Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 606 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–45
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 20, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2024
FULD et al. v. PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 24–20. Argued April 1, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025*
Before the Court are two separate lawsuits fled in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York under the Antiterror-
ism Act of 1990 (ATA). The ATA creates a federal civil damages action
for U. S. nationals injured or killed “by reason of an act of international
terrorism.” 18 U. S. C. § 2333(a); see also § 2333(d)(2) (permitting aiding
and abetting liability). Respondents (defendants below) are the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA)—
entities responsible for carrying out governmental functions for parts of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The question presented is whether the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over respondents under the Promoting Security and Justice for Vic-
tims of Terrorism Act (PS JVTA) violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The PS JVTA names the PA and PLO specifcally
and provides that they “shall be deemed to have consented to personal
jurisdiction” in ATA cases under two circumstances. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5).
The frst jurisdictional predicate relates to respondents' practice of pay-
ing salaries to terrorists in Israeli prisons and to families of deceased
*Together with Waldman et al. v. Palestine Liberation Organization
et al. (see this Court's Rule 12.4) and No. 24–151, United States v. Pales-
tine Liberation Organization et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
1
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2 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Syllabus
terrorists—conduct Congress has condemned as “an incentive to commit
ac
ts of terror.” 132 Stat. 1143. The second ties jurisdiction to re-
spondents' activities on U. S. soil. § 2334(e)(1)(B).
Petitioners alleged that respondents engaged in conduct triggering
both jur isdic ti ona l predicates. The Second Circuit held that the
PS JVTA could not, consistent with constitutional due process, establish
personal jurisdiction over the PLO or PA.
Held: The PS JVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably
ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involv-
ing the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters
within the prerogative of the political branches. Pp. 11–25.
(a) Courts must have personal jurisdiction over parties before resolv-
ing cases. Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580 U. S. 82, 95. The
Court's modern personal jurisdiction cases have addressed the limita-
tions imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the jurisdiction of state
courts, but the Court has reserved whether the Fifth Amendment im-
poses the same restrictions on federal courts. Pp. 11–18.
(1) The Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction framework
derives from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, and
requires that a defendant have suffcient “contacts” with the forum
State so that maintaining suit is “reasonable” and “does not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 358 (quoting Inter-
national Shoe). Respondents urge application of this familiar frame-
work here, noting that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments are textually similar. The Court has recognized,
however, that the Amendments “were engrafted upon the Constitution
at different times and in widely different circumstances” and thus that
“questions may arise in which different constructions and applications
of their provisions may be proper.” French v. Barber Asphalt Paving
Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328. Pp. 12–13.
(2) The Four teenth Amendment's due process li mitati ons are
driven by two principles: (1) treating defendants fairly and (2) pro-
tecting interstate federalism, the latter of which ensures “that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 292. These
interstate federalism concerns do not apply to the Fifth Amendment's
limitations on the power of the Federal Government and the corollary
authority of the federal courts. The Constitution empowers the Fed-
eral Government—and it alone—with both nationwide and extraterrito-

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3
Syllabus
rial authority. Because the State and Federal Governments occupy
dramatica
lly different sovereign spheres, the Court declines to import
the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth
Amendment. Rather, the Fifth Amendment permits a more fexible
jurisdictional inquiry commensurate with the Federal Government's
broader sovereign authority. Pp. 13–16.
(3) While acknowledging that interstate federalism concerns are
irrelevant under the Fifth Amendment, respondents argue that fairness
and individual liberty considerations justify applying equivalent juris-
dictional limitations. But the Court has observed in the Fourteenth
Amendment context that interstate federalism concerns may be deci-
sive. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U. S., at 294. Accord-
ingly, while these “general fairness considerations” are relevant to the
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, they do not compel applying equivalent
jurisdictional limits here. Pp. 17–18.
(b) The Court does not delineate the full scope of the Federal Govern-
ment's power to hale foreign defendants into U. S. courts. Whatever
the Fifth Amendment's outer limits, the PS JVTA—which ties federal
jurisdiction to conduct closely related to the United States that impli-
cates important foreign policy concerns—does not transgress them.
Pp. 18–25.
(1) The Federal Government's foreign affairs power must be exer-
cised within constitutional bounds. See American Ins. Assn. v. Gara-
mendi, 539 U. S. 396, 416–417, n. 9. The Court accordingly reviews
even legislation implicating foreign policy issues to ensure that it has
not crossed a constitutional line. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U. S. 1, 34. Here, in passing and signing the PS JVTA into
law, Congress and the President made a considered judgment to subject
the PLO and PA to liability in U. S. courts as part of a comprehensive
legal response to deterring international terrorism that threatens the
life and limb of American citizens. The PS JVTA refects the political
branches' balanced judgment of competing concerns over national secu-
rity, foreign affairs, and fairness to these defendants—entities with
which the Federal Government has complex, longstanding relationships
in which concerns over terrorism have been paramount.
The PS JVTA is suitably limited to these ends. It does not broadly
expose respondents to myriad civil actions, but applies only to ATA
cases. The Federal Government may craft a narrow jurisdictional pro-
vision ensuring Americans injured or killed by acts of terror have an
adequate forum in which to vindicate their right to ATA compensation.
The statute's jurisdictional predicates are likewise narrow. The pay-
ments prong furthers the Federal Government's longstanding policy of
deterring payments that promote acts of overseas terror that may po-
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4 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Syllabus
tentially injure or kill Americans. The activities prong, in predicating
jur
isdiction on respondents' U. S. conduct, is a continuation of the Fed-
eral Government's longstanding, nuanced policy governing the opera-
tions that respondents may conduct on U. S. soil. The PS JVTA thus
ties jurisdiction to specifc, narrow conduct directly implicating sensitive
and ongoing concerns in respondents' relationships with the United
States. And the statute's targeted applicability to only two enumer-
ated nonsovereign foreign entities put the PLO and PA on full notice
that they could be subject to personal jurisdiction in ATA suits in U. S.
courts. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5). Pp. 18–23.
(2) Because the Court holds that the PS JVTA ties jurisdiction to
predicate conduct bearing a meaningful relationship to the United
States, the Court need not consider whether the statute comports with
cases addressing when defendants may be deemed to have consented to
jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U. S.
122. P. 23.
(c) Although the Fifth Amendment does not incorporate the Four-
teenth Amendment minimum contacts standard, the Fifth Amendment
might still require a “reasonableness” inquiry. Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 115. Even
assuming such analysis is constitutionally required, the PS JVTA easily
satisfes the factors previously applied to determine “the reasonableness
of the exercise of jurisdiction” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.,
at 113. Reasonableness depends on evaluating “the burden on the de-
fendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining relief.” Ibid. The PS JVTA satisfes all three. The Federal
Government has an exceedingly compelling interest in providing a
forum for American victims to hold accountable the perpetrators of acts
of international terror that harm U. S. citizens. American plaintiffs
have a strong interest in seeking justice through ATA damages actions
in U. S. courts. Finally, respondents do not assert lack of notice or
contend that litigating in the United States forces them to bear an
unfair or unmanageable burden. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
PS JVTA's jurisdictional rule makes litigation so “gravely diffcult and
inconvenient,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 478, as to
render the exercise of personal jurisdiction “unreasonable and unfair,”
Asahi, 480 U. S., at 116. Pp. 23–25.
82 F. 4th 64 (second judgment) and 74 (frst judgment), reversed and
remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito,
Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Gorsuch,
J., joined as to Part II, post, p. 25.
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5
Opinion of the Court
Kent A. Yalowitz argued the cause for petitioners in No.
24
–20. With him on the briefs were Nicole L. Masiello,
Allon Kedem, John P. Elwood, Dirk C. Phillips, Stephen K.
Wirth, Daniel Yablon, Samuel Silverman, Jeffrey Fleisch-
mann, and Brian M. Williams.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States in No. 24–151. With him on the briefs
were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Acting Assistant At-
torney General Shumate, Kevin J. Barber, Benjamin H. Tor-
rance, Sharon Swingle, and Courtney L. Dixon.
Mitchell R. Berger argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief was Gassan A. Baloul.†
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for
Victims of Terrorism Act in 2019. The Act deems the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority—
if they engage in specifed conduct—to have consented to
personal jurisdiction in civil suits brought in the United
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for
Agudath Israel of America et al. by Mark I. Pinkert, Jason Torchinsky,
Nathan J. Diament, Steven C. Sheinberg, Steven M. Freeman, Marc Stern,
Susan B. Tuchman, Kenneth Marcus, Alyza Lewin, Richard A. Rosen,
Clifford A. Rieders, Jonathan L. Sherman, and Steven Orlow; for the
America First Legal Foundation by R. Trent McCotter and Reed D. Ru-
binstein; for the American Association for Justice by Robert S. Peck and
Jeffrey R. White; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay
Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Andrew J. Ekonomou,
and Benjamin P. Sisney; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America by Peter B. Rutledge, Hillary K. Lukacs, Jennifer B.
