Glossip v. Oklahoma

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 226–304
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 25, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
226 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA
certiorari
to the court of criminal appeals of
oklahoma
No. 22–7466. Argued October 9, 2024—Decided February 25, 2025
In 1997, Justin Sneed beat Barry Van Treese to death with a baseball bat
at an Oklahoma hotel owned by Van Treese and managed by petitioner
Richard Glossip. Glossip initially made inconsistent statements to the
police about Sneed's role in the murder, but he ultimately told police
that Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese. Sneed later claimed Glossip
had asked him to murder Van Treese because, among other things,
Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip maintained
his innocence and refused a plea deal that would have had him avoid the
death penalty in return for testifying against Sneed. Sneed then testi-
fed against Glossip at trial in exchange for avoiding the death penalty,
and Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence connecting Glossip
to the murder. The jury convicted Glossip and sentenced him to death.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned that con-
viction because the defense had been ineffective in challenging Sneed's
testimony and the remainder of the evidence only weakly corroborated
Sneed's account. At the retrial, Sneed provided inconsistent testimony
on potential motives for Glossip's murder. Sneed also denied that he
had been prescribed lithium or seen a psychiatrist. After the defense
established (through the State's medical examiner) that Van Treese had
been attacked with a knife as well as a bat, Sneed testifed that he had
repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a pocket knife.
But Sneed had previously denied stabbing Van Treese both when ques-
tioned by the police as well as at Glossip's frst trial. Glossip moved for
a mistrial based on the prosecution's failure to notify the defense about
Sneed's change in testimony, which the trial court denied after the
prosecution disclaimed any knowledge about the change. Glossip was
again convicted and sentenced to death, and a closely divided OCCA
affrmed, holding that circumstantial evidence suggesting Glossip had
mismanaged the hotel, combined with Glossip's concession that he had
been dishonest in his initial statements after the murder, suffciently
corroborated Sneed's testimony that he killed Van Treese at Glossip's
direction.
Glossip subsequently fled several unsuccessful habeas petitions.
Concerns over the integrity of his conviction led a bipartisan group of

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
227
Syllabus
Oklahoma legislators to commission an independent investigation by a
law
frm, Reed Smith. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported “grave
doubt” about Glossip's conviction, citing factors such as the prosecution's
deliberate destruction of key evidence and the false portrayal of Justin
Sneed as a non-violent “puppet.” The State then disclosed seven boxes
of previously withheld documents, including letters suggesting Sneed
had considered recanting and a note from prosecutor Connie Smother-
mon to Sneed's lawyer noting they should “get to” Sneed to discuss his
problematic testimony about a knife found in Van Treese's room.
Glossip fled for post-conviction relief based on this evidence and evi-
dence revealed by Reed Smith. Glossip also argued that, during his
second trial, Smothermon had interfered with Sneed's testimony about
the knife in violation of the rule of sequestration, which prohibits wit-
nesses from hearing each other's testimony. Oklahoma waived any pro-
cedural defenses to Glossip's claims, and asked the OCCA to deny the
claims on their merits. The OCCA denied Glossip's claims as procedur-
ally barred and meritless.
The State then discovered additional documents revealing that Sneed
had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium, contra-
dicting his trial testimony. The attorney general determined that
Smothermon had knowingly elicited false testimony from Sneed and
failed to correct it, violating Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, which held
that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct false testi-
mony. Glossip fled a successive petition for post-conviction relief,
which the attorney general supported, conceding multiple errors that
warranted a new trial. The OCCA denied the unopposed petition with-
out a hearing, holding that Glossip's claims were procedurally barred
under Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), and further
that the State's concession was not “based in law or fact” because it did
not create a Napue error. This Court stayed Glossip's execution and
granted certiorari.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA's judgment. The
independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes the Court
from considering a federal question if the state court's decision rests on
an independent and adequate state-law ground. The OCCA's applica-
tion of the PCPA was not such a ground, because the OCCA's decision
to apply the PCPA depended on its antecedent rejection of the attorney
general's confession of a Napue error, which was based solely on federal
law. The OCCA held that the confession could not overcome the
PCPA's limitations because it lacked a basis in law or fact, specifcally
fnding no Napue error.

Page Proof Pending Publication
228 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Syllabus
Oklahoma precedent confrms that the OCCA normally rejects an at-
tor
ney general's confession of error only after fnding it unsupported by
law and the record. By making the application of the PCPA contingent
on its determination that the attorney general's confession of federal
constitutional error was baseless, the OCCA made the procedural bar
dependent on an antecedent ruling on federal law. To the extent that
the OCCA's reasoning on this point is insuffciently “clear from the face
of the opinion,” the Court presumes reliance on federal law under Mich-
igan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040–1041. Pp. 242–246.
2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct
false testimony. Pp. 246–258.
(a) Under Napue, a conviction obtained through the knowing use
of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that
the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false testimony to go
uncorrected. If a violation is established, a new trial is warranted if
the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the
jury's judgment; meaning, ordinarily, that the prosecution must estab-
lish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bagley,
473 U. S. 667, 680, n. 9; Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24. Here,
Oklahoma's attorney general joins Glossip in asserting a Napue error,
conceding that Sneed's testimony about his lithium prescription was
false and that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct it. The rec-
ord supports that confession of error. Evidence showed that Sneed was
prescribed lithium to treat bipolar disorder, not after asking for cold
medicine as he claimed at trial. The evidence likewise establishes that
the prosecution knew Sneed's testimony was false. The prosecution al-
most certainly had access to Sneed's medical fle through Sneed's compe-
tency evaluation. And Smothermon's notes show that she had a pre-
trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned “lithium” and “Dr.
Trumpet.” The straightforward inference is that Smothermon was
aware before trial that Sneed had received his lithium prescription from
Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist and the sole medical professional at the
Oklahoma County jail authorized to prescribe lithium.
Because Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence of Glossip's
guilt, the jury's assessment of Sneed's credibility was material and nec-
essarily determinative. Correcting Sneed's lie would have undermined
his credibility and revealed his willingness to lie under oath. The false
testimony also bore on Glossip's guilt because evidence of Sneed's bipo-
lar disorder, which could trigger impulsive violence when combined with
his drug use, would have contradicted the prosecution's portrayal of
Sneed as harmless without Glossip's infuence. Hence there is a reason-

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
229
Syllabus
able likelihood that correcting Sneed's testimony would have affected
the
judgment of the jury. Napue, 360 U. S., at 271. Additional prose-
cutorial misconduct, such as violating the rule of sequestration, destroy-
ing evidence, and withholding witness statements, further undermines
confdence in the verdict. Consequently, the prosecution's failure to
correct Sneed's false testimony entitles Glossip to a new trial under
Napue. Pp. 246–252.
(b) The OCCA's contrary holding rests on a mistaken interpretation
of Napue. The OCCA held that there was no violation because the
defense was aware or should have been aware that Sneed was taking
lithium. But Sneed's false testimony concerned the reasons for his pre-
scription, not merely the fact that he had taken lithium. Moreover, the
Due Process Clause imposes the duty to correct false testimony on the
State, not the defense. The OCCA's holding that Sneed was likely in de-
nial of his mental health disorders is beside the point; what matters is that
the testimony was false and the prosecutor knowingly allowed it to stand.
Additional arguments in support of the OCCA's position are unpersua-
sive. Napue does not require that the false testimony itself must have
directly affected the trial's outcome; Napue requires assessing whether
the prosecutor's failure to correct the testimony could have contributed
to the verdict. Also unpersuasive are arguments based on extra-record
materials and insuffcient time spent interviewing the prosecutor.
Because the attorney general's confession of error is supported by
ample evidence, the Court declines to remand this case for further evi-
dentiary proceedings. When the Court has jurisdiction, a new trial is
the appropriate remedy for a violation of Napue. Pp. 252–258.
529 P. 3d 218, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined, and in which
Barrett, J., joined as to Part II. Barrett, J., fled an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 258. Thomas, J., fled a dis-
senting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, and in which Barrett, J.,
joined as to Parts IV–A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3, post, p. 262. Gorsuch,
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Catherine M. A. Carroll, Zaki
Anwar, Donald R. Knight, Amy P. Knight, John R. Mills,
and Joseph J. Perkovich.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for respondent under
this Court's Rule 12.6. With him on the briefs were Gentner
F. Drummond, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Garry M.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
230 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Syllabus
Gaskins II, Solicitor General, Matthew D. Rowen, and Jo-
se
ph J. DeMott.
Christopher G. Michel, by invitation of the Court, 601 U. S.
1010, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were
Rachel G. Frank, Alex Van Dyke, and Nicholas J. Caluda.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the District of
Columbia et al. by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District
of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak,
Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor
General, and Elissa R. Lowenthal, Assistant Attorney General, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Philip J.
Weiser of Colorado, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown of Mary-
land, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota,
Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez
of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, and Ellen F. Rosenblum of
Oregon; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by William R.
Weaver, David D. Cole, Brian W. Stull, Randy Alan Bauman, and Megan
Lambert; for Former Members of the Oklahoma Death Penalty Review
Commission by Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and Jacqueline G.
Cooper; for the Innocence Project by Andrianna D. Kastanek; for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Barbara E. Berg-
man and Hassan Ahmad; for R. Michael Cassidy et al. by Meaghan
VerGow, Joshua Revesz, and Bruce A. Green; for Kenneth T. Cuccinelli
II, by Emmet T. Flood; and for Rep. Kevin McDugle et al. by Gregory
G. Garre.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Texas by Ken Paxton,
Attorney General, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General,
Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Philip A. Lionberger, Assistant
Solicitor General, and Matthew Ottoway and J. Andrew Mackenzie, Assist-
ant Attorneys General; for the State of Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes,
Attorney General of Utah, Stan ford E. Purser, Solicitor General, Andrew
F. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, and Ginger Jarvis and Mark C.
Field, Assistant Solicitors General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of
Arkansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Alan
Wilson of South Carolina, and Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee; for the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; for Current
and Former State and Federal Prosecutors by David A. Senior and Ann
K. Tria; for Federal Courts Scholars by Melanie L. Bostwick, Thomas M.

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
231
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
An
Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Richard Glossip of
paying Justin Sneed to murder Barry Van Treese and sen-
tenced him to death. At trial, Sneed admitted he beat Van
Treese to death, but testifed that Glossip had offered him
thousands of dollars to do so. Glossip confessed he helped
Sneed conceal his crime after the fact, but he denied any
involvement in the murder.
Nearly two decades later, the State disclosed eight boxes
of prev i ously w ithheld documents from Glossip's tr ia l.
These documents show that Sneed suffered from bipolar dis-
order, which, combined with his known drug use, could have
caused impulsive outbursts of violence. They also estab-
lished, the State agrees, that a jail psychiatrist prescribed
Sneed lithium to treat that condition, and that the prosecu-
tion allowed Sneed falsely to testify at trial that he had
never seen a psychiatrist. Faced with that evidence, Okla-
homa's attorney general confessed error. Before the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the State conceded
that the prosecution's failure to correct Sneed's testimony
violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), which held
that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct
false testimony. The attorney general accordingly asked
the court to grant Glossip a new trial. The OCCA declined
to grant relief because, it held, the State's concession was
not “based in law or fact.” 2023 OK CR 5, ¶25, 529 P. 3d
218, 226. Because the prosecution violated its obligations
under Napue, we reverse the judgment below and remand
the case for a new trial.
I
A
Barry Van Treese owned a Best Budget Inn in Tulsa and
in Oklahoma City. Richard Glossip managed the Oklahoma
Bondy, and Katherine M. Kopp; and for Derek Van Treese et al. by Paul
G. Cassell.
Page Proof Pending Publication

232 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
City hotel and lived there with his girlfriend. In the sum-
mer
of 1996, Justin Sneed and his stepbrother approached
Glossip and asked him about working for a room. 2 App.
648. Glossip agreed to let them stay in return for help with
maintenance and housekeeping. Sneed, however, had a his-
tory of violence, angry outbursts, and substance abuse that
included marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and acid.
Id., at 700–701. When, on January 6, 1997, Van Treese vis-
ited the inn to collect cash deposits there, Sneed beat him to
death with a baseball bat. See 2007 OK CR 12, ¶¶4–5, 157
P. 3d 143, 147–148 (Glossip II).
After killing Van Treese, Sneed evaded law enforcement
for several days. Police did promptly interview Glossip,
who told them that Sneed had knocked on his door that night
with a bump on his head “like somebody punched him.”
App. to Response to Petitioner's Succ. Application for Post-
Conviction Relief in No. PCD–2022–819, Tr. of Glossip Police
Interview 15 (Jan. 8, 1997). Glossip added that Sneed had
told him he slipped in the shower. Ibid. Glossip disclaimed
any knowledge of Van Treese's murder, but admitted that he
helped Sneed replace (from the outside) the broken window
of the room where Van Treese's body was later found. The
next day, offcers arrested Glossip in front of an attorney's
offce with approximately $1,700 in cash on him. 1 App. 291–
292. Glossip then admitted Sneed had told him “that he
killed Barry.” Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9,
1997). When confronted with his prior inconsistent state-
ments about the murder and Van Treese's whereabouts,
Glossip said that he had been scared to tell the truth because
he feared his failure to notify the police immediately meant
he was “already involved in it.” Id., at 29–30.
The State thereafter charged Sneed with capital murder
and Glossip as an accessory after the fact based on his inac-
curate statements to the police. Eventually, police located
and interviewed Sneed, who had $1,680 in bloody cash on
him. See 14 Tr. 18 (May 28, 2004); 15 Tr. 170 (June 1, 2004).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
233
Opinion of the Court
The offcers told Sneed that before he “ma[de] up [his] mind
on
anything ” they wanted him “to hear some of the things”
they “[had] to say,” including that they did not think Sneed
had acted alone and that he should not “take the whole
thing ” himself. 2 App. 645–646. “[E]verybody” was mak-
ing Sneed “the scapegoat in this,” they told him—especially
Glossip, who was “putting it on [him] the worst.” Id., at 655.
Sneed initially responded to the offcers' prompts by at-
tempting to implicate his brother, ibid., but eventually said
that Glossip had wanted to steal Van Treese's money and
that Van Treese's death had been the result of a robbery
gone wrong. Id., at 655–660. Sneed described breaking
into Van Treese's room and beating him with a baseball bat
until he “fgured he was knocked out.” Id., at 665. Accord-
ing to Sneed, he then took Van Treese's car keys, stole an
envelope with approximately $4,000 in cash from his car, and
split the money with Glossip. Id., at 665–669. When off-
cers pressed him on the state of Van Treese's body, Sneed
asserted that, “[a]ctually,” Glossip had asked him to kill Van
Treese so that he “could run the motel without him being
the boss.” Id., at 675.
Following Sneed's interview, Oklahoma charged Glossip,
too, with capital murder. The prosecution offered Glossip a
deal: plead guilty and avoid the death sentence in return for
testifying against Sneed. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
22–6500, p. 144a. When Glossip refused, maintaining his in-
nocence, the State offered Sneed the same deal, and Sneed
accepted. 2001 OK CR 21, ¶5, 29 P. 3d 597, 599 (Glossip I).
Sneed then testifed at Glossip's trial that he beat Van Treese
to death “because [Glossip] asked him to do it.” Ibid.
When asked whether there was any “particular reason why
[Glossip] wanted to kill [Van Treese]” that night, Sneed re-
plied, “Not that I know of. Every time that Mr. Van Treese
showed up, [Glossip] was wanting me to kill him.” 6 Tr. 89
(June 8, 1998). In closing, the prosecution argued that
Glossip had asked Sneed to kill Van Treese because he be-

234 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
lieved Van Treese planned to fre him for embezzling hotel
profts.
8 Tr. 14–15 (June 10, 1998). The jury convicted
Glossip and sentenced him to death.
The OCCA unanimously reversed. Sneed's testimony was
the only direct evidence connecting Glossip to the murder, it
held, and “[t]he evidence at trial tending to corroborate
Sneed's testimony was extremely weak.” Glossip I, 29
P. 3d, at 599. Defense counsel's failure to cross-examine
Sneed on his many inconsistent statements was therefore “so
ineffective” as to undermine any “confdence that a reliable
adversarial proceeding took place.” Ibid.
In 2004, after Glossip rejected another plea offer, 3 App.
720, the State tried him a second time. Several witnesses
confrmed what Glossip had told the police in his second in-
terview: In the hours following Van Treese's killing, Glossip
feigned ignorance and lied about Van Treese's whereabouts.
As in the frst trial, however, only one witness, Justin Sneed,
testifed that Glossip was involved in anything more.
1
This time, moreover, the defense established (through the
State's medical examiner) that Van Treese had been attacked
1
The dissent's narrative, which presents as historical fact the testimony
of the prosecution's witnesses at Glossip's second trial, relies heavily on
Sneed's testimony to suggest that Glossip directed the crime and an elabo-
rate coverup. See post, at 262–267 (opinion of Thomas, J.). To the ex-
tent the dissent relies on witnesses other than Sneed, their testimony con-
frms no more than what Glossip himself admitted to the police. As for
Sneed's testimony, the dissent constructs its favored narrative from among
his multiple inconsistent accounts of the murder. See supra, at 232–235;
compare post, at 264 (dissent asserting that “Sneed left [Van Treese's
room] when he thought that he had killed Van Treese”), with 2 App. 665
(Sneed telling police he left Van Treese's room when he thought Van
Treese was “knocked out”); compare post, at 264 (dissent asserting Glossip
told Sneed “they would both be evicted if Glossip lost his job”), with 2
App. 655–665 (Sneed telling police that Van Treese's death was the acci-
dental result of a robbery gone wrong), 6 Tr. 89 (June 8, 1998) (Sneed
testifying that he did not know why Glossip wanted him to kill Van
Treese), and 12 Tr. 75 (May 26, 2004) (Sneed testifying that Glossip had
wanted to rob Van Treese).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
235
Opinion of the Court
with a knife as well as with a baseball bat. 1 id., at 239–
245.
Although Sneed had denied stabbing Van Treese to the
police and at Glossip's frst trial, he now said that he had
repeatedly tried to stab Van Treese in the chest with a
pocket knife. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 148–149. Because
the prosecution had not notifed the defense about this
change in testimony, Glossip moved for a mistrial. 12 Tr.
105 (May 26, 2004). The trial court denied that motion after
the prosecution attested that the change was news to them,
too. Id., at 107–108 (“The chest thing we're all hearing at
the same time”).
The prosecution also asked Sneed whether anyone had
prescribed him any medication:
“Q. After you were arrested, were you placed on any
type of prescription medication?
“A. When I was arrested I asked for some Sudafed be-
cause I had a cold, but then shortly after that somehow
they ended up giving me Lithium for some reason, I don't
know why. I never seen no psychiatrist or anything.
“Q. So you don't know why they gave you that?
“A. No.” Id., at 64.
Sneed then confrmed that he used illegal drugs including
marijuana and “crank” (methamphetamine) “twice a week”
prior to his arrest. Id., at 64–65. Finally, Sneed testifed
about Glossip's purported motives for killing Van Treese.
He asserted that Glossip had suggested “robbing Barry of
his money,” id., at 75, that he had “told [Sneed] at one point
that with Mr. Van Treese out of the way . . . he would be
able not only [to] manage the motel on Council but also an-
other one they had [in Tulsa],” id., at 89, and that he had
worried he “was going to get fred” because “a couple of the
rooms that were already supposed to be remodeled . . .
weren't,” id., at 95.
The prosecution weaved these suggestions into its closing
argument along with its original theory that Glossip had
Page Proof Pending Publication

