. of
Oral Arg. 48.

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fndings. Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 (2020). Sub-
st
antial evidence, we have long emphasized, is “ `more than
a mere scintilla,' ” but “means—and means only—`such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.' ” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 97,
103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U. S. 197, 229 (1938)). Or, to come full circle, “ `fndings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.' ” Nasrallah, 590
U. S., at 584 (quoting § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
Whether a given agency determination fts within the pur-
view of subparagraph (B)—and is thus reviewed for substan-
tial evidence—is not always clear. Indeed, the courts of ap-
peals have split over the standard of review that should
apply to the agency's determination that an asylum applicant
has not established past “persecution” or a “well-founded
fear of [future] persecuti on” w ith i n the meani ng of
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
Some courts review the entire inquiry (both the underly-
ing factual fndings about what happened to the applicant
in her home country and the agency's application of the stat-
ute to those fndings) under the substantial-evidence stand-
ard.
2
Other courts break down the inquiry into two parts,
reviewing the agency's factual fndings for substantial evi-
dence and its legal conclusions de novo.
3
Yet even those
courts are not always careful when differentiating between
factual fndings and the application of the law to those fnd-
2
See Gómez-Medina v. Barr, 975 F. 3d 27, 31, 33 (CA1 2020); Ai Hua
Chen v. Holder, 742 F. 3d 171, 177–178 (CA4 2014); Yu v. Ashcroft, 364
F. 3d 700, 702–703 (CA6 2004); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F. 3d 669, 673 (CA7
2006); Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F. 3d 1086, 1091 (CA10 2008).
3
See Diallo v. INS, 232 F. 3d 279, 287 (CA2 2000); Herrera-Reyes v.
Attorney Gen., 952 F. 3d 101, 106 (CA3 2020); Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft,
263 F. 3d 442, 444 (CA5 2001) (per curiam); Njong v. Whitaker, 911 F. 3d
919, 922 (CA8 2018); Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F. 3d 1216, 1221 (CA9 2021);
Mejia v. Attorney Gen., 498 F. 3d 1253, 1256 (CA11 2007).

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ings, sometimes applying substantial-evidence review to the
entire
inquiry.
4
Today we resolve the proper-standard question as it re-
lates to the courts of appeals' review of the agency's persecu-
tion determination. As explained in Part III, infra, we hold
that § 1252(b)(4)(B) requires courts to review the entirety of
the agency's conclusions—both the underlying factual fnd-
ings and the application of the INA to those fndings—for
substantial evidence. Thus, in the language of the statute,
the agency's determination whether a given set of undis-
puted facts rises to the level of persecution under
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) is generally “conclusive unless any reason-
able adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-
trary.” § 1252(b)(4)(B).
III
Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards to
the agency's persecution determination, we have already
concluded that these determinations receive substantial-
evidence review. Specifcally, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U. S. 478 (1992), we held that “to obtain judicial reversal”
of the agency's persecution determination, an asylum ap-
plicant “must show that the evidence he presented was
so compelling that no reasonable factfnder could fail to
fnd the requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at 483–484. To
be sure, Congress amended the INA shortly after our de-
cisi on. But those amendments—and the additi on of
§ 1252(b)(4) in particular—codifed the Elias-Zacarias stand-
ard. As such, the statute as it reads today requires
substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecu-
tion determination.
4
See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F. 3d 316, 328, 336 (CA2 2020); Thayalan v.
Attorney Gen., 997 F. 3d 132, 137–138, n. 1 (CA3 2021); Gjetani v. Barr,
968 F. 3d 393, 396–397, and n. 2 (CA5 2020); Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F. 4th
1087, 1093 (CA8 2023); Sharma v. Garland, 9 F. 4th 1052, 1060 (CA9 2021);
Martinez v. Attorney Gen., 992 F. 3d 1283, 1292 (CA11 2021).