Dickey, and Jonathan D. Urick; for Scholars of Civil Procedure et al. by
Kevin D. Benish; for Michael Pompeo by Douglass Mitchell and Andri-
anna D. Kastanek; for Stephen E. Sachs, pro se; and for Abraham D. So-
faer et al. by Tejinder Singh and Alan B. Morrison.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 24–20 were fled for Sen.
Charles Grassley et al. by J. Carl Cecere; and for the U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives by Matthew B. Berry.
Alan Mygatt-Tauber, pro se, fled a brief of amicus curiae in both cases.
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6 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
States under the Antiterrorism Act. The question pre-
sented
is whether this personal jurisdiction provision vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
I
A
Before us are two separate lawsuits against respondents,
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian
Authority (PA)—entities responsible for carrying out, re-
spectively, foreign and domestic governmental functions for
parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See 82 F. 4th 74, 80
(CA2 2023). Although the United States does not recognize
respondents as sovereign, other nations do, and respondents
maintain consular facilities and diplomatic missions around
the world. The PLO also maintains an offce in New York
City as part of its mission to the United Nations, in which
the PLO participates as a “Permanent Observer.” Ibid.
Motivated by concerns over respondents' support for over-
seas terrorism, Congress has for decades restricted their ac-
tivities on U. S. soil. For example, in the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 1406, 22 U. S. C. § 5201 et seq., Congress
found that the PLO and its constituent groups “ha[d] taken
credit for, and been implicated in, the murders of dozens of
American citizens abroad.” § 5201(a)(4). Congress accord-
ingly limited the PLO's operations in the United States.
§§ 5201(b), 5202. Congress has similarly restricted the PA's
ability to conduct activities on U. S. soil. See Palestinian
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, § 7, 120 Stat. 3324, 22 U. S. C.
§ 2378b. It has also placed limits on the distribution of for-
eign aid and other assistance to respondents. See Taylor
Force Act, § 1004(a), 132 Stat. 1144, 22 U. S. C. § 2378c–1(a).
As part of its comprehensive legal response to interna-
tional terrorism, Congress also enacted the Antiterrorism
Act of 1990 (ATA), § 132, 104 Stat. 2250–2252, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2331 et seq.; see H. R. Rep. No. 102–1040, p. 5 (1992). The
ATA creates a civil treble damages cause of action for any
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U. S. national injured or killed “by reason of an act of inter-
nati
onal terrorism.” § 2333(a); see also § 2333(d)(2) (permit-
ting aiding and abetting liability). The ATA provides for
nationwide service of process and venue and exclusive juris-
diction in federal courts. §§ 2334(a), 2338.
B
The ATA supplied the underlying cause of action in both
lawsuits now before us. The frst was brought by a group
of American citizens (and their estates and survivors) in-
jured in terror attacks in Israel. It was fled in 2004 in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No.
1:04–cv–397, 1 App. 1–51.
1
The case went to trial, and in
2015 a jury found respondents liable under the ATA. The
jury awarded the plaintiffs $218.5 million in damages, which
was trebled to $655.5 million.
That victory was short lived. The next year, the Second
Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and directed
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondents
were not subject to jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held,
because the complained of “killings and related acts of ter-
rorism . . . were unconnected to the forum and were not
expressly aimed at the United States.” 835 F. 3d 317, 337
(2016); accord, Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F. 3d 45, 57–
58 (CADC 2017).
Congress responded by enacting the Anti-Terrorism Clari-
fcation Act of 2018 (ATCA), 132 Stat. 3183. The ATCA
added a new provision to the ATA, which deemed defendants
“to have consented to personal jurisdiction” if they engaged
in certain activities in the United States or accepted particu-
1
This case was recaptioned Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion in the Second Circuit. 82 F. 4th 64, 69, n. 2 (2023) (per curiam).
Like the parties, we refer to the case as Sokolow, which is how it was
captioned in the District Court. See Brief for Petitioner Miriam Fuld
et al. 9–11; Brief for United States 2, n. 2; Brief for Respondents 5–9.

8 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
lar forms of U. S. foreign assistance. See § 4(a), id., at 3184.
The
Sokolow plaintiffs moved for the Second Circuit to recall
its mandate in light of the ATCA. The Court of Appeals
declined to do so, 925 F. 3d 570, 574–576 (2019) (per curiam),
and the plaintiffs fled a petition for a writ of certiorari in
this Court, see Pet. for Cert. in Sokolow v. Palestine Libera-
tion Org., O. T. 2019, No. 19–764.
C
While the Sokolow certiorari petition was pending, the
landscape changed again—this time, through Congress's en-
actment in December 2019 of the law at issue here: the Pro-
moting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act
(PSJVTA), § 903, 133 Stat. 3082–3085, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2333,
2334. Section 903(c) of the PSJVTA, subtitled “Jurisdic-
tional Amendments to Facilitate Resolution of Terrorism-
Related Claims of Nationals of the United States,” super-
seded the ATCA's jurisdictional provisions. 133 Stat. 3083.
Under the PSJVTA's now operative provision, which refers
to the PA and PLO by name, respondents “shall be deemed
to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in ATA cases in
two specifed circumstances. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5).
The frst jurisdictional predicate relates to respondents'
practice “of paying salaries to terrorists serving in Israeli
prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists”—
conduct which Congress has condemned as “an incentive to
commit acts of terror.” Taylor Force Act, § 1002(1), 132
Stat. 1143. Jurisdiction is triggered under this prong if,
after a specifed time, respondents “mak[e] any payment, di-
rectly or indirectly”:
“(i) to any payee designated by any individual who,
after being fairly tried or pleading guilty, has been im-
prisoned for committing any act of terrorism that in-
jured or killed a national of the United States, if such
payment is made by reason of such imprisonment; or
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Opinion of the Court
“(ii) to any family member of any individual, following
such
individual's death while committing an act of ter-
rorism that injured or killed a national of the United
States, if such payment is made by reason of the death
of such individual.” § 2334(e)(1)(A).
The PSJVTA's second predicate ties jurisdiction to re-
spondents' activities on U. S. soil. The PLO and PA are
deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if, after a
specifed period, either “continues to maintain,” “estab-
lishes[,] or procures any offce, headquarters, premises, or
other facilities or establishments in the United States,” or
otherwise “conducts any activity while physically present in
the United States.” § 2334(e)(1)(B). The statute expressly
excludes respondents' United Nations mission and its ancil-
lary activities. § 2334(e)(3).
D
Given this legislative development, we granted the Soko-
low plaintiffs' pending certiorari petition, vacated the judg-
ment of the Second Circuit, and remanded for “further con-
sideration in light of the [PSJVTA].” 590 U. S. 921 (2020).
A few days after our remand, a different set of plaintiffs—
the family of an American citizen stabbed in a 2018 attack
in the West Bank—sued respondents under the ATA in the
Southern District of New York, and invoked the PSJVTA as
the basis for personal jurisdiction. See Fuld v. Palestine
Liberation Org., No. 1:20–cv–3374, 2 App. 383–439.
Both sets of plaintiffs—the Sokolow plaintiffs back in Dis-
trict Court and the Fuld plaintiffs there for the frst time—
alleged that respondents had engaged in conduct suffcient to
trigger both PSJVTA predicates. In response, respondents
contended that the PSJVTA violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in
both cases to defend the law's constitutionality. See 28
U. S. C. § 2403(a); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5.1(c).
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v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
Both District Courts found evidence that respondents had
engaged
in conduct suffcient to satisfy at least the payments
prong. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 607 F. Supp.
3d 323, 325 (SDNY 2022); 578 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583, and
n. 3 (SDNY 2022). But both courts agreed with respond-
ents that “an exercise of jurisdiction under either of the
PS JVTA's factua l predicates is unconstituti ona l. ” 607
F. Supp. 3d, at 326; see also 578 F. Supp. 3d, at 595–596.
The Second Circuit consolidated the cases and affrmed.
Following Circuit precedent “holding that the due process
analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments paral-
lel one another in civil cases,” the panel explained that the
statute's factual predicates involve conduct insuffcient to es-
tablish personal jurisdiction. 82 F. 4th, at 91, 102. And so,
it reasoned, “those same activities” could not “reasonably be
interpreted” under the deemed consent language as signal-
ing respondents' intent to submit to “the authority of ” U. S.
courts. Id., at 91; see also id., at 102–104. The court there-
fore held that the PSJVTA could not, consistent with “the
requirements of constitutional due process,” “establish per-
sonal jurisdiction over the PLO or the PA.” Id., at 80; 82
F. 4th 64, 73 (2023) (per curiam).
The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Judge
Menashi, joined by two other judges in full and one judge in
part, dissented. In his view, the panel had construed too
narrowly the circumstances under which a foreign entity
may be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction.
See 101 F. 4th 190, 204–205 (2024). The dissent also dis-
agreed that “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment imposes the same limits on the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on the jurisdiction of the state courts.”