236 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
wanted Van Treese dead to avoid being fred for embezzle-
ment.
See 15 Tr. 65 (June 1, 2004) (arguing Glossip's motive
was “a big wad of around 4,000 bucks of American good Yan-
kee dollars to split with the kid”); id., at 153, 163 (arguing
Glossip was going to be fred because of “missing money”);
id., at 164–165 (arguing Glossip was going to be fred because
of the condition of the rooms). It then argued that Sneed,
“satisfed and contented with [his] humble life,” id., at 68,
had no propensity to violence except at Glossip's direction:
“[I]t's as if Justin Sneed was a Rottweiler puppy, let's
say 11 months old, and Richard Glossip was the dog
trainer. You can sure sick a dog on somebody, but if
you're going to do that and you send a dog that's not
trained or is a little bit too young, he might trip and fall,
he might get scared and run away, he might do some-
thing stupid, he might not do a good job. But no matter
how you slice it, no matter how you parse it, the person
that says `sick `em' is the person that makes the deci-
sion.” Id., at 73.
The jury again convicted Glossip of capital murder and
again sentenced him to death.
A closely divided OCCA affrmed, holding that circumstan-
tial evidence suggesting Glossip had mismanaged the hotel,
combined with the concession that Glossip had been dishon-
est in his initial statements after the murder, suffciently cor-
roborated Sneed's testimony that he killed Van Treese at
Glossip's direction. Glossip II, 157 P. 3d, at 151–153. In
dissent, Judge Chapel and Judge A. Johnson argued that the
majority “overstate[d] the strength of the accomplice corrob-
oration evidence.” Id., at 164–165, 175.
B
Glossip continued to maintain his innocence in the years
after his conviction, fling several habeas petitions in state
and federal court. Although that litigation did not result
in relief, mounting concerns over the integrity of Glossip's
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
237
Opinion of the Court
conviction drew the attention of the Oklahoma Legislature.
A
bipartisan group of 62 Oklahoma legislators retained a law
frm, Reed Smith, to conduct an independent investigation
into the case. Pet. for Cert. 12; App. to Pet. for Cert. 390a–
391a. In June 2022, Reed Smith reported its “grave doubt
as to the integrity of Glossip's murder conviction and death
sentence.” Independent Investigation of State v. Richard E.
Glossip 6 (June 7, 2022). Among other things, Reed Smith
concluded the prosecution had deliberately destroyed “key
physical evidence” before Glossip's retrial, including several
items from the crime scene and the inn's receipts and deposit
books, which could have helped Glossip address the accusa-
tions of embezzlement. Id., at 7, 9, n. 25, 34, 48. Reed
Smith further concluded that the State had “falsely por-
trayed Sneed at trial as a meek and non-violent `puppet,' ”
id., at 10, and that key testimony about Glossip's motive and
actions on the morning after the murder had been provided
by a former police offcer of “ `very limited honesty and in-
tegrity' ” who was jailed for making false statements shortly
after Glossip's second trial, id., at 6–12.
Two months after Reed Smith's report, the State disclosed
seven boxes of previously withheld documents from Glossip's
trials. Those boxes contained a note the head prosecutor,
Connie Smothermon, sent to Sneed's lawyer before Sneed
testifed at the second trial. Smothermon's note concerned
“a few items that have been testifed to that I needed to
discuss with Justin,” including the “biggest problem,” which
(the note said) was “still the knife.” 3 App. 953. The exam-
iners' testimony about the knife was problematic, Smother-
mon's note explained, because “Justin [told] the police that
the knife fell out of his pocket and that he didn't stab the
victim with it,” yet the victim had “ `lacerations' ” consistent
with the “knife blade.” Ibid. It did not “make much sense”
to Smothermon, moreover, “that Justin could have control of
the bat and a knife” on his own. Ibid. “[W]e should get to
him this afternoon,” the note concluded. Ibid.

238 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
The boxes further contained letters from Sneed to his at-
tor
ney suggesting he had expressed a desire to recant his
testimony prior to Glossip's second trial. See id., at 811–
816. For example, in a letter dated May 15, 2003, Sneed
wrote to his attorney asking “ `do I have the choice of recant-
ing my testimony at any time during my life,' ” and is “ `there
. . . anything you know, on [Glossip's] court date and about
re-canting.' ” Id., at 815 (emphasis deleted); App. to Pet. for
Cert. in Glossip v. Oklahoma, No. 22–6500, at 192a.
2
Based on this new evidence and the evidence revealed by
Reed Smith, Glossip fled another motion for post-conviction
relief with the OCCA. Among other things, Glossip argued
that, during his second trial, Smothermon had interfered
with Sneed's testimony about the knife in violation of the
rule of sequestration, which prohibits witnesses from hear-
ing each other's testimony. 3 App. 785–882. Oklahoma re-
sponded that Glossip's claims were meritless, but that it
would nonetheless waive any procedural defenses in order to
mitigate the damage from a “media campaign” on Glossip's
behalf. Id., at 717–718. Oklahoma further asked the OCCA
to deny Glossip's claims on their merits so as “to trigger the
state court deference anticipated in [the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act]” in any future federal review.
Id., at 718, n. 7. Noting that it alone would “determine
whether the rules of this Court should be abandoned,” the
OCCA held that Glossip's claims were procedurally barred
as well as meritless. Id., at 775–783.
2
The dissent claims Sneed thought the phrase “ `recan[t] my testimony' ”
meant “ `refuse to testify,' ” post, at 272, n. 2, meaning (on the dissent's
view) Sneed asked his lawyer: “If I [testify] again, do I have the choice of
[refusing to testify] at any time during my life?” The dissent further
points to an interview Sneed gave decades later, where (with Glossip's
execution imminent) he denied ever “ `want[ing] to change the truth.' ”
Post, at 271, n. 2. Of course, Sneed's much later denials do not erase his
prior statements about recanting.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
239
Opinion of the Court
Shortly thereafter, the State “unearthed disturbing reve-
lati
ons about the contents of ” an eighth box of trial docu-
ments “consisting of material it previously prevented the de-
fense from obtaining.” Brief for Respondent 10. “Buried
inside Box 8,” the State says, “was a page of notes handwrit-
ten by Smothermon during a pretrial interview with Sneed,”
indicating “that Sneed had told Smothermon that he was `on
lithium' not by mistake, but in connection with a `Dr. Trum-
pet.' ” Ibid. Oklahoma's attorney general “deduced the
import of these notes in short order”: Only a single psychia-
trist worked in the Oklahoma County jail when Sneed was
held there, and his name was Dr. Larry Trombka. Ibid.;
see also 3 App. 930. A summary of Sneed's medical records
(previously withheld from Glossip's counsel after motion
practice seeking their discovery) showed that Sneed had re-
ceived lithium to treat his undisclosed bipolar disorder.
Brief for Respondent 10; 3 App. 1005. After this discovery,
Dr. Trombka signed an affdavit attesting that he was the
only medical professional at the jail who would have pre-
scribed Sneed lithium. Id., at 1003.
The attorney general accordingly determined that Sneed
“was not in fact mis-prescribed lithium, but rather diagnosed
with bipolar disorder and treated with lithium under the care
of a psychiatrist”—and “despite her knowledge of these
facts,” Smothermon “elicited false testimony from Sneed” on
that subject. Brief for Respondent 11.
3
3
Also included in Box 8 were prosecutors' witness interview notes sug-
gesting the State may have omitted certain details from the summaries it
turned over to the defense. For example, one witness apparently told the
prosecution that Glossip had sold him a big screen TV and a couch for
$900, 3 App. 952—a sum that would account for much of the cash Glossip
had on his person at his arrest. That same witness testifed at trial that
he did not know how much money Glossip had received for those sales. 1
id., at 286. Glossip's girlfriend later explained in a post-trial affdavit that
Glossip had been selling their possessions to pay for an attorney. 2 id.,
at 706.
Page Proof Pending Publication

240 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
The attorney general thereafter disclosed Box 8 to Glossip
and
retained an independent counsel to conduct another re-
view of Glossip's conviction. As relevant here, the inde-
pendent counsel concluded that Smothermon's attempt to in-
terfere with Sneed's testimony about the knife violated the
rule of sequestration, that her failure to turn over Sneed's
statements about his mental health treatment violated
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and that her failure
to correct Sneed's false trial testimony that he had been
given lithium after asking for cold medicine violated Napue,
360 U. S. 264. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, 58a. His report
concluded:
“[T]he State must vacate Glossip's conviction due to its
decades-long failure to disclose what I believe is Brady
material, correct what I believe was false trial testi-
mony of its star witness, and what I believe was a viola-
tion of the Court ordered Rule of Sequestration of wit-
nesses. . . . In my view, this case is also permeated by
failures to secure, safeguard and maintain evidence in a
capital murder case.” Id., at 62a.
Following the Box 8 disclosure and the independent coun-
sel's recommendation, Glossip fled a successive petition for
post-convicti on relief w ith the OCCA asser ti ng Brady,
Napue, cumulative error, and actual innocence claims.
4
The
attorney general fled a “Response in Support of Petitioner's
Successive Application for Post-Conviction Relief.” 3 App.
973. Although the attorney general did not endorse Gloss-
ip's actual innocence claim, he represented that his offce had
“concluded that Justin Sneed . . . made material misstate-
ments to the jury regarding his psychiatric treatment and
4
The dissent faults Glossip for “ignor[ing] the lithium issue on direct
appeal” years earlier. Post, at 269. Glossip had no reason to know at
the time of his direct appeal that Smothermon knowingly failed to correct
Sneed's false testimony about why he had been given lithium, however, so
he would have had no occasion to raise his Napue or Brady claims then.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
241
Opinion of the Court
the reasons for his lithium prescription,” which the State
had
failed to correct in violation of Napue. 3 App. 974. In
addition, the State indicated it was “concerned that there
were multiple and cumulative errors, such as violation of the
rule of sequestration and destruction of evidence, that when
taken together with Sneed's misstatements warrant” a new
trial. Ibid.; see also id., at 977 (“[T]he State believes
Glossip is entitled to post-conviction relief ”); id., at 978
(State is “compelled, consistent with Napue,” to correct mis-
statements); id., at 979 (“[T]he State requests that the Court
vacate Glossip's conviction and that the case be remanded to
the district court”). Because Oklahoma agreed with Glossip
on the pertinent facts, it did not request an evidentiary
hearing.
The OCCA denied Glossip's unopposed petition without a
hearing. It acknowledged the attorney general's request
that Glossip's conviction be vacated, noting that this conces-
sion alone could not “directly” provide a ground for relief.
529 P. 3d, at 223. The court said the following about the
State's confession of Napue error:
“Glossip claims that the State failed to disclose evidence
of Justin Sneed's mental health treatment and that
Sneed lied about his mental health treatment to the jury.
Though the State in its response now concedes that this
alleged false testimony combined with other unspecifed
cumulative errors warrant postconviction relief, the con-
cession alone cannot overcome the limitations on succes-
sive post-conviction review. See 22 O.S. Supp. 2022,
§ 1089(D)(8). The State's concession is not based in law
or fact.” 529 P. 3d, at 226 (footnote omitted).
The OCCA then applied Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Proce-
dures Act (PCPA) to hold that Glossip's claims were proce-
durally barred. It concluded separately that the evidence
presented by the parties did not “create a Napue error.”
Ibid. (footnote omitted).

242 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
This Court thereafter stayed Glossip's execution at the
joi
nt request of the parties and granted certiorari to consider
Glossip's Brady and Napue claims and the effect of the attor-
ney general's confession of error.
5
601 U. S. 999 (2024).
The Court also requested argument on an additional ques-
tion: whether the OCCA's holding that the PCPA precluded
post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-
law ground for the judgment.
Because Oklahoma agrees with Glossip on the merits of
his appeal, the Court appointed Christopher Michel as ami-
cus curiae to defend the judgment below. 601 U. S. 1010
(2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
II
A
We begin with this Court's jurisdiction to review the
OCCA's judgment. “ `This Court will not take up a question
of federal law presented in a case “if the decision of [the
state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent
of the federal question and adequate to support the judg-
ment.” ' ” Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U. S. 17, 25 (2023) (quoting
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 375 (2002)). “In the context of
direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and
adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional.” Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991). A state ground of
decision is independent only when it does not depend on a
federal holding, Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. 488, 498 (2016),
and also is not intertwined with questions of federal law,
M i ch i gan v. L o ng, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040 –1041 (1983).
“[W]hen the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state
5
Because the Court grants relief under Napue, the Court need not reach
the merits of Glossip's Brady claim.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
243
Opinion of the Court
court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federa
l law required it to do so.” Ibid.
Amicus argues this Court lacks jurisdiction because the
OCCA held that Glossip's claims were barred under the
PCPA, and the PCPA is “a paradigmatic independent and
adequate state-law ground.” Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae 13. That argument fails because it over-
looks an antecedent holding that turned on federal law. The
OCCA frst rejected the attorney general's confession of
Napue error, deeming it meritless and therefore incapable of
“overcom[ing]” application of the PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226.
Only then did it apply the PCPA to Glossip. Because the
OCCA's decision to reject the attorney general's confession
of error rested exclusively on federal law, so too did its sub-
sequent decision to apply the PCPA.
In his brief to the OCCA, the attorney general disclaimed
reliance on any procedural defenses, including the PCPA.
Instead, the attor ney genera l “concede[d] error under
Napue,” 3 App. 978, acknowledging that, as a matter of fed-
eral law, the prosecution's knowing failure to correct Sneed's
“material misstatements” entitled Glossip to a new trial.
Id., at 977, 978, 979. The OCCA held that this confession of
Napue error could not “overcome the [PCPA's] limitations on
successive post-conviction review” because it was “not based
in law or fact.” 529 P. 3d, at 226. Specifcally, the OCCA
concluded that the underlying evidence “d[id] not create a
Napue error.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). Thus, the OCCA's
application of the PCPA over the attorney general's confes-
sion of error depended on its determination that no Napue
violation had occurred. That was a federal holding, and it
was the only reason the OCCA provided for its conclusion
that the attorney general's confession could not “overcome”
the PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226. The PCPA therefore poses
no impediment to our review in this case.
Oklahoma precedent involving confessions of error by an
attorney general confrms this reading. As the OCCA has
Page Proof Pending Publication

244 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
repeatedly explained, it will normally reject an attorney
genera
l's confession of error only after fnding that it lacks a
basis in the law and in the record. See, e. g., Bindrum v.
State, 27 Okla. Crim. 372, 228 P. 168 (1924) (“Where the At-
torney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine the
record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well
founded in law, the conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by
the court)).
6
Otherwise, if the confession of error is sup-
ported by the law and the record, the OCCA will reverse
the underlying conviction and remand for a new trial.
7
Ibid.
The OCCA applied that same rule here: It rejected the attor-
ney general's confession of error as having no basis “in law
or fact,” and explained that it would therefore apply the
PCPA. 529 P. 3d, at 226.
In doing so, the OCCA “made application of the procedural
bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is,
on the determination of whether federal constitutional error
ha[d] been committed.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75
(1985). After all, it made application of the PCPA contin-
6
See also Raymer v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 398, 228 P. 500 (1924) (“Where
the Attorney General confesses error, th[e] court will examine the record,
and, if the confession is sustained thereby and is well founded in law, the
conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Dorsett v. State, 16
Okla. Crim. 65, 69, 180 P. 557, 558 (1919) (reversing conviction because
“the confession of error [of the attorney general] is well founded” in law);
Whittemore v. State, 26 Okla. Crim. 338, 223 P. 890 (1924) (per curiam)
(same); Day v. State, 352 P. 2d 935 (OCCA 1960) (“Where the Attorney
General confesses error, Court of Criminal Appeals will examine the rec-
ord, and, if confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in law,
conviction will be reversed” (syllabus by the court)); Casey v. State, 440
P. 2d 208, 209 (OCCA 1968) (“When the Attorney General confesses error,
this Court will carefully examine the record for fundamental error”); Mc-
Connell v. State, 485 P. 2d 764, 765 (OCCA 1971) (similar); One Ford Tour-
ing Car v. State, 100 Okla. 267, 268, 229 P. 231, 232 (1924) (establishing
identical rule in civil forfeiture context).
7
The PCPA would not stand in the way of a reversal under this rule
because it is not a jurisdictional bar. See Valdez v. State, 2002 OK CR
20, ¶¶24–28, 46 P. 3d 703, 710.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
245
Opinion of the Court
gent on its determination that the attorney general's confes-
si
on of federal constitutional error had no basis in law or
fact. To the extent that the OCCA's reasoning on this point
is insuffciently “clear from the face of the opinion,” we none-
theless presume reliance on federal law under Michigan v.
Long, 463 U. S., at 1040–1041. This Court therefore has ju-
risdiction to review the judgment below.
B
The dissent dismisses all this as an “invent[ed] . . . federal
holding that the OCCA never made.” Post, at 279. As the
dissent sees it, the OCCA rejected the attorney general's
confession of error because (the dissent says) the State failed
adequately to address all of the PCPA's procedural require-
ments. See post, at 280. The OCCA plainly held that the
attorney general's confession was “not based in law or fact,”
529 P. 3d, at 226, however, forcing the dissent to provide
an awkward explanation that this holding about a federal
confession of error on the merits was only about the PCPA's
state-law, procedural requirements. Post, at 280. Yet the
State expressly attempted to waive those procedural re-
quirements by arguing that Glossip was entitled to a new
trial. 3 App. 979 (“[T]he State requests that the Court va-
cate Glossip's conviction and that the case be remanded to
the district court”). So to explain away the “based in law
or fact” language, the dissent must proceed on the assump-
tion that Oklahoma law requires applicants to satisfy the
PCPA's nonjurisdictional provisions even when the State
waives them and even if the State's confession of constitu-
tional error is otherwise meritorious—notwithstanding the
many other contexts where the OCCA privileges meritorious
confessions of error. See n. 6, supra (collecting cases); App.
to Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers as Amicus Curiae 1a–21a (cataloging the OCCA's deci-
sions in the 298 confession-of-error cases predating Glossip's,
all of which resulted in relief ).
Page Proof Pending Publication

