Lackey v. Stinnie

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 192–225
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OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 25, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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192 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
LACKEY, COMMISSIONER OF THE VIRGINIA
DEP
ARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES v.
STINNIE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 23–621. Argued October 8, 2024—Decided February 25, 2025
Drivers whose licenses were suspended under a Virginia statute for failure
to pay court fnes sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department
of Motor Vehicles under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, challenging the statute as
unconstitutional. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Commissioner from enforcing the statute. Before trial,
the Virginia General Assembly repealed the statute and required re-
instatement of licenses suspended under the law. The parties then
agreed to dismiss the pending case as moot.
Section 1988(b) allows an award of attorney's fees to “prevailing par-
t[ies]” under § 1983. The District Court declined to award attorney's
fees to the drivers under that section on the ground that parties who
obtain a preliminary injunction do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies].”
A Fourth Circuit panel affrmed, but the Fourth Circuit reversed en
banc. The en banc court held that some preliminary injunctions can
provide lasting, merits-based relief and qualify plaintiffs as prevailing
parties, even if the case becomes moot before fnal judgment.
Held: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive
relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing par-
t[ies]” eligible for attorney's fees under § 1988(b) because no court con-
clusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on
the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the
parties. Pp. 199–208.
(a) Under the “American Rule,” a prevailing litigant is ordinarily not
entitled to collect attorney's fees from the loser absent express statu-
tory authorization. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness So-
ciety, 421 U. S. 240, 249. Congress has provided that in actions brought
under certain civil rights statutes—including 42 U. S. C. § 1983—“the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.”
§ 1988(b).
To determine whether the drivers here qualify as “prevailing par-
t[ies]” under § 1988(b), the Court begins with the statute's text. The
Court has recognized “prevailing party” as a legal term of art. Buck-

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193
Syllabus
hannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Hum
an Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 603. When § 1988(b) was adopted,
contemporary dictionaries defned a prevailing party as one who suc-
cessfully maintains its claim when the matter is fnally resolved. See
Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); Ballentine's Law Dic-
tionary 985 (3d ed. 1969).
Preliminary injunctions do not make a party “prevailing ” because
they do not conclusively decide the case on the merits. Such injunc-
tions only determine if a plaintiff is likely to succeed, along with factors
such as irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest.
See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until a trial can occur, see University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S.
390, 395, and external events that render a dispute moot do not convert
that temporary order into a conclusive adjudication. Pp. 199–202.
(b) The Court's precedents interpreting § 1988(b) establish that a
plaintiff “prevails” when a court grants enduring judicial relief that ma-
terially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Two recent
decisions emphasize that this change must be both judicially sanctioned
and enduring. In Buckhannon, the Court rejected the “catalyst the-
ory”—the theory that a plaintiff may receive attorney's fees under
§ 1988(b) when he “achieves the desired result because the lawsuit
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.” 532
U. S., at 601. The Court explained that the plaintiff was not a “prevail-
ing party” because there had been “no judicially sanctioned change in
the legal relationship of the parties.” Id., at 605. And in Sole v.
Wyner, 551 U. S. 74, the Court decided that a plaintiff initially granted
a preliminary injunction after an abbreviated hearing, but denied a per-
manent injunction after a adjudication on the merits, did not qualify as
a “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 1988(b) because the plaintiff
gained no enduring change in the legal relationship between herself and
the defendants. Id., at 77, 78, 86. The Court's holding in this case—
that the enduring nature of that change must itself be judicially sanc-
tioned—follows naturally from Sole and Buckhannon. A plaintiff who
wins a transient victory on a preliminary injunction does not become a
“prevailing party” simply because external events convert the transient
victory into a lasting one. Pp. 202–204.
(c) The rule established serves the interests of judicial economy. A
straightforward, bright-line rule is easy to administer, reducing the risk
of signifcant litigation over attorney's fees. Concerns that government
defendants who have lost at the preliminary injunction stage will strate-
gically moot litigation are speculative, and such a risk could arise in only
a small number of contexts. The judicial role here is limited. Con-

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CKEY v. STINNIE
Syllabus
gress may amend the statutory language to empower courts to award
attor
ney's fees to plaintiffs who have enjoyed some success but have not
prevailed in a judgment on the merits. Pp. 204–205.
(d) The drivers' remaining arguments are unpersuasive. The argu-
ment that § 1988(b) was enacted against a historical backdrop that fa-
vored awarding interim costs at equity, including for preliminary injunc-
tions, was rejected by the Court in Alyeska Pipeline. 421 U. S., at 241,
247. The drivers also contend that the availability of fees in some cases
while litigation is ongoing suggests that § 1988(b) includes no fnality
requirement, but the Court's decisions simply indicate that attorney's
fees may be awarded when conclusive, enduring judicial relief is meted
out on an incremental basis. Finally, the availability of fees after a
court-ordered consent decree is consistent with the rule announced here.
While the decree refects the parties' own resolution of the merits, it is
approved and given force of law by a court, and it may grant enduring
relief that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.
The dissent confates preliminary judicial relief that becomes irrevers-
ible by way of mootness with relief that is permanent by virtue of a
judicial order. Pp. 205–207.
77 F. 4th 200, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas,
Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jack-
son, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined, post,
p. 208.
Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General of Virginia, argued the
cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Jason S.
Miyares, Attorney General of Virginia, Kevin M. Gallagher,
Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Graham K. Bryant, Dep-
uty Solicitor General, M. Jordan Minot, Assistant Solicitor
General, Maya M. Eckstein, Trevor S. Cox, and David M.
Parker.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Stewart, Charles W. Scarborough, Thomas Pulham, and
Dana Kaersvang.
Brian D. Schmalzbach argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Matthew A. Fitzgerald, John J.

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Opinion of the Court
Woolard, Jonathan T. Blank, Angela A. Ciolfi, and Patrick
Lev
y-Lavelle.*
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondents are Virginia drivers whose licenses were sus-
pended due to their failure to pay court fnes or costs. The
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Geor-
gia et al. by Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia, Stephen J.
Petrany, Solicitor General, Ross W. Bergethon, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General, and Paul R. Draper, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Ala-
bama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Raúl R. Labra-
dor of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris
Kobach of Kansas, Elizabeth Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Missis-
sippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael
T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrigley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio,
Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty
J. Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton
of Texas, and Sean Reyes of Utah; for the Local Government Legal Center
et al. by Joshua A. Skinner, Benjamin J. Gibbs, and Alexander J. Lind-
vall; and for the University of Florida Board of Trustees by H. Christo-
pher Bartolomucci and Justin A. Miller.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Alliance De-
fending Freedom et al. by Allyson N. Ho, Elizabeth A. Kiernan, Christine
A. Budasoff, John J. Bursch, Travis C. Barham, and Cynthia Fleming
Crawford; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Andrew J.
Pincus; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Douglas Laycock, John
Greil, and Steven T. Collis; for the Constitutional Accountability Center
by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R. Frazelle; for the
Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., et al. by Cody J. Wisniewski; for the First
Liberty Institute by Kelly J. Shackel ford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, David J.