Id., at 205. In the dissent's view, “the federal government
is not similarly situated to the state governments in the ex-
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standards limiting the exercise of personal jurisdiction are
not
the same.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the PSJVTA vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment. 604 U. S. 1041 (2024).
II
We have long held that a “court must have . . . power
over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can
resolve a case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580
U. S. 82, 95 (2017). This requirement, we have stated, “fows
. . . from the Due Process Clause.” Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694,
702 (1982). Our modern personal jurisdiction cases, how-
ever, have grappled only with the limitations imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment on state courts. See 4 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & A. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1068.1, pp. 696–699 (4th ed. 2015). We have expressly re-
served “the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes
the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by a federal court.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 269 (2017)
(emphasis added); see also Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).
To be sure, this is not our frst personal jurisdiction case
to have originated in federal court. But under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[f]ederal courts ordinarily follow
state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over
persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 125 (2014)
(citing Rule 4(k)(1)(A)) (applying Fourteenth Amendment
analysis to evaluate personal jurisdiction in Federal District
Court). Any difference between the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is therefore implicated in only a subset of fed-
eral cases, such as those in which personal jurisdiction is—
as in the PSJVTA—“authorized by a federal statute.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(C). Because we must determine in
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Opinion of the Court
these cases the constitutionality of such a statute, the ques-
ti
on we have long reserved is now squarely before us.
A
Our current framework for assessing personal jurisdiction
under the Fourteenth Amendment derives from Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). Under
that framework, “a tribunal's authority” over a defendant
“depends on the defendant's having such `contacts' with the
forum State that `the maintenance of the suit' is `reasonable,
in the context of our federal system of government,' and
`does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' ” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting International
Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316–317).
Since International Shoe, “our decisions have recognized
two types of personal jurisdiction: `general' . . . and `spe-
cifc.' ” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. General
jurisdiction lies in the forum where the defendant is domi-
ciled or “fairly regarded as at home.” Ibid. (quoting Good-
year Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915,
924 (2011)). A court in such a forum “may hear any claim
against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying
the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers
Squibb, 582 U. S., at 262. No one contends, however, that
the PLO and PA are subject to general jurisdiction in the
United States.
“Specifc jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less
intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower
class of claims.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 359. A state
court may exercise specifc jurisdiction “over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist `minimum contacts' be-
tween the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980)
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316). The requi-
site contacts “for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the
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name `purposeful availment.' ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at
359.
“The defendant, we have said, must take `some act by
which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State.' ” Ibid. (quoting Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958); alteration omitted).
And the plaintiff's claims, we have held, must “deriv[e] from,
or [be] connected with,” those activities. Goodyear, 564
U. S., at 919.
Respondents urge us to apply this familiar Fourteenth
Amendment framework here. See Brief for Respondents
49–50. They point out that the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are, textually speaking,
nearly identical. Compare Amdt. 5 (“No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”) with Amdt. 14, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”).
2
We have long recognized, however, that “[w]hile the lan-
guage of [the two] amendments is the same,” “they were en-
grafted upon the Constitution at different times and in
widely different circumstances of our national life.” French
v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 328 (1901). We
have therefore anticipated that “questions may arise in
which different constructions and applications of their provi-
sions may be proper.” Ibid.
B
We have repeatedly described the due process limitations
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment as driven by two
principles: (1) “treating defendants fairly,” and (2) “protect-
ing `interstate federalism.' ” Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at
360 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293); see
also, e. g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U. S., at 263. We have
2
Neither the private petitioners nor the United States asks us to revisit
the Second Circuit's determination that respondents, as nonsovereign enti-
ties, have due process rights. See 835 F. 3d 317, 329 (2016).

14 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
emphasized, therefore, “that the reasonableness of asserting
jur
isdiction over the defendant must be assessed `in the con-
text of our federal system of government,' and stressed that
the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but also
the `orderly administration of the laws.' ” World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293–294 (quoting International
Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317, 319; citation omitted). The require-
ment that a defendant have minimum contacts with the
forum, we have said, “can be seen to perform [these] two
related, but distinguishable, functions.” World-Wide Volks-
wagen, 444 U. S., at 291–292.
This framing follows from “the principles of interstate fed-
eralism embodied in the Constitution,” id., at 293, and the
related protections of due process which ensure that individ-
uals are “subject only to lawful power,” J. McIntyre Machin-
ery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opin-
ion). State sovereign authority is bounded by the States'
respective borders. We explained as much nearly one hun-
dred years ago in Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 404 (1933):
“The application to the States of the rule of due process . . .
comes from the fact that their spheres of activity are en-
forced and protected by the Constitution.” “Due process
requires that the limits of jurisdiction shall not be trans-
gressed,” and in our constitutional system, “[t]he limits of
State power are defned in view of the relation of the States
to each other in the Federal Union.” Id., at 401.
Our Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction stand-
ards emerged in that vein, as “a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States.” Hanson,
357 U. S., at 251. Those standards—and in particular, the
requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with
the forum State—functionally “ensure that the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S.,
at 292.
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15
Opinion of the Court
These interstate federalism concerns, however, do not
apply
to limitations under the Fifth Amendment upon the
power of the Federal Government and the corollary author-
ity of the federal courts. The Constitution confers upon the
Federal Government—and it alone—both nationwide and ex-
traterritorial authority. While “the limitations of the Con-
stitution are barriers bordering the States and preventing
them from transcending the limits of their authority,” there
is no equivalent “ground for constructing an imaginary con-
stitutional barrier around the exterior confnes of the United
States for the purpose of shutting that government off from
the exertion of powers which inherently belong to it by vir-
tue of its sovereignty.” United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S.
299, 306 (1914).
We observed in Burnet, for example, that the geographical
limitations on “the taxing power of the States under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not equiva-
lently “restrict the taxing power of the Federal Govern-
ment,” because “[t]he Constitution creates no such relation
between the United States and foreign countries as it creates
between the States themselves.” 288 U. S., at 400–401, 403,
405; accord, Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 55–56 (1924). That
same year, we recognized—in light of Congress's “constitu-
tional authority `to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions' ”—the Federal Government's exclusive authority “[i]n
international relations and with respect to foreign inter-
course and trade.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 48, 56, 59 (1933) (quoting Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3) (rejecting contention that state instrumentality was
immune from paying import duties).
Of particular salience here, we have also recognized the
National Government's interest in holding accountable those
who perpetrate an “act of violence against” U. S. nationals—
who, even when physically outside our borders, remain
“under the particular protection” of American law. Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 687 (2019). So too the Na-
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Opinion of the Court
tional Government's corresponding authority to make “the
k
illing of an American abroad” punishable as a federal of-
fense “that can be prosecuted in [U. S.] courts.” Ibid. (citing
18 U. S. C. § 2332(a)(1)); see also Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Con-
gress power to “defne and punish” certain extraterritorial
offenses). Indeed, that background context informed the
enactment of the ATA, which legislators hoped would “ope[n]
the courthouse door to victims of international terrorism” by
“extend[ing] the same jurisdictional structure that under-
girds the reach of American criminal law to the civil reme-
dies that it defnes.” S. Rep. No. 102–342, p. 45 (1992).
Given the distinct territorial reach of the Federal Govern-
ment's sovereign power, it makes little sense to mechanically
import the limitations that the Fourteenth Amendment im-
poses on the authority of state courts, which is restricted
consonant w ith the States' more constrained sovereig n
spheres. See Burnet, 288 U. S., at 401. Indeed, when eval-
uating state court jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we have emphasized that “personal jurisdiction re-
quires” a “sovereign-by-sovereign . . . analysis.” Nicastro,
564 U. S., at 884 (plurality opinion). And we have acknowl-
edged the straightforward premise that “the United States
is a distinct sovereign.” Ibid. That distinction makes a
difference.
Accordingly, to the extent that the Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments both implicitly limit
the jurisdictional authority of courts, they do so with respect
to the distinct sovereignties from which those courts derive
their authority. Because the State and Federal Govern-
ments occupy categorically different sovereign spheres, we
decline to import the Fourteenth Amendment minimum
contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily per-
mits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry commensurate
with the Federal Government's broader sovereign authority.
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17
Opinion of the Court
C
In
the cases before us the Second Circuit, relying on Cir-
cuit precedent, declined to apply a different jurisdictional
test from the one required under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See 82 F. 4th, at 102–105. The PLO and PA likewise
urge us not to diverge from Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples. They acknowledge that concerns of interstate federal-
ism cease to be relevant in the Fifth Amendment context,
but nonetheless take the view that related considerations of
fairness and individual liberty justify the application of
equivalent jurisdictional limitations here.
To be sure, we have occasionally framed the personal juris-
diction limits on state courts as “represent[ing] a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty,” protecting a defendant from the
burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum with which he
has little connection. Omni, 484 U. S., at 104 (quoting In-
surance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 702). These state-
ments are best understood, however, to refect the principle
that “due process protects the individual's right to be subject
only to lawful power.” Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 884 (plurality
opinion). And “whether a judicial judgment is lawful de-
pends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.”