246 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
That assumption is hardly “clear from the face of the opin-
i
on” below. Long, 463 U. S., at 1041. Thus, we must “ac-
cept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court
decided the case the way it did because it believed that fed-
eral law required it to do so.” Ibid.
III
A
Turning to the merits, we conclude that the prosecution
v i olated its constituti ona l obl igati on to correc t fa lse
testimony.
In Napue v. Illinois, this Court held that a conviction
knowingly “obtained through use of false evidence” violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 360
U. S., at 269. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant
must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false tes-
timony or knowingly allowed it “to go uncorrected when it
appear[ed].” Ibid. If the defendant makes that showing, a
new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony “may
have had an effect on the outcome of the trial,” id., at 272—
that is, if it “ `in any reasonable likelihood [could] have af-
fected the judgment of the jury,' ” Giglio v. United States,
405 U. S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U. S., at 271).
In effect, this materiality standard requires “ ` “the benef-
ciary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.” ' ” United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S.
667, 680, n. 9 (1985) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386
U. S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Here, Oklahoma's attorney general joins Glossip in assert-
ing a Napue error, conceding both that Sneed's testimony
was false and that the prosecution knowingly failed to cor-
rect it. The record supports that confession of error. A
summary of Sneed's medical records created by the local
sheriff 's department establishes that someone diagnosed
Sneed with bipolar disorder and prescribed him lithium. 3
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
247
Opinion of the Court
App. 1005. Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist, attested in a sworn
affdav
it that he was the only medical professional at the
Oklahoma County jail who would have issued Sneed that pre-
scription. Id., at 930–931. Dr. Trombka also confrmed,
and nobody contests, that lithium is used only in psychiatric
treatments and not for dental pain (as Sneed said at a pre-
trial hearing) or a cold (as Sneed testifed at Glossip's trial).
Ibid. Nor would anyone confuse lithium with Sudafed,
which is a cold medication. Ibid. Sneed's trial testimony
that he had been given lithium after asking for Sudafed and
had “never seen no psychiatrist or anything ” was therefore
false.
The evidence likewise establishes that the prosecution
knew Sneed's statements were false as he testifed to them.
The prosecution almost certainly had access to Sneed's medi-
cal fle, which would have listed both the lithium prescription
and the bipolar diagnosis. Among other things, those rec-
ords would have been provided to the State as part of
Sneed's competency evaluation, id., at 931, and the State op-
posed Glossip's discovery request of Sneed's medical fles on
its merits, 2 id., at 622–623; 3 id., at 933. As amicus and
the dissent emphasize, moreover, “[l]ithium is prescribed
only for mood disorders.” Brief for Court-Appointed Ami-
cus Curiae 14; post, at 268 (“It is undisputed that lithium's
sole medical purpose, both in 1997 and today, is to treat bipo-
lar disorder and other mental health disorders”). Yet the
prosecution knew that Sneed had previously told a compe-
tency evaluator that he had been prescribed lithium “after
his tooth was pulled,” 2 App. 700; that statement was part
of a competency record to which both the State and Glossip
had access, id., at 698–703. Prosecutors then heard Sneed
testify to a different version of events at trial: that the lith-
ium had been given to him after he asked for Sudafed be-
cause he had a cold. 1 id., at 312.
In addition, Smothermon's notes show that she had a pre-
trial conversation with Sneed at which he mentioned “lith-

248 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
ium” and “Dr. Trumpet.” 3 id., at 927. Glossip argues, and
the
attorney general admits, that this shows Sneed told
Smothermon that Dr. Trumpet (meaning Dr. Trombka) had
prescribed him lithium. As just discussed, the record shows
that, in fact, Dr. Trombka did diagnose Sneed with bipolar
disorder and prescribe him lithium. Sneed plainly discussed
these matters with the prosecution. In that private conver-
sation, he would have had little to gain from prevaricating
about his prescriptions, nor do the notes suggest he did any-
thing of the kind. The straightforward inference is that
Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trombka had prescribed
him the lithium.
8
That leaves materiality. Evidence can be material even if
it “goes only to the credibility of the witness,” Napue, 360
U. S., at 269; indeed, “[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence,” ibid. Because Sneed's testimony was
the only direct evidence of Glossip's guilt of capital murder,
the jury's assessment of Sneed's credibility was necessarily
determinative here. Besides Sneed, no other witness and
no physical evidence established that Glossip orchestrated
Van Treese's murder. Thus, the jury could convict Glossip
only if it believed Sneed.
Had the prosecution corrected Sneed on the stand, his
credibility plainly would have suffered. That correction
would have revealed to the jury not just that Sneed was
untrustworthy (as amicus points out, the jury already knew
he repeatedly lied to the police), but also that Sneed was
8
The dissent claims Sneed instead repeated his prior false statement
that he had been given the lithium after having his tooth pulled. See
post, at 273, 274, n. 3, 286, n. 6, 302–303. Yet the dissent's only source for
this theory, Smothermon's co-counsel Gary Ackley, acknowledged under
oath that he knew lithium was not a pain medication, 3 App. 940, meaning
he would have known this story, too, to be wrong. In any event, even if
the prosecution did believe Sneed had been given lithium for a toothache,
that still would have put them on notice that Sneed's testimony at trial
(about receiving lithium after asking for cold medication) was false.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
249
Opinion of the Court
willing to lie to them under oath. Such a revelation would
be
signifcant in any case, and was especially so here where
Sneed was already “nobody's idea of a strong witness.”
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 37. Even if
Sneed's bipolar disorder were wholly irrelevant, as amicus
argues, his willingness to lie about it to the jury was not.
“ `A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject.' ” Napue, 360
U. S., at 269–270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d 554,
557, 136 N. E. 2d 853, 854–855 (1956)).
Sneed's false testimony also bore on Glossip's guilt in a
more direct way. As Smothermon's co-counsel Gary Ackley
has conceded, it “would have been an important fact for the
defense to know” that Sneed had been prescribed lithium to
treat bipolar disorder. 3 App. 940. After the Box 8 disclo-
sures, Dr. Trombka explained to Glossip's counsel that bipo-
lar disorder symptoms “can be exacerbated by illicit drug
use, such as methamphetamine,” to “cause an individual to be
more paranoid or potentially violent.” Id., at 932. Sneed
admitted at trial that he regularly used drugs, including
methamphetamine. His diagnosis with a disorder that could
trigger impulsive violence when combined with drug use
thus would have undermined the prosecution's theory that
Sneed was harmless on his own—a Rottweiler puppy be-
holden to his trainer. 15 Tr. 73 (June 1, 2004). That theory
was an important part of the prosecution's case and featured
prominently in its opening and closing statements. See, e.g.,
3 Tr. 209 (May 13, 2004) (arguing in opening that Sneed was
“pretty content . . . to do whatever it is that Richard Glossip
wanted him to do”); 15 Tr. 69–74 (June 1, 2004) (emphasizing
in closing that Sneed would have never committed murder
without Glossip). Hence there is a reasonable likelihood
that correcting Sneed's testimony would have affected the
judgment of the jury. Napue, 360 U. S., at 271.
Amicus objects that “the jury already knew that Sneed
had been prescribed lithium, used illegal drugs, and behaved
impulsively; he admitted that he beat a man to death with a
Page Proof Pending Publication

250 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
baseball bat in the middle of the night with no advanced
planni
ng.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 36.
As amicus sees it, the additional evidence provided by
Sneed's lie and his treatment for bipolar disorder could
hardly have made a difference in light of so much other im-
peaching evidence. Id., at 36–37. Of course, at trial, the
prosecution urged the jury to believe just the opposite: that
despite his prior dishonesty and violence, Sneed was now
telling the truth. See, e. g., 15 Tr. 153–155 (June 1, 2004).
A prosecutor's midtrial revelation that Sneed lied on the
stand would have signifcantly undercut that argument.
In any event, amicus's position is self-defeating. If the
evidence impeaching Sneed's credibility was already over-
whelming, then no reasonable jury could have convicted
Glossip in the frst place, given that the prosecution's case
rested centrally on Sneed's credibility. Amicus appears to
assume the jury would have believed Sneed no matter what.
Such an assumption has no place in a materiality analysis,
which asks what a reasonable decisionmaker would have
done with the new evidence. See Wearry v. Cain, 577 U. S.
385, 393–394 (2016) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that
evidence was immaterial because witness's credibility was
“already impugned”); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
668, 695 (1984).
Although the prosecution's failure to correct Sneed's false
testimony was a material Napue violation on its own, addi-
tional conduct by the prosecution further undermines conf-
dence in the verdict. The attorney general has confessed
to “ `violation of the rule of sequestration' ” with respect to
Smothermon's apparent midtrial attempt to speak with
Sneed about the knife, as well as to “ `destruction of evi-
dence,' ” including the hotel's fnancial records and items
Glossip and Sneed allegedly handled in Van Treese's room.
See Brief for Respondent 13; 3 App. 935 (prosecutor Ackley
attesting under oath that “I was informed that a box of evi-
dence containing 10 items was destroyed by the Oklahoma
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
251
Opinion of the Court
City Police Department. . . . It is likely that I was aware of
that
fact during the 2004 retrial . . . . That this happened
horrifes me”); Independent Investigation of State v. Richard
E. Glossip, at 7, 12–13, 41–43 (cataloging destroyed items).
In addition, the eight boxes of documents released to Glossip
included statements from Sneed evincing a desire to recant
his testimony and witness notes with details not previously
turned over to the defense. For example, the fles suggest
one witness told the prosecution (contrary to his trial testi-
mony) that Glossip sold him a couch and a TV for $900. 3
App. 952. That evidence would have supported Glossip's ac-
count of the cash he carried at his arrest outside an attor-
ney's offce: that he had sold his possessions to pay for an
attorney. See 2 id., at 706. Because prejudice analysis re-
quires a “cumulative evaluation” of all the evidence, whether
or not that evidence is before the Court in the form of an
independent claim for relief, these documents reinforce our
conclusion that the Napue error here prejudiced the defense.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 441 (1995).
9
9
The dissent's attempts to minimize these issues are unpersuasive.
Sneed's letter inquiring about “ `the choice of recanting my testimony,' ” 3
App. 815, disproves the dissent's assertion that “there is no evidence that
Sneed wished to `recant' his testimony.” Post, at 293. That Glossip re-
called receiving only $490 for his possessions during his frst trial does
not absolve the prosecution from its ordinary duty to disclose inconsistent
statements by its witnesses. Contra, ibid. The State's conceded seques-
tration violation also is not merely an insignifcant state-law issue, post,
at 292; like any other attorney, a prosecutor may not seek to infuence the
content of a witness's testimony. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425
U. S. 80, 90, n. 3 (1976) (“An attorney must respect the important ethical
distinction between discussing testimony and seeking improperly to in-
fuence it”). The dissent labors to discredit certain “handwritten notes”
on which neither Glossip nor this Court relies, see post, at 293, n. 8, but
Smothermon undisputedly wrote to Sneed's counsel that she needed to
“get to” him “to discuss” his problematic testimony about the knife. 3
App. 953. The next day, Sneed's testimony corrected the very problem
raised by Smothermon's letter. Smothermon nonetheless disclaimed any
knowledge of Sneed's change in testimony when Glossip objected. 12 Tr.
Page Proof Pending Publication

252 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
For these reasons, we conclude that the prosecution's fail-
ure
to correct Sneed's trial testimony violated the Due Proc-
ess Clause. Glossip is entitled to a new trial.
B
The OCCA's contrary holding rested on a mistaken inter-
pretation of Napue. According to the OCCA, there was no
violation because the defense “was aware or should have
been aware that Sneed was taking lithium at the time of
trial,” and the prosecution could not have “knowingly con-
cealed” something the defense already knew. 529 P. 3d, at
226. As an initial matter, Sneed's false testimony concerned
the reasons for his lithium prescription, not the mere fact
that he had taken it. Glossip's counsel was aware of the
latter, not of the former. In any event, the Due Process
Clause imposes “ `the responsibility and duty to correct' ”
false testimony on “representatives of the State,” not on de-
fense counsel. Napue, 360 U. S., at 269–270 (quoting Sav-
vides, 1 N. Y. 2d, at 557, 136 N. E., at 854).
The OCCA also held that Sneed's testimony was not
“clearly false” because Sneed was “more than likely in denial
of his mental health disorders.” 529 P. 3d, at 226, 227. It
is not apparent why the OCCA thought Sneed was in denial,
nor why such denial should have caused Sneed to believe
that he had never seen a psychiatrist, when in fact he had.
Even supposing it did, however, Sneed's beliefs are beside
the point. What matters is that his testimony was false and
a prosecutor knowingly let it stand nonetheless. Napue, 360
U. S., at 269 (“[I]t is established that a conviction obtained
through use of false evidence, known to be such by repre-
sentatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
107–108 (May 26, 2004). Finally, not even the original prosecutors dispute
that the police destroyed key evidence before Glossip's retrial; the dissent
nonetheless dismisses that claim, undisputed for over two decades, as this
Court's “own creation.” Post, at 292–293.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
253
Opinion of the Court
The dissent's arguments in support of the OCCA's conclu-
si
ons fare no better. As an initial matter, even the dissent
does not dispute that Sneed falsely testifed he had never
seen a psychiatrist. See post, at 290 (suggesting Sneed
“misremembered” that a psychiatrist prescribed him lithium
to treat bipolar disorder). The dissent does maintain that
other aspects of Sneed's statement were true, noting that
because Sneed was in denial about his diagnosis, his “state-
ment about his own knowledge was not false.” Post, at 291.
Sneed's statement that he asked for “Sudafed” to treat “a
cold” and was given lithium instead, 12 Tr. 64 (May 26, 2004),
was not, however, a statement “about his own knowledge.”
Even if Sneed himself did not believe that he suffered from
bipolar disorder, moreover, that would not render true his
assertion that he had no idea why his doctor thought he
needed lithium.
The dissent next claims that the false testimony must itself
have directly affected the trial's outcome to be material
under Napue. Post, at 288 (“[T]he relevant inquiry under
Napue is whether the content of the false testimony at issue
is material”). As Napue made clear, however, “ `[a] lie is a
lie, no matter what its subject.' ” 360 U. S., at 269–270
(quoting Savvides, 1 N. Y. 2d, at 557, 136 N. E. 2d, at 854–
855). Nothing in Napue requires ignoring the fact of
Sneed's perjury in the prejudice analysis. To the contrary,
materiality instead always requires courts to assess whether
“the error complained of ” could have contributed to the ver-
dict. Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24; Bagley, 473 U. S., at 680,
n. 9. Here, the prosecutor's failure to correct Sneed's false
testimony is the relevant error, so the Court asks whether a
correction could have made a material difference. The an-
swer is clearly yes. See supra, at 247–252.
10
10
The dissent also argues Sneed's lithium use was immaterial because
“the defense chose not to turn” it “into an impeachment issue,” post, at 288,
but each premise in that argument is mistaken. First, the defense did not
choose “not to raise Sneed's mental condition,” post, at 287; they asked him
Page Proof Pending Publication

254 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
The remaining arguments offered in defense of the OCCA's
positi
on are likewise unpersuasive. In an amicus brief, the
Van Treese family argues that it was Glossip's counsel who
asked Sneed about his lithium prescription, and that Smoth-
ermon's notes reveal only that Sneed relayed those questions
to Smothermon. See Brief for Victim Family Members as
Amici Curiae 7–22. That argument relies heavily on extra-
record materials not properly before the Court, including a
recent unsworn statement from Smothermon adopting the
family's interpretation of the notes. (The dissent, which
criticizes the independent counsel for “impugning ” the trial
prosecutors' reputation, post, at 276, justifes its reliance on
these materials by accusing the Oklahoma attorney general
of “collusively exclud[ing]” them from the record, see post,
at 303.) Nor would accepting the family's account change
the Napue analysis. Whatever the impetus for the conver-
sation, the family agrees that Sneed and Smothermon dis-
cussed Dr. Trombka and lithium. The natural inference is
that Sneed explained to Smothermon the circumstances that
led to his lithium use. To avoid that inference, the family in
turn suggests both that Sneed was never diagnosed with bi-
polar disorder in the frst place, Brief for Victim Family
Members as Amici Curiae 17, and that Glossip's counsel
“knew about [Dr. Trombka] more than two decades ago,” id.,
at 21. Yet for the reasons previously explained, defense
counsel's purported knowledge of Dr. Trombka's existence is
irrelevant, and the prison medical record supports the attor-
about it in cross-examination and Sneed repeated his false testimony. See
13 Tr. 15 (May 27, 2004). Second, the defense did not know during trial
that Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder; to the contrary,
Glossip later sought (and the State successfully opposed) discovery on that
issue. 2 App. 621–622. Third, even if the defense had made a conscious
choice not to raise the (then-uncertain) reasons for Sneed's lithium use,
that would be irrelevant to the prosecution's duty to correct false testi-
mony “when it appears.” Napue, 360 U. S., at 269.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
255
Opinion of the Court
ney general's concession that Sneed received a lithium pre-
scr
iption as treatment for his bipolar disorder.
The family also maintains (and the dissent agrees) that
Reed Smith and the independent counsel spent insuffcient
time interviewing Smothermon. Neither the family nor
Smothermon raised that objection before the OCCA, nor
does anyone now explain its relevance to the Napue analy-
sis. The argument is also unpersuasive on its own terms.
Both investigators spoke to Smothermon. When they did,
Smothermon did not provide the account she now endorses:
that Sneed relayed to her a conversation with Glossip's coun-
sel about Dr. Trombka and lithium. Instead, during a third
interview, Smothermon asked the independent counsel “why
he thought it was Dr Trombka and not Dr Trumpet the jazz
musician and I was making a personal note or something
else.” App. to Brief for Victim Family Members as Amici
Curiae 31a. There is no compelling evidence that a fourth
or ffth consultation with Smothermon would have yielded
materially different results.
The Court-appointed amicus, for his part, largely aban-
dons the OCCA's reasoning and focuses instead on ambigu-
ities in Smothermon's notes. Amicus maintains that too
many inferential steps separate those notes from the conclu-
sion that Sneed lied on the stand and that Smothermon knew
it. For example, amicus argues that “the parties do not ex-
plain the basis for their asserted link between `Dr. Trumpet?'
and Trombka,” reiterating Smothermon's earlier statements
that she “ `is not convinced that Dr. Trombka and “Dr. Trum-
pet” are the same person.' ” Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae 32. As already explained, however, there is
ample evidence in the record before this Court supporting
the inference that Smothermon knew about Sneed's psychiat-
ric treatment and lithium prescription, including the prison
medical record, Dr. Trombka's attestations, and Smother-
mon's own notes.
Page Proof Pending Publication