Hacker, Jeremiah G. Dys, and Camille P. Varone; for the Foundation for
Individual Rights and Expression et al. by Joshua A. House and Edward
S. Rudofsky; for the Institute for Free Speech et al. by Alan Gura and
Brett R. Nolan; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
et al. by Damon T. Hewitt, Dariely Rodriguez, Ezra D. Rosenberg,
Thomas Silverstein, Pooja Chaudhuri, Angela M. Liu, and Christopher
J. Merken; and for the New Jersey State Bar Association by Gary S. Stein,
William H. Mergner, Jr., Robert B. Hille, Peter J. Gallagher, and James
A. Lewis V.

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drivers sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department
of
Motor Vehicles under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, arguing that the
Virginia statute requiring suspension of their licenses was
unconstitutional. The District Court preliminarily enjoined
the Commissioner from enforcing the statute. But before
the case reached fnal judgment, the Virginia General As-
sembly repealed the challenged law, rendering the action
moot. The question presented is whether the drivers are
“prevailing part[ies]” who qualify for an award of attorney's
fees under § 1988(b).
I
Until recently, a Virginia statute directed the state courts
to suspend the license of any driver who failed to pay “any
fne, costs, forfeitures, restitution, or penalty lawfully as-
sessed against him” for violation of a federal, state, or local
law. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2–395(B) (2016) (repealed 2020).
The suspension remained in force until the amount due was
paid in full or the driver entered into a court-approved pay-
ment plan. Virginia drivers—whose licenses were sus-
pended under the law and who asserted that they could not
afford to pay the fnes or costs or keep up with a payment
plan—sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of
Motor Vehicles on their own behalf and on behalf of a puta-
tive class. The drivers alleged that the statute facially vio-
lated the Due Process Clause by “failing to provide suffcient
notice or hearing to any driver before license suspension”
and violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses “as applied to people who cannot afford to pay due
to their modest fnancial circumstances.” First Amended
Class Action Complaint in Stinnie v. Holcomb, No.
3:16−cv−00044 (WD Va., Sept. 11, 2018), ECF Doc. 84, pp.
2−3; see also id., at 37−43. The drivers sought declaratory
relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and at-
torney's fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988(b).
In December 2018, the District Court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction, prohibiting the Commissioner from enforc-
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ing the statute against the drivers or future class members.
See
Stinnie v. Holcomb, 355 F. Supp. 3d 514, 520 (WD Va.
2018). The court explained that the drivers had made “a
clear showing that [they were] likely to succeed” on their
procedural due process claim, though it noted that they need
not “establish a certainty of success.” Id., at 527 (quoting
Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F. 3d 224, 230 (CA4 2017)). The
court also determined that the remaining preliminary injunc-
tion factors—the risk of irreparable harm, the balance of eq-
uities, and the public interest—weighed in the drivers' favor.
Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d, at 532; see Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008). The
Commissioner did not appeal the grant of the preliminary
injunction.
In April 2019, about four months before a bench trial was
scheduled to begin, the Commissioner moved to dismiss as
moot or, in the alternative, stay the case. See Stinnie v.
Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (WD Va.). The Virginia
General Assembly had recently adopted Budget Amendment
No. 33, which “eliminate[d] the suspension of drivers' li-
censes for failure to pay court fnes and costs through July
1, 2020, but [did] not repeal § 46.2–395.” Ibid. The Com-
missioner represented that the General Assembly was likely
to repeal the law during the next legislative session. The
District Court granted a stay, reasoning in part that doing
so served the interests of judicial economy and enabled the
court to avoid “weigh[ing] in on sensitive constitutional ques-
tions about license suspension schemes about which other
courts ha[d] disagreed.” Id., at 660.
In April 2020, the Virginia General Assembly repealed
§ 46.2–395 and required the permanent reinstatement of li-
censes suspended under the law. See 2020 Va. Acts ch. 965.
As a result, the parties agreed that the action had become
moot and stipulated to dismissal. The drivers, however, as-
serted that they were entitled to attorney's fees under
§ 1988(b), so the parties jointly requested that the court re-
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tain jurisdiction to resolve that dispute. The District Court
decl
ined to award attorney's fees, following Smyth v. Rivero,
282 F. 3d 268 (CA4 2002). See Stinnie v. Holcomb, 2021 WL
2292807 (WD Va., June 4, 2021). In Smyth the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that a plaintiff awarded a preliminary injunction is
not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 1988(b).
282 F. 3d, at 277. A Fourth Circuit panel affrmed, again
relying on Smyth. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 37 F. 4th 977 (2022).
Judge Harris concurred, suggesting that the Circuit may
wish to reconsider that precedent. Id., at 983.
The Fourth Circuit did so, rehearing the case en banc and
overturning its decision in Smyth. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77
F. 4th 200 (2023). It observed that Smyth had become the
“outlier” among the courts of appeals. 77 F. 4th, at 209. It
reasoned that some preliminary injunctions “provide endur-
ing, merits-based relief that satisfes all the requisites of the
prevailing party standard.” Id., at 203. And it explained,
in light of this Court's decision in Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, that a plaintiff could no longer pre-
vail on a preliminary injunction for reasons that “had virtu-
ally nothing to do with the merits of her claim.” 77 F. 4th,
at 208−209; see Winter, 555 U. S., at 20 (clarifying that a
fnding of likely success on the merits is a prerequisite to
preliminary injunctive relief ). Finally, it noted that Con-
gress had enacted § 1988(b) in the interest of facilitating the
redress of civil rights grievances. 77 F. 4th, at 210.
The en banc court articulated a new standard: “When a
preliminary injunction provides the plaintiff concrete, irre-
versible relief on the merits of her claim and becomes moot
before fnal judgment because no further court-ordered as-
sistance proves necessary, the subsequent mootness of the
case does not preclude an award of attorney's fees.” Ibid.
Applying that standard, the en banc court vacated and re-
manded the case to allow the District Court to determine a
reasonable fee. Id., at 218. Judge Quattlebaum dissented,
arguing that a preliminary injunction does not constitute a
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judicial decision on the merits and that a fee award on the
basis
of such an injunction therefore conficts with both the
text of § 1988(b) and this Court's precedents. See id., at 225,
227, 231.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the term
“prevailing party” in § 1988(b) encompasses a party who is
awarded a preliminary injunction, if the case becomes moot
before the court reaches a fnal judgment. 601 U. S. 1161
(2024).
II
Since 1796, this Court has maintained that “the Judiciary
itself would not create a general rule, independent of any
statute, allowing awards of attorneys' fees in federal courts.”
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S.
240, 249 (1975) (citing Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306
(1796)). The principle that “the prevailing litigant is ordi-
narily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from
the loser” became known as the “American Rule.” Alyeska
Pipeline, 421 U. S., at 247. Federal courts may depart from
this rule only when “there is express statutory authoriza-
tion” to do so. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429
(1983).
In 1976, Congress adopted the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act. 90 Stat. 2641. The law provides that, in
actions brought under certain civil rights statutes—includ-
ing 42 U. S. C. § 1983—“the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of the costs.” § 1988(b). The
question is whether the drivers in this case qualify as “pre-
vailing part[ies]” within the meaning of § 1988(b).
A
When interpreting a statute, we begin with the text. As
we have previously recognized, the phrase “prevailing party”
in § 1988(b) is a “legal term of art.” Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and
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Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 603 (2001). We assume
that
“when Congress `borrows terms of art in which are ac-
cumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas
that were attached to each borrowed word.' ” United States
v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 774 (2023) (quoting Morissette v.
