CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 1
Pages 223–237
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 5, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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223
Syllabus
CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. et al. v. ANTRIX
CORP
. LTD. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 23–1201. Argued March 3, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025*
Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. signed a satellite-leasing agreement with
Antrix Corporation Ltd., which is owned by the Republic of India for
use by its Department of Space. But when the Indian Government
later determined it needed more satellite capacity for itself, Antrix ter-
minated the contract under its force majeure clause. The parties pro-
ceeded to arbitration. After unanimously concluding that Antrix had
breached the contract, the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million
in damages plus interest. Devas then petitioned the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington to confrm the award.
The District Court confrmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judg-
ment against Antrix.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, fnding that personal jurisdiction was
lacking. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1)
an immunity exception applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been
properly served. § 1330(b). The Ninth Circuit did not question that
Antrix is a “foreign state” under the FSIA, that an immunity exception
applies, and that Devas effectuated proper service. Yet bound by Cir-
cuit precedent, the panel explained that the Act imposes an additional
requirement: “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a tra-
ditional minimum contacts analysis” as set forth in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, and its progeny. Applying that stand-
ard, the court concluded it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
Antrix because Antrix lacked suffcient suit-related contacts with the
United States.
Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity ex-
ception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof
of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required
by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.
Pp. 232–237.
*Together with No. 24–17, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix
Corp. Ltd. et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
Syllabus
(a) The FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision imposes two substan-
tive
requirements. First, the district court must have subject-matter
jurisdiction, which the FSIA grants whenever an enumerated immunity
exception applies. Second, service must be made under the FSIA's
specialized service-of-process rules. When both criteria are satisfed,
the statute declares that personal jurisdiction “shall exist.” Accord-
ingly, the most natural reading of the operative text is that personal
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is automatic whenever an immunity
exception applies and service of process has been accomplished. Nota-
bly absent from the provision is any reference to “minimum contacts.”
And the Court declines to add what Congress left out, as the FSIA
was supposed to “clarify the governing standards,” not hide the ball.
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 488.
Of course, the FSIA's immunity exceptions themselves require vary-
ing degrees of suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed.
But to the extent these exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is be-
cause the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not
because the Act's personal-jurisdiction provision secretly incorporated
the Court's due-process cases.
The Act's structure reinforces this reading. The FSIA “comprehen-
sively regulat[es] the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United
States.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134,
141. The immunity and jurisdictional provisions form the foundation of
that comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied them to-
gether: whenever an exception applies, the FSIA strips immunity and
grants jurisdiction. Reading an additional minimum-contacts require-
ment into only one of the FSIA's tethered immunity and jurisdictional
provisions would weaken the link Congress forged and create a gap in
the Act's otherwise “comprehensive framework.” Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 699. Pp. 232–235.
(b) The Ninth Circuit's two contrary arguments cannot override the
plain meaning of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision. First, the
fact that one of the immunity exceptions contains language resembling
the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional pro-
vision located elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Second, the
legislative history cited by the Ninth Circuit shows only that Congress
believed the contacts set forth in the Act's then-existing immunity
exceptions satisfy due process, not that the personal-jurisdiction pro-
vision silently includes an atextual minimum-contacts requirement.
Pp. 235–236.
(c) Antrix's alternative arguments—that the Fifth Amendment itself
requires a showing of minimum contacts, that the claims at issue do not
fall within the FSIA's arbitration exception, and that the suit should be

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as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025)
225
Opinion of the Court
dismissed under forum non conveniens—were not addressed below by
the
Ninth Circuit. This Court declines to address them in the frst
instance. Pp. 236–237.
Reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for petitioner in No. 24–
17. With him on the briefs was Christopher E. Tutunjian.
Matthew D. McGill argued the cause for petitioners in No.
23–1201. With him on the briefs in both cases were Jacob
T. Spencer, Ankita Ritwik, David W. Casazza, Brian C. Mc-
Carty, Anne Champion, and Malaika Eaton.
Acting Solicitor General Harris argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both
cases. On the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Kneedler, Anthony A. Yang, Sharon
Swingle, and Lewis S. Yelin.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief were Gregory M. Wil-
liams, Kwaku A. Akowuah, and Madeleine Joseph.†
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Peter B.
Rutledge, Jennifer B. Dickey, Jonathan D. Urick, and Ryan P. Meyers;
for the United States Council for International Business by Viren Mascar-
enhas and D. Jason File; for George A. Bermann by Alexander A. Yanos
and Kristen K. Bromberek; for Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. by James E.