256 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of the Court
Because ample evidence supports the attorney general's
confessi
on of error in this Court, there also is no need to
remand for further evidentiary proceedings at the OCCA.
Indeed, that such proceedings are not necessary is the one
point on which Glossip, Oklahoma, amicus, and the OCCA
unanimously agree. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 108 (amicus con-
ceding that “I guess we all agree that [an evidentiary hear-
ing is] not . . . that it's not necessary”). The partial concur-
rence suggests this Court should nonetheless remand for
further proceedings on the ground that the evidence does not
remove all doubt that the attorney general's view of the rec-
ord is correct. Post, at 262 (Barrett, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Yet for the reasons already ex-
plained, the record establishes a violation of Napue. See
supra, at 246–252. This Court has not required an eviden-
tiary record free of doubt to fnd a Napue violation in any
case, much less when an attorney general confesses that his
own offce erroneously obtained a capital conviction.
11
C
Finally, the dissent maintains this Court lacks the author-
ity to remand for a new trial, but its analysis proves the
contrary. The dissent emphasizes that “ `[o]ur only power
over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.' ” Post, at 294 (quot-
ing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125–126 (1945)). It further
11
The dissent would order a hearing to provide “the Van Treese family
[with] the opportunity to present its case.” Post, at 303 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). The family has not requested an evidentiary hearing (or
participation in one) at any stage before the OCCA and does not request
that relief before this Court. Nor has the OCCA ever extended Oklaho-
ma victims' right to participate in criminal proceedings to state post-
conviction hearings. Cf. post, at 303–304. The request to do so here is
the dissent's alone. In any event, this Court does not “cast aside the
family's interests,” on procedural or any other grounds. Post, at 304.
For the reasons already explained, considering the evidence submitted by
the family would not change the outcome. See supra, at 255.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
257
Opinion of the Court
agrees that, where a state court relies on a procedural rule
whose
application turns on “whether federal constitutional
error has been committed,” Ake, 470 U. S., at 75, this Court
may remand for a new trial if it “ha[s] confdence that no
other state ground could support the decision below,” post,
at 300. Those principles describe this case.
As explained above, the OCCA “incorrectly adjudge[d]”
Glossip's “federal rights.” Herb, 324 U. S., at 126. In doing
so, it relied on a procedural rule whose application turned on
the merits of a federal claim: “ `Where the Attorney General
confesses error, [the OCCA] will examine the record, and, if
the confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in
law, the conviction will be reversed.' ” See supra, at 244
(quoting Bindrum, 27 Okla. Crim., at 372, 228 P., at 168, and
collecting authorities). Here, the attorney general “con-
cede[d] error under Napue,” 3 App. 978, and the OCCA re-
jected that confession because it wrongly concluded that no
such federal error had occurred. See supra, at 244. Be-
cause the Napue confession was “well founded in law,” it fol-
lows that “the conviction will be reversed.” Bindrum, 27
Okla. Crim., at 372, 228 P., at 168. Accordingly, all that re-
mains below is to vacate the conviction, and a new trial fol-
lows a fortiori.
The dissent concludes otherwise because, in its view, a re-
mand for further consideration of alternative state grounds
is mandatory in every case where Michigan v. Long resolves
lingering doubt over the Court's jurisdiction. Post, at 295–
296. Long describes the circumstances under which this
Court has jurisdiction to review a state-court judgment; it
does not limit the Court's remedial authority over an estab-
lished federal constitutional violation. Nor does any other
precedent support the dissent's rule. That state courts who
“grant relief to criminal defendants” under an erroneous in-
terpretation of federal law may later grant relief “as a mat-
ter of [more protective] state law,” Kansas v. Carr, 577 U. S.
108, 128 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), plainly does not

258 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of Barrett, J.
deprive this Court of the authority to grant relief where it
f
nds a federal violation, contra, post, at 295–296; cf. Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 8 (1995) (“Under [Michigan v. Long] state
courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional
provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights
than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution”).
The dissent inverts this precedent, asserting that state
courts should always have another opportunity to identify
additional grounds for denying relief, even where this Court
has found a federal constitutional violation. Yet there is no
reason to allow state courts a second (or third, or fourth) bite
at the apple to identify alternative state grounds for their
decision in every case involving a dependent ground. The
facts as conceded by the attorney general and supported by
the record establish a violation of Napue. A new trial is the
remedy for a Napue violation. See Giglio, 405 U. S., at 155.
Here, this Court has jurisdiction and a Napue violation oc-
curred. Thus, Glossip is entitled to a new trial. See Ake,
470 U. S., at 86–87 (vacating conviction and remanding case
to the OCCA under similar circumstances).
***
The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or de-
cision of this case.
Justice Barrett, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
While I agree with much of the Court's analysis, I would
not order the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
to set aside Richard Glossip's conviction. The OCCA did
not make factual fndings on the most important questions,
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
259
Opinion of Barrett, J.
and the record is open to multiple plausible interpreta-
ti
ons. Consistent with our ordinary practice, the Court
should have corrected the OCCA's misstatement of Napue v.
Illinois and remanded this case for further proceedings.
360 U. S. 264 (1959). Instead, the Court has drawn its own
conclusions about what the record shows, thereby exceeding
its role.
I begin with the common ground. At the threshold, I
agree with the Court's jurisdictional holding and therefore
join Part II of its opinion. We lack jurisdiction to review a
state court's adjudication of federal claims if the state court's
decision “rests on a state law ground that is independent of
the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991). But when
a state-law ground of decision is intertwined with analysis
of a federal question, we will treat the decision as independ-
ent only if the state court “make[s] clear by a plain state-
ment” that its resolution of the state-law question does not
depend on its resolution of the federal question. Michigan
v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Though it is a closer
question for me than it is for the Court, I agree that the
OCCA's opinion does not clear this bar. True, the OCCA
rejected Glossip's application based on state-law procedural
limits on postconviction relief. But the opinion can be read
to say that the OCCA refused to accept the attorney gener-
al's waiver of this procedural bar because his confession of
error was not “based in law.” 2023 OK CR 5, ¶25, 529 P. 3d
218, 226. If that is what the OCCA meant, then its reliance
on state law depended on the merits of Glossip's federal
claims. After all, if the trial contained federal constitutional
error, then the attorney general's confession of error may
have been “based in law.” Because the opinion lacks a
“plain statement” clarifying that the OCCA's reliance on
state law was truly independent of its assessment of Gloss-
ip's federal claims, the Court rightly proceeds to the merits.
Michigan, 463 U. S., at 1041.
Page Proof Pending Publication

260 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Opinion of Barrett, J.
I also share the Court's view that the OCCA misapplied
N
apue. The OCCA appeared to think that Justin Sneed's
testimony “was not clearly false” because he “was more than
likely in denial of his mental health disorders.” 529 P. 3d,
at 227. But for purposes of Napue, the question is not
whether a witness subjectively thought he was lying—it is
whether the prosecution knowingly presented untrue testi-
mony. The OCCA also stated that Sneed's “known mental
health treatment evidence” would not have created a “rea-
sonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different had Sneed's testimony regarding his use
of lithium been further developed at trial.” 529 P. 3d, at
227. Yet the OCCA ignored the critical fact that—had the
prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, corrected Sneed's testi-
mony—the jury would have learned that Sneed made a false
statement on the stand. Sneed's testimony was the primary
evidence that the State offered to prove that Glossip planned
the murder. Faced with a prosecutor forced to correct her
star witness, a juror might have disbelieved Sneed's testi-
mony in its entirety. And if a juror went from belief to dis-
belief in Sneed, she might have changed her ultimate assess-
ment of whether the State had proved Glossip's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. So if Sneed really did give false testi-
mony, and if Smothermon really did knowingly allow that
testimony to go uncorrected, then Smothermon violated
Glossip's due process rights under Napue. The OCCA's con-
trary statements were wrong as a matter of federal law.
I part ways with the Court on what comes next. In exer-
cising our appellate function, it is not our role to fnd facts;
instead, we review the factual fndings of lower courts, sub-
ject to a deferential standard of appellate review. See Price
v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 291 (1948). This practice makes
good sense. This Court is well equipped to answer ques-
tions of federal law; it is ill equipped either to determine the
credibility of witnesses or to master voluminous trial rec-
ords. Other actors in our judicial system—including, where
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
261
Opinion of Barrett, J.
appropriate, state courts like the OCCA—better serve these
func
tions, as our standard of review refects. In this case,
however, the Court has chosen to function as the initial
factfnder.
To establish a violation of Napue, Glossip must show that
(1) Sneed gave false testimony and (2) Smothermon knew
that the testimony was false. To make these showings,
Glossip relies largely on notes taken by Smothermon, an af-
fdavit from Dr. Trombka, and a “medical information sheet.”
According to the Court, these documents clearly demon-
strate that (1) Sneed lied when he said that he did not know
why he had been given lithium and that he had never seen a
psychiatrist and (2) Smothermon knew that both of these
statements were lies. See ante, at 246–248, 255. Thus, the
Court concludes, there is no need for the OCCA to make its
own factual fndings.*
*The Court suggests that this shortcut is appropriate because Glossip,
the attorney general, the Court-appointed amicus, and the OCCA “unani-
mously agree” that the record is suffciently developed. Ante, at 256. I
do not think that this assertion fairly captures the views of either the
amicus or the OCCA. When asked whether he “object[ed] to an eviden-
tiary hearing,” amicus—whom we appointed to defend the judgment
below in this Court—expressed doubt that he “ha[d] standing to object to
an evidentiary hearing.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 107–108. When pushed on the
point, he responded that the current record supports affrmance “based on
the evidence that [Glossip has] chosen to present and particularly given
that he's now told you he wants the case decided on the current record
[and] without an evidentiary hearing.” Id., at 109 (emphasis added). In
other words, amicus simply stated that the current record did not support
Glossip's claim—not that the record was in any objective sense already
fully developed. Moreover, the question here is not only whether further
factual development is warranted, but also which court should fnd facts
in the frst instance. Amicus certainly did not concede that this Court,
rather than the OCCA, should play that role on this record. As for the
OCCA, its lack of explanation of the facts cannot be divorced from its
erroneous view of Napue. Nothing in its opinion indicates what it would
make of this record evidence if it confronted the relevant questions
under Napue.

262 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
I respectfully disagree. Smothermon's notes, taken dur-
i
ng a jailhouse interview of Sneed, consist of the words “on
Lithium?” and “Dr Trumpet?” 3 App. 927. These notes
are hardly clear, and there are competing explanations of
what they mean. Glossip, the Oklahoma attorney general,
and the Court argue that they demonstrate Smothermon's
knowledge that Sneed had lied about Dr. Trombka's prescrib-
ing him lithium for bipolar disorder. See ante, at 247–248,
255. The Van Treese amicus brief and Justice Thomas
contend that the notes instead refect Sneed's account of a
conversation with Glossip's lawyers, who had asked Sneed
whether he had received lithium from a “Dr Trumpet.” See
post, at 272–275, and n. 3 (dissenting opinion). There are
other possibilities too: For instance, perhaps Smothermon
was confused by references to “Dr Trumpet” and lithium but
never investigated the issue further. Neither Dr. Trombka's
affdavit nor the attached medical information sheet nor any
of the other record evidence discussed by the Court fore-
closes any of these possibilities.
When the record is susceptible to multiple plausible infer-
ences, this Court should not be in the business of choosing
between them. It should have corrected the OCCA's mis-
statements of federal law and vacated the judgment, leaving
next steps—including the decision whether to conduct an ev-
identiary hearing—to the OCCA. By doing otherwise, the
Court has both displaced the OCCA as factfnder and poten-
tially overridden state-law constraints on the OCCA's reme-
dial authority. See post, at 293–301 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). Because the Court has exceeded its appellate role, I
respectfully dissent in part.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, and
with whom Justice Barrett joins as to Parts IV–A–1, IV–
A–2, and IV–A–3, dissenting.
Richard Glossip—a convicted murderer twice sentenced to
death by Oklahoma juries—challenges the denial of his ffth
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
263
Thomas, J., dissenting
appl icati on for st ate post-conv ic ti on rel ief. Although
Glossip
won the support of Oklahoma's new attorney general,
he failed to persuade either body with authority to grant
him relief: The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
denied Glossip's application as both procedurally defcient
and nonmeritorious, and Oklahoma's Pardon and Parole
Board denied clemency. Because this Court lacks the power
to override these denials, that should have marked the end
of the road for Glossip. Instead, the Court stretches the law
at every turn to rule in his favor. At the threshold, it con-
cocts federal jurisdiction by misreading the decision below.
On the merits, it fnds a due process violation based on pat-
ently immaterial testimony about a witness's medical condi-
tion. And, for the remedy, it orders a new trial in violation
of black-letter law on this Court's power to review state-
court judgments. I respectfully dissent.
I
A
This case arises from the 1997 murder of Barry Van
Treese, the owner of an Oklahoma City motel. Beginning
in 1995, Glossip began working for Van Treese as the motel's
manager. 4 Tr. 182–183 (May 14, 2004). In that capacity,
Glossip unoffcially hired 19-year-old Justin Sneed to be the
motel's handyman. Glossip did not pay Sneed; instead,
he let him live at the motel free of charge and occasionally
bought him food. Id., at 43–44; 5 Tr. 67–70 (May 17, 2004);
2 App. 644. In late 1996, Van Treese learned of discre-
pancies in Glossip's accounting suggesting that Glossip had
been allowing guests to stay at the motel off the books and
pocketing the money for himself. 4 Tr. 63, 68–71 (May 14,
2004); 7 Tr. 35, 39–40, 45–49 (May 19, 2004); 11 Tr. 172–173
(May 25, 2004). During a visit to the motel on January
6, 1997, Van Treese confronted Glossip about this issue,
and, having discovered unregistered guests staying at the
Page Proof Pending Publication

264 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
motel, he threatened to report Glossip to the police un-
less
Glossip produced receipts for their rooms. 8 Tr. 82
(May 20, 2004).
Hours later, after Van Treese had gone to bed, Sneed en-
tered Van Treese's motel room and repeatedly beat him over
the head with a baseball bat. 2 App. 662–664; 11 Tr. 55 (May
25, 2004). Sneed left when he thought that he had killed
Van Treese, although the State's forensic pathologist later
determined that Van Treese had initially survived the at-
tack, and died several hours later after slowly bleeding out.
Id., at 55–57, 61; App. to Response to Petitioner's Succ. Ap-
plication for Post-Conviction Relief in No. PCD–2022–819
(OCCA), Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9, 1997).
Following his arrest, Sneed explained to police that Glossip
had urged him to kill Van Treese. 2 App. 645, 660. Accord-
ing to Sneed, Glossip told him that they would both be
evicted if Glossip lost his job, and Glossip had promised to
pay him $10,000 for carrying out the murder. 12 Tr. 95–96,
98 (May 26, 2004).
Shortly after the attack, Sneed went to Glossip's motel
room and informed him that he had killed Van Treese. Tr.
of Glossip Police Interview 10 (Jan. 9, 1997). Glossip began
directing a coverup. On Sneed's account, Glossip frst told
Sneed to clean up glass shards from a window that Sneed
had broken during the attack. 12 Tr. 122 (May 26, 2004).
Glossip also sent Sneed to retrieve about $4,000 in cash from
Van Treese's car, and then to abandon the car in a nearby
credit union parking lot. Id., at 124, 129. When Sneed re-
turned, the two divided the cash. Id., at 128–129. They
then entered Van Treese's room, whereupon Glossip directed
Sneed to tape a shower curtain over the broken window and
run the air conditioning at full blast to eliminate any odor.
Id., at 130, 132. Glossip then dispatched Sneed to buy plexi-
glass, which the pair installed over the broken window on
the morning of January 7. Tr. of Glossip Police Interview
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
265
Thomas, J., dissenting
14–15 (Jan. 9, 1997); 4 Tr. 163–165 (May 14, 2004); 13 Tr. 126
(May
27, 2004).
1
Glossip took additional steps to cover up the murder. He
told multiple witnesses that the window in Van Treese's
room was broken because two drunks had stayed there the
night before and smashed it in a brawl. 5 Tr. 85 (May 17,
2004); 7 Tr. 64 (May 19, 2004); 9 Tr. 46, 206 (May 21, 2004);
11 Tr. 188–189 (May 25, 2004). He told the housekeeper that
she did not need to clean the downstairs rooms—including
Van Treese's room. 8 Tr. 122–123 (May 20, 2004). Instead,
as Glossip explained to another employee and a motel resi-
dent, he and Sneed would cover those rooms. 7 Tr. 64 (May
19, 2004); 9 Tr. 49 (May 21, 2004). Glossip had never taken
such steps before. 8 Tr. 122–123 (May 20, 2004). He also
told various witnesses that he had seen Van Treese alive and
1
Despite its consistent theme that Sneed's testimony is too implausible
to sustain Glossip's conviction, the majority feels the need to bolster its
account by fnding “inconsisten[cies]” in his testimony that are not genu-
ine. Ante, at 234, n. 1. There is no contradiction in Sneed's claims that
he committed the murder as part of a robbery and that he did so to avoid
being “ `evicted if Glossip lost his job.' ” Ibid. At both of Glossip's trials,
Sneed consistently testifed that Glossip proposed taking the cash Van
Treese had with him and that Glossip told him that they would get evicted
if he did not kill Van Treese. 12 Tr. 95–96, 98, 124 (May 26, 2004); 6 Tr.
89–90, 95–96 (June 8, 1998). Contemporaneous evidence supports both
motivations. In his confession to police, Sneed stated that Glossip had
proposed killing Van Treese and taking the cash that Van Treese had with
him. 2 App. 675. And, two days after the murder, Glossip told police
that Sneed had committed the murder in part because “[h]e thought Barry
[Van Treese] was going to throw him out in the street.” Tr. of Glossip
Police Interview 13 (Jan. 9, 1997). Nor did Sneed ever claim that “he did
not know why Glossip wanted him to kill Van Treese.” Ante, at 234, n. 1.
He testifed only that he did not know “why Mr. Glossip wanted to kill
Mr. Van Treese on this particular night,” because “[e]very time that
Mr. Van Treese showed up, [Glossip] was wanting me to kill him.” 6 Tr.
89 (June 8, 1998) (emphasis added). As noted, Sneed clearly testifed at
the same trial that Glossip wanted Sneed to kill Van Treese so that they
would not be evicted. Id., at 90.