United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952)).
At the time § 1988(b) was adopted, Black's Law Dictionary
defned “prevailing party” as the party “who successfully
prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it.”
Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). It ex-
plained that prevailing party status “does not depend upon
the degree of success at different stages of the suit, but
whether, at the end of the suit, or other proceeding, the
party who has made a claim against the other, has success-
fully maintained it.” Ibid.; accord, Ballentine's Law Dic-
tionary 985 (3d ed. 1969). A prevailing party, in other
words, is “[t]he party ultimately prevailing when the matter
is fnally set at rest.” Black's Law Dictionary 1352.
Preliminary injunctions, however, do not conclusively re-
solve legal disputes. In awarding preliminary injunctions,
courts determine if a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the mer-
its—along with the risk of irreparable harm, the balance of
equities, and the public interest. Winter, 555 U. S., at 20.
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to pre-
serve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the
merits can be held,” University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U. S. 390, 395 (1981), and “to balance the equities as the liti-
gation moves forward,” Trump v. International Refugee As-
sistance Project, 582 U. S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam).
“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discre-
tion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities
of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it pre-
sents.” Id., at 579. Such relief is also “customarily granted
on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence
that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Camen-
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isch, 451 U. S., at 395. As a result, we have previously cau-
ti
oned against “improperly equat[ing] `likelihood of success'
with `success' ” and treating preliminary injunctions as “tan-
tamount to decisions on the underlying merits.” Id., at 394.
The transient nature of preliminary injunctions is most ap-
parent when a court reaches a different conclusion upon full
consideration of the merits. For example, in one of our
more recent cases interpreting § 1988, Sole v. Wyner, 551
U. S. 74, 78–79 (2007), protesters sought a preliminary in-
junction against a state regulation of beach attire in order
to assemble nude in the form of a peace sign. The day after
the complaint was fled, the District Court held a hearing
and granted the preliminary injunction. Id., at 79. The
preliminary injunction permitted the protest to occur and
thus preserved the participants' rights until a fnal determi-
nation could be made on the merits of their claim. Ulti-
mately, however, the court declined to award a permanent
injunction, ruling that the regulation was no more burden-
some than necessary to protect the public. Id., at 80−81.
Because preliminary injunctions do not conclusively re-
solve the rights of parties on the merits, they do not confer
prevailing party status. A plaintiff who secures a prelimi-
nary injunction has achieved only temporary success at an
intermediary “stage[ ] of the suit.” Black's Law Dictionary
1352. It cannot yet be said that he will “ultimately prevail[ ]
when the matter is fnally set at rest” or that he will have
“successfully maintained” his claim “at the end. ” Ibid.
And external events that render a dispute moot do not con-
vert a temporary order designed to preserve the status of
the parties into a conclusive adjudication of their rights.
The Fourth Circuit en banc was persuaded that “Winter's
stringent merits requirement” avoided the “risk” that “a
plaintiff may prevail, and thus be entitled to fees, based on
a preliminary injunction that had virtually nothing to do
with the merits of her claim.” 77 F. 4th, at 209. But it is
not enough that Winter guarantees a preliminary injunction
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award has at least something to do with the merits. The
plai
ntiff must succeed on the merits.
B
This conclusion is consistent with our precedents inter-
preting § 1988(b). We have held that, for the purposes of
§ 1988(b), a plaintiff “prevails” when a court grants enduring
judicial relief that constitutes a “material alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties.” Texas State Teachers
Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782,
792−793 (1989). For example, we have ruled that a plaintiff
may qualify as a “prevailing party” based on an award of
nominal damages, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 112 (1992),
or a fnal victory on a material even if not predominant claim,
Texas State Teachers Assn., 489 U. S., at 791−793. By con-
trast, a party does not qualify as a “prevailing party” when
a court of appeals overturns directed verdicts and discovery
orders entered against him, Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S.
754, 756 (1980) (per curiam), or when a court enters a declar-
atory judgment but does not modify the defendant's behavior
toward the plaintiff, Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 3−4
(1988) (per curiam) (holding that no fees were available
under § 1988 when the judgment afforded no relief to the
plaintiff due to mootness).
Two of our more recent decisions highlight the require-
ments that the change in legal relationship be judicially sanc-
tioned and enduring. In Buckhannon Board & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Re-
sources, we rejected the “catalyst theory”—the theory that
a plaintiff may receive attorney's fees under § 1988(b) when
he “achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought
about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.” 532
U. S., at 601; see id., at 600. In that context, we explained
that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” because there
had been “no judicially sanctioned change in the legal rela-
tionship of the parties.” Id., at 605. The defendant's volun-
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tary actions “lack[ed] the necessary judicial imprimatur.”
Ib
id. We were not persuaded that § 1988(b) “authorizes fed-
eral courts to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who” fled
a “potentially meritless lawsuit” and “reached the `sought-
after destination' without obtaining any judicial relief.” Id.,
at 606 (quoting id., at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
In Sole v. Wyner, we decided that “a plaintiff who gain[ed]
a preliminary injunction after an abbreviated hearing, but
[was] denied a permanent injunction after a dispositive adju-
dication on the merits,” did not qualify as a “prevailing
party” within the meaning of § 1988(b). 551 U. S., at 77; see
id., at 78. That plaintiff, we explained, “gained no enduring
change in the legal relationship” between herself and the de-
fendants. Id., at 86 (emphasis added; alterations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Although we left open the
question presented in this case, see ibid., we described the
plaintiff 's success at the preliminary injunction stage as
“a transient victory at the threshold of an action,” a “feeting
success” that “did not establish that [the plaintiff] prevailed
on the gravamen of her plea for injunctive relief,” one
“tentative [in] character, in view of the continuation of the
litigation to defnitively resolve the controversy,” id., at 78,
83, 84.
We recognize that neither opinion resolves this case, but
our holding today follows naturally from these precedents.
In Sole, we established that the change in the legal rela-
tionship between the parties must be “enduring.” Id., at
86. In Buckhannon, we established that the change must
be “judicially sanctioned.” 532 U. S., at 605. Today, we
establish that the enduring nature of that change must itself
be judicially sanctioned. A plaintiff who wins a transient
victory on a preliminary injunction does not become a
“prevailing party” simply because external events convert
the transient victory into a lasting one. Rather, a plaintiff
“prevails” under the statute when a court conclusively re-
solves a claim by granting enduring judicial relief on the
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merits that materially alters the legal relationship between
the
parties.
*
C
The rule we establish today also serves the interests of
judicial economy. A straightforward, bright-line rule is
easy to administer, reducing the risk of “a second major liti-
gation” over attorney's fees. Cf. Hensley, 461 U. S., at 437.
The drivers, however, suggest that our rule promotes sim-
plicity at the cost of creating perverse incentives. They fear
that government defendants who have lost at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage will strategically moot litigation rather
than risk a fee award were they to ultimately lose on the
merits. See Brief for Respondents 42−47. We found simi-
lar concerns to be “entirely speculative” when we rejected
the catalyst theory in Buckhannon, 532 U. S., at 608. We
reiterate that such risk could arise in only a small number of
contexts. After all, if a plaintiff “has a cause of action for
damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the
case.” Id., at 609. And even if the plaintiff seeks only in-
junctive relief, voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct
does not moot an action “unless it is `absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be ex-
pected to recur.' ” Ibid. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S.