Berger, Samantha Chaifetz, and Charlene C. Sun; and for Mark B. Feld-
man by Robert K. Kry and Mark B. Feldman, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the
Republic of India by Andrea J. Menaker, Nicolle Kownacki, and Weiqian
Luo; for the Republic of Zimbabwe by Rodney Q. Smith II; and for Paul
B. Stephan by Jeffrey T. Green.
Seth P. Waxman and Eric L. Hawkins fled a brief for Ingrid (Wuerth)
Brunk as amicus curiae in both cases.
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DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
Opinion of the Court
generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the
A
ct creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607.
And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests
federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims.
Th is suit concer ns the FSIA's neighbor ing persona l-
jurisdiction provision. It provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an ex-
ception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the
foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In
the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third
requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state
has made “minimum contacts” with the United States suff-
cient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and
its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional require-
ment goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse.
I
A
Like so many disputes, this one began with two companies
and a contract. Antrix Corporation Ltd. (Antrix) is orga-
nized under Indian law and is owned by the Republic of India
for use by its Department of Space. In Antrix's words, it
serves as “the commercial arm of Indian Space Research Or-
ganisation”—a division within the Department of Space—
and is tasked with “promot[ing] and commercially market-
[ing] the products and services emanating from the Indian
Space Programme.” No. 2:18–cv–01360 (WD Wash., Dec. 21,
2018), ECF Doc. 24–1, p. 43. The Indian Government f-
nances most of Antrix's operations and appoints much of its
leadership. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a.
In January 2005, Antrix signed a satellite-leasing agree-
ment with Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (Devas), a pri-
vately owned Indian company i ncor porated to develop
satellite-based telecommunications technology. Under the
agreement, Antrix would build and launch a new satellite
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network into geostationary orbit*—specifcally, at the 83°E
orbit
al slot—and lease some of that network's capacity back
to Devas. Devas, in turn, would use its leased satellite ca-
pacity to provide multimedia broadcasting services across
India.
The agreement proceeded as expected for several years.
Antrix obtained project approval from the Indian Govern-
ment and clearance from the International Telecommunica-
tions Union, the arm of the United Nations responsible for
allocating orbital satellite space among member states. For
its part, Devas secured the requisite internet- and television-
provider licenses, brought on investors, and paid Antrix the
contractually required fees. And as satellite construction
neared completion, the parties performed several success-
fu l tr ia ls of Devas's newly developed sof tware and
infrastructure.
In February 2011, however, Antrix and Devas hit a snag.
Just before the satellites were scheduled for launch, the In-
dian Government determined it needed greater satellite ca-
pacity for itself and could no longer lease its limited S-band
spectrum (the type Antrix and Devas planned to use) for
commercial use. So, at the behest of government offcials,
Antrix terminated the agreement with Devas. Citing the
contract's force majeure clause, Antrix explained that India's
new satellite-allocation policy prevented it from continuing
performance on the contract.
But Devas thought Antrix was liable for the fnancial fall-
out. So Devas invoked the contract's arbitration provision,
commenced proceedings, and argued the purported force
*“Satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) fly above Earth's equator,
moving from west to east, exactly matching Earth's rotation . . . . GEO
is ideal for satellites that need to stay fxed above a specifc location, such
as telecommunication satellites, allowing antennas on Earth to stay in a
constant position, always pointing at the satellite.” European Space
Agency, Types of Orbits (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.esa.int/Enabling_
Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits.

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DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
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majeure was self-induced. The three-member arbitral panel
r
uled unanimously for Devas on September 14, 2015.
Applying Indian law, the panel concluded Antrix had wrong-
fully terminated the contract and awarded Devas $562.5 mil-
lion in damages plus interest.
After successfully confrming the arbitration award in
France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought to do the
same in the United States. See 2 J. Grenig, Domke on Com-
mercial Arbitration § 41:1, p. 467 (3d ed. 2025) (“[C]onfrma-
tion of an arbitration award fnalizes the award and makes
the award a judgment of the court”). In September 2018,
Devas petitioned the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington to confrm the award, citing
the FSIA's so-called arbitration exception as the basis for
federal jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(6). Antrix
moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction.
B
For much of American history, foreign states and their in-
strumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our
courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119
(2025). This posture refected the venerable international
law principle that states are independent sovereign entities,
and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the
United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S.