Page Proof Pending Publication
266 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
well around 7 o'clock that morning. 4 Tr. 99 (May 14, 2004);
7
Tr. 62–63 (May 19, 2004); 9 Tr. 194 (May 21, 2004); 11 Tr.
126–127, 182–183 (May 25, 2004).
That afternoon, the credit union called the motel to report
that Van Treese's car had been abandoned in its parking lot.
7 Tr. 70 (May 19, 2004). At that point, it became clear
to the motel's staff that Van Treese was missing. Id., at
72–74. Shortly thereafter, Glossip returned to the motel
from a shopping trip, during which he had made several
large purchases, including an engagement ring for his girl-
friend. Id., at 74; 14 Tr. 41 (May 28, 2004). He then pur-
ported to search the rooms and surrounding area for Van
Treese. 5 Tr. 97 (May 17, 2004); 9 Tr. 192–193 (May 21,
2004); 11 Tr. 185–186, 190 (May 25, 2004). He even assured
Van Treese's wife over the phone that everything was fne
and that he had seen Van Treese that morning. 4 Tr. 99–
100 (May 14, 2004).
Glossip later repeated to a local police offcer the story that
two drunks had broken the window and that he had seen
Van Treese that morning. 9 Tr. 194, 206–207 (May 21, 2004).
Unpersuaded, the offcer checked the room with the broken
window and discovered Van Treese's body. Id., at 220, 224–
225; 11 Tr. 191, 194 (May 25, 2004). Glossip immediately told
the offcer that he suspected that Sneed had something to do
with the murder, explaining that he had heard glass breaking
and that Sneed had banged on his door, but he did not claim
to know anything more. 9 Tr. 233 (May 21, 2004).
Homicide detectives interviewed Glossip later that night.
Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 1, 10–11 (Jan. 8, 1997). He
denied knowing that Van Treese had been murdered before
the body was discovered. Id., at 70, 86. And, he vacillated
between doubting that Sneed was involved and asserting
that he likely was. Id., at 27–28, 69–70.
On the morning of January 8, Glossip began to sell all his
possessions, telling multiple witnesses that he would like to
leave town. 8 Tr. 88 (May 20, 2004); 11 Tr. 199 (May 25,

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
267
Thomas, J., dissenting
2004). On January 9, police picked up Glossip after he failed
to
appear for a meeting with homicide detectives. 12 Tr. 7
(May 26, 2004). He had $1,757 in cash on his person and
no explanation for how he—living paycheck to paycheck and
having made only $490 from selling his possessions the pre-
vious day—had so much cash. Id., at 12–13; 14 Tr. 43–44
(May 28, 2004); 15 Tr. 17, 93 (June 1, 2004).
Glossip sat for a second interview with homicide detectives
later that day. Tr. of Glossip Police Interview 1 (Jan. 9,
1997). This time, although continuing to deny that he had
ordered Sneed to kill Van Treese, Glossip admitted that
Sneed had told him about the murder just after committing
it, and that he had instructed Sneed to clean up the glass
and repair the window. Id., at 13–14, 36. Glossip also ad-
mitted that Van Treese “was upset because the motel wasn't
doing as well as it could.” Id., at 32. When asked why he
hid the murder, Glossip denied doing so to protect Sneed.
He said he covered up the murder instead to protect himself,
because he “was involved in it” and risked losing his girl-
friend otherwise. Id., at 29–30.
During this interview, Glossip also tried to minimize his
involvement in the crime by insisting that he had not gone
inside Van Treese's hotel room after the attack. Id., at 18;
see also ante, at 232 (emphasizing this denial). At trial,
however, a motel resident testifed that, on the morning of
January 7, Glossip had said that he and Sneed had been “in
the room” after the window was broken. 9 Tr. 120 (May
21, 2004).
Police arrested Sneed fve days later and charged him with
capital murder. 2 App. 644–645. He had $1,680 in cash in
his possession. 14 Tr. 12–18 (May 28, 2004). At frst, Sneed
denied involvement, claiming that his brother and Glossip
had once discussed the idea but that it never went beyond
talk. 2 App. 655–657. Later in the interview, however,
Sneed confessed to murdering Van Treese at Glossip's insti-
gation. Id., at 660, 664.
Page Proof Pending Publication

268 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
B
1
Glossip
was convicted and sentenced to death in 1998, but
the OCCA ordered a retrial based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. 2001 OK CR 21, 29 P. 3d 597.
At his second trial in 2004, a jury convicted Glossip again,
and the judge again sentenced him to death. Sneed testifed
against Glossip during the guilt phase, as he had at the frst
trial. While Sneed was providing background information
about himself at the outset of this testimony, the State's lead
prosecutor, Connie Smothermon, asked him whether he had
received any “prescription medication” after being arrested.
12 Tr. 63–64 (May 26, 2004). Sneed responded that he had
briefy been prescribed “Lithium for some reason, I don't
know why. I never seen no psychiatrist or anything.” Id.,
at 64. The matter did not come up again during the trial.
It would not have been challenging for the parties to de-
duce the reason for Sneed's lithium prescription. It is un-
disputed that lithium's sole medical purpose, both in 1997 and
today, is to treat bipolar disorder and other mental health
disorders. See ante, at 247. Were there any doubt about
Sneed's condition, records long available to both sides resolve
it. In 1997, Sneed underwent a pretrial competency evalua-
tion with forensic psychologist Dr. Edith King. Dr. King 's
report strongly suggested that although Sneed himself may
have been in denial, he was taking lithium to treat bipo-
lar disorder or a similar condition. During his evaluation,
Sneed asserted that he “d[id] not think he ha[d] any serious
mental problems.” 2 App. 701. And, he reported he was
given the lithium, apparently by mistake, “after his tooth
was pulled.” Id., at 700. Dr. King felt otherwise. Con-
cluding that Sneed qualifed as a “mentally ill person or a
person requiring treatment,” ibid., she determined that he
likely had “an atypical mood swing disorder in his past char-
acterized by `ups and downs' including anger outburst.” Id.,
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
269
Thomas, J., dissenting
at 702. “His present medication [i.e., the lithium] is prob-
ably
helping him control his moods.” Ibid.
The defense was well aware of this report before Glossip's
second trial. In fact, on direct appeal of his frst conviction,
Glossip's appellate counsel had faulted his trial counsel for
not using Dr. King 's report to show the jury that Sneed was
taking lithium to control his anger. 1 id., at 18. Neverthe-
less, after the OCCA vacated his frst conviction, Glossip de-
clined to seek further pretrial discovery on the issue or raise
it during his second trial.
After his second conviction and sentence, Glossip ignored
the lithium issue on direct appeal, instead raising a general
suffciency-of-the-evidence challenge. The OCCA unani-
mously rejected that challenge, fnding that there was suff-
cient evidence to convict and that the State had satisfed an
additional state-law requirement for corroborative evidence
where a conviction rests on accomplice testimony. 2007 OK
CR 12, ¶¶47–53, 157 P. 3d 143, 153–154. Two judges dis-
sented on different grounds but “agree[d] with the majority
that the State presented a strong circumstantial case against
Glossip.” Id., at 175 (Chapel, J.); see also ibid. (A. John-
son, J.).
2
Glossip has spent the past two decades challenging his con-
viction and sentence through direct appeal, state and federal
collateral proceedings, and civil litigation under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Throughout that time, no court
has “determined error in [his] trial proceeding ” or found that
“there [has] been a showing of actual innocence.” 2023 OK
CR 5, ¶2, 529 P. 3d 218, 229 (Lumpkin, J., specially concur-
ring). And, for almost that entire duration, the Oklahoma
attorney general has steadfastly defended the verdict and
sentence, insisting that the evidence the State presented in
1998 and 2004 has never “been credibly rebutted.” 3 App.
769.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
270 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
In 2022, as Glossip's execution date approached, a group of
Oklahoma
legislators opposed to his execution commissioned
the law frm Reed Smith LLP to conduct an independent
investigation of his case. The frm, which is publicly com-
mitted to “fghting the death penalty,” id., at 709, n. 3 (alter-
ation and internal quotation marks omitted), issued a fnal
report expressing “grave doubt as to the integrity of Gloss-
ip's murder conviction and death sentence,” Independent In-
vestigation of State v. Richard E. Glossip 6 (June 7, 2022)
(Reed Smith Report). The attorney general vigorously dis-
agreed. In subsequent post-conviction flings, the State as-
serted that the report was “built on assumptions, half-truths,
and (in some cases) outright falsehoods,” 3 App. 769, and
criticized its fndings at length, see id., at 754–769.
In response to the Reed Smith Report, the attorney gener-
al's offce released all its fles from the case to Glossip, except
for one box of attorney work product. Based on this infor-
mation, Glossip fled a fourth motion for post-conviction relief
in the OCCA, raising two overarching claims. The frst
claim was that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373
U. S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence that Sneed consid-
ered recanting his original testimony before the second trial.
The second claim was that Smothermon, the lead prosecutor,
committed misconduct and violated the rule of sequestration
(which prohibits witnesses from hearing other witnesses' tes-
timony) during trial. After the State's forensic pathologist
testifed that there was evidence Sneed used a knife in addi-
tion to the bat during the murder, Smothermon sent a memo-
randum to Sneed's attorney highlighting ways in which this
testimony was hard to square with some of Sneed's earlier
statements. Glossip thus claimed Smothermon violated the
rule of sequestration by conveying witness statements for
the purpose of coaching Sneed into altering his testimony to
ft the forensic evidence. Attorney General John O'Connor
opposed the application, urging the OCCA not to be cowed

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
271
Thomas, J., dissenting
by the ongoing “public relations campaign” to “falsely” pres-
ent
Glossip as “innocent.” 3 App. 717.
The OCCA unanimously denied the application. Under
Oklahoma's Post-Conviction Procedure Act (PCPA), Glossip's
post-conviction application could not proceed unless he could
show (1) that the “factual basis for the claim” was previously
unavailable and (2) that, but for the alleged error, no rea-
sonable jury would have convicted him or sentenced him
to death. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1089(D)(8)(b) (2024). The
OCCA held that both claims failed the frst requirement be-
cause they were not based on new information. It also held
that Glossip's claims failed on the merits.
As to the recantation claim, the OCCA held that Glossip's
frst claim was procedurally barred because the defense
knew even before the 2004 trial that Sneed was reluctant to
testify again. 3 App. 777. In fact, one of Glossip's attor-
neys had even visited Sneed before trial in an effort to per-
suade him not to testify. Ibid. On the merits, there was
“no evidence that Sneed had any desire to recant or change
his testimony.” Id., at 776. Sneed had even told Reed
Smith that “ `recant[ing]' ” was “ `impossible because I told the
truth.' ” Id., at 724. Sneed was reluctant to testify because
he wanted to obtain a better plea deal or to avoid the disrup-
tion to his life that testifying would cause. Id., at 776.
2
2
The majority points to a letter from Sneed to his attorney in which Sneed
raised the prospect of “ ` “recanting ” ' ” his trial testimony. Ante, at 238
(quoting 3 App. 815). But, in two subsequent interviews with Reed Smith
attorneys, Sneed made clear that, although he wanted to avoid testifying
again if possible, he continued to stand by the truth of his earlier testimony:
“[REED SMITH ATTORNEY]: Yeah. Well, I think the bottom line
here, the most important things that we needed to clarify was like when
you're talking about recanting, you're not talking about changing your
story about what happened. Have you ever indicated to anybody that
you ever wanted to change your story about what happened?
“JUSTIN SNEED: No, sir. I have not ever indicated that I wanted to
change the truth of him applying pressure to me.” App. to Response to

272 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
Turning to the sequestration claim, the OCCA pointed out
that
Smothermon had acknowledged at trial that she had
spoken with Sneed's counsel, so the claim likewise lacked a
new factual basis. Id., at 780; see 12 Tr. 107–108 (May 26,
2004). On the merits, the court held that Oklahoma's se-
questration statute does not prohibit counsel from discussing
with a witness other witnesses' testimony. 3 App. 781.
Federal courts have similarly interpreted the federal seques-
tration rule to permit “witnesses . . . to discuss the case”
with “counsel for either side.” 2A C. Wright & P. Henning,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 416, p. 195, and n. 29 (4th
ed. 2009) (collecting cases). And, nothing in Smothermon's
memorandum indicates she was encouraging Sneed to lie. 3
App. 781–782.
3
In January 2023, Gentner Drummond became Oklahoma's
attorney general. During his frst month in offce, Drum-
mond released the fnal box of evidence (Box 8) to Glossip.
He also appointed Rex Duncan, a personal friend and cam-
paign donor, as independent counsel to reexamine the legiti-
macy of Glossip's conviction.
Among the materials released in Box 8 were handwritten
notes taken by Smothermon and her co-counsel Gary Ackley
during a 2003 meeting between them, Sneed, and Sneed's
attorney.
Petitioner's Succ. Application for Post-Conviction Relief in No. PCD–
2022–819 (OCCA), Tr. of Sneed Reed Smith Interview 46–47 (Aug. 15,
2022).
See also id., Tr. of Sneed Reed Smith Interview 24 (Sept. 7, 2022)
(“There isn't any way of really making up some [new] storyline that isn't
going to cover all the evidence that is already there . . . ”). Sneed has
never on any occasion indicated that his testimony that Glossip directed
him to kill Van Treese was false, see 3 App. 724–725, and the majority
cites no such occasion. The best explanation for Sneed's letter, and the
one that the OCCA credited as factual, is thus that Sneed, an eighth-grade
dropout, used the phrase “recanting my testimony” imprecisely to mean
“refuse to testify.” Id., at 725, and n. 13, 776.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
273
Thomas, J., dissenting
Glossip's counsel quickly seized on Smothermon's notes.
In
the top left corner of the notes, Smothermon had written
“on Lithium?” and “Dr Trumpet?” See Figure 1, infra.
According to Glossip's counsel, these phrases meant that
Sneed had admitted during the meeting that he had been
prescribed lithium by Dr. Lawrence Trombka, the psychia-
trist at the Oklahoma County Jail.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Smothermon and Ackley disagree with this interpretation.
They assert before this Court that, during the meeting,
Sneed recounted two interviews that he previously had with
members of Glossip's defense team. In context, Smother-
mon's notes simply record that Sneed told her that Glossip's
defense team had asked him about his use of lithium and
about “Dr Trumpet.” The prosecutors claim that this fact
is apparent from the other notes on the page and from
Ackley's notes, both of which refer to details of these prior
interviews. Ackley's notes also highlight the phrase “ `tooth
pulled.' ” 3 App. 940. The prosecutors' interpretation of
their own notes thus suggests that Sneed recounted that he
had responded to questions about lithium and Dr. Trombka
Figure 1. Smothermon's handwritten notes. See 3 App. 927.

