Fischer v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 603 U. S. Part 1
Pages 480–519
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 28, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
480 OCTOBER
TERM, 2023
Syllabus
FISCHER v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 23–5572. Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who
corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document,
or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the ob-
ject's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. ” 18
U. S. C. § 1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to
anyone who “otherwise obstructs, infuences, or impedes any offcial pro-
ceeding, or attempts to do so.” § 1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer
was charged with violating § 1512(c)(2) for his conduct on January 6,
2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the
votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of
supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capi-
tol, and some eventually forced their way into the building, breaking
windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol
delayed the certifcation of the vote. The criminal complaint alleges
that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was
charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including ob-
structing an offcial proceeding in violation of § 1512(c)(2). He moved
to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminalizes only at-
tempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District
Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C.
Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Held: To prove a violation of § 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish
that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an
offcial proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used
in an offcial proceeding, or attempted to do so. Pp. 485–498.
(a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in
§ 1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding
words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and
“ `give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.' ”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Men-
asche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539). The Court considers both “the specifc
context” in which (c)(2) appears “and the broader context of the statute
as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341. Pp. 486–492.
(1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal conduct
in specifc terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to cover

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
481
Syllabus
some set of “matters not specifcally contemplated” by (c)(1). Republic
o
f Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought to crimi-
nalize all obstructive acts in § 1512(c), and having named a few examples
in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could have a nar-
rower scope if Congress designed it to fll inadvertent gaps in the fo-
cused language of (c)(1).
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for
guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general princi-
ples are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a
word is “given more precise content by the neighboring words with
which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294.
And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective
term at the end of a list of specifc items is typically controlled and
defned by reference to those specifc items that precede it. Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458. These approaches to statu-
tory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress
would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless
the specifc text that accompanies it.
Under these principles, the “otherwise” provision of § 1512(c)(2) is lim-
ited by the list of specifc criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). If,
as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive conduct
beyond § 1512(c)(1)'s focus on evidence impairment, Congress would
have had little reason to provide any specifc examples at all. And the
sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that narrower
provision with no work to do.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the dis-
tinct purpose of each provision. Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defned
set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, im-
pair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for
use in an offcial proceeding. Reading the “otherwise” clause as having
been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a
crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or
objects used in an offcial proceeding in ways other than those specifed
in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false
evidence—rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection
(c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the avail-
ability or integrity of other things used in an offcial proceeding beyond
the “record[s], document[s], or other object[s]” enumerated in (c)(1), such
as witness testimony or intangible information. Pp. 486–491.
(2) It makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the
history of the provision. The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loop-
hole in § 1512. At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone
who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred
Page Proof Pending Publication

482 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
documents. But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who
destroyed
records himself. The parties agree that Congress enacted
§ 1512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loophole.
It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress
created a catchall provision that reaches beyond the scenarios that
prompted the legislation. Pp. 491–492.
(b) The broader context of § 1512 in the criminal code confrms that
(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists
of numerous provisions that target specifc criminal acts and settings,
much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all
obstructive conduct. Given the Court's obligation to give meaning
where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S.,
at 404, the Court's narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) is the
superior one.
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render
superfuous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive con-
duct in § 1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of nearly
two dozen means of committing obstruction with penalties ranging from
three years to life in prison, or even death. The Government's reading
would lump together under (c)(2) disparate types of conduct for which
Congress had assigned proportionate sentences. Pp. 492–496.
(c) The Government's theory would also criminalize a broad swath of
prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison.
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist reading ”
particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall” statute. Yates, 574
U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion). Nothing in the text or statutory his-
tory gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today. And
the Government's interpretation would give prosecutors broad discre-
tion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw ft to
punish with far shorter sentences. By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1),
the Court affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in
carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defning crimes and
setting the penalties for them. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593,
600. Pp. 496–498.
64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Jackson, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 498. Barrett, J., fled a dissenting
opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 506.
Jeffrey T. Green argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Heidi R. Freese, Ronald A. Krauss,
and Frederick W. Ulrich.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
483
Opinion of the Court
Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for the
U
nited States. With her on the brief were Acting Assistant
Attorney General Argentieri, Deputy Solicitor General Fei-
gin, Matthew Guarnieri, and James I. Pearce.*
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability
on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or con-
ceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do
so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or avail-
abi l ity for use i n an officia l proceedi ng. ” 18 U. S. C.
§ 1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition
to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, infuences, or impedes
any offcial proceeding, or attempts to do so.” § 1512(c)(2).
We consider whether this “otherwise” clause should be read
in light of the limited reach of the specifc provision that
precedes it.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for America's Future
et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Robert J. Olson, Patrick
M. McSweeney, J. Mark Brewer, Michael Boos, Daniel H. Jorjani, and
John I. Harris III; for Citizens Concerned for the Constitutional Rights
of Defendants by Paloma A. Capanna; for Liberty Counsel Action, Inc.,
by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, and Horatio G. Mihet; for Sen.
Tom Cotton et al. by R. Trent McCotter and Gene P. Hamilton; and for
Christopher Warnagiris et al. by Theodore M. Cooperstein and Marina
Medvin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Former Govern-
ment Offcials et al. by Matthew A. Seligman, Fred Wertheimer, and E.
Danya Perry; and for John Danforth et al. by Richard D. Bernstein,
pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American Center for Law and
Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Jordan A. Sekulow, Walter
M. Weber, and Benjamin P. Sisney; for the FormerFedsGroup Freedom
Foundation et al. by Edward Lacy Tarpley, Jr.; for the LONANG Institute
by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A. Pentiuk; and for Law-Linguistics
Research Team Clark D. Cunningham et al. by Clark D. Cunningham,
pro se.
Page Proof Pending Publication