167, 189 (2000)); see also FBI v. Fikre, 601 U. S. 234, 241
(2024) (characterizing this burden as “formidable” (quoting
Friends of the Earth, 528 U. S., at 190)). A survey asking
public interest organizations to self-report on the impact of
*A different body of caselaw addresses when a defendant is a “prevail-
ing party” for the purposes of other fee-shifting statutes. Our decision
today should not be read to affect our previous holding that a defendant
need not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits to prevail, nor to
address the question we left open of whether a defendant must obtain a
preclusive judgment in order to prevail. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc.
v. EEOC, 578 U. S. 419, 431−434 (2016). As we have explained, “[p]lain-
tiffs and defendants come to court with different objectives.” Id., at 431.
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Buckhannon does not change our minds. See post, at 224
(
Jackson, J., dissenting).
It is Congress's job to craft policy and ours to interpret
the words that codify it. “Atextual judicial supplementation
is particularly inappropriate when . . . Congress has shown
that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provi-
sion.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019). Congress
has shown that it knows how to empower courts to award
attorney's fees to plaintiffs who have enjoyed some success
but have not prevailed in a judgment on the merits. In the
Freedom of Information Act, for example, Congress author-
ized courts to assess attorney's fees when a complainant has
“substantially prevailed,” even if through “a voluntary or
unilateral change in position by the agency.” 5 U. S. C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E). If Congress determines that the rule we
adopt today is unwise, it may amend the statutory lan-
guage—just as it enacted § 1988(b) itself in response to our
decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
ety. 421 U. S. 240; see Hensley, 461 U. S., at 429. Until
then, “it is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Con-
gress has written.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017).
D
The drivers urge the opposite conclusion, but we fnd their
arguments unpersuasive.
First, the drivers, joined by the dissent, argue that the
dictionary defnitions support them. But they assume that
the favorable resolution of a dispute is tantamount to success
on a claim in a legal action. A “prevailing party,” however,
is defned in the latter sense—one who “successfully prose-
cutes the action,” who has “made a claim” against another
and “has successfully maintained it.” Black's Law Diction-
ary 1352.
Second, the drivers and dissent contend that § 1988(b) was
enacted against a historical backdrop that favored awarding
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Opinion of the Court
interim costs at equity, including for preliminary injunctions.
See
Brief for Respondents 19−21. The dissent in Alyeska
Pipeline similarly invoked “the well-established power of
federal equity courts to award attorneys' fees when the in-
terests of justice so require.” 421 U. S., at 272 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). We rejected that argument, however, and
determined that the American Rule supplied the default rule
at law and equity, subject to narrow historical exceptions not
at issue here. See id., at 241, 247 (majority opinion).
Next, the drivers argue that the availability of fees while
litigation is ongoing suggests that § 1988(b) includes no fnal-
ity requirement. See Brief for Respondents 40−42. The
dissent likewise points to our statement in Buckhannon that
a “ `prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to the vic-
tor only after entry of a fnal judgment following a full trial
on the merits.” 532 U. S., at 607 (quoting H. R. Rep. No.
94–1558, p. 7 (1976)); see post, at 221. We have recognized
that “Congress contemplated the award of fees pendente lite
in some cases.” Hanrahan, 446 U. S., at 757. For example,
we have explained that, in school desegregation cases, “many
fnal orders may issue in the course of the litigation” because
injunctive relief “must prove its effcacy . . . over a period
of time and often with frequent modifcations.” Bradley v.
School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696, 723 (1974). Our deci-
sions simply indicate that attorney's fees may be awarded
when conclusive, enduring judicial relief is meted out on an
incremental basis. Hanrahan, 446 U. S., at 758 (“Congress
intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only
when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of
his claims.”). Key language on which the dissent relies—
our statement that a party prevails when it “succeed[s] on
any signifcant claim affording it some of the relief sought,”
including relief on the merits pendente lite—explained our
rejection of the “central issue test,” which would have re-
quired a party to prevail on its central claim in order to be
awarded attorney's fees. Texas State Teachers Assn., 489
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207
Opinion of the Court
U. S., at 791; see post, at 211. It did not refer to prelimi-
nary
relief.
The availability of fees following the entry of a court-
ordered consent decree is fully consistent with the rule we
announce today. A consent decree refects the parties' own
resolution of the merits, but it is approved and given force
of law by the court. See Firefghters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S.
501, 523 (1986). Violation of a consent decree is enforceable
by a citation for contempt. Ibid. So a consent decree is
like a fnal judgment in the relevant ways: It conclusively
resolves the claim, bears a judicial imprimatur, and may
grant enduring relief that materially alters the legal re-
lationship between the parties. That is why “[w]e have only
awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff has received
a judgment on the merits or obtained a court-ordered con-
sent decree.” Buckhannon, 532 U. S., at 605 (citation omit-
ted). For its part, the dissent confates preliminary judicial
relief that becomes irreversible by way of mootness with re-
lief that is permanent by virtue of a judicial order. See
post, at 217−218. That a preliminary order may sometimes
“function[ ] . . . like” a fnal order due to external circum-
stances, see post, at 218, is not dispositive of the nature of
the order.
***
Section 1988(b) permits courts to award attorney's fees to
a “prevailing party.” A party “prevails” when a court con-
clusively resolves his claim by granting enduring relief on
the merits that alters the legal relationship between the par-
ties. Critically, both the change in relationship and its per-
manence must result from a judicial order. A preliminary
injunction, which temporarily preserves the parties' litigat-
ing positions based in part on a prediction of the likelihood
of success on the merits, does not render a plaintiff a “pre-
vailing party.” Nor do external events that moot the action
and prevent the court from conclusively adjudicating the
claim. Because the drivers in the present case gained only
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CKEY v. STINNIE
Jackson, J., dissenting
preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot,
they
do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attor-
ney's fees under § 1988(b).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins,
dissenting.
Congress has authorized courts to award attorney's fees
to the “prevailing party” in certain civil rights cases. 42
U. S. C. § 1988(b). Today, the Court holds that a plaintiff
who secures a preliminary injunction does not “prevail”
under this fee-shifting statute, even when the preliminary
injunction provides meaningful relief and is never reversed
on the merits. The Court maintains that this holding “fol-
lows naturally from” our precedents. Ante, at 203. But
that will come as a surprise to the 11 Courts of Appeals that
have previously considered this issue; all of them agree that
at least some preliminary injunctions trigger fee eligibility
under § 1988(b).
Stated simply, the majority's categorical preclusion of fee
awards for any plaintiff who successfully obtains preliminary
injunctive relief is unwarranted. It lacks any basis in the
text of § 1988(b) and is plainly inconsistent with that statu-
tory provision's clear objective, which is to encourage attor-
neys to fle civil rights actions on behalf of the most vulnera-
ble people in our society. The Court has now eliminated fee
eligibility for all preliminary injunctions—even those that
effectively resolve the case. But if Congress had meant for
“prevailing party” status to hinge entirely on the “conclu-
sive” nature of a judicial order, it could easily have said so.
It is the role of Congress, not this Court, to weigh concerns
about administrative ease against the benefts of guaran-

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209
Jackson, J., dissenting
teeing individuals an opportunity to vindicate their civil
r
ights.