274 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
with his earlier story that he was prescribed lithium in
error
after having his tooth pulled. This interpretation
is explained at great length by the Van Treese family's
brief. See Brief for Victim Family Members as Amici
Curiae 7–22.
3
And, as of yet, no one—including the par-
3
According to Smothermon, her notes refect two visits (“2X”) by de-
fense representatives—with notes about the two visits separated by a ho-
rizontal line. According to the notes above the line, Sneed's frst visitors
were “women,” one of whom was an investigator (“invest.”) who may have
been heavy set (“heavy set?”). These visitors may have been involved in
Glossip's earlier direct “appeal.” These women asked Sneed whether he
was “on Lithium?” and about a “Dr Trumpet?” The notes also document
a discussion of a “waiver for records,” “IQ test,” and “GED. VoTech.”
Similarly, Ackley's notes record that the “W[itness, i.e., Sneed,] was visited
by 2 women who said they rep Glossip.” They were “heavy,” “1 `Inv.' &
1 `Atty,' ” who may have been on Sneed's “Appellate” team. These two
women asked Sneed about lithium (“Li”), and he responded with some-
thing about getting his “ `tooth pulled.' ” Brief for Victim Family Mem-
bers as Amici Curiae 9–12.
These notes correspond to Sneed's 2001 meeting with Wyndi Hobbs
(Glossip's post-conviction counsel) and an investigator named Lisa Cooper,
which was documented in the record of Glossip's fourth post-conviction
application. See 3 App. 729–730. At this meeting, Sneed “ `signed re-
leases for juvenile, jail, prison and criminal records,' ” id., at 729, which
corresponds to the “waiver for records” mentioned in Smothermon's notes.
Sneed later wrote a letter to Cooper to ensure that she received informa-
tion about his participation in a “vo-tech program,” id., at 730, which cor-
responds to the reference to “GED. VoTech.”
According to Smothermon's notes below the line, Sneed's second visit
was from a “man” named “Burch” who tried to “con [him] out” of giving
“testimony” against Glossip. Burch “gave [Sneed a] case.” Ackley's
notes likewise indicate that Sneed “[ l]ater” met with “1 guy” named
“Burch.” Sneed said of the meeting, ` “Basically all he was trying to do
was con me out of not [sic] getting onto the stand.' ” Brief for Victim
Family Members as Amici Curiae 9–13 (alteration in original).
The flings from Glossip's fourth application also recount that Lynne
Burch, one of Glossip's attorneys, met with Sneed after the OCCA vacated
Glossip's frst conviction. 3 App. 731. Burch told Sneed “ `he didn't have
to testify' ” in Glossip's second trial, and (in line with Smothermon's notes)
gave Sneed a case, State v. Dyer, 2001 OK CR 31, 34 P. 3d 652, holding
that the State could not renege on a plea agreement for refusing to testify
at a codefendant's second trial. 3 App. 731–732.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
275
Thomas, J., dissenting
ties and the majority—has attempted to refute it on the
mer
its.
Based on Smothermon's notes, Glossip fled a ffth post-
conviction application in the OCCA in March 2023. He
framed the notes as new evidence of Sneed's previously un-
known bipolar disorder. Glossip attached an affdavit from
Dr. Trombka stating that he was the only person who would
have prescribed lithium while Sneed was in jail. Glossip
also attached what appears to be a jail record indicating that
Sneed has bipolar disorder. He argued that the State's re-
fusal to produce these notes before trial violated Brady, on
the theory that he could have used Sneed's condition to im-
peach his testimony.
At the same time, Glossip recognized that he would need
additional evidence to prove his theory. Together with his
application, Glossip also fled a motion for an evidentiary
hearing, in which he sought to call Smothermon and Ackley
as witnesses. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing in No. PCD–
2023–267 (OCCA), p. 2. Glossip explained in the motion that
“the resolution” of his Brady claim “turns in part on inter-
pretation of prosecutors' notes.” Motion for Evidentiary
Hearing, at 1. “Without their testimony,” he acknowledged,
“any fnding about what they meant or what the attorneys
did or did not know when they wrote them would be specula-
tion.” Id., at 1–2.
Independent Counsel Duncan, on the other hand, deter-
mined that no further evidence was needed. Duncan re-
leased his fnal report shortly after Glossip fled his ffth
application. He agreed that the State violated Glossip's
Brady rights and asserted that Smothermon's failure to cor-
rect Sneed's testimony amounted to a due process violation
under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). Duncan based
his conclusions on the speculation that “seasoned capital
homicide prosecutors . . . could be expected” to know that
“Trumpet” referred to Dr. Trombka and that Dr. Trombka
was the psychiatrist at the Oklahoma County Jail. App. to
Reply Brief in Support of Pet. for Cert. 23a. He then con-
Page Proof Pending Publication

276 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
cluded the report with praise for Drummond, stating that
Dr
ummond's “decision to seek a stay of execution and more
thoroughly examine this case may be the bravest leadership
decision I've ever witnessed.” Id., at 30a.
Notably, Duncan failed to give Smothermon a meaningful
opportunity to explain what her notes may have meant or
what she knew about Sneed's medical history. Instead, he
discussed the matter with her only once, during a 3-minute
phone call. App. to Brief for Victim Family Members as
Amici Curiae 31a. Worse, he gave Smothermon no chance
to review the decades-old notes before asking her to explain
them during the brief call. Ibid. Drummond was likewise
uninterested in hearing from the attorney he and Duncan
were impugning. Following Duncan's report, both Smother-
mon and the Van Treese family contacted Drummond's offce
to request that Drummond speak with Smothermon about
the notes. Id., at 6a–7a, 71a. Their pleas were ignored.
4
At the attorney general's behest, the State supported
Glossip's post-conviction application. It argued that Smoth-
ermon's notes proved that the prosecutors violated Brady
and Napue, and that Glossip was entitled to relief under the
State's PCPA. It neglected to address, however, the strin-
gent limitations that the PCPA imposes on such subsequent
applications. See § 1089(D)(8)(b).
4
The majority insists that Smothermon had a fair opportunity to explain
her notes because she met once with attorneys at the Reed Smith law frm
and had an earlier, longer phone call with Duncan. Ante, at 255. But,
the Reed Smith meeting occurred before the release of Box 8. See Reed
Smith Report 80, n. 321 (noting that the Reed Smith meeting occurred in
May 2022, eight months before Box 8 was released in January 2023).
And—by his own admission—Duncan “forgot to ask” Smothermon about
“Dr. Larry Trombka” during his earlier, longer phone call. App. to Brief
for Victim Family Members as Amici Curiae 32a. The majority also
faults Smothermon for not having an explanation ready during the 3-
minute phone call. Ante, at 255. But, without giving Smothermon an
opportunity to review the notes, it was unreasonable to expect her instan-
taneously to recall their meaning 20 years later.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
277
Thomas, J., dissenting
The OCCA unanimously denied Glossip's ffth post-
con
viction application. The court frst held that Glossip had
not satisfed either requirement of § 1089(D)(8)(b), and thus
that the Brady and Napue claims were procedurally barred.
529 P. 3d, at 226. The OCCA then held that both claims also
failed on the merits. No Brady violation occurred, the court
explained, because Sneed's 1997 pretrial competency report
already informed the defense of Sneed's prescription and
condition. The OCCA determined that defense counsel had
likely made a strategic decision not to base a defense on
them. 529 P. 3d, at 226. Nor was there any Napue viola-
tion, according to the court, because Sneed's testimony “was
not clearly false” and, in any event, was not material given
defense counsel's choice not to raise Sneed's condition. 529
P. 3d, at 226–227. After the OCCA issued its decision, Okla-
homa's Pardon and Parole Board denied clemency.
II
As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review this
case. “This Court from the time of its foundation has ad-
hered to the principle that it will not review judgments of
state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125 (1945). “Be-
cause this Court has no power to review a state law deter-
mination that is suffcient to support the judgment, resolu-
tion of any independent federal ground for the decision could
not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.”
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991). Thus, on
direct review of a state-court judgment, the presence of an
adequate and independent state ground imposes a “jurisdic-
tional” limitation. Ibid. The decision below rests on such
grounds, and the majority concludes otherwise only by
grossly mischaracterizing the state court's analysis.
A
The PCPA authorizes a criminal defendant to collaterally
challenge his conviction on the ground that it violates the
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
278 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
Federal Constitution. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1080(1). But,
g
iven the extraordinary nature of collateral challenges, the
statute also imposes a variety of restrictions on relief. In
capital cases, the applicant must establish not just a constitu-
tional violation, but also, among other requirements, that his
claim “could not have been raised in a direct appeal” and that
“the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
the errors or that the defendant is factually innocent.”
§ 1089(C).
The PCPA further bars subsequent applications for relief,
such as Glossip's, unless the applicant satisfes two additional
requirements. As mentioned, the applicant must show that
“the factual basis for the claim” was not previously “ascer-
tainable through the exercise of reasonable dil igence. ”
§ 1089(D)(8)(b)(1). And, the applicant must demonstrate
that “the facts underlying the claim” would, if proved, “es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the
alleged error, no reasonable fact fnder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense or would have ren-
dered the penalty of death.” § 1089(D)(8)(b)(2). These two
necessary conditions—the diligence and actual-innocence
requirements—closely mirror limits that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes
on successive federal habeas petitions. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B); Davison v. State, 2023 OK CR 11, ¶9, n. 1,
531 P. 3d 649, 651, n. 1.
As with other state-law requirements, the PCPA's bar on
subsequent applications ordinarily will constitute an ade-
quate and independent state ground precluding our review.
It is independent because its application does not “depend
upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits.” Stewart
v. Smith, 536 U. S. 856, 860 (2002) (per curiam). It is ade-
quate as a general matter because States have no constitu-
tional obligation to create “collateral proceedings” in the frst
place. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 10 (1989) (plural-

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
279
Thomas, J., dissenting
ity opinion). And, it is adequate in particular cases so long
as
the OCCA's decision to rely on it is not “so unfounded” in
existing law or the record “as to be essentially arbitrary.”
Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U. S. 17, 26 (2023) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A decision will be inadequate on this basis
only in “the rarest of situations.” Ibid.
Here, the OCCA held that the PCPA barred Glossip's ap-
plication twice over because he failed to meet either the dili-
gence or actual-innocence requirements. 529 P. 3d, at 226.
The OCCA properly grounded these conclusions in its analy-
sis of the record: It explained that because Glossip had been
aware of Sneed's condition and lithium prescription since
1997, with “reasonable diligence” the Napue violation “could
have been presented previously.” 529 P. 3d, at 226. Like-
wise, Glossip could not establish that, but for the alleged
Napue violation, “no reasonable fact fnder” would have con-
victed him. 529 P. 3d, at 226. Correcting Sneed's testi-
mony simply would have furnished the defense with addi-
tional impeachment evidence that did not directly contradict
the State's basic theory. But, “evidence of factual innocence
must be more than that which merely tends to discredit or
impeach a witness.” Id., at 225 (collecting cases). The
OCCA's reliance on the PCPA thus was both an adequate
basis for its judgment and independent of federal law, leav-
ing us without jurisdiction. Glossip's case should end here.
B
The majority evades this straightforward conclusion by in-
venting a federal holding that the OCCA never made. Be-
fore applying the PCPA's bar on subsequent applications, the
majority contends, the OCCA frst addressed the State's
“confession of Napue error.” Ante, at 243. The OCCA
then found this confession to be “ `not based in law or fact.' ”
Ibid. (quoting 529 P. 3d, at 226). Thus, the majority con-
cludes, the OCCA premised its application of the PCPA's

280 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
bar on an “antecedent holding ” of “federal law,” which we
have
jurisdiction to review. Ante, at 243. This theory mis-
states the decision below and defes logic.
As the OCCA recognized (and the majority does not), the
State did not merely confess to a Napue violation; it “con-
cede[d] that [Sneed's] alleged false testimony combined with
other unspecifed cumulative errors warrant post-conviction
relief.” 529 P. 3d, at 226 (emphasis added). A federal claim
can warrant post-conviction relief under the PCPA only if
the applicant meets the PCPA's additional requirements.
See § 1089(D)(4). The State partly recognized as much, ex-
pressly acknowledging that, “[t]o obtain post-conviction re-
lief, Glossip needs to show” that he satisfes the requirements
of “§ 1089(C).” 3 App. 976. The State therefore argued
that the alleged Napue violation met those requirements—
namely, that the violation “could not have been asserted in a
direct appeal,” and that “the result of the trial” likely would
not “have been the same but for” the Napue violation and
cumulative errors. 3 App. 977–978.
The OCCA properly concluded that this argument suffered
a threshold defect: It ignored the PCPA's additional require-
ments for “subsequent application[s] for post-conviction re-
lief ” under § 1089(D). Beyond showing that he met the
§ 1089(C) requirements, Glossip also had to show he satis-
fed § 1089(D)'s diligence and actual-innocence requirements.
§ 1089(D)(8)(b). Yet, the State never addressed those pre-
requisites. The OCCA thus held that Oklahoma's “con-
cession alone cannot overcome the limitations on succes-
sive post-conviction review.” 529 P. 3d, at 226 (citing
§ 1089(D)(8)).
5
Because the State's concession that the cir-
5
The majority claims that the OCCA could not have meant to rely on
§ 1089(D) because the State “expressly attempted to waive” the require-
ments of that provision. Ante, at 245. The State did no such thing. In
its response to Glossip's application, the State of Oklahoma contended that,
“[t]o obtain post-conviction relief, Glossip needs to show” he satisfes the
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
281
Thomas, J., dissenting
cumstances “warrant post-conviction relief ” overlooked
these
additional state-law requirements, the OCCA correctly
observed that the State's assertion was “not based in law or
fact.” Id., at 226. And, as the OCCA's § 1089(D) citation
makes clear, the court was referring to Oklahoma law, not
federal law.
The structure of the OCCA's analysis reinforces this con-
clusi on. The relevant por ti on of the opi ni on reads as
follows:
Ҧ25 Glossip claims that the State failed to disclose
evidence of Justin Sneed's mental health treatment and
that Sneed lied about his mental health treatment to the
jury. Though the State in its response now concedes
that this alleged false testimony combined with other
unspecifed cumulative errors warrant post-conviction
relief, the concession alone cannot overcome the limita-
tions on successive post-conviction review. See 22 O.S.
Supp. 2022, § 1089(D)(8). The State's concession is not
based in law or fact.
Ҧ26 This issue is one that could have been presented
previously, because the factual basis for the claim was
ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, and the facts are not suffcient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for the alleged
error, no reasonable fact fnder would have found the
PCPA. 3 App. 976 (citing § 1089(C)). It then offered an argument that
Glossip had satisfed the PCPA's requirements. Id., at 976–978. Such an
argument is distinct from a “waiver,” which “is the voluntary and inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right.” Price v. Zhang, 2022 OK 95,
¶19, 521 P. 3d 795, 799–800. Regardless, even if the State had purported
to waive § 1089(D), the OCCA nonetheless explicitly applied it. 529 P. 3d,
at 226 (citing § 1089(D)(8)). Perhaps the majority thinks that ruling is too
harsh—even though AEDPA's analogous limitations on successive federal
habeas petitions are often, if not always, unwaivable. See Burton v. Stew-
art, 549 U. S. 147, 157 (2007) (per curiam). But, the harshness of such a
ruling would not make it any less independent of federal law.
Page Proof Pending Publication

282 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
applicant guilty of the underlying offense or would have
rendered
the penalty of death.
Ҧ27 [Glossip's Brady claim fails on the merits.]
Ҧ28 The evidence, moreover, does not create a Napue
error. . . .” Id., at 226–227 (footnotes omitted).
The OCCA's application of § 1089(D)'s diligence and actual-
innocence requirements in paragraph 26 immediately fol-
lowed its “law or fact” comment in paragraph 25. Only
thereafter in paragraph 28 did the court turn to the State's
Napue claim and conclude that “[t]he evidence, moreover,
does not create a Napue error.” 529 P. 3d, at 226 (footnote
omitted). This structure leaves no doubt that § 1089(D)'s re-
quirements are why the State's concession failed: The appli-
cation of § 1089(D) in paragraph 26 explained the immedi-
ately preceding statement that the “State's concession is not
based in law or fact.” The merits discussion in paragraph
28 was a follow-on, alternative holding.
The majority's alternative interpretation is incoherent.
According to the Court, the OCCA's analysis proceeded as
follows: First, the court asserted that the State's “concession
alone cannot overcome the limitations on successive post-
conviction review,” and expressly cited § 1089(D)'s diligence
and actual-innocence requirements. Ibid. Second, the
OCCA without explanation switched—in the very next sen-
tence—to the merits and decided the Napue question in a
single, conclusory assertion that the “State's concession is
not based in law or fact.” 529 P. 3d, at 226. Third, after
summarily deciding the merits of a federal constitutional
claim, the OCCA toggled back to the procedural bar in the
very next paragraph to explain why Glossip failed to meet
the PCPA's procedural requirements. Fourth and fnally,
the OCCA circled around to spell out its “antecedent” Napue
merits holding. Ante, at 243. This reading is as convoluted
and implausible as it sounds. If “the only reason” § 1089(D)
applied had been because the Napue claim independently
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
283
Thomas, J., dissenting
failed on the merits, there would have been no point in dis-
cussi
ng § 1089(D) in the frst place. Ante, at 243.
Finally, the majority cannot fall back on Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032 (1983), which establishes a presumption that
a state court has based its decision on federal law when it is
“insuffciently `clear from the face of the opinion' ” that the
court meant to rely on an independent state-law ground.
Ante, at 245 (quoting 463 U. S., at 1040–1041). Here, the
OCCA expressly held that § 1089(D) barred any relief based
on Napue. 529 P. 3d, at 226. That leaves the “face of the
opinion” as “clear” as it gets. Long, 463 U. S., at 1041. The
majority's tortured reading of the OCCA's “law or fact”
phrase is too farfetched to undermine the force of that “plain
statement” that state law resolved the case. Ibid.
C
Unable to make a plausible case from the four corners of
the opinion below, the majority attempts to bolster its read-
ing by relying on “Oklahoma precedent involving confessions
of error.” Ante, at 243. In particular, in a series of deci-
sions issued between 54 and 106 years ago, the OCCA held
that a confession of error must have “a basis in the law and
in the record” to be sustained. Ante, 244, and n. 6. Accord-
ing to the majority, these decisions establish that whenever
the State identifes that a federal constitutional error oc-
curred, all independent legal grounds for sustaining the judg-
ment disappear. Ante, at 243–245.
We disapproved of the majority's method of fnding juris-
diction in Long. There, we decided that, as a general mat-
ter, we would no longer “decide issues of state law that go
beyond the opinion that we review” to determine whether
a judgment rests on an adequate and independent state
ground. 463 U. S., at 1040. We adopted this practice be-
cause the “process of examining state law” ourselves “re-
quires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally
unfamiliar, and which often . . . have not been discussed at
Page Proof Pending Publication