Ibid.
Interstate federalism concerns accordingly may be deci-
sive for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., for instance, we stressed that “[e]ven if
the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State
. . . , the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State
of its power to render a valid judgment.” 444 U. S., at 294.
We echoed the point in Bristol-Myers Squibb. After ac-
knowledging that “the `primary concern' is `the burden on
the defendant,' ” we emphasized that “[a]ssessing this bur-
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18 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
den” requires not only “consider[ing] the practical problems
resu
lting from litigating in the forum,” but also “the more
abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a
State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims
in question.” 582 U. S., at 263. And so we clarifed again:
“[A]t times, this federalism interest may be decisive.” Ibid.
While certainly germane to the Fourteenth Amendment in-
quiry, the “general fairness considerations” invoked by re-
spondents do not compel the application of equivalent jur-
isdictional limits here. Nicastro, 564 U. S., at 883–884
(plurality opinion) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S.,
at 294).
III
Although we hold today that the Fifth Amendment does
not impose the same jurisdictional limitations as the Four-
teenth, we do not purport to delineate the outer bounds of
the Federal Government's power, consistent with due proc-
ess, to hale foreign defendants into U. S. courts. On this
score, the private petitioners argue that the Fifth Amend-
ment imposes no territorial limits on personal jurisdiction.
See Brief for Petitioner Miriam Fuld et al. 20. The United
States, however, asks us not to embrace—at least for now—
this maximalist theory of federal jurisdiction. The Govern-
ment cautions that the theory is “not easily confrmed as a
historical matter,” and points to “strong policy reasons . . .
against reaching ” it, including the possibility that other na-
tions might respond in kind by haling Americans into their
courts under expansive theories of jurisdiction. Brief for
United States 47–48.
We agree with the Government that we need not address
the private petitioners' unbounded jurisdictional theory
today. The PSJVTA ties federal jurisdiction to conduct
closely related to the United States that implicates impor-
tant foreign policy concerns. We are wary to reach further
and bless more attenuated assertions of jurisdiction when
the cases before us do not require doing so. Cf. Asahi Metal
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19
Opinion of the Court
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S.
102,
115 (1987) (“Great care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the
international feld.” (quoting United States v. First Nat. City
Bank, 379 U. S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). It
is suffcient unto the day that, whatever the Fifth Amend-
ment's outer limits on the territorial jurisdiction of federal
courts, the PSJVTA does not transgress them.
A
1
The Federal Government's “ `inherent' foreign affairs
power,” “like every other governmental power, must be ex-
ercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution.” American Ins. Assn. v Garamendi, 539
U. S. 396, 416–417, n. 9 (2003) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936)). We
accordingly review even legislation implicating foreign policy
issues to ensure that it has not crossed a constitutional line.
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 34
(2010). We will not, however, cavalierly interfere with the
political branches' “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign
affairs. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 273 (2018)
(plurality opinion); see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S.
212, 215 (2016) (emphasizing that action in this realm “war-
rants respectful review by courts”). And when the Execu-
tive and Congress have spoken with one voice in that sphere,
their coordinate action is “supported by the strongest of pre-
sumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,
and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any
who might attack it.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
In respectively passing and signing the PSJVTA into law,
Congress and the President made a considered judgment to
subject the PLO and PA to liability in U. S. courts as part of
a comprehensive legal response to “halt, deter, and disrupt”
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v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
acts of international terrorism that threaten the life and limb
of
American citizens. H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, pp. 7–8
(2018). Combating terrorism is, we have recognized, “an ur-
gent objective of the highest order.” Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U. S., at 28. The Federal Government, relat-
edly, has a strong interest in permitting American victims of
international terror to pursue justice in domestic courts.
Cf. Gamble, 587 U. S., at 687 (recognizing interest of United
States in prosecuting “the killing of an American abroad . . .
in [U. S.] courts”). Indeed, a “key premise” of the PSJVTA
was Congress's desire to facilitate “the adjudication of ATA
claims like the plaintiffs',” which it views as “vital” to “fur-
thering the safety of Americans abroad, facilitating compen-
sation for injuries or death, and deterring international ter-
rorism.” Brief for United States 29, 36 (citing Brief for Sen.
Charles Grassley et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert.
18–19; H. R. Rep. No. 115–858, at 3–4, 7–8); see also
§ 903(d)(1)(A), 133 Stat. 3085 (providing that the PSVJTA
“should be liberally construed to carry out the purposes of
Congress to provide relief for victims of terrorism”). The
PSJVTA thus refects the political branches' balanced judg-
ment of competing concerns over “sensitive and weighty in-
terests of national security and foreign affairs” and fairness
to these particular defendants—entities with which the Fed-
eral Government has complex, longstanding relationships in
which concerns over terrorism have long been at the fore.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 33–34; see Brief
for United States 38, 43.
The PSJVTA is also suitably limited to those ends. It
does not put respondents at broad risk of being haled into
U. S. courts for myriad civil liability actions. Rather, the
statute applies only to ATA cases, a narrow category of
claims that provide civil remedies only for Americans injured
by acts of international terrorism. See 4 Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1068.1, at 733 (“[W]hen Congress
has undertaken to enact a nationwide service statute appli-
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21
Opinion of the Court
cable to a certain class of disputes, that statute should be
afforded
substantial weight as a legislative articulation of
federal social policy.”). It is permissible for the Federal
Government to craft a narrow jurisdictional provision that
ensures, as part of a broader foreign policy agenda, that
Americans injured or killed by acts of terror have an ade-
quate for um i n wh ich to v i ndicate their r ight to ATA
compensation.
The statute's jurisdiction triggering predicates are like-
wise narrow. The payments prong furthers the Federal
Government's longstanding policy of deterring these sorts of
payments, which the United States has determined promote
acts of terror that may injure or kill Americans. See Taylor
Force Act, 132 Stat. 1143; Reply Brief for United States 2.
3
And the activities prong—which predicates jurisdiction on
respondents' conduct within the United States—represents
a continuation of the Federal Government's longstanding, nu-
anced policy delineating the operations in which respondents
may permissibly engage on U. S. soil. See Brief for United
States 43. Far from an anything-goes approach, then, the
PSJVTA ties jurisdiction to specifc and narrow conduct that
directly implicates issues of sensitive and ongoing concern in
respondents' relationships with the United States.
The PSJVTA also limits jurisdiction to only two enumer-
ated nonsovereign foreign entities, both of which have been
subject to a series of congressional enactments aimed at de-
terring terrorism and accomplishing other foreign relations
objectives. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(3)(B); 22 U. S. C.
3
Respondents dispute that such payments reward or incentivize terror-
ism, and instead characterize the payments as part of a general welfare
system. See Brief for Respondents 32–33. Congress has suggested it
thinks otherwise. See Taylor Force Act, 132 Stat. 1143. We express no
view on the proper characterization of the program. See Holder v. Hu-
manitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 35 (2010). Nor do respondents'
statements that they “formally revoked” the payments program in Febru-
ary 2025 bear on our analysis. See Brief for Respondents 31–32; Reply
Brief for United States 11.
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Opinion of the Court
§§ 286w, 2227(a), 2378b(a) and (b), 2378c(a), 2378c–1(a), 5201,
5202.
Far from haling just any run-of-the-mill private de-
fendant into American courts, the PSJVTA represents but
one targeted aspect of a multifaceted foreign policy toward
these two sui generis foreign entities, both of which exercise
governmental functions in a geopolitically sensitive region
and have decades of “meaningful `contacts, ties, [and] rela-
tions' ” with the United States. Burger King Corp. v. Rud-
zewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting International Shoe,
326 U. S., at 319).
2
Respondents, for their part, contend that petitioners
“greatly overstate the signifcance of the PSJVTA” to Con-
gress's antiterror efforts. Brief for Respondents 45. They
point out that the statute only applies to them, but not any
“other terrorist group or state-sponsor of terrorism.” Id.,
at 46; see also id., at 69–70. If anything, though, this sup-
posed underinclusiveness only serves to reinforce that the
statute refects “delicate judgments” on matters of foreign
policy that are in “the prerogative of the political branches
to make.” Jesner, 584 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion).
“Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to
make principled distinctions between activities that will fur-
ther terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign
policy, and those that will not.” Humanitarian Law Proj-
ect, 561 U. S., at 35. Rather than subject to jurisdiction in
its courts a broader range of potential defendants—each of
which presumably would implicate distinct foreign affairs
concerns—the Federal Government took a narrower tack.