170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily
or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long under-
stood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and
comity,” so judges historically “ `deferred to the decisions of
the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive
Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular ac-
tions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004)
(quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S.
480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State
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Department fling a case-specifc “ `suggestion of immunity' ”
whene
ver a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that oc-
curred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar
v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru,
318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)).
Beginning in the mid-20th century, the Executive Branch
adopted a more nuanced stance toward sovereign immunity,
but its new approach “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461
U. S., at 487. Specifcally, the State Department declared in
1952 it would no longer suggest immunity in “cases arising
out of a foreign state's strictly commercial acts.” Ibid.
While this shift brought the United States into parity with
the emerging international consensus, it also provoked ten-
sion and confusion. “[F]oreign nations often placed diplo-
matic pressure on the State Department,” and, “[o]n occa-
sion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity
in cases where immunity would not have been available.”
Ibid. Furthermore, in instances where the State Depart-
ment simply failed to fle any suggestion, courts were forced
to determine immunity based on standards that were “nei-
ther clear nor uniformly applied.” Id., at 488.
Congress addressed the problem in 1976 by enacting the
FSIA, now “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in our courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 434 (1989). Instead
of case-by-case determinations that were governed by fuzzy
legal standards and prone to manipulation, the FSIA im-
poses a bright-line rule: foreign states and their instru-
mentalities are immune from suit unless one of the Act's
enumerated exceptions applies. 28 U. S. C. § 1604; see
§§ 1605–1607. Exceptions include claims based on commer-
cial activities with a specifed nexus to the United States,
§ 1605(a)(2), claims based on torts that have caused domestic
personal injury or property damage, § 1605(a)(5), claims
based on certain expropriations, § 1605(a)(3), and several
others.
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The Act also waives immunity for suits to confrm arbitra-
ti
on awards. § 1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception ap-
plies in four statutorily defned contexts, including where
the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States call-
ing for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.”
§ 1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded
to the New York Conventi on, wh ich requires it to en-
force cer t ai n awards issued abroad. See Conventi on
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997;
9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA
is otherwise satisfed, the arbitration exception would also
apply.
Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdic-
tion usually follows. That is because the Act's jurisdictional
provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1330, pegs both subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction to the exceptions. Subsection (a) of
that provision grants district courts “original jurisdiction”
over “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . under sec-
tions 1605–1607,” which are the FSIA's immunity exceptions.
And subsection (b) provides for personal jurisdiction “as to
every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a)”—i. e., for every claim sub-
ject to an immunity exception—and “where service has been
made under section 1608.” See Republic of Sudan v. Har-
rison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's spe-
cialized service-of-process rules).
C
Once this dispute arrived in federal court in this country,
a dramatic series of events unfolded. Upon satisfying itself
that jurisdiction was proper under the FSIA's arbitration ex-
ception, the District Court confrmed the award and entered
a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix. Yet before Devas
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could collect, an Indian corporate-law tribunal found that
D
evas—an Indian company—had procured the Devas–Antrix
agreement by fraud; so the tribunal appointed an Indian
Government offcial to seize control of Devas and wind down
its affairs. Quickly thereafter, several Devas shareholders
and an American subsidiary attempted to intervene in the
federal proceedings below and to enforce the judgment
themselves. Successfully so: over Devas's and Antrix's ob-
jections, they intervened, secured post-judgment discovery
to locate Antrix's domestic assets, and registered the judg-
ment in the Eastern District of Virginia, where Antrix held
executable assets. Then, adding one last wrinkle to an al-
ready complex dispute, the High Court of New Delhi set
aside the arbitration award based largely on the Indian
corporate-law tribunal's earlier fraud determination.
Several appeals followed, and a Ninth Circuit panel found
that personal jurisdiction was lacking and therefore reversed
the District Court's orders confrming and registering the
award. See No. 20–36024 etc. (Aug. 1, 2023), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 3a–8a. The court did not question “that for pur-
poses of the FSIA, Antrix is a `foreign state,' service has
been made, and an enumerated exception applies.” Id., at
4a. Yet bound by Circuit precedent, the panel explained
that the Act imposes an additional requirement: “personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a traditional min-
imum contacts analysis,” ibid., which is a reference to our
jurisdictional due-process test frst developed in Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S.