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A
Like
this case, Elias-Zacarias began with an IJ's determi-
nation that a noncitizen was ineligible for asylum. Id., at
480. Elias-Zacarias had testifed that he feared retaliation
in his home country of Guatemala after he refused to join a
group of guerillas who had attempted to recruit him. Id.,
at 479–480. But the IJ concluded that this testimony “failed
to demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion” as the INA
requires. Id., at 480 (citing 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a)).
After the BIA affrmed, Elias-Zacarias sought review in fed-
eral court. 502 U. S., at 480.
The Court of Appeals sided with Elias-Zacarias, holding
that “a guerilla organization's attempt to conscript a person
into its military forces necessarily constitutes `persecution
on account of . . . political opinion,' because `the person resist-
ing forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hos-
tile to the persecutor.' ” Id., at 481 (quoting Elias-Zacarias
v. INS, 921 F. 2d 844, 850 (CA9 1990)). We reversed the
Court of Appeals, however, reading the INA to require
substantial-evidence review. See 502 U. S., at 481, 483–484.
The version of the INA in place at the time of our decision
did not contain what is now § 1252(b)(4)(B). But it contained
a similar provision, which specifed that agency “fndings of
fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclu-
sive.” 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988 ed.). We interpreted
that provision to require substantial-evidence review of the
BIA's determination that Elias-Zacarias was ineligible for
asylum. More specifcally, we explained that the provision
set forth the substantial-evidence standard for review, allow-
ing reversal “only if the evidence presented . . . was such
that a reasonable factfnder would have to conclude that the
requisite fear of persecution existed.” 502 U. S., at 481.

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Though we did not explicitly use the term “substantial evi-
dence
,” our explanation accorded with how we have long
understood that standard to apply in the administrative
context. See Consolidated Edison, 305 U. S., at 229 (ex-
plaining that a statute providing that an agency's “fndings
. . . as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclu-
sive” means “substantial evidence” and requires only “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We then went on to apply the substantial-evidence stand-
ard to the entirety of the agency's persecution determina-
tion—including its conclusion that Elias-Zacarias's testimony
did not satisfy the legal standard for persecution. We ex-
plained that Elias-Zacarias had failed to establish a “well-
founded fear” that the guerillas would “persecute him be-
cause of ” his political opinion “with the degree of clarity
necessary to permit reversal of a BIA fnding to the con-
trary.” 502 U. S., at 483 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, even accepting his allegations as true,
they were not “so compelling that no reasonable factfnder
could fail to fnd the requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at
484.
Elias-Zacarias thus clarifed that the INA's provision
for substantial-evidence review encompassed not only the
agency's factual fndings but also the application of those
fndings to the statutory standard for persecution. Indeed,
following our decision, the courts of appeals overwhelmingly
understood it to require substantial-evidence review of the
entirety of the persecution determination. See, e.g., Klawit-
ter v. INS, 970 F. 2d 149, 152 (CA6 1992) (“According to the
Supreme Court, the Board's determination [a noncitizen] is
not eligible for asylum must be upheld unless the [noncitizen]
shows that the evidence he or she presented was `so compel-
ling that no reasonable factfnder could fail to fnd the requi-

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site fear of persecution' ” (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S.,
at
483–484)).
5
B
Just a few years after we decided Elias-Zacarias, Con-
gress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), amending several pro-
visions of the INA governing judicial review. § 306(a)(2),
110 Stat. 3009–607. Among other things, IIRIRA added
§ 1252(b)(4), clarifying the relevant standards of review for
IJ and BIA removal orders. But § 1252(b)(4) did not depart
from our decision in Elias-Zacarias. To the contrary,
§ 1252(b)(4) stayed the course.
Indeed, subparagraph (B) largely tracks our opinion in
Elias-Zacarias. Compare § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that
“administrative fndings of fact are conclusive unless any rea-
sonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary”) with 502 U. S., at 483–484 (stating that, if an asy-
lum applicant “seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's
determination, he must show that the evidence he presented
was so compelling that no reasonable factfnder could fail to
fnd the requisite fear of persecution”). Thus, § 1252(b)(4)(B)
effectively restates the pre-IIRIRA practice of applying the
INA's deferential standard for factual fndings to the perse-
cution determination. Cf. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598
U. S. 69, 80 (2023) (“This Court generally assumes that, when
Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of this Court's relevant
precedents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Supporting this reading of § 1252(b)(4)(B) are IIRIRA's
other amendments to the INA, which tend to restrict (rather
than expand) review of immigration-related determinations
in federal court. IIRIRA added, for instance, § 1252(a)
5
See also Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA4 1992) (citing
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S., at 483–484); Chun v. INS, 40 F. 3d 76, 78 (CA5
1994) (per curiam) (same); Milosevic v. INS, 18 F. 3d 366, 370 (CA7 1994)
(same); Yacoub v. INS, 999 F. 2d 1296, 1297 (CA8 1993) (per curiam)
(same); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F. 3d 902, 905 (CA9 1995) (same).