We decline to second guess why Congress did not use a
blunter remedial tool to achieve its desired foreign policy
ends. And moreover, the statute's targeted applicability
put the PLO and PA on full notice that they could be subject
“to personal jurisdiction” in ATA suits in U. S. courts. 18
U. S. C. §§ 2334(e)(1), (5).
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Opinion of the Court
In respondents' view, deference to the political branches is
a
lso unwarranted here because “Congress's explicit purpose
[was] to reverse federal decisions” holding that the same ac-
tivities that trigger jurisdiction under the PSJVTA were “in-
suffcient to support the exercise of jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause.” Brief for Respondents 14, 45. But
we hold today that those lower courts applied the wrong con-
stitutional test.
3
We need not separately consider whether the statute com-
ports with our cases addressing the circumstances under
which a defendant may be deemed, consistent with due proc-
ess, to have consented to jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mallory v.
Norfolk Southern R. Co., 600 U. S. 122 (2023). Respondents'
consent-based arguments rest on the premise that Con-
gress could not in the PSJVTA “transform constitutionally-
insuffcient conduct overseas into grounds for `deemed con-
sent' to personal jurisdiction in the United States.” Brief
for Respondents 31. The Court of Appeals thought simi-
larly. See 82 F. 4th, at 91. Since we hold that the statute
ties the assertion of jurisdiction to predicate conduct that in
and of itself bears a meaningful relationship to the United
States, we need not further consider the matter through the
lens of consent.
B
Although we have already made clear that the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not incorporate the
Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard, the
prospect remains that the Fifth Amendment might entail a
similar “inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case.” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 115.
We need not determine whether such analysis is constitu-
tionally required because, even if it were, the PSVJTA easily
comports with the factors we have previously applied to de-
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v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Opinion of the Court
termine “the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction”
e
ven under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 113. Rea-
sonableness, we have explained, will depend in each case “on
an evaluation of several factors,” including “the burden on
the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the
plaintiff 's interest in obtaining relief.” Ibid. The PSJVTA
ticks all three boxes.
For largely the same reasons that we conclude there is a
close connection between the PSJVTA's predicate conduct
and the United States, it follows that the forum sovereign
has a substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute. We
will not belabor that the Federal Government has an exceed-
ingly compelling interest, as part of its comprehensive ef-
forts to deter international terrorism, in providing a forum
for American victims to hold the perpetrators of such acts
accountable. For similar reasons, American plaintiffs have
a strong interest in seeking justice through an ATA damages
action in U. S. courts. Cf. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at 368
(recognizing the “signifcant interests” of a forum State in
“providing [its] residents with a convenient forum for re-
dressing injuries inficted by out-of-state actors” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Respondents, moreover, “do not complain of any lack of
notice or contend that litigating these cases in the United
States would force them to bear an unfair or unmanageable
burden.” Reply Brief for United States 9. And as the
United States points out, it seems implausible to think other-
wise. See Brief for United States 38. Respondents are “so-
phisticated international organizations” that operate “billion-
dollar budgets” and “govern a territory recognized as a
sovereign state by many other countries.” Ibid.; 101 F. 4th,
at 208 (Menashi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc). They maintain embassies, missions, and delegations
around the world and a longstanding “presence in the United
States” which continues to this day. Brief for United States
3, 38. Nor could it have come as much of a surprise that
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25
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
respondents were haled into U. S. courts in these cases.
They
have litigated ATA suits here for decades, and in the
PSJVTA were put on clear notice—far more than most de-
fendants in the mine-run of litigation—that continuing to
engage in certain specifed conduct would open them up to
potential federal court jurisdiction. See ibid.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
PSJVTA's jurisdictional rule makes “litigation `so gravely
diffcult and inconvenient,' ” Burger King, 471 U. S., at 478,
as to render the “exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . unrea-
sonable and unfair,” Asahi, 480 U. S., at 116.
***
The PSJVTA reasonably ties the assertion of federal juris-
diction over the PLO and PA to conduct that involves the
United States and implicates sensitive foreign policy matters
within the prerogative of the political branches. We hold
that the statute's provision for personal jurisdiction com-
ports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as
to Part II, concurring in the judgment.
The Court properly holds that the personal-jurisdiction
provisions of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims
of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), § 903, 133 Stat. 3082–3085, 18
U. S. C. §§ 2333, 2334, do not violate respondents' claimed
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See ante, at 18–25. In reaching this conclusion, the
majority recognizes that the Fourteenth Amendment's “min-
imum contacts standard” does not apply to the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Ante, at 16. But, rather than
decide what standard does apply, the Court holds only that
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26 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
the Fifth Amendment at least permits a statute such as the
PS
JVTA that “ties federal jurisdiction to conduct closely re-
lated to the United States that implicates important foreign
policy concerns.” Ante, at 18. The Court leaves for another
day the task of defning “the Fifth Amendment's outer limits
on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts.” Ante, at 19.
I would take a different approach. When interpreting
constitutional provisions, we must look to “the text of the
Constitution” as well as “historical evidence from the fram-
ing ” that can illuminate “the intent of those who drafted and
ratifed it.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S.
334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). The
critical question in these cases is what boundaries the Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee, as originally under-
stood, places on the Federal Government's power to extend
personal jurisdiction over respondents. Historical evidence
demonstrates that the answer is “none.” “Because the ma-
jority has adopted an analysis that is largely unconnected
to the Constitution's text and history, I concur only in the
judgment.” Id., at 371.
I
“We start with the text of the Fifth Amendment” and in-
terpret its provisions in light of how they were “ `understood
in 1791.' ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 683
(2019); see also McIntyre, 514 U. S., at 370–371 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
provides that “[n]o person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Thus, to show
that the PSJVTA's jurisdictional provisions run afoul of the
Fifth Amendment's due process protections, respondents
must establish both that they are “person[s]” protected by
the Fifth Amendment and that the PSJVTA transgresses
their due process rights. These requirements in turn raise
two threshold issues: whether respondents enjoy constitu-
tional rights in the frst place, and what “due process of law”
requires. While my conclusions as to both threshold issues
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27
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
remain tentative, there are strong reasons to think that each
poses
an independently fatal problem for respondents. At
a minimum, however, I would conclude today that the
PSJVTA's jurisdictional provisions do not violate any plausi-
ble understanding of due process.
A
I am skeptical that entities such as the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA)
enjoy any constitutional rights at all, let alone qualify as
“person[s]” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
1
The PLO and the PA are foreign bodies that are not recog-
nized as sovereign by the United States, but that neverthe-
less carry out governmental functions. Ante, at 6. Al-
though the Federal Government does not take a position on
the question whether such foreign nonsovereign governmen-
tal bodies have constitutional rights, Tr. of Oral Arg. 43–45,
the Executive Branch has for decades endorsed principles
that suggest that the Constitution does not protect these
types of entities.
Begin with the Executive's approach to “the nature of for-
eign sovereigns.” Constitutionality of Closing the Palestine
Information Offce, an Affliate of the Palestine Liberation
Org., 11 Op. OLC 104, 106 (1987). To be sure, the United
States does not recognize respondents as sovereign states,
ante, at 6, but the Executive's view of foreign nations' consti-
tutional rights nevertheless may shed light on respondents'
assertion of constitutional rights here. Foreign sovereigns,
the Offce of Legal Counsel has explained, each “interac[t]
with the United States as a foreign, co-equal sovereign.” 11
Op. OLC, at 106. “[T]he United States interacts with for-
eign states not within the constitutional system, but as a
juridical equal, on the level of international law and diplo-
macy.” Id., at 107. It follows that no sovereign can be
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28 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
“ `amenable,' or subject to the other,” ibid., for such an ar-
rangement
would violate the precept that “the body of the
nation, the State, remains absolutely free,” E. de Vattel, The
Law of Nations, Preliminaries, § 4, p. lv (J. Chitty ed. 1854).
1
Thus, “[a] foreign nation, . . . unlike a foreign national, does
not have rights under the Fifth Amendment.” Presidential
Authority To Settle the Iranian Crisis, 4A Op. OLC 248, 260,
n. 9 (1980).
The Executive Branch has reached the same conclusion
regarding domestic nonsovereign governing bodies, such as
United States Territories. See Mutual Consent Provisions
in the Guam Commonwealth Legislation, 1994 WL 16193765,
*5 (OLC, July 28, 1994) (“non-state areas” are “governmental
bodies” that “are not protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment”). “Territories are but political
subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States”
and thus relate to the Federal Government similarly to the
way in which municipalities relate “to the respective States.”
National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 133
(1880). Given that a municipality is “created by a state for
the better ordering of government,” and thus has “no privi-
leges or immunities under the federal constitution which it
may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator,” Williams
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 40 (1933); see also New-
ark v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 192, 196 (1923), the Executive's
conclusion that the same logic should apply to Territories
is reasonable. Accord, e. g., Puerto Rico Public Housing
Admin. v. United States Dept. of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325 (PR 1999) (instrumentalities
1
Vattel was “widely consulted by the constitutional generation in the
United States,” and was “invariably invoked as authoritative on matters
of international law by the likes of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
James Wilson, Edmund Randolph, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, Jo-
seph Story and James Kent, among others.” M. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N. C. L. Rev. 133, 169–170
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are “ `non-persons' ” for
pur
poses of constitutional claims).