277, 283–286 (2014). Applying that standard, the court con-
cluded that Antrix lacked suffcient suit-related contacts
with the United States and that the lawsuit must therefore
be dismissed.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the FSIA re-
quires proof of “minimum contacts” before a court can exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state. See 603
U. S. 949 (2024). We hold it does not.

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II
The
facts of this suit are complex, but the legal question
we address today is straightforward. The text and struc-
ture of the FSIA demonstrate that Congress did not require
“minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already re-
quired by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sover-
eign immunity.
A
We start, as always, with the relevant statutory text.
Here, that is the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision, 28
U. S. C. § 1330(b). It provides:
“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist
as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have [subject-matter] jur isdiction under subsecti on
(a) where service has been made under section 1608 of
this title.”
As noted earlier, this provision imposes two substantive re-
quirements—one related to subject-matter jurisdiction, the
other related to service of process. See supra, at 230.
First, “district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction
under subsection (a)” when any of the FSIA's immunity ex-
ceptions applies. See Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at 434–435.
Second, “service has been made under section 1608” when
a plaintiff complies with the FSIA's specialized service-of-
process rules. See Harrison, 587 U. S., at 4–5, 8–13.
When both criteria are satisfed, the statute declares that
personal jurisdiction “shall exist,” and, “as in other contexts,
the use of the word `shall' creates an obligation impervious
to judicial discretion.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476
(2024) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the most natural reading of § 1330(b) is that personal
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is “automatic” when-
ever (1) “an exception to immunity applies” and (2) “service
of process has been accomplished.” Samantar, 560 U. S., at
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324, n. 20; accord, Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5; Restate-
ment
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 451, Comment b (2017). Or phrased in even simpler terms,
“subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals
personal jurisdiction.” GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port
Auth., 680 F. 3d 805, 811 (CADC 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Notably absent from § 1330(b) is any reference to “mini-
mum contacts.” And we decline to add in what Congress
left out: the FSIA was supposed to “clarify the governing
standards,” not hide the ball. Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 488;
cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 618
(1992) (refusing to read an “unexpressed requirement” into
the FSIA).
Although nothing in the text of § 1330(b) requires a
minimum-contacts analysis, that does not mean Congress
dispensed altogether with proof of contact between the for-
eign state and the United States. In order for subject-
matter jurisdiction to exist under the FSIA, an exception to
immunity must apply. See § 1330(a). And the FSIA's im-
munity exceptions themselves require varying degrees of
suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed.
See §§ 1605–1607. Some exceptions call for considerable do-
mestic nexus, such as “rights in immovable property situated
in the United States,” “commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state,” or “commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere” that “causes a direct effect
in the United States.” §§ 1605(a)(2)–(4); see Verlinden, 461
U. S., at 490–491. Others, like § 1605A's terrorism excep-
tion, are satisfed by less direct or pervasive contact with the
territory of the United States, as the parties acknowledge.
See Brief for Petitioner Devas Multimedia Private Limited
26, 31–32; Brief for Petitioner CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited
et al. 48–49; Brief in Opposition 7. To the extent that some
or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is only
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because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that
st
andard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our
jurisdictional due-process cases.
The Act's structure reinforces this straightforward read-
ing of § 1330(b)'s text. As we have recognized on many oc-
casions, the FSIA “ `comprehensively regulat[es] the amen-
ability of foreign nations to suit in the United States.' ”
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134,
141 (2014) (quoting Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 493). The Act's
immunity and jurisdictional provisions are the foundation of
this comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied
them together. Namely, whenever a §§ 1605–1607 exception
applies, § 1604's immunity falls away, and § 1330 grants juris-
diction. See supra, at 229–230; Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at
434–435, and n. 3 (detailing how immunity and jurisdiction
“work in tandem”); Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5, 489,
and n. 14 (same); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F. 3d 82, 89 (CADC 2002) (observing that “the
FSIA collapses subject matter jurisdiction, in personam ju-
risdiction, and sovereign immunity into a single inquiry”).
And, in the narrow instances where Congress did not want for
immunity and jurisdiction to be coextensive with the enu-
merated exceptions, it said so. See §§ 1330(a)–(b) (limiting
jurisdiction to “nonjury civil action[s],” “for relief in perso-
nam,” where “service has been made under section 1608”).
Instead of enforcing these provisions as written, the Ninth
Circuit read an additional requirement into one—and only
one—of the FSIA's tethered immunity and jurisdictional pro-
visions. As a practical matter, that would weaken the link
Congress forged among foreign sovereign immunity, subject-
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and the enumer-
ated exceptions; it would also create a gap in the Act's other-
wise “comprehensive framework.” Altmann, 541 U. S., at
699. “We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted
from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless in-
tends to apply.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs En-
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235
Opinion of the Court
forcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341 (2005). And we are all the
more
reluctant to do so where, as here, reading such a re-
quirement into the statute would upset the “carefully cali-
brated” system Congress chose. Turkiye Halk Bankasi
A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 273 (2023).