There is no persuasive reason to believe that Congress
meant to preclude fee awards for every plaintiff who secures
preliminary injunctive relief but not a fnal judgment, no
matter the context. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
Nothing in § 1988(b)'s text compels the conclusion that a
plaintiff who obtains preliminary injunctive relief is never
eligible for a fee award. Section 1988(b) states simply that,
in actions to enforce certain civil rights statutes, including
42 U. S. C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.” § 1988(b). The major-
ity recognizes that “prevailing party” is a legal term of art
and begins its analysis by asserting that this term means
what legal dictionaries said it meant at the time that
§ 1988(b) was enacted.
According to the majority's preferred dictionary, a “pre-
vailing party” is one “ `who successfully prosecutes the action
or successfully defends against it.' ” Ante, at 200 (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). Thus, pre-
vailing party status turns on “ `whether, at the end of the
suit, or other proceeding, the party who has made a claim
against the other, has successfully maintained it.' ” Ante,
at 200 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, at 1352). Reasoning
from this defnition, the majority holds that preliminary in-
junctions, which provide interim relief by their nature, can
never confer prevailing party status because they do not
“conclusively resolve the rights of parties on the merits.”
Ante, at 201.
But the majority's analysis inexplicably confates the re-
quirement for success when the suit ends (which is what the
dictionary defnition says) with a requirement that the suit
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end by virtue of a “conclusive” judicial ruling on the merits
of
the plaintiff 's claims (which is nowhere in Black's Law
Dictionary or anywhere else). In other words, the majori-
ty's reasoning elides the fact that a suit can end in various
ways—including through acts of the defendant or others that
moot the legal action. Black's Law Dictionary and its con-
temporaries simply require a court determining eligibility
for a fee award to take stock of where things stand at the end
of the lawsuit. A prevailing party for § 1988(b) purposes is
one who has successfully maintained his claim (in the manner
I describe below, see Part II–A, infra) “when the matter is
fnally set at rest.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1352.
In essence, then, the majority errs by assuming that the
only kind of resolution to a suit that can precipitate a fee
award is a “conclusive” fnal judgment on the merits. See,
e. g., ante, at 200–201, 203, 206. That assumption is un-
founded. The text of the fee statute does not require a fnal
judgment in the party's favor, “conclusive” or otherwise.
Nor does any dictionary defnition of “prevailing party” to
which the majority cites. Rather, according to Black's Law
Dictionary, a “prevailing party” is simply a “part[y] to a suit
who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully de-
fends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though
not to the extent of his original contention.” Black's Law
Dictionary, at 1352. Ballentine's Law Dictionary is substan-
tially similar; it defnes “prevailing party” as “[t]he party
who is successful or partially successful in an action, so as to
be entitled to costs.” Ballentine's Law Dictionary 985 (3d
ed. 1969).
Signifcantly for present purposes, both dictionaries fur-
ther emphasize that “[t]o be [a prevailing party] does not de-
pend upon the degree of success at different stages of the
suit, but whether, at the end of the suit . . . the party who
has made a claim against the other, has successfully main-
tained it.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1352; accord, Ballen-
tine's Law Dictionary, at 985. Yet, today, the majority de-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
mands that, in order to prevail, the party must have achieved
a
certain degree of success at a certain point in the case: a
conclusive fnal judgment in his favor at the end of litigation.
B
This Court has not previously linked prevailing party
status to securing a conclusive fnal judgment. Quite to
the contrary, we have held that a prevailing party for fee-
shifting purposes is one who has “succeeded on any signif-
cant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pen-
dente lite”—i. e., pending the suit—“or at the conclusion of
the litigation.” Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland In-
dependent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782, 791 (1989). That is, a
plaintiff prevails when he accomplishes his lawsuit's “objec-
tiv[e],” which is to achieve “a material alteration in the legal
relationship between the parties.” CRST Van Expedited,
Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U. S. 419, 431 (2016). This is because, for
a plaintiff, “[a]t the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment,
but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that
the judgment produces—the payment of damages, or some
specifc performance, or the termination of some conduct.”
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987).
A plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction awarding
actual relief on the merits of his claim that is never reversed
by a fnal decision of the court has “successfully maintained”
his claim “at the end.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1352.
Such a plaintiff has achieved what he has “come to court”
for—the desired “alteration in the legal relationship between
the parties.” CRST, 578 U. S., at 431.
1
Take this case, for example. At the point it ended—when
the District Court dismissed the litigation as moot—re-
1
There are, of course, other kinds of preliminary injunctive orders, in-
cluding orders that maintain the status quo. All that is necessary to re-
ject the majority's categorical rule is the recognition that at least some
preliminary injunctions afford the type of material change that confers
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212 LA
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Jackson, J., dissenting
spondents had secured a preliminary injunction against the
Commissi
oner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles.
That order enabled respondents to drive their cars on Vir-
ginia's highways for 16 months, over the Commissioner's ob-
jection. And, because the District Court's interim award
had facilitated respondents' access to the road as licensed
drivers, they had prevailed on the merits of their claim in
every meaningful sense. Put another way, “at the end of
the litigation,” respondents did not “leav[e] the courthouse
emptyhanded.” Sole v. Wyner, 551 U. S. 74, 78 (2007). In-
stead, they departed having accomplished exactly what they
had sought to achieve. The fact that respondents achieved
their goal via a preliminary court ruling, as opposed to a
fnal judgment, is irrelevant, for “[n]othing in the language
of § 1988 conditions the District Court's power to award fees
on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination
that the plaintiff 's rights have been violated.” Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980) (emphasis added).
Juxtapose that reality with the text of other statutes that
make “prevailing party” status expressly dependent on the
entry of a fnal order. For example, the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1972—enacted just four years before § 1988(b)—
states that, “[u]pon the entry of a fnal order,” a court hear-
ing a school desegregation case may “allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.” 20 U. S. C. § 1617 (repealed 1979)
(emphasis added). Several statutes enacted after § 1988(b)
are similarly explicit about when a fee award must be fastened
to a fnal judgment. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (de-
fning “prevailing party” in eminent domain proceedings to
“mea[n] a party who obtains a fnal judgment” of a certain
amount); 15 U. S. C. § 6104(d) (authorizing courts hearing ac-
tions under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act to award “reasonable fees . . . to the
prevailing party” upon “issuing any fnal order”). The fact
that § 1988(b) lacks any such language confrms that a conclu-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
sive ruling from the court in the form of a fnal judgment is
not
a prerequisite for a fee award under that statute.
C
The majority disregards these important context clues and
focuses instead on a provision of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) that authorizes fee awards for a “complainant”
who “ has substantially prevailed” by “obtain[ing] relief
through either—(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written
agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or unilateral
change in position by the agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
The term “prevailing party” appears nowhere in this FOIA
provision. But, no matter: The majority nevertheless sug-
gests that this is how Congress authorizes fee shifting for
“plaintiffs who have enjoyed some success but have not pre-
vailed in a judgment on the merits.” Ante, at 205.
The problem is that Congress had a much more targeted
objective when it enacted § 552(a)(4)(E). It sought merely
to repudiate this Court's decision in Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 606 (2001), which had held
that a plaintiff must obtain some “judicial relief ” to be eligi-
ble for a fee award in FOIA cases.