Assuming that the Executive Branch is correct that nei-
ther foreign sovereign governments nor domestic nonsover-
eign Territories enjoy constitutional rights, it is unclear why
the Constitution would treat foreign nonsovereign govern-
mental entities such as respondents differently. In the Ex-
ecutive's own words, the PLO is at bottom “a foreign political
entity” that “ `lies outside the structure of the union.' ” 11
Op. OLC, at 107 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U. S. 313, 330 (1934)). Neither it nor the PA has
taken any “general obligation to abide by the constitutional
norms to which the federal government and the several
states are subject, nor are there any effective means to place
[them] on parity with the United States or the states for
purposes of enforcement of particular norms.” 11 Op. OLC,
at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). It would seem to
follow that neither entity enjoys constitutional protections.
In addition to the conclusions of the Executive Branch,
decisions from this Court further suggest that entities like
respondents may not be “person[s]” protected by the Fifth
Amendment. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S.
301, 323 (1966), the Court held that “[t]he word `person' in
the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be
expanded to encompass the States of the Union.” Decades
later, the Court cited Katzenbach to suggest that “a foreign
state” might not be “a `person' for purposes of the Due Proc-
ess Clause.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U. S. 607, 619 (1992).
“Since Weltover, the consensus of circuit courts has fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's lead and defnitively held that
foreign states are not entitled to the protections of the Due
Process Clause.” CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix
Corp., 91 F. 4th 1340, 1350 (CA9 2024) (Bumatay, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc). The D. C. Circuit
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thoroughly analyzed the issue in Price v. Socialist People's
L
ibyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F. 3d 82 (2002). Compared to
foreign nations, which are “entirely alien to our constitu-
tional system,” the court explained, domestic States “derive
important benefts and must abide by signifcant limita-
tions.” Id., at 96. It would therefore be “highly incongru-
ous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to foreign na-
tions.” Ibid. At least two other Circuits have reached the
same conclusion. See Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp.
v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F. 3d 393, 399
(CA2 2009) (“If the States, as sovereigns that are part of the
Union, cannot `avail themselves of the fundamental safe-
guards of the Due Process Clause,' we do not see why for-
eign states, as sovereigns wholly outside the Union, should
be in a more favored position” (citation omitted)); Abelesz v.
Magyar Nemze t i Bank, 692 F. 3d 661, 694 (CA7 2012)
(similar).
These courts' and the Executive's determinations that for-
eign sovereigns do not fall within the “person[s]” protected
by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause seem very
likely correct, and it is diffcult to see why the Constitution
would afford better treatment to foreign nonsovereign gov-
ernmental entities. To conclude otherwise would imply that
foreign governmental entities may receive greater consti-
tutional protections by engaging in conduct that leads the
United States to refuse to recognize their sovereignty. I
seriously doubt that the Constitution compels such a result.
As the Offce of Legal Counsel concluded, “[i]t would be
anomalous if the Executive's decision to withhold recognition
from a foreign political entity . . . invested that entity with
rights greater than those enjoyed by friendly sovereigns
present in the United States.” 11 Op. OLC, at 120, n. 7.
2
Nevertheless, some lower courts have concluded that the
Constitution treats nonsovereign foreign governing bodies
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like respondents more favorably than it treats recognized
sovereig
ns, States, Territories, and municipalities. In Liv-
nat v. Palestinian Authority, 851 F. 3d 45, 52 (2017), for
example, the D. C. Circuit held that the Due Process Clause
applies to the PA and the PLO, distinguishing Price as
“appl[ying] to sovereigns alone.” Because neither the PA
nor the PLO are “ `recognized by the United States govern-
ment as sovereigns,' ” the court reasoned, they are therefore
“protected by the Due Process Clause.” 851 F. 3d, at 52.
The D. C. Circuit's opinion could be read to embrace a di-
chotomy in which entities are either nonsovereigns, which
enjoy constitutional rights, or sovereigns, which do not.
See ibid.; accord, Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835
F. 3d 317, 329 (CA2 2016) (noting that “sovereign states are
not entitled to due process protection,” but rejecting the ar-
gument that respondents lack such protection because “nei-
ther the PLO nor the PA is recognized by the United States
as a sovereign state”). Respondents rely on that theory
here, arguing that a constitutional “binary” applies to the
question whether an entity is a “person” under the Fifth
Amendment: An entity either is “a person for purposes of
the Due Process Clause,” or it is “a sovereign state”; there
is no “no-man's-land” in which the entity is “neither a sover-
eign state nor a person.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 91.
While I agree with a “binary” framework insofar as the
Due Process Clause either applies to respondents or it does
not, I do not see how sovereignty supplies the dividing line.
It is uncontroversial that entities such as municipalities and
United States Territories are not sovereigns. See County
of Yankton, 101 U. S., at 133; Mutual Consent Provisions in
the Guam Commonwealth Legislation, 1994 WL 16193765,
*5. Under respondents' framework, this nonsovereign char-
acter would seem to compel the conclusion that municipali-
ties and Territories thus must be “person[s]” with constitu-
tional rights. For reasons already discussed, see supra, at
28–29, this result is dubious, see Williams, 289 U. S., at 40
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
(municipalities have “no privileges or immunities under the
federa
l constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the
will of its creator”); accord, e. g., East St. Louis v. Circuit
Ct. for Twentieth Jud. Cir., St. Clair Cty., 986 F. 2d 1142,
1144 (CA7 1993) (“Municipalities . . . are not `persons' within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause”). Further, assum-
ing the Court was correct to conclude that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not “encompass the
States of the Union,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 323, it is
rather odd to think that the Constitution would provide
greater constitutional rights to Territories or the political
subdivisions of States than to the States themselves.
Neither the private petitioners nor the Government
pressed the argument that the Constitution does not protect
respondents at all, so we should not resolve the cases on that
basis. See, e. g., H. Proctor, “Will the Meaning of the Second
Amendment Change . . . ?”: Party Presentation and Stare
Decisis in Text-and-History Cases, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 453,
463, n. 70 (2023) (cautioning against courts attempting to
“correc[t] for defciencies in party presentation”). But, the
question whether entities like respondents receive any con-
stitutional protection is antecedent to whatever constitu-
tional arguments they might make, and I am hopeful that in
an appropriate case parties will brief and the Court will ad-
dress this issue.
2
2
One amicus raises the argument that “certain governmental entities,
including `foreign states,' ” are not “ `person[s]' ” under the original mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae 6; see also, e. g., A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law 273 (2012) (“[T]he word person traditionally ex-
cludes the sovereign”). This textual argument has generated scholarly
debate. See, e. g., Brief for Professor Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk as Amicus
Curiae in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., O. T. 2024, No. 23–
1201 etc., pp. 3–4 (arguing that, at the time of ratifcation, “the word `per-
son' was routinely used to describe states”).
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B
E
ven assuming that the PLO and the PA are “person[s]”
protected by the Fifth Amendment, respondents still must
grapple with another threshold inquiry: whether the Due
Process Clause imposes any limits on the legislative power.
“The four words—due process of law—have been the cen-
ter of substantial legal debate over the years.” In re
Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 378 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). As
I have previously explained, the Due Process Clause may
have originally been understood to require only that our
Government “ `proceed according to the “law of the land”—
that is, according to written constitutional and statutory pro-
visions,' ” before depriving someone of life, liberty, or prop-
erty. Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015)
(opinion concurring in judgment). Numerous scholars have
supported this view, “conclud[ing] that `considerable histori-
cal evidence supports the position that “due process of law”
was a separation-of-powers concept designed as a safeguard
against unlicensed executive action, forbidding only depriva-
tions not authorized by legislation or common law.' ” Ibid.
(quoting D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The First Hundred Years 1789–1888, p. 272 (1985)); see also,
e. g., E. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before
the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 370–373 (1911) (listing
reasons to conclude that “the phrase `law of the land' ” did
not “import any limitation upon legislative power”); 4 Papers
of Alexander Hamilton 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962)
(“The words `due process' . . . can never be referred to an act
of legislature”).
Others have disagreed. For example, some scholars have
argued that “as originally understood, `the principle of due
process' required, among other things, that `statutes that
purported to empower the other branches to deprive persons
of rights without adequate procedural guarantees [be] sub-
ject to judicial review.' ” Johnson, 576 U. S., at 623 (opinion
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
of Thomas, J.) (quoting N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due
Process
as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1679
(2012)).
And, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), the Court itself concluded that the
mere existence of a legislative enactment was insuffcient on
its own to satisfy due process under the Fifth Amendment.
Despite acknowledging that “[t]he words, `due process of
law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning
as the words, `by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta,” the
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause “is a restraint
on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government.” Id., at 276. The Court fa-
mously declared that due process must comport with “those
settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the com-
mon and statute law of England, before the emigration of our
ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country.” Id., at 277.