B
The Ninth Circuit based its contrary interpretation on a
strange statutory argument and on the FSIA's legislative
history. Neither overrides § 1330(b)'s plain meaning.
As noted by the court below, the Ninth Circuit frst read
§ 1330(b) to “requir[e] satisfaction of the traditional minimum
contacts standard” in an earlier precedent, Thos. P. Gonzalez
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F. 2d 1247, 1255 (1980). Gonzalez offered two pieces of sup-
port for that conclusion. First, one of the enumerated im-
munity exceptions requires proof of a “direct effect” in the
United States, § 1605(a)(2), which Gonzalez “interpreted as
embodying the minimum contacts standard of International
Shoe,” id., at 1255. But see Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC,
816 F. 3d 383, 394 (CA6 2016) (“[T]he `direct effect' require-
ment does not incorporate the `minimum contacts' test”).
Second, Gonzalez then read “[t]he legislative history of the
Act”—particularly the House Judiciary Committee Report's
discussion of personal jurisdiction—to “confr[m] that the
reach of § 1330(b) does not extend beyond the limits set by
the International Shoe line of cases.” 614 F. 2d, at 1255,
and n. 5. But see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S.
497, 523 (2018) (“[L]egislative history is not the law”).
Even accepting Gonzalez's cited authority on its own
terms, we do not fnd either step of the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis compelling. The fact that one of the immunity excep-
tions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts
test says little about whether a jurisdictional provision lo-
cated elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Each im-
munity exception should be interpreted according to the text
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Congress enacted, see, e. g., Simon, 604 U. S., at 126–128, and
so
should § 1330(b).
To the extent it is relevant, the legislative history Gonza-
lez cites is not to the contrary. True, the House Report
says, “[t]he requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts
and adequate notice are embodied i n the [persona l-
jurisdiction] provision.” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1487, p. 13
(1976). But then the Report explains that this “embodi-
ment” of due process comes from the Act's immunity excep-
tions and service-of-process rules, not a minimum-contacts
requirement silently emanating from § 1330(b). “[E]ach of
the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605–1607, re-
quires some connection between the lawsuit and the United
States,” and, the Report notes, § 1330(b)'s plain text “incor-
porat[es] these jurisdictional contacts by reference.” Ibid.
The Report then makes the critical point: “These immunity
provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which
must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdic-
tion. . . . [S]ection 1330(b) also satisfes the due process re-
quirement of adequate notice by prescribing that proper
service be made under section 1608 of the bill.” Id., at 13–
14 (emphasis added); see also Rote, 816 F. 3d, at 398 (White,
J., concurring) (“[The House Report] shows only that Con-
gress believed that the contacts set forth in the immunity
provisions satisfy due-process requirements. . . . It is a sepa-
rate question whether Congress was correct in its assump-
tion”). Thus, the FSIA's legislative history leads to the
same result as § 1330(a)'s text: personal jurisdiction rises and
falls based on whether an immunity exception applies and
the plaintiff has effectuated proper service.
III
Antrix does not defend the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. See
Brief for Respondent 1; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. Instead, it
raises various alternative reasons why we should affrm the
decision below notwithstanding its misreading of the FSIA.

Cite
as: 605 U. S. 223 (2025)
237
Opinion of the Court
Namely, Antrix contends that the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process
Clause itself requires a showing of minimum con-
tacts before a federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a company owned by a foreign sovereign. Antrix also
argues that the claims at issue in this dispute do not fall
within the FSIA's arbitration exception, properly conceived,
and that the suit should be dismissed under forum non
conveniens.
We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth
Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA's
personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet ad-
dressed Antrix's alternative arguments. “[A]nd, for that
reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v.
Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S.
483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate
these contentions on remand consistent with principles of
forfeiture and waiver.
***
Personal jurisdiction exists under § 1330(b) of the FSIA
when an immunity exception applies and service is proper.
Because the Ninth Circuit required more, we reverse the
judgment below and remand the suit for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 226, line 6 from bottom: “See App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a” is inserted
after “leadership”
p. 228, line 4 from bottom: “foreign” is inserted before “sovereigns”