484 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
I
Th
is case concerns the prosecution of petitioner Joseph Fi-
scher for his conduct on January 6, 2021. That day, both
Houses of Congress convened in a joint session to certify the
votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so,
a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gath-
ered outside the Capitol. As set forth in the criminal com-
plaint against Fischer, some of the crowd eventually “forced
entry” into the building, “breaking windows,” and “assault-
ing members of the U.S. Capitol Police.” App. 189. This
breach of the Capitol caused Members of Congress to evacu-
ate the Chambers and delayed the certifcation process.
The complaint alleges that Fischer was one of those who in-
vaded the building.
According to the complaint, about an hour after the Houses
recessed, Fischer trespassed into the Capitol and was in-
volved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement.
Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed police
back about 25 feet,” and that he “was inside the [Capitol]
talking to police.” Id., at 193–194. Body camera footage
shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and police
who were trying to eject trespassers from the building. Id.,
at 195–196.
A grand jury retur ned a seven-count superseding in-
dictment against Fischer. Six of those counts allege that
Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal offcer, entered and re-
mained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly
and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes.
See id., at 181–185; 18 U. S. C. §§ 111(a), 231(a)(3), 1752(a)(1),
(a)(2); 40 U. S. C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), (G). Those six counts
carry maximum penalties ranging from six months' to eight
years' imprisonment.
In Count Three, the only count now before us, the Govern-
ment charged Fischer with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1512(c)(2).
Fischer moved to dismiss that count, arguing that the provi-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
485
Opinion of the Court
sion criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or
i
ntegrity of evidence. The District Court granted his mo-
tion in relevant part. It concluded that the scope of Section
1512(c)(2) is limited by subsection (c)(1) and therefore re-
quires the defendant to “ `have taken some action with re-
spect to a document, record, or other object.' ” 2022 WL
782413, *4 (DC, Mar. 15, 2022) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022)).
A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings. Judge Pan, writing for the
court, held that the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2)
means that the provision unambiguously covers “all forms of
corrupt obstruction of an offcial proceeding, other than the
conduct that is already covered by § 1512(c)(1).” 64 F. 4th
329, 336 (2023). Judge Walker concurred in part and con-
curred in the judgment because he read the mens rea ele-
ment of the statute—“corruptly”—as requiring a defendant
to act with “an intent to procure an unlawful beneft.” Id.,
at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judge Katsas dissented. In his view, the language in sub-
section (c)(1) narrows the language that comes after the
word “otherwise” in subsection (c)(2). He therefore con-
strued Section 1512(c)(2) as applying “only to acts that,” like
the ones specifed in (c)(1), “affect the integrity or availability
of evidence” at an offcial proceeding. Id., at 363.
We granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ––– (2023).
II
The controversy before us is about the scope of the resid-
ual “otherwise” clause in Section 1512(c)(2). On the one
hand, Fischer contends that (c)(2) “applies only to acts that
affect the integrity or availability of evidence.” Brief for
Petitioner 8. On the other, the Government argues that
(c)(2) “capture[s] all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Sec-
tion 1512(c)(1)'s focus on evidence impairment.” Brief for
United States 13.
Page Proof Pending Publication