284 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
length by the parties.” Id., at 1039. That concern is on full
display
here: Not a single merits brief in this case cites any
of the decisions invoked by the majority for its grand theory
of confessions of error under Oklahoma law; the majority de-
veloped it entirely sua sponte. Despite wrapping itself in
the mantle of Long, the majority disregards one of its cen-
tral teachings.
If we are to look at other OCCA decisions, I would start
with history that is more recent and more on point. In re-
sponse to Glossip's fourth application for post-conviction re-
lief, the State explicitly “waive[d] its right to argue the
claims within this . . . application are waived” under the
PCPA. 3 App. 717–718. But, the OCCA refused to accept
the waiver, holding that “[t]his Court alone will determine
whether the rules of this Court should be abandoned.” Id.,
at 775; see also ante, at 238. The OCCA thus made clear
that it would apply the PCPA's procedural bars whether the
State wanted it to or not. It makes no sense to say, just
months later—and in the same case—that the OCCA re-
versed course without explanation and decided that § 1089(D)
becomes irrelevant when the State supports the applicant's
claim for relief (while at the same time holding that § 1089(D)
applies). See ante, at 245. It should go without saying that
a decision issued fve months before the decision below in
Glossip's own case sheds far more light on what the OCCA
meant than decisions issued in different cases a century ago.
In any event, the majority vastly overreads the case law
it cites. The decisions establish the modest point that a con-
fession of error does not automatically entitle a defendant
to relief; rather, the OCCA will independently “examine the
record” to ensure that the confession is “well founded in law.”
Raymer v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 398, 228 P. 500 (1924) (sylla-
bus by the court); see ante, at 243–244, and n. 6. Of course,
a confession that post-conviction relief is warranted is not
well founded if the PCPA bars relief. And, those decisions
nowhere hold that procedural bars that might render an
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
285
Thomas, J., dissenting
error harmless become irrelevant whenever the State con-
fesses
error.
This Court follows the same rule, derived from early Eng-
lish practice, that it must “examine independently” confes-
sions of error before reversing. Young v. United States, 315
U. S. 257, 258–259 (1942) (citing Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527,
2551, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 340–341 (K. B. 1770)). And, this
Court applies independent bars to relief even when the Gov-
ernment confesses error. See, e. g., Grzegorczyk v. United
States, 597 U. S. 937 (2022) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.,
joined by Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, and Barrett,
JJ., respecting denial of certiorari) (rejecting the Govern-
ment's confession of error and request for vacatur of the
judgment below because the defendant's guilty plea waived
his claim). Yet, the majority here foists upon Oklahoma es-
sentially the opposite rule by requiring reversal based on
errors a court has not independently ruled to be reversible.
There is no basis to infer from the OCCA's duty to independ-
ently examine confessions of error that it will ignore inde-
pendent grounds for upholding a conviction.
The Court's detour into state-law materials whose con-
siderati on L o ng strong ly discouraged does noth i ng to
undermine the straightforward conclusion that the decision
below invoked § 1089(D)'s procedural bar as a hurdle inde-
pendent of the Napue claim's merits. That adequate and
independent state ground bars our review of this case.
III
Even if we had jurisdiction, we could not grant relief be-
cause Glossip has failed to show that he is entitled to a hear-
ing on the merits of his Napue claim.
Napue establishes that “a State may not knowingly use
false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted
conviction.” 360 U. S., at 269. If a witness gives false tes-
timony, which the prosecutor knows to be false but fails to
correct, then a new trial is warranted if there is “any reason-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
286 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
able likelihood” that the false testimony could “have affected
the
judgment of the jury.” Id., at 270–271. A Napue claim
therefore requires three elements: falsity, prosecutorial
knowledge, and materiality. Here, the OCCA correctly
held, at minimum, that the Napue claim fails the material-
ity requirement.
6
6
Because the OCCA did not address whether the prosecutors knew that
Sneed's testimony was false, our review of the knowledge element is espe-
cially improper. The rule that “we are a court of review, not of frst
view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005), applies with
special force to such a fact-intensive question. The OCCA, which has
resolved two direct appeals and fve post-conviction applications over two
decades of appeals in this case, is far more steeped in the relevant facts
than this Court. And, it is at least entitled to apply Oklahoma's reticu-
lated post-conviction evidentiary standards in the frst instance. See
Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1089(D)(4)(a)(1); OCCA Rule 9.7(D) (2024). The ma-
jority's analysis well illustrates our comparative disadvantage, as it over-
reads silence and ignores explicit contrary evidence in an effort to leap
across its inferential gaps. For example, Smothermon's notes say nothing
about bipolar disorder or psychiatry. So, even if Sneed said Dr. Trombka
prescribed the lithium, that is no justifcation for inferring that he commu-
nicated the reason for the prescription or the fact that Dr. Trombka is a
psychiatrist. Further, we cannot assume that Smothermon already knew
who Dr. Trombka was at the time of the meeting. In fact, the evidence
suggests the opposite; Smothermon clearly did not understand to whom
Sneed was referring given that she mistook his name for “Trumpet?”
See Figure 1, supra. Finally, the Court overlooks the affdavit submitted
by Glossip from Gary Ackley. It attests that, according to Ackley's con-
temporaneous notes of the meeting, Sneed said something about his
“ `tooth' ” being “ `pulled,' ” 3 App. 940, which is how he said he was mistak-
enly prescribed lithium in Dr. King 's report, see 2 id., at 700. Ackley also
did “not recall knowing or discussing with anyone that Justin Sneed was
on lithium at any time as treatment for bipolar disorder.” 3 id., at 940.
The majority dismisses the signifcance of Sneed's “tooth pulled” com-
ment on the ground that Ackley “knew lithium was not a pain medication.”
Ante, at 248, n. 8. But, whether or not Sneed in fact received lithium in
connection with his tooth being pulled, the fact that Sneed said something
to that effect strongly undermines the supposedly “straightforward infer-
ence . . . that Sneed told Smothermon that Dr. Trombka had prescribed
him the lithium.” Ante, at 248. Sneed's disputed testimony is not that
he received lithium to treat a toothache; it is that he had “never seen” a

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
287
Thomas, J., dissenting
A
The
OCCA held that Sneed's allegedly false statements—
that he had “never seen” a psychiatrist and did not “know
why” he was given lithium—were not material because the
defense already had reason to know about Sneed's condition
but made a strategic decision not to make an issue of it. 529
P. 3d, at 226–227. That holding is correct.
The “touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial.” Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 219 (1982). “Even in cases of egre-
gious prosecutorial misconduct,” we have granted relief
“only when the tainted evidence was material to the case.”
Id., at 220, n. 10. To that end, the proper inquiry is whether
“ `the false testimony' ” could have “ `affected the judgment
of the jury.' ” Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154
(1972) (emphasis added); see also Napue, 360 U. S., at 269
(due process violation occurs where the State “use[s] false
evidence . . . to obtain a tainted conviction”).
There is no reasonable likelihood that Sneed's challenged
testimony changed the jury's verdict, because it did not bear
on any contested issue. As early as 1997, the defense knew
that Sneed likely suffered from an “atypical mood swing dis-
order” that involved “anger outburst[s],” and that his lithium
prescription helped to treat it. 2 App. 699–700, 702–703; see
also ante, at 247 (agreeing that “Glossip had access” to
Sneed's pretrial competency report). On direct appeal from
his frst conviction, Glossip's counsel identifed his use of
“lithium” to “ `not to feel so angry' ” as “vital evidence to
attack Sneed's credibility and the State's specious theory of
the case.” 1 App. 18.
Nonetheless, the defense elected not to raise Sneed's men-
tal condition at the second trial. Given defense counsel's
awareness of the pretrial competency report, this choice
psychiatrist and did not “know why” he was given lithium. 12 Tr. 64
(May 26, 2004).
Page Proof Pending Publication

288 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
must have been a conscious one. Perhaps, as the OCCA
suggested,
the defense was concerned that highlighting
“Sneed's mental health” could have the counterproductive ef-
fect of “showing that he was mentally vulnerable to Glossip's
manipulation and control.” 529 P. 3d, at 226. Or, perhaps
the defense believed it would not be credible to argue that
Sneed acted on impulse in a manic state, given other wit-
nesses' testimony that Sneed possessed a consistently mild-
mannered disposition. See, e. g., 7 Tr. 26 (May 19, 2004); 9
Tr. 17–18 (May 21, 2004). Whatever the reason, the defense
chose not to turn Sneed's mental health into an impeachment
issue. That left no work for Sneed's challenged testimony
to do, so it could not reasonably have affected the jury's ver-
dict. See Napue, 360 U. S., at 269.
The majority concludes otherwise only by redefning the
Napue materiality inquiry. In its view, Sneed's testimony is
material because the jury's verdict could have changed
“[h]ad the prosecution corrected” the testimony. Ante, at
248. Thus, even “wholly irrelevant” testimony that had no
impact on the jury can be material, so long as the act of
correcting it might have caused the jury to doubt the wit-
ness's credibility. Ante, at 249. We have never defned ma-
teriality in these terms. Rather, we have consistently
framed the issue as whether “the false testimony” itself “had
an effect on the outcome.” Napue, 360 U. S., at 272. Thus,
the relevant inquiry under Napue is whether the content of
the false testimony at issue is material. Were the test for
materiality whether a counterfactual correction of a false
statement might tend to undermine the witness's credibility,
the materiality requirement would be meaningless in a great
number of cases.
Napue itself illustrates this point. The “principal state
witness” in that case “testifed . . . that he had received no
promise of consideration in return for his testimony” when
the prosecutor “had in fact promised him consideration” in
the form of support for a reduced sentence. Id., at 265–266.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
289
Thomas, J., dissenting
The Court did not fnd this false testimony material merely
because
such testimony generally undermines a witness's
credibility. Rather, the Court took issue with the content
of the testimony: “Had the jury been apprised of the true
facts, . . . it might well have concluded that [the witness]
had fabricated testimony in order to curry the favor of the”
prosecutor. Id., at 270; see also Wearry v. Cain, 577 U. S.
385, 393–394 (2016) (per curiam) (similarly fnding false tes-
timony material because it concerned whether the witness
was receiving favorable treatment in exchange for testi-
mony); Giglio, 405 U. S., at 154–155 (same).
Rather than base its holding on Napue's actual discussion
of materiality, see 360 U. S., at 270–272, the majority seizes
on a line from a different section of the opinion: that “ ` “[a]
lie is a lie, no matter what its subject.” ' ” Ante, at 249, 253
(quoting 360 U. S., at 269–270). But, the majority omits the
second half of the sentence: “ `and, if it is in any way rele-
vant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility
and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the
truth.' ” Id., at 270 (emphasis added). Read in its entirety,
the sentence makes clear that the prosecutor's “ `duty to cor-
rect' ” is triggered only if the false statement “ `is . . . rele-
vant to the case.' ” Ibid. That specifcation is inconsistent
with the majority's conception of Napue, under which any
known false statement triggers the duty to correct, and then
the question of materiality turns on a counterfactual inquiry
into whether the failure to correct could have affected the
outcome of the trial.
7
7
The full context of Napue's materiality discussion further underscores
the decision's emphasis on the content of the false testimony rather than
the effect of a counterfactual correction:
“Had the jury been apprised of the true facts, however, it might well
have concluded that Hamer [the witness] had fabricated testimony in order
to curry the favor of the very representative of the State who was prose-
cuting the case in which Hamer was testifying, for Hamer might have
believed that such a representative was in a position to implement (as
he ultimately attempted to do) any promise of consideration. That the

290 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
The majority's novel approach also unmoors the Napue
mater
iality standard from its theoretical justifcation. This
Court applies a defendant-friendly standard of materiality to
Napue claims “because they involve a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process.” United States
v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). Where the jury does not
rely on the false testimony because it is irrelevant, no such
corruption occurs.
B
In any event, the majority fails its own test. Even fram-
ing the question as whether a correction could have affected
the outcome of tr ia l, the par ties have not est abl ished
materiality.
First, irrespective of whether Sneed lied, prosecutorial
correction of his testimony would not have led the jury to
infer that he had consciously committed perjury. The far
more plausible inference would have been that Sneed simply
misremembered—like numerous other witnesses in the same
trial. Recall that Glossip's second trial took place seven
years after the events in question and six years after his
frst trial. Many key witnesses in Glossip's second trial tes-
tifed in his frst, leaving them open to impeachment on any
details they remembered differently six years later.
The record is replete with instances of counsel—including
the prosecutors—reminding the State's witnesses of facts
they had forgotten or misremembered. See, e. g., 5 Tr. 90
(May 17, 2004); 7 Tr. 83–85 (May 19, 2004); 8 Tr. 40–42 (May
20, 2004); 9 Tr. 100 (May 21, 2004); 10 Tr. 31 (May 24, 2004);
Assistant State's Attorney himself thought it important to establish before
the jury that no offcial source had promised Hamer consideration is made
clear by his redirect examination, which was the last testimony of Hamer's
heard by the jury:
.....
“[O]ur own evaluation of the record here compels us to hold that the
false testimony used by the State in securing the conviction of petitioner
may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.” 360 U. S., at 270–272.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
291
Thomas, J., dissenting
14 Tr. 18 (May 28, 2004). Moreover, Sneed took lithium for
only
a brief period in 1997. Considering that this testimony
held no signifcance for any contested issue at trial, in this
environment there is no reason to think its correction would
have been noteworthy, much less the voilà moment the ma-
jority imagines.
Second, correcting Sneed's allegedly false statements
would not have led the jury to believe that Sneed's mental
condition led him to attack Van Treese on his own initiative.
To begin with, the prosecution had no Napue obligation to
disclose that Sneed had bipolar disorder. Napue requires
prosecutors “to correct” what they know to be “false testi-
mony,” not to proactively identify impeachment material.
360 U. S., at 265. At most, the only false statement was
Sneed's assertion that he had not seen a psychiatrist. The
OCCA found Sneed “was more than likely in denial of his
mental health disorders.” 529 P. 3d, at 227. This factual
fnding has record support. Sneed asserted during his pre-
trial competency evaluation that he “does not think he has
any serious mental problems.” 2 App. 701. That state-
ment predated his plea agreement and so cannot be chalked
up to trying to maintain his credibility on the stand. The
OCCA thus reasonably found Sneed's statement about his
own knowledge was not false. Nor did Sneed testify that he
was given lithium to treat a cold. See ante, at 253. He said
only that “shortly after” he had asked for Sudafed he was
given lithium for a “reason” that he “d[id]n't know.” 12 Tr.
64 (May 26, 2004). Sneed thus never falsely testifed as to
why he received lithium. And, without knowing why a psy-
chiatrist prescribed lithium to Sneed, a lay jury would not
likely be able to attribute much signifcance to the mere fact
that a psychiatrist did so.
Regardless, there is no reason to think that disclosing
Sneed's bipolar disorder would have affected the outcome of
the trial. Glossip's defense team was well aware of Sneed's
condition and chose not to use it as impeachment evidence.

Page Proof Pending Publication
292 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
As appellate judges examining a cold record 20 years after
the
trial, we should be wary of believing that we understand
the import of evidence better than Glossip's counsel. More-
over, the defense made no effort in its questions and argu-
mentation to lay the groundwork for a theory that Sneed
acted on a manic impulse. So, it is hard to see why the jury
would have developed any theory on its own from a cursory
mention of the condition.
Finally, the Court cannot rescue its materiality analysis
by invoking the cumulative-error doctrine. The Court as-
serts with virtually no legal analysis that various other vio-
lations of state and federal law undermine confdence in the
verdict. Ante, at 250–251. But, the cumulative-error doc-
trine applies only if there are multiple errors to consider
cumulatively. See Wearry, 577 U. S., at 394 (only “wrong-
fully withheld” evidence can be assessed cumulatively under
Brady and Napue); Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F. 3d 810, 852
(CA10 2015) (“We cumulate error only upon a showing of at
least two actual errors”). The OCCA held that the remain-
ing claims of error the Court asserts are either procedurally
barred, meritless, or both. See 529 P. 3d, at 227; 3 App. 776–
783; No. PCD–2022–589 (OCCA, Nov. 10, 2022), p. 11; supra,
at 270–272. We did not grant certiorari to review the cor-
rectness of those decisions, so they are not properly before
us. See Pet. for Cert. i.
In all events, the other claimed violations are meritless or
beyond our jurisdiction. The State's supposed violation of
the rule of sequestration is a state-law issue over which we
have no jurisdiction. See 3 App. 780–781.
8
The evidence-
8
The majority insists that the alleged violation of the rule of sequestra-
tion is more than a state-law issue, ante, at 251, n. 9, but for support it
offers only a case discussing “the ethical limits on guiding witnesses” as
defned by the American Bar Association's model professional responsibil-
ity code for States, see Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80, 90, and n. 3
(1976). Moreover, although the State has confessed a violation of “the
rule of sequestration” (without addressing the OCCA's earlier, contrary
decision, see supra, at 272), it has not conceded that Smothermon improp-
erly infuenced Sneed's testimony, see Brief for Respondent 13; 3 App.

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
293
Thomas, J., dissenting
destruction claim is the majority's own creation. Although
both
parties mention alleged evidence destruction in the
background statements of their briefs, neither argues to this
Court that any destruction of evidence amounted to a viola-
tion of federal law militating in favor of reversal. See Brief
for Petitioner 33–38; Brief for Respondent 30–31. So too,
there is no evidence that Sneed wished to “recant” his testi-
mony, ante, at 251; to the contrary, Sneed explained to Reed
Smith that “recant[ing]” was “impossible because I told the
truth,” 3 App. 724 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also n. 2, supra (further explaining that Sneed has never de-
nied the truth of his testimony against Glossip). And, the
claim that Glossip sold his couch and television for $900 on
January 8—thus suggesting an alternative source for the
money he stole from Van Treese—is a nonstarter: Glossip
himself testifed under oath that he received only $490 for
those items and others. 15 Tr. 17 (June 1, 2004).
In short, even setting aside our lack of jurisdiction, Glossip
still lacks a valid Napue claim because Sneed's allegedly false
testimony was immaterial.
IV
Having erred in both its threshold and merits analyses, the
majority rounds out its opinion with an indefensible remedial
decree. Rather than vacate the decision below, the majority
takes the remarkable step of requiring a new trial. Ante,
978. Such a claim is utterly unsupported. Glossip initially based this
accusation on “handwritten notes” found in a copy of Smothermon's letter
to Sneed's attorney, which Glossip claimed were instructions from Smoth-
ermon on what Sneed was to say at trial. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–
6500, p. 20. But, Glossip now concedes that those notes came from
Sneed's attorney, not Smothermon. Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 4. Despite
this concession, the majority asserts that Smothermon acted improperly
when she stated at trial that, although she had spoken with Sneed's attor-
ney, she had never before heard him claim that he had attempted to stab
Van Treese in the chest. Ante, at 251–252, n. 9 (citing 12 Tr. 107–108
(May 26, 2004)). The majority offers no evidence to suggest that this
statement was false. Yet, it insists on deeming Smothermon's conduct a
serious ethical breach.