These requirements generally include an independent judge,
“regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial ac-
cording to some settled course of judicial proceedings.” Id.,
at 280. The Court's decision in Murray's Lessee “opened
the door to a dramatic reinvention of the Due Process of
Law Clause as a check on the statutory enactment of novel
methods of procedure.” M. Crema & L. Solum, The Original
Meaning of “Due Process of Law” in the Fifth Amendment,
108 Va. L. Rev. 447, 519 (2022).
In these cases, “I need not choose between these two un-
derstandings of `due process of law.' ” Johnson, 576 U. S.,
at 623 (opinion of Thomas, J.). If the “law of the land” view
of due process is correct and requires only that Congress
have authorized the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
that the Federal Government effects, see Sessions v. Di-
maya, 584 U. S. 148, 207 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting), then
the PSJVTA's proper enactment resolves the question pre-
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
sented. But, as explained next, even assuming that “settled
usages
and modes of proceeding ” govern the due process in-
quiry, Murray's Lessee, 18 How., at 277, respondents' due
process argument still fails.
II
The Fifth Amendment was never understood to constrain
Congress's ability to extend federal jurisdiction. The Fed-
eral Government has always possessed the power to extend
its jurisdiction beyond the Nation's borders, and, as under-
stood in 1791, the Fifth Amendment did not limit this sover-
eign prerogative. Rather, insofar as any limits on extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction existed, they stemmed from general
principles of international law. But, those principles were
defeasible, subconstitutional rules that the sovereign could
override through clear command. This understanding re-
spects the Constitution's design by reserving matters of
foreign affairs to the political branches.
A
Congress's and the Judiciary's extraterritorial powers are
evident in the Constitution. The text is explicit: Congress
may “defne and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,” and
it may “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water.” Art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 11.
By design, the authority of “the Judicial” branch was to
be “commensurate to the legislative and executive Author-
ity.” 1 Records of the Federal Convention 237, n. 18 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) (statement of James Wilson). “The judi-
cial Power” accordingly “extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of
the United States”; “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; and to “all Crimes,” including those “not com-
mitted within any State.” Art. III, § 2, cls. 1, 3.
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
The First Congress, “many of whose members had taken
par
t in framing ” the Constitution, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins.
Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297 (1888), exercised its authority to pre-
scribe extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of
1789. See § 9, 1 Stat. 76–77 (granting federal courts juris-
diction over “civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion” arising “upon the high seas”); see also, e. g., N. Chap-
man, Due Process Abroad, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 377, 409 (2017)
(“[O]ne of the federal government's top priorities” postrati-
fcation was “[t]he prosecution and punishment of extraterri-
torial crimes, including crimes committed by aliens”). This
“actio[n] of the First Congress” is “of course persuasive evi-
dence of what the Constitution means.” Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U. S. 957, 980 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); see, e. g.,
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788–790 (1983). Early
treatises further reinforce the conclusion that the Federal
Government possessed the power to exercise its jurisdiction
beyond its borders, noting for example that “for the purpose
of giving jurisdiction,” “on whom or where a piratical offence
has been committed” is irrelevant. 1 J. Kent, Commentaries
on American Law 174 (1826).
Constitutional text, postratifcation practice, and early
commentary thus demonstrate that Congress and the Judi-
ciary can exercise jurisdiction beyond the United States.
The question turns to what, if anything, limits this power.
B
Preratifcation and postratifcation courts observed limits
on their own and each other's extraterritorial authority.
Those limits were originally understood to derive from the
international law of nations, not the Constitution. But, Con-
gress always possessed the power to legislate beyond the
boundaries that these international-law principles imposed.
1
Early courts routinely applied law-of-nations principles
under which personal jurisdiction was “typically a problem

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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
in recognition”; that is, “[t]he question for American courts
was
whether [foreign] judgments would be recognized and
enforced.” S. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Texas L. Rev.
1249, 1270 (2017) (Sachs 2017). Because “[e]arly American
states stood in much the same position as foreign nations,”
they would review each other's jurisdiction and refuse to rec-
ognize or enforce foreign judgments that exceeded com-
monly understood jurisdictional limits. Id., at 1273–1274.
In Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S. C. L. 8 (1784) (per curiam), for
example, a South Carolina court recognized that whether a
North Carolina admiralty court's judgment was due “faith
and credit” pursuant to “[t]he act of confederation . . . and
the law of nations” turned on whether the foreign court had
“competent jurisdiction” to enter the judgment. Id., at 9–
10; see also, e. g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1786) (concluding that a Massachusetts court
lacked “legal jurisdiction of the cause” and thus rejecting
creditors' attempt to have the court recognize out-of-state
judgment).
Courts “continued to reason this way” after the Fifth
Amendment's ratifcation in 1791. Sachs 2017, at 1275.
Riding circuit, Justice Story rejected the application of a
Massachusetts personal-jurisdiction statute to an absent
Louisiana citizen based on the “universal” “principle,” “con-
sonant with the general principles of justice, that the legisla-
ture of a state can bind no more than the persons and prop-
erty within its territorial jurisdiction.” Flower v. Parker, 9
F. Cas. 323, 324–325 (No. 4,891) (CC Mass. 1823). This
Court reinforced those principles in D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11
How. 165, 174 (1851), in which it addressed whether a credi-
tor could enforce a New York judgment in a Louisiana fed-
eral court against a “citizen of Louisiana not served with
process.” Observing that neither an act of Congress nor
a provision of the Constitution had displaced the “well-
established rules of international law,” the Court concluded
that following such a procedure to enforce the New York
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judgment would be “deemed an illegitimate assumption of
power
.” Id., at 174–176. At bottom, this international-law
approach to personal jurisdiction meant that when one gov-
ernment attempted to exercise “jurisdiction which, accord-
ing to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer,”
that government's “sentences [were] not regarded by foreign
courts” irrespective of whether they were valid “within the
dominions of the prince from whom the authority is derived.”
Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 276–277 (1808) (Marshall, C. J.,
for the Court).
Absent from this approach to personal jurisdiction was any
consideration of due process. The Court's omission of such
analysis in D'Arcy is illustrative: The Court could have ana-
lyzed the legitimacy of enforcing the New York judgment
under the New York Constitution—which “contained an
exac t repl ica of the Fi f th Amendment's Due Process
Clause”—but it conspicuously declined to do so. See Brief
for Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae 10 (citing
N. Y. Const. of 1846, Art. I, § 6). Due process was not the
issue; the “well-established rules of international law” were.
11 How., at 174.
2
These rules of international law, however, were always un-
derstood to be defeasible. Even if Congress generally re-
spected such rules, it retained the power to override them
through clear statutory command.
Founding-era courts may have sought to avoid “constru-
[ing]” statutes “to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remain[ed],” but they understood that
the legislature could depart from this international baseline
“by express words or a very plain and necessary implica-
tion.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court); see also, e. g., Talbot v.
Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 43 (1801) (“[T]he laws of the United
States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to
infract the common principles and usages of nations” (empha-
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sis added)). A nation “might always `exercise its territorial
powers
in a manner not consonant to the usages and received
obligations of the civilized world' ”; even if it were “ `consid-
ered as violating its faith,' ” the rules still would be “valid
within that nation's courts.” S. Sachs, The Unlimited Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 106 Va. L. Rev. 1703, 1722
(2020) (Sachs 2020) (quoting Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don, 7 Cranch 116, 137 (1812)); accord, e. g., United States v.
Yousef, 327 F. 3d 56, 108 (CA2 2003) (the “claim that princi-
ples of customary international law constrain Congress's
power to enact laws that proscribe extraterritorial conduct
is simply wrong ”).
Th is approach reflects the “ longstanding principle of
American law” that congressional statutes are “meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States”—“unless a contrary intent appears.” EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (empha-
sis added; internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U. S. 421, 437 (1932) (whether “the legisla-
tion of the Congress” applies extraterritorially to “citizens
of the United States in foreign countries” is a “question of
. . . construction, not of legislative power”). Given that prin-
ciples of international law formed the basis for early under-
standings of personal jurisdiction, Congress's general ability
to override those principles strongly implies its power to ef-
fect extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond what the law of na-
tions might permit.
This conclusion becomes nearly inescapable when taking
into account the views of early jurists who considered the
question. For example, Justice Johnson, while dissenting on
a separate point, acknowledged as an “eternal principl[e] of
justice” the precept “that jurisdiction cannot be justly exer-
cised by a state over property not within the reach of its
process, or over persons not owing them allegiance or . . .
found within their limits.” Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481,
486 (1813). Nevertheless, he had no trouble concluding that

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courts could “dispense with” that principle “when compelled
by
positive statute.” Ibid.; see Sachs 2020, at 1722.