2
Since the point of
§ 552(a)(4)(E) was to “abrogat[e] the rule of Buckhannon in
the FOIA context and reviv[e] the possibility of FOIA fee
awards in the absence of a court decree,” Brayton v. Offce
of U. S. Trade Rep., 641 F. 3d 521, 525 (CADC 2011), that
2
Congress enacted 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(E) because Buckhannon had
empowered Government agencies to “stonewall valid FOIA claims” and
then prevent an award of attorney's fees by “disclosing the documents at
the last moment before judgment,” thereby mooting the case. Brayton
v. Offce of U. S. Trade Rep., 641 F. 3d 521, 525 (CADC 2011). Under
Buckhannon, such plaintiffs were not eligible for fee awards because they
had not obtained any judicial order—preliminary, fnal, or otherwise.
This strategic behavior ensured that FOIA plaintiffs never became eligi-
ble for fee awards despite incurring signifcant costs, so Congress inter-
vened. 641 F. 3d, at 525.
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statutory provision sheds no light whatsoever on whether
the
term “prevailing party” requires a plaintiff to secure a
conclusive ruling on the merits to qualify as a prevailing
party for purposes of § 1988(b).
In short, while the majority insists that obtaining a pre-
liminary injunction can never suffce for a fee award under
§ 1988(b) “[b]ecause preliminary injunctions do not conclu-
sively resolve the rights of parties on the merits,” ante, at
201, the text of § 1988(b), contemporary dictionary def-
nitions, and our precedents require far less. All of the
Courts of Appeals to consider the question—11 in total—
understood this and thus correctly held that, for fee-shifting
purposes, it is possible for a party to prevail based on a pre-
liminary ruling.
3
The majority's reading of “prevailing
party” in § 1988(b) makes obtaining a court's conclusive fnal
judgment the hallmark of that status in a manner that is
both novel and in many ways anathema to the legal term of
art that Congress actually chose.
II
A
So what does it take to qualify as a “prevailing party” for
purposes of this fee-shifting statute? In Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U. S. 103 (1992), we explained that a plaintiff “ `prevails' ”
3
See, e. g., Haley v. Pataki, 106 F. 3d 478, 484 (CA2 1997); Singer Mgmt.
Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F. 3d 223, 229–230, and n. 4 (CA3 2011)
(en banc); Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F. 4th 200, 210 (CA4 2023) (en banc) (case
below); Dearmore v. Garland, 519 F. 3d 517, 524 (CA5 2008); Planned
Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F. 3d 530, 534 (CA6
2019); Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F. 3d 714, 723, and n. 4 (CA7 2005); Rogers
Group, Inc. v. Fayetteville, 683 F. 3d 903, 909–910 (CA8 2012); Higher
Taste, Inc. v. Tacoma, 717 F. 3d 712, 717–718 (CA9 2013); Kansas Jud.
Watch v. Stout, 653 F. 3d 1230, 1232, 1238–1239 (CA10 2011); Common
Cause Ga. v. Georgia, 17 F. 4th 102, 107 (CA11 2021); Select Milk Produc-
ers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F. 3d 939, 942, 948–949 (CADC 2005). The First
Circuit has not yet considered the issue. See Sinapi v. Rhode Island Bd.
of Bar Examiners, 910 F. 3d 544, 552 (2018).
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if he receives (1) “actual relief on the merits of his claim” in
a
manner that (2) “materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior
in a way that directly benefts the plaintiff.” Id., at 111–
112; see also Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U. S. 1, 4 (2012) (per
curiam). This test is well established, and it leads inexora-
bly to the conclusion that, in some circumstances, an unre-
versed preliminary injunction can confer prevailing party
status.
Start with the requirement of a “ `material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties,' ” which we have repeat-
edly called the “ `touchstone' ” of the prevailing party inquiry.
Sole, 551 U. S., at 82 (quoting Texas State Teachers Assn.,
489 U. S., at 792–793). A plaintiff need not obtain all of the
relief he has requested in the lawsuit to satisfy this require-
ment. Instead, under our precedents, a plaintiff who has
achieved even “ `some of the beneft' ” he sought has secured
the change in the parties' legal relationship necessary to
“cros[s] the threshold to a fee award of some kind.” Id., at
791–792 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d 275, 278–279
(CA1 1978); emphasis added).
A permanent injunction—just like a declaratory judgment
or a damages award—“will usually satisfy that test,” Lefe-
mine, 568 U. S., at 4, because permanent injunctive relief
generally “affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff,” Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4 (1988) (per cu-
riam). At least some preliminary injunctions also qualify.
The preliminary injunction in this case, for example, pro-
vided respondents with actual relief by reinstating their sus-
pended licenses, allowing them to drive without fear of sanc-
tion for failing to repay their fnes and fees. For the roughly
16 months that the preliminary injunction was in place, “that
ruling worked the requisite material alteration in the par-
ties' relationship” by permitting respondents to engage in
conduct that would have been prohibited otherwise. Lefe-
mine, 568 U. S., at 5.
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It is indisputable that the preliminary injunction the Dis-
tr
ict Court issued provided a “direc[t] beneft” to respond-
ents. Farrar, 506 U. S., at 111. That relief was also
awarded “ `on the merits.' ” Lefemine, 568 U. S., at 4 (quoting
Farrar, 506 U. S., at 111–112). We have long taken a “prac-
tical” approach to the merits inquiry in this context. Han-
rahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758 (1980) (per curiam).
Under that approach, relief is granted “on the merits” when
it provides “a resolution of the dispute which changes the
legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.”
Texas State Teachers Assn., 489 U. S., at 792 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Notably, for prevailing party status, we have not required
that a court actually determine whether a legal claim is meri-
torious. The majority acknowledges our holding that the
entry of a consent decree following “the parties' own resolu-
tion of the merits” counts. Ante, at 207; see Farrar, 506
U. S., at 111 (recognizing that a consent decree satisfes the
requirement that the plaintiff “obtain at least some relief on
the merits of his claim”). Indeed, in Maher, we upheld a fee
award based on a consent decree that “did not purport to
adjudicate” the plaintiff's claims at all. 448 U. S., at 126,
n. 8, 129. We have also suggested that default judgments,
which do not involve any assessment of the merits of the
plaintiff 's claims, “almost invariably give rise to fee awards.”
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U. S. 197, 208,
n. 3 (2016).
A court's entry of a preliminary injunction—which does
require a judge to make a preliminary assessment of the
merits—provides a basis for prevailing party status that is
at least as strong as a consent decree or a default judgment.
Plaintiffs seeking the “extraordinary remedy” of a prelimi-
nary injunction must make a “clear showing ” that they are
“likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20, 22 (2008).
And the court's decision to order preliminary injunctive re-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
lief often involves “searching ” proceedings, Sole, 551 U. S.,
at
84, even though the “evidence . . . is less complete than in
a trial on the merits,” University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U. S. 390, 395 (1981).
In this case, the District Court thoroughly assessed the
merits of respondents' claims and granted their request for
preliminary injunctive relief after extensive briefng and an
evidentiary hearing during which multiple witnesses testi-
fed. It blinks reality to suggest that the District Court's
order requiring the Commissioner to give respondents their
licenses back now—based on the court's conclusion that re-
spondents were likely to succeed if this matter proceeded to
trial—is “not the stuff of which legal victories are made.”