294 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
at 256–258. But, whether Glossip is entitled to a new trial
tur
ns on several unresolved questions of state law that this
Court has no authority to disregard or decide for itself.
And, at the very least, Glossip cannot show that he is entitled
to relief without an evidentiary hearing.
A
Even if the majority is correct that this Court has jurisdic-
tion and that the OCCA misapplied Napue, the appropriate
remedy is to remand for further proceedings. This Court
has no authority to order a new trial.
1
This Court cannot order a new trial unless federal law re-
quired the OCCA to do so in the decision below. “It is be-
yond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over
the courts of the several States.” Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U. S. 428, 438 (2000). “Our only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incor-
rectly adjudge federal rights.” Herb, 324 U. S., at 125–126.
Even when a federal question gives this Court jurisdiction
to review a state-court judgment, “State courts” remain “the
only proper tribunal” for “the decision of questions” in the
case “arising under their local law.” Murdock v. Memphis,
20 Wall. 590, 626 (1875). Thus, when a state court's judg-
ment rests on an erroneous interpretation of federal law, this
Court must “either render such judgment here as the State
court should have rendered, or remand the case to that court,
as the circumstances of the case may require.” Id., at 636.
It has no authority to order relief that the state court could
legitimately have refused. And, naturally, we cannot deter-
mine what judgment “the State court should have rendered”
if doing so requires resolving questions of state law beyond
our jurisdiction. Id., at 626, 636. In such cases, remand is
the only legitimate disposition. Id., at 636.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
295
Thomas, J., dissenting
Our customary practice refects these principles. “Nor-
ma
lly the Supreme Court, when reversing a state court judg-
ment, remands the case for proceedings `not inconsistent'
with the Court's opinion. The state court is therefore free
to resolve any undecided questions or even to alter its deter-
mination of underlying state law.” W. Baude, J. Goldsmith,
J. Manning, J. Pfander, & A. Tyler, Hart and Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 634 (8th ed. 2025)
(Hart & Wechsler); accord, S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop,
E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice
§ 3.27, p. 3–94 (11th ed. 2019). The Court usually refrains
from directing a specifc form of relief even when reversing
decisions made on direct appeal of a criminal conviction, with
no apparent issues of state law remaining to be decided.
See, e. g., Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U. S. 66, 82–83
(2023); Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U. S. 629, 656 (2022);
Hemphill v. New York, 595 U. S. 140, 156 (2022).
2
The Court today instead “remand[s] the case for a new trial.”
Ante, at 231. This step would be unusual even on direct
review. In the context of a successive motion for post-
conviction relief in a state-law regime replete with special-
ized procedural requirements, it is without precedent. And,
more importantly, the majority's directive exceeds the limits
on this Court's jurisdiction. For at least three reasons,
state-law questions prevent this Court from holding that the
OCCA should have granted Glossip a new trial below.
First, the majority's jurisdictional holding necessarily
leaves open state-law questions for the OCCA to address on
remand. The Court fnds jurisdiction by invoking the Long
presumption that a state court “reli[es] on federal law” when
it is “insuffciently `clear from the face of the opinion' ” that
its decision rests on state law. Ante, at 245 (quoting 463
U. S., at 1040–1041). But, the Long presumption is just
Page Proof Pending Publication

296 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
that—a presumption. When this Court invokes it, state
cour
ts “remai[n] free” to “ `reinstat[e] their prior judgments
after clarifying their reliance on state grounds.' ” Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 8, and n. 3 (1995); see also Kansas v.
Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 128 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that, when this Court relies on the Long pre-
sumption, the “lower court is able to reinstate its holding as
a matter of state law”). “Even when the Supreme Court
does review an ambiguous decision and reverses on the fed-
eral issue, the state courts retain the power on remand to
consider independent state-law grounds and, indeed, to rely
on such grounds in reinstating their initia l judg ment. ”
Hart & Wechsler 672. The OCCA is therefore entitled to
clarify that it meant to invoke § 1089(D)'s bar on subsequent
applications even accepting the majority's Napue analysis.
The majority's contrary directive ignores settled law.
This error is no mere technical violation. It erases an es-
sential component of the Long presumption, which is meant
to “preserve the integrity of federal law” and to “provide
state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state ju-
risprudence unimpeded by federal interference.” 463 U. S.,
at 1041. Presuming a federal basis for ambiguous decisions
ensures that States cannot evade federal review by obfusca-
tion. At the same time, allowing for clarifcation on remand
preserves state courts' freedom to develop and apply their
own law as they see ft. We have even said that reversing
under the Long presumption makes state courts “freer” to
develop their own law because they can do so while “disa-
bused of [an] erroneous view of what the United States Con-
stitution requires.” Evans, 514 U. S., at 8. In contrast,
under the majority's approach, ambiguity in the decision
below gives this Court license to vaporize any independent
state grounds that it does not like, no matter how clearly
they ought to apply as a matter of state law. This sort of
federal power grab dishonors our dual system of state and
federal courts.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
297
Thomas, J., dissenting
Second, even setting aside § 1089(D)(8), there are several
potentia
l independent state-law grounds for denying relief
that the OCCA has not yet considered. Where there is “a
possible adequate and independent state ground” for the de-
cision below that “was not addressed by the state court,”
“the state court may address th[e] question on remand.”
California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 997–998, n. 7 (1983).
Indeed, the “settled rule” is that “the Supreme Court will
remand to permit the state court to resolve the unde-
termined state law issue.” Hart & Wechsler 655. “The
state court remains free to reinstate its prior judgment
on that state-law ground.” Ibid. (collecting cases of re-
instatement); see also Smith v. Texas, 550 U. S. 297,
325 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]n cases in which this
Court has reversed a state-court decision based on a pos-
sible federal constitutional violation, it is not uncommon for
the state court on remand to reinstate the same judgment
on state-law grounds” (collecting cases)). Here, several
potential grounds for reinstating the decision below are
apparent.
To begin, the alleged Napue violation may be harmless
under the PCPA's prejudice standard. See § 1089(C)(2).
Below, the OCCA recognized that this standard required
Glossip to prove that preventing the errors he alleged
“would have changed the outcome” of the trial. 529 P. 3d,
at 224; see § 1089(C)(2). In its confession of error, the State
also agreed that “Glossip needs to show . . . that the outcome
of the trial would have been different.” 3 App. 976 (citing
§ 1089(C)). The OCCA had no occasion to consider this
standard, however, because it concluded that any false testi-
mony would have been immaterial under the federal no-
reasonable-probability standard. See 529 P. 3d, at 227.
The Court today applies that standard and disagrees. Ante,
at 248–252. But, no court has yet applied § 1089(C)(2)'s
higher—and concededly applicable—standard. The OCCA
should have the chance to do so on remand.
Page Proof Pending Publication

298 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
In addition, in the proceedings below, only the State ar-
g
ued that there was a Napue violation, and it is unclear
whether the State can raise a claim on a defendant's behalf.
See § 1089(A) (assuming that an “application for postconvic-
tion relief ” comes from “a defendant”). Nor is it clear that
the State timely raised its Napue objection. State law re-
quired Glossip to fle his application within 60 days of the
State's disclosure of Box 8. See OCCA Rule 9.7(G)(3).
Glossip met that deadline. The State did not. See 3 App.
973 (response dated 69 days after disclosure of Box 8).
Thus, any Napue claim is at least arguably untimely. And,
there may be more state-law issues for the OCCA to consider
of which we are unaware simply because we are unfamiliar
w ith Oklahoma's h igh ly specia l i zed post-conv ic ti on
procedure.
Third, even if state law does not bar Glossip's Napue claim
entirely, state law appears not to authorize a new trial as the
remedy for a violation at this stage. Cf. Price v. Georgia,
398 U. S. 323, 332 (1970) (remanding after fnding petitioner's
conviction unconstitutional because petitioner's precise rem-
edy turned “upon the construction of several Georgia stat-
utes and on the power of Georgia courts to fashion remedial
orders” “under Georgia law”). The PCPA authorizes only
two dispositions of a capital post-conviction application when
it is frst fled with the OCCA: denial, or remand to the trial
court for a merits determination. §§ 1089(D)(4) and (5).
The OCCA has made clear that the Act does not authorize
vacating the applicant's conviction or sentence at that initial
stage, for “affdavits and evidentiary materials fled in sup-
port of a post-conviction application are not part of the trial
record but are only part of the capital post-conviction rec-
ord.” Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2, ¶11, 105 P. 3d 832,
835. “As such, those affdavits and evidentiary materials are
not reviewed on their merits but are reviewed . . . `[t]o deter-
mine if a threshold showing is met to require a review on
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
299
Thomas, J., dissenting
the merits.' ” Ibid. (quoting OCCA Rule 9.7(D)(1)(a); em-
phasis
added).
In this respect, the OCCA's initial review of capital post-
conviction proceedings is analogous to AEDPA's procedure
for second and successive federal habeas petitions. Before
an applicant can proceed with such a petition, he must frst
fle a motion for authorization in the court of appeals. 28
U. S. C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). If the applicant makes a prima facie
showing that he satisfes the special requirements for second
and successive petitions, the court of appeals authorizes pro-
ceedings in the district court. § 2244(b)(3)(C). But, if the
applicant fails to make a prima facie showing, the court of
appeals denies authorization, and the proceedings end. No
matter how strong the applicant's ultimate claim, the court
of appeals cannot grant habeas relief at that stage; only a
district court may do so. For the same reason, it makes no
sense to say that no “further evidentiary proceedings” are
warranted because the OCCA “agree[d]” they are unneces-
sary. Ante, at 256. The OCCA's authority to deny relief
without a hearing does not imply corresponding authority to
summarily grant relief.
In short, multiple state-law issues foreclose this Court
from holding that the OCCA “should have rendered” a “judg-
ment” ordering a new trial. Murdock, 20 Wall., at 636.
The Court therefore has no authority to order one itself.
3
The majority insists that “Glossip is entitled to a new trial”
simply because “this Court has jurisdiction” and “[a] new
trial is the remedy for a Napue violation.” Ante, at 258.
This response overlooks, however, that “States may apply
their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims.” How-
lett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372 (1990). Here, Glossip seeks
post-conv ic ti on rel ief under Oklahoma's PCPA. See
§ 1080(1); supra, at 277–279. Under that Act, a new trial is not
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
300 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
the remedy for a Napue violation unless Glossip also satisfes
cer
tain procedural requirements and unless his case frst pro-
ceeds to a merits hearing before a state trial court. See
§ 1089(D)(4); Slaughter, 105 P. 3d, at 835.
For similar reasons, the majority's reliance on Ake v. Okla-
homa, 470 U. S. 68 (1985), in which this Court reversed the
OCCA and remanded for a new trial, id., at 73–74, 87, is
misplaced. See ante, at 258. The asserted state ground in
that case was a “waiver rule” with an established exception
for “federal constitutional errors.” 470 U. S., at 74–75. In
other words, the waiver rule turned on “whether federal con-
stitutional error ha[d] been committed.” Id., at 75. Thus,
it was perfectly clear that the rule there could not supply an
independent ground for denying a federal constitutional
claim. And, because the case arose on direct review, id., at
73–74, the Court could also have confdence that no other
state ground could support the decision below, and therefore
that the petitioner was legally entitled to a new trial. Here,
by contrast, the Court has found jurisdiction only by apply-
ing the Long presumption; the case arises from a subsequent
post-conviction application in a complex state-law regime
that imposes numerous procedural bars; there are several
state grounds that could foreclose relief entirely; and the
OCCA issued the decision below in a preliminary posture in
which it was not authorized to order a new trial. Further,
although the new-trial order in Ake was legally defensible,
it was still a signifcant departure from ordinary practice,
which is to remand for further proceedings even on direct
review. See supra, at 294–295.
The majority further insists that no “precedent” requires
a remand based on the Long presumption. Ante, at 257. It
claims that at most this Court has recognized the power of
state courts to “ `grant relief to criminal defendants' ” under
state law after erroneously granting relief under federal law.
Ibid. That assertion is incorrect. Evans recognized state

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
301
Thomas, J., dissenting
courts' power to reinstate their judgments after reversal as
par
t of a general discussion of the Long presumption. See
514 U. S., at 7–9. Its reasoning was not confned to the spe-
cifc context of a state court granting relief to a criminal
defendant. Similarly, treatise writers have recognized that
state courts can reinstate their judgments whenever this
Court “review[s] an ambiguous decision.” Hart & Wechsler
672. And, more fundamentally, when this Court asserts ju-
risdiction based on the Long presumption, “we merely as-
sume that there are no [adequate and independent state]
grounds” justifying the decision below; we do not conclu-
sively decide that none exists. 463 U. S., at 1042 (emphasis
added). Without a defnitive ruling that no independent
state ground bars ordering a new trial, we cannot hold that
ordering a new trial is the “judgment” that “the State court
should have rendered.” Murdock, 20 Wall., at 636. The
majority cannot have it both ways. If it wants to rely on
the Long presumption to fnd jurisdiction, it must accept the
limitations that the presumption entails.
4
Finally, the majority asserts that Glossip is presently enti-
tled to a new trial, because, under Oklahoma law, a conces-
sion that an error occurred at trial renders irrelevant all
other legal obstacles to a new trial. Ante, at 256–257. As
I have already explained, the precedents cited by the Court
do not support that proposition; they establish only that
courts have an independent duty to assess confessed errors
for themselves, which is nearly the opposite of the majority's
point. Supra, at 284–285. To make matters even more im-
plausible, the Court apparently interprets this principle to
mean that a confession of error transforms a nonmerits pre-
liminary proceeding into a merits proceeding where the
OCCA can directly order ultimate relief. And, more impor-
tantly, it is for the OCCA to decide whether state law ent-
Page Proof Pending Publication

302 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
tles Glossip to a new trial at this time, and it is absurd to
th
ink that the only conclusion the OCCA could reach is the
majority's.
B
Even if we could blind ourselves to the foregoing proce-
dural issues, Glossip would still be entitled to no more than
an evidentiary hearing on his Napue claim. The Court says
that the facts “supported by the record establish a violation
of Napue,” as though it were a trial court making fndings
after an evidentiary hearing. Ante, at 258. That approach
cannot possibly be right. The PCPA envisions that further
proceedings are necessary if there are “controverted, pre-
viously unresolved factual issues.” § 1089(D)(5). On this
record, I do not see how one could conclude that there is not
even a genuine issue of fact as to whether a Napue claim
has been established—especially considering that Glossip
himself recognized below that, without further discovery,
his claims rested on “speculation.” Motion for Evidentiary
Hearing, at 1–2.
Concluding that no new factual development is needed is
particularly inappropriate given the alternative reading of
the notes advanced by the Van Treese family in this Court.
As discussed above, the family has argued that the supposed
“smoking gun”—the notes from Box 8—in fact refects
Sneed's recollection of what defense counsel had asked him at
two prior meetings. Supra, at 273–275, and n. 3. Smother-
mon and Ackley have likewise endorsed this interpretation,
which casts serious doubt on Glossip's and the State's theory.
Ibid. If Sneed simply reported that he was asked about Dr.
Trombka without admitting Dr. Trombka prescribed him
lithium, Smothermon and Ackley would have had no reason
to know that Dr. Trombka prescribed him lithium. And, the
indication in Ackley's notes that Sneed apparently mentioned
his “ `tooth' ” being “ `pulled' ” suggests that Sneed stood by
his earlier story that he was mistakenly prescribed lithium
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 226 (2025)
303
Thomas, J., dissenting
when his tooth was pulled. 3 App. 940; see 2 id., at 700
(Sneed'
s earlier statement).
Given the existence of a plausible alternative interpreta-
tion of the evidence, I would not order a new trial at this
time even if we had discretion to do so. To the extent the
Court insists it cannot endorse the family's theory because
it relies on “extra-record materials not properly before the
Court,” ante, at 254, such as parts of Ackley's notes, that is
because the parties collusively excluded this highly relevant
evidence from the record in order to reach a predetermined
outcome. The majority rewards this gamesmanship, and in
so doing denies the victim's family the opportunity to present
contrary evidence.
The “Government should turn square corners in dealing
with the people.” St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368
U. S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). That command
extends not only to criminal defendants, but also to their
victims. “[C]onducting retrials years later inficts substan-
tial pain on crime victims,” who must “relive their trauma
and testify again,” in this case 28 “years after the crim[e]
occurred. ” Edw ards v. Vanno y, 593 U. S. 255, 263 –264
(2021). The Oklahoma Constitution recognizes this interest
by giving crime victims like the Van Treese family the
right—“which shall be protected by law in a manner no less
vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused”—“to be
heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing,
disposition, parole and any proceeding during which a right
of the victim is implicated.” Art. II, § 34(A). Glossip, on
the other hand, would suffer no prejudice from an eviden-
tiary hearing in which the Van Treese family had the oppor-
tunity to present its case. If the evidence is as decisive as
the majority believes, Glossip would still receive a new trial.
There is no excuse for denying the Van Treese family its day
in court.
After having bent the law at every turn to grant relief to
Glossip, the Court suddenly retreats to faux formalism when
Page Proof Pending Publication

304 GLOSSIP
v. OKLAHOMA
Thomas, J., dissenting
dealing with the victim's family. The Court concludes that
it
need not honor the family's right to be heard because the
family did not request an evidentiary hearing earlier in the
proceedings. Ante, at 256, n. 11. But, the family had no
need to do so, since Glossip had conceded that “a hearing is
necessary” for his claim to rise above the level of “specula-
tion.” Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, at 2. And, before
this Court, the Van Treese family has vigorously asserted its
interests. The family fled the only brief opposing certiorari
in this case. See Brief for Victim Family Members et al. as
Amici Curiae in Opposition. It fled a merits brief high-
lighting critical evidence that the parties sought to sweep
under the rug. See supra, at 273–275, and n. 3. And, it
fled a motion to participate in oral argument, which this
Court denied. 603 U. S. 941 (2024). The majority's asser-
tion that the family has sat on its rights is groundless. Nor
is there any reason to believe that Oklahoma victims' right
to be heard in “any proceeding,” Art. II, § 34(A), contains an
implicit exception for “post-conviction hearings,” ante, at
256, n. 11. Finally, even if the family had no formal right to
be heard, any reasonable factfnder plainly could consider the
account of the evidence that the family has brought to light,
making the majority's procedural objections beside the point.
Make no mistake: The majority is choosing to cast aside the
family's interests. I would not.
***
The Court's decision distorts our jurisdiction, imagines a
constitutional violation where none occurred, and abandons
basic principles governing the disposition of state-court ap-
peals. I respectfully dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 229, line 26: “157 P. 3d 143” is changed to “529 P. 3d 218”
p. 251, n. 9, line 4: “that” is inserted before “Sneed”
p. 258, line 4: “state” is inserted before “constitutional”