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(2)(D), which strips courts of jurisdiction to review certain
ty
pes of removal orders entirely, restoring jurisdiction only
for “constitutional claims or questions of law.” IIRIRA sim-
ilarly limited the scope of review under § 1252(b)(4), even in
the areas where courts retain their jurisdiction over removal
orders. Not only does subparagraph (B) require deference
toward “administrative fndings of fact,” but subparagraphs
(C) and (D) mandate that certain agency determinations are
“conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law.” Against
this backdrop, it would make little sense to interpret sub-
paragraph (B) as expanding judicial review beyond the pre-
IIRIRA practice of applying deference to agency persecu-
tion determinations.
IV
Given the force of Elias-Zacarias and IIRIRA's enact-
ment history, we cannot accept petitioners' arguments about
the applicable standard of review. Petitioners primarily
contend that Congress meant for de novo review to apply to
persecution determinations because § 1252(b)(4)(B) requires
deference only for “fndings of fact” and no subparagraph of
§ 1252(b)(4) explicitly addresses the “mixed question of law
and fact” that is the determination of past persecution and
fear of future persecution. See Brief for Petitioners 15–16.
With their focus on the metaphorical trees, we think peti-
tioners have missed the forest. It is certainly true that the
required persecution determination turns on more than just
the facts: The INA's legal standard for “persecution” must
be applied to the IJ's fndings of fact. But Elias-Zacarias
and the subsequent statutory history suggest that Congress
meant for the entirety of this kind of “mixed” determina-
tion—including both the IJ's factual fndings and the applica-
tion of the statute to those fndings—to receive deference
under § 1252(b)(4)(B). That makes sense because the overall
determination of refugee status primarily requires the IJ to
make critical factual fndings about a given applicant's expe-
riences in his country of nationality. And even where, as

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550 URIAS-OREL
LANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
here, the IJ accepts the applicant's testimony as true, the IJ
must
make an antecedent determination on the factual ques-
tion of the applicant's credibility. See Garland v. Ming Dai,
593 U. S. 357, 373 (2021) (explaining that, during immigration
proceedings, the IJ “makes fndings of fact, including deter-
minations as to the credibility of particular witness testi-
mony”). Given that Congress has required the courts of
appea ls to g ive sig ni ficant deference to I J fac tfi ndi ng
throughout § 1252(b)(4), it would be anomalous indeed to con-
clude that cour ts can rev iew subst antia l ly si mi lar
persecution-related fndings de novo.
6
Our decisions in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209
(2024), and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020),
are not to the contrary. In those cases, we held that a mixed
question of law and fact could qualify as a “question of law”
exempt from § 1252(a)'s bar on judicial review. 601 U. S.,
at 212; 589 U. S., at 225. But unlike § 1252(b), § 1252(a) does
not speak to the standards of review for removal orders;
rather, it addresses a court's ability to review removal orders
at all. As a result, whether a given issue is treated as
a question of law exempt from the INA's jurisdiction-
stripping provisions tells us nothing about the type of review
the court must afford to that issue under other provisions of
the statute. See Wilkinson, 601 U. S., at 222 (recognizing
that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not gov-
ern the standard of review); Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S.,
at 228 (same). Neither case, then, requires de novo review
here.
6
Our conclusion that § 1252(b)(4)(B) applies to the persecution determi-
nation and sets forth a deferential standard of review means we need not
address petitioners' argument about Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024). See Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (maintaining
that Loper Bright requires de novo review under these circumstances).
That decision is not applicable “when a particular statute” mandates defer-
ential review or otherwise “delegates authority to an agency consistent
with constitutional limits.” 603 U. S., at 413.

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Cite
as: 607 U. S. 537 (2026)
551
Opinion of the Court
***
Because
the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate
standard under § 1252(b)(4)(B) when it reviewed the agency
persecution determination for substantial evidence, the judg-
ment below is affrmed.
It is so ordered.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None