Hewitt, 482 U. S., at 760.
It is no answer to simply declare by ipse dixit that prelimi-
nary injunctions are materially different from consent de-
crees because “a consent decree is like a fnal judgment in
the relevant ways”—i. e., “[i]t conclusively resolves the
claim, bears a judicial imprimatur, and may grant enduring
relief that materially alters the legal relationship between
the parties.” Ante, at 207. The very question before us is
the relevance of this kind of fnality to the prevailing party
determination. And, luckily, that question has already been
answered: Neither the text of § 1988(b) nor any of this
Court's past cases make fee eligibility dependent on the
entry of a conclusive fnal judgment, as I explained above.
In any event, if a plaintiff need only obtain an order that
is “like a fnal judgment” to prevail, ibid., it is not at all clear
why at least some preliminary injunctions would not count.
Consider, for example, a dispute in which the district court
reviews the evidence and the parties' arguments and enters
the type of preliminary injunction that changes the legal re-
lationship of the parties. The case proceeds but then be-
comes moot such that the litigation ends; the preliminary
injunction is not—and can never be—reversed by a subse-
quent order of the court. In this scenario, all the purport-
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Jackson, J., dissenting
edly “relevant” characteristics of a consent decree exist, be-
cause
the parties' legal relationship was materially altered
by judicial imprimatur, and that preliminary relief is conclu-
sive insofar as the case has ended and the ruling cannot be
undone by a later determination. In this circumstance, the
preliminary injunction “functions much like the grant of
an irreversible partial summary judgment on the merits,”
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F. 3d 1083, 1086
(CA8 2006), which all appear to agree would suffce to confer
fee eligibility under § 1988(b).
B
Our decisions in Buckhannon, 532 U. S. 598, and Sole, 551
U. S. 74, are not to the contrary. The majority cites these
two decisions to support its view that obtaining a prelimi-
nary injunction is never suffcient to qualify the recipient for
a fee award under § 1988(b). Ante, at 202–204. But those
cases hold no such thing. Instead, they simply clarify that,
for a plaintiff to prevail, the requisite “change in the legal
relationship of the parties” must be both “judicially sanc-
tioned,” Buckhannon, 532 U. S., at 605, and “enduring,” Sole,
551 U. S., at 86. Neither case mandates the majority's cate-
gorical rule.
In Buckhannon, this Court rejected the so-called “catalyst
theory,” under which a plaintiff could collect a fee award as
a “prevailing party” without securing any judicial relief so
long as the lawsuit produced “a voluntary change in the de-
fendant's conduct.” 532 U. S., at 601. We held that such a
voluntary change, “although perhaps accomplishing what the
plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary
judicial imprimatur on the change” to trigger fee eligibility.
Id., at 605. In Sole, we considered whether a plaintiff who
obtains a preliminary injunction but is subsequently denied
a permanent one prevails for fee purposes under § 1988(b).
551 U. S., at 77. We explained that when a plaintiff 's “initial
victory” at the preliminary injunction stage is “superseded”
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Jackson, J., dissenting
by a nonfavorable fnal “ruling on the merits,” he does not
qua
lify as a “prevailing party,” because the relief he received
was not “enduring.” Id., at 84–86.
A preliminary injunction that mandates a judicially sanc-
tioned legal change in the parties' relationship and is never
reversed by a fnal ruling on the merits satisfes both Buck-
hannon and Sole. A court that issues interim injunctive re-
lief unquestionably gives its “judicial imprimatur” to the
change afforded, as Buckhannon requires. 532 U. S., at 605.
For its part, Sole stands merely for the proposition that a
party can be divested of “prevailing party” status if his “suc-
cess rested on a premise the District Court ultimately re-
jected.” 551 U. S., at 84–86. But Sole is inapposite when a
subsequent fnal decision does not thwart the judge-
sanctioned basis for the preliminary injunction. Indeed,
Sole expressly said so, by specifcally reserving the question
“whether, in the absence of a fnal decision on the merits of
a claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a
preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of
counsel fees,” id., at 86—the precise issue that is before the
Court today.
The majority thus overreads our precedents to support its
blanket rule that preliminary injunctions can never support
fee awards. Ante, at 202–204. With respect to Sole in par-
ticular, it is true that we characterized the preliminary injunc-
tion at issue there as “feeting ” and “tentative.” 551 U. S.,
at 83–84; see also ante, at 203 (contrasting interim relief with
relief that “last[s]”). But the Sole Court did not tie the re-
quirement for “enduring ” relief to the inherent permanence
of the relevant judicial order. Instead, we made crystal
clear that “[o]f controlling importance to our decision” was
the fact that “the eventual ruling on the merits for defend-
ants, after both sides considered the case ft for fnal adjudi-
cation, superseded the preliminary ruling.” 551 U. S., at 84–
85 (emphasis added); see also id., at 78 (observing that a
plaintiff does not prevail if “at the end of the litigation, her
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initial success is undone and she leaves the courthouse
emptyhanded”).
A
t the end of the day, Sole should be taken to mean only
what it expressly holds: Preliminary injunctive relief that is
subsequently superseded by a fnal judgment reversing the
ruling does not endure for fee-shifting purposes. Here, the
preliminary injunction provided actual relief to respondents
for more than 16 months, and there was no Sole-like sup-
planting of that preliminary relief by a subsequent court
order.
III
A
In addition to misinterpreting the text of § 1988(b) and
misconstruing our precedents, the majority ignores Con-
gress's clear intent to expand access to justice. It is puz-
zling, to say the least, that the majority seems to go out of
its way to adopt a rule that categorically prohibits fee shift-
ing while interpreting a statute that expressly authorizes
fee awards.
There is no dispute that Congress enacted § 1988(b) “for a
specifc purpose”: to respond to this Court's decision in Aly-
eska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S.
240 (1975), which had rejected the “former equitable practice
of awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in certain
civil rights cases.” Farrar, 506 U. S., at 118 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The Alyeska Court held that, absent statutory
authorization, courts should not depart from the “ `American
Rule,' ” under which litigants ordinarily bear their own at-
torney's fees. 421 U. S., at 247. Congress swiftly enacted
§ 1988(b) in Alyeska's wake to codify a civil rights exception
to the American Rule. The majority does not, and cannot,
dispute that Congress's intent was “to ensure `effective ac-
cess to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights
grievances.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983)
(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, p. 1 (1976)).
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Consistent with that “clear congressional intent,” this
Cour
t has previously recognized that fee awards should be
available to “partially prevailing civil rights plaintiffs. ”
Texas State Teachers Assn., 489 U. S., at 790. This principle
is, in fact, readily apparent from the statute's enactment his-
tory. See Buckhannon, 532 U. S., at 607. The history dem-
onstrates that the question of awarding fees for success
based on interim orders was not overlooked by the legisla-
ture; to the contrary, Congress specifcally “contemplated the
award of fees pendente lite,” at least where a party “has
established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of
his claims.” Hanrahan, 446 U. S., at 757 (citing S. Rep. No.
94–1011, p. 5 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94–1558, at 7–8).
The majority says that Congress merely wanted § 1988(b)
to authorize fee awards when “conclusive, enduring judicial
relief is meted out on an incremental basis.” Ante, at 206.