Justice Story shared this view. In Picquet v. Swan, 19
F. Cas. 609, 613 (No. 11,134) (CC Mass. 1828), the plaintiff
sued a defendant residing abroad through jurisdictionally du-
bious means, the implications of which might suggest that “a
subject of England, or France, or Russia . . . may be sum-
moned from the other end of the globe to obey our process,
and submit to the judgment of our courts.” Justice Story
concluded that Congress had not authorized the plaintiff 's
expansive theory of federal jurisdiction, which would inter-
fere with “principles of . . . immutable justice.” Id., at 614.
But, he made clear that this absence of congressional action
was due to a lack of will, not power: “If congress had pre-
scribed such a rule, the court would certainly be bound to
follow it, and proceed upon the law.” Id., at 615. In other
words, “foreign-based defendants were owed no more than
service authorized by Congress before being haled into our
federal courts.” Antrix Corp., 91 F. 4th, at 1352 (opinion of
Bumatay, J.) (citing Picquet, 19 F. Cas., at 613, 615–616).
This Court eventually endorsed Justice Story's analysis.
In Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 302 (1838), as in Picquet,
the Court addressed whether a federal statute authorized a
plaintiff 's attempt to have the federal court exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant residing abroad. Assigning
“great force” to the reasoning of Picquet, the Toland Court
held that Congress had not contemplated federal jurisdiction
over those “who were in a foreign jurisdiction,” and thus had
not extended “the reach of the process of the courts” over
those individuals. 12 Pet., at 328–330. Nevertheless, the
Court followed Justice Story's analysis and concluded that
federal courts would be bound to exercise such jurisdiction
if Congress required it through “positive legislation,” no
matter how “unjust.” Id., at 329–330; see also 101 F. 4th
190, 218–219 (CA2 2024) (Menashi, J., dissenting from denial
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
of rehearing en banc) (detailing the Toland Court's “em-
brac[
e]” of Justice Story's reasoning).
Subsequent historical and legal developments, including
the ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, have not
changed the fundamental point that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause does not territorially confne the Federal
Government's jurisdiction.
3
During the Lochner era, for ex-
ample, this Court began to determine that the Fourteenth
Amendment restricts States' ability to adjudicate cases in-
volving conduct beyond their borders. See, e. g., Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 403 (1917). But, the
Court during that period continued to recognize that the
Fifth Amendment provides “no ground for constructing an
imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confnes
of the United States for the purpose of shutting [the federal]
government off from the exertion of powers which inher-
ently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty.” United
States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299, 306 (1914); see also Brief for
Petitioners in No. 24–20, pp. 27–28.
Cases from the founding era onward have continually reaf-
frmed that the Fifth Amendment was never understood to
impose limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Any
3
Until today, this Court had continually left open the question whether
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause constrains the Federal Gov-
ernment to the same extent that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Proc-
ess Clause limits the States. See, e. g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Supe-
rior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 268–269 (2017); Omni
Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudol f Wol ff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102–103, n. 5 (1987).
That reservation was appropriate. Because it makes little sense to inter-
pret the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause according to this Court's
interpretation of the later ratifed, identical language in the Fourteenth
Amendment, I agree with the majority that the Fourteenth Amendment's
“minimum contacts” due process inquiry is inapposite here. Ante, at 16.
But, it may well be that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
should inform our understanding of parallel language in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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42 FULD
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
such limits derived from international law, which Congress
cou
ld override.
C
That Congress may override general principles of interna-
tional law does not imply that it should, but instead that the
relevant considerations are not constitutional ones. Serious
nonconstitutional considerations include implications for for-
eign policy. But, concerns over foreign affairs are no reason
to impose constitutional limits on federal courts' extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. Just the opposite—the implications of
such limitations on the political branches' power to conduct
foreign policy reinforce the conclusion that the Constitution
does not inhibit the Federal Government's ability to extend
its jurisdiction extraterritorially.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress has the power to
subject foreign nationals to what they might view as overly
broad jurisdiction. In response, countries may decide to
enact “ `retaliatory' jurisdictional provisions” that “empower
[their] national courts to exercise jurisdiction over [American
citizens] in circumstances where [American] courts . . . would
have asserted jurisdiction.” G. Born, Refections on Judicial
Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 1, 15 (1987) (Born); see also ante, at 18. Constitutionally
unchecked authority to extend federal jurisdiction thus un-
deniably has the potential to generate repercussions in for-
eign affairs. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 55–56 (counsel for the Fed-
eral Government acknowledging that the Government could
face “problems” with “retaliation” were Congress to exercise
jurisdiction “very far and wide”); Brief for United States
47–48.
But, that possibility is no basis for erecting constitutional
barriers here. The “feld of foreign affairs” requires “deli-
cate judgments, involving a balance that is the prerogative
of the political branches to make,” and these judgments are
“entitled to special respect.” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,
584 U. S. 241, 273 (2018) (plurality opinion). “Congress has
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43
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
the undisputed power to decide . . . whether and under what
circumst
ances foreign nations should be amenable to suit
in the United States.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 493 (1983) (emphasis added). That
power is not diminished simply because the United States
does not recognize the sovereignty of the foreign govern-
mental entity at issue.
Although it is possible that Congress might extend federal
jurisdiction to such a degree that foreign actors retaliate,
“the controlling role of the political branches” remains “both
necessary and proper.” Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578
U. S. 212, 234 (2016). After all, other countries can exercise
their jurisdiction in offensive ways, too. And, if they do, our
political branches may decide to enact “ `retaliatory' jurisdic-
tional provisions” of their own. Born 15; accord, e. g., The
Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423 (1815) (“If it be the will of the
government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures
which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government will
manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose”).
Applying constitutional limits to Congress's authority to
enact such provisi ons wou ld risk impeding the political
branches' efforts to conduct foreign affairs in federal litiga-
tion. That is no small matter. Civil litigation can be a bar-
gaining chip in foreign policy. As this Court has explained,
“[n]ot infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding
claims by nationals of one country against the government
of another country are `sources of friction' between the two
sovereigns.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 679
(1981) (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 225
(1942)). Following “ `established international practice re-
fecting traditional international theory,' ” nations frequently
enter into agreements to settle the claims of their respective
nationals. Dames & Moore, 453 U. S., at 679; see also, e. g.,
Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power
Auth., 651 F. 2d 800, 811 (CA1 1981) (collecting examples of
the Federal Government “extinguish[ing] claims of United
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44 FULD
v. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
States nationals against foreign governments” in exchange
for
various concessions). Limiting the political branches'
ability to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction could stymie its
use of this tool for international negotiation, in turn sowing
tension with the fundamental premise that foreign policy is
the domain of the political branches, not the federal courts.
See Bank Markazi, 578 U. S., at 234; cf. Ex parte Peru, 318
U. S. 578, 589 (1943) (“[O]ur national interest will be better
served [if] cases . . . involving our relations with a friendly
foreign power, are righted through diplomatic negotiations
rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings”).
This potential intrusion on the political branches' authority
supports what the historical evidence makes clear: The Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes no limits on the
Federal Government's power to extend federal jurisdiction
beyond the Nation's borders. See supra, at 35–41.
***
The Court's opinion does not foreclose the “maximalist
theory of federal jurisdiction” compelled by the original un-
derstanding of the Fifth Amendment, but resolves the cases
without deciding whether that understanding is correct.
Ante, at 18. In my view, “historical evidence from the fram-
ing ” provides the proper framework for deciding these cases,
McIntyre, 514 U. S., at 370 (opinion of Thomas, J.), and that
evidence demonstrates that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment places no territorial limitation on Con-
gress's ability to call parties to answer.
4
And, for the rea-
4
The concepts of notice and an opportunity to be heard are distinct
from the Federal Government's authority to extend personal jurisdiction.
Although the Fifth Amendment places no limit on the latter, it may still
require that defendants be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
I do not decide that question today. Even assuming the Fifth Amend-
ment does impose such requirements, the PLO and the PA have received
due process. Both entities received notice of this suit through service of
process on a representative, and the entities have not claimed that it is
infeasible to defend themselves in American courts.
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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
sons explained, this conclusion respects our deferential ap-
proach
to the political branches' “delicate judgments” in
foreign affairs. Jesner, 584 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion).
Insofar as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause re-
quires deprivations of life, liberty, or property to accord with
“those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing ” at
common law, Murray's Lessee, 18 How., at 277, the PSJVTA
plainly meets that standard. Nothing on the statute's face
or in its application here deprives respondents of an inde-
pendent judge, “regular allegations, opportunity to answer,
[or] a trial according to some settled course of judicial pro-
ceedings.” Id., at 280. And, even assuming that the law of
nations might otherwise supply a rule of decision and that
the PSJVTA's jurisdictional provisions are in tension with
such a rule—questions on which I take no position here—
those principles of international law are defeasible presump-
tions that Congress unmistakably overrode when it enacted
the PSJVTA. In my view, the Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess inquiry ends there.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 39, line 20: “the” is inserted before “Congress”