But that is not what the historical record establishes, and
Buckhannon fatly rejects this contention. There, we spe-
cifcally observed that, per § 1988(b)'s legislative history,
“ ` “prevailing party” is not intended to be limited to the vic-
tor only after entry of a fnal judgment following a full trial
on the merits.' ” 532 U. S., at 607 (quoting H. R. Rep. No.
94–1558, at 7); see also Hanrahan, 446 U. S., at 756–757.
The legislative history is likewise unequivocal that a prevail-
ing party for § 1988(b) purposes should “also include a liti-
gant who succeeds even if the case is concluded prior to a
full evidentiary hearing before a judge or jury.” H. R. Rep.
No. 94–1558, at 7.
B
Nor could a Congress that wished to authorize fee awards
for civil rights victories have intended the absurdities that
will result from the majority's categorical preclusion of pre-
liminary injunctive relief from § 1988(b). To state the obvi-
ous, the majority's bright-line rule lacks the nuance that is
needed to account for the various circumstances in which a
preliminary injunction may be “preliminary” in name only.
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One example is the plaintiff who requests a preliminary
i
njunction to achieve an interim result, given the timeframe
at issue. “When protesters seek an injunction to exercise
their First Amendment rights at a specifc time and place—
say to demonstrate at a Saturday parade—a preliminary in-
junction will give them all the court-ordered relief they need
and the end of the parade will moot the case.” McQueary
v. Conway, 614 F. 3d 591, 599 (CA6 2010). Thus, the Courts
of Appeals regularly hold that plaintiffs who successfully ob-
tain a preliminary injunction that permits them to engage in
the otherwise prohibited conduct “prevail” for fee-shifting
purposes. See, e. g., Young v. Chicago, 202 F. 3d 1000, 1000–
1001 (CA7 2000) (per curiam) (awarding fees to plaintiffs
who obtained a preliminary injunction to protest a political
convention even though the “suit became moot before a de-
fnitive determination of its merits” could be made).
In its r ush to carve prel i mi nary i n junc ti ons out of
§ 1988(b), the majority also overlooks situations in which
courts have, in fact, conclusively resolved the merits of a
plaintiff 's claims at the preliminary injunction stage. A
trial court might defnitively determine that a law is “ ` “fa-
cially unconstitutional” ' ” in the course of granting prelimi-
nary relief, for example. Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v.
Milgram, 650 F. 3d 223, 229–230, and n. 4 (CA3 2011) (en
banc) (quoting People Against Police Violence v. Pittsburgh,
520 F. 3d 226, 229 (CA3 2008)). But the majority nonethe-
less adopts a sweeping rule under which preliminary injunc-
tions can never be the basis for fee eligibility.
And to what end? The majority seeks to justify its broad
holding on the grounds that it discourages fee disputes and
thereby “serves the interests of judicial economy.” Ante,
at 204. But concerns about judicial administration cannot
supplant Congress's clear intent to promote access to justice
via fee shifting in civil rights cases.
What is more, it is actually the majority's categorical rule
that will promote wasteful litigation and incentivize litigants
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Jackson, J., dissenting
to manipulate fee liability. Under the majority's rule, a
plai
ntiff who has incurred substantial attorney's fees in order
to secure a preliminary injunction that provides all the relief
he needs will face a choice: He may either concede that the
litigation has run its course and pay his own fees, or he may
seek to litigate the case to fnal judgment in order to secure
a fee award. No one would blame a plaintiff with a strong
case for choosing the latter option. But such additional liti-
gation is an ineffcient waste of judicial resources if the plain-
tiff has already achieved his objective at an earlier part of
the case.
Worse still, the majority's rule appears to preference con-
servation of judicial resources over the maintenance of meri-
torious civil rights lawsuits, to the extent that excluding
preliminary injunctive relief from § 1988(b) facilitates the
strategic mooting of cases by defendants to avoid paying at-
torney's fees. This case illustrates precisely that problem.
After a robust evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued
a comprehensive opinion that preliminarily enjoined the
Commissioner from enforcing the challenged law against re-
spondents. Seeing the writing on the wall, the Commis-
sioner sought and obtained a stay of the case—over respond-
ents' objec ti ons—based on h is represent ati on that the
legislature was likely to repeal the challenged law. The
Commissioner then successfully lobbied the legislature to re-
peal the legislation, emphasizing that doing so would, in his
words, “result in [respondents'] pending litigation being dis-
missed, relieving the Department from continuing to incur
costly legal fees.” App. 409.
As the Fourth Circuit observed, precluding fee shifting
in this scenario is manifestly inequitable, because it leaves
respondents “holding the bag ” for considerable litigation fees
despite—and largely because of—their having succeeded in
obtaining preliminary relief. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 77 F. 4th
200, 210 (2023) (en banc). Ironically, it was the strength of
respondents' challenge as verifed by the court's preliminary
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order that prompted both the change in law and the Commis-
si
oner's robust effort to stiff the plaintiffs with respect to
attorney's fees. Moreover, it is hardly a revelation that law-
yers who would otherwise be willing to litigate meritorious
civil rights cases (i. e., matters in which interim relief is criti-
cal due to ongoing civil rights violations) will likely be dis-
couraged from taking on such representations if fee awards
can be so easily thwarted.
The majority dismisses concerns about strategic mooting
as both “ `entirely speculative' ” and likely to “arise in only a
small number of contexts.” Ante, at 204 (quoting Buckhan-
non, 532 U. S., at 608). But, as I have shown, the facts of
this very case belie the majority's nonchalance, particularly
in light of the Buckhannon experience. Research suggests
that the Court's rejection of the catalyst theory in that case
had the predictable practical effect of discouraging public in-
terest organizations and private attorneys from taking on
civil rights actions. C. Albiston & L. Nielsen, The Proce-
dural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buck-
hannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
1087, 1092 (2007); cf. n. 2, supra. Similarly, a multitude of
legal advocacy groups have fled amicus briefs in this case
to explain that losing the ability to recoup fees for securing
interim relief will jeopardize their missions. See, e. g., Brief
for Alliance Defending Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae 7–10;
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 28–30; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 17–18.
There is thus every reason to believe that the net result
of today's decision will be less civil rights enforcement in the
long run. Without irony, the majority reads a statute that
was “enacted to [e]nsure that private citizens have a mean-
ingful opportunity to vindicate their [civil] rights,” Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
478 U. S. 546, 559 (1986), as if Congress meant to make pri-
vate civil rights enforcement harder to achieve.
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Jackson, J., dissenting
***
The
majority holds that obtaining a preliminary injunction
never entitles a plaintiff to fees under § 1988(b). In doing
so, it overrules the decisions of every Court of Appeals to
consider the issue, relies on an atextual “conclusive judg-
ment” requirement, and ignores both our precedents and
Congress's intent.
It is quite true that Congress has demonstrated its ability
to fx our mistakes in this realm. Ante, at 205. But, in my
view, rather than relying on Congress to check our work, we
should give full effect to the plain text and remedial purpose
of § 1988(b) in the frst instance. This Court should have
held that, when a court hearing a civil rights lawsuit issues a
preliminary injunction that materially alters the relationship
between the parties and is never reversed, the requesting
party “prevails” for fee-shifting purposes and is thus eligible
for a fee award under § 1988(b).
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 217, line 13: “was” is changed to “is”