486 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Resolving such a dispute requires us to determine how the
residua
l clause is linked to its “surrounding words.” Yates
v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality opinion);
see, e. g., United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 774–775
(2023). In doing so, “we must `give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of [the] statute.' ” Williams v. Tay-
lor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting United States v. Men-
asche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955)). To that end, we con-
sider both “the specifc context” in which (c)(2) appears “and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997); see, e. g., Pulsifer v.
United States, 601 U. S. 124, 133 (2024) (choosing between
“two grammatically permissible ways” to read a sentencing
statute “by reviewing text in context”).
A
1
Section 1512 provides:
“(c) Whoever corruptly—
“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the
intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for
use in an offcial proceeding; or
“(2) otherwise obstructs, infuences, or impedes
any offcial proceeding, or attempts to do so,
“shall be fned . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.”
Subsection (c)(1) describes particular types of criminal
conduct in specifc terms. To ensure the statute would not
be read as excluding substantially similar activity not men-
tioned, (c)(2) says it is also illegal to engage in some broader
range of unenumerated conduct.
The purpose of the “otherwise” clause is therefore, as the
parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifcally
contemplated” by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
487
Opinion of the Court
848, 860 (2009); see Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for United
St
ates 12–13. The problem is defning what exactly Con-
gress left for (c)(2). Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize
all obstructive acts in Section 1512(c), and having named a
few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest in
one go. The point of (c)(1) would then be to illustrate just
one type of conduct among many (c)(2) prohibits; it would be
subsidiary to the overarching prohibition in (c)(2). But (c)(2)
could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed it
with the focused language of (c)(1) in mind. Subsection
(c)(1) would then prohibit particular types of obstructive con-
duct and (c)(2) would fll any inadvertent gaps that might exist.
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is
to look for guidance from whatever examples come before
it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of
noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is associ-
ated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008).
That “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that
it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps.” Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under the re-
lated canon of ejusdem generis, “a `general or collective
term' at the end of a list of specifc items” is typically “ `con-
trolled and defned by reference' to the specifc classes . . .
that precede it.” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S.
450, 458 (2022) (quoting frst Ali v. Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001)); accord, Bissonnette v.
LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246, 252 (2024).
These approaches to statutory interpretation track the com-
mon sense intuition that Congress would not ordinarily in-
troduce a general term that renders meaningless the specifc
text that accompanies it.
To see why, consider a straightforward example. A zoo
might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw
objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.” If a vis-
Page Proof Pending Publication

488 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
itor eats lunch in front of a hungry gorilla, or talks to a friend
near
its enclosure, has he obeyed the regulation? Surely
yes. Although the smell of human food or the sound of
voices might well disturb gorillas, the specifc examples of
impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with and
harassment of the zoo animals. Merely eating or talking is
so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it would
be implausible to assume those activities were prohibited,
even if literally covered by the language.
The idea is simply that a general phrase can be given a
more focused meaning by the terms linked to it. That prin-
ciple ensures—regardless of how complicated a sentence
might appear—that none of its specifc parts are made redun-
dant by a clause literally broad enough to include them. See
Yates, 574 U. S., at 545–546 (plurality opinion). For in-
stance, a football league might adopt a rule that players must
not “grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equip-
ment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack,
assault, or harm any player.” If a linebacker shouts insults
at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the linebacker
nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has. The ex-
amples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical
conduct that might infict bodily harm; trash talk is simply
not of that kind. See 64 F. 4th, at 365–366 (Katsas, J.,
dissenting).
Similarly improbable consequences can result from unteth-
ering an “otherwise” provision from the rest of a criminal
statute. Take Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008)
(abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States,
576 U. S. 591 (2015)). The question there was whether driv-
ing under the infuence qualifed as a “violent felony” under
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A “violent fel-
ony” was defned in relevant part by ACCA as a crime, pun-
ishable by more than a year's imprisonment, that “ `is bur-
glary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
489
Opinion of the Court
risk of physical injury to another.' ” 553 U. S., at 139–140
(
quoting 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 ed.)). We recog-
nized that, depending on the context, “the word `otherwise'
can”—though not “must”—“refer to a crime that is similar to
the listed examples in some respects but different in others.”
553 U. S., at 144 (emphasis deleted). And we held that while
driving under the infuence certainly may present a serious
risk of physical injury, such an offense was so dissimilar from
the previously enumerated examples that it could not be
classifed as a “violent felony” under the statute. Id., at
142–146. The list of crimes that preceded the residual
clause—burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explo-
sives—focused on “purposeful, violent, and aggressive con-
duct.” Id., at 144–145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And if that focus did not extend to the residual clause,
ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence would apply
to a host of offenses “not typically committed by those whom
one normally labels `armed career criminals' ” and that were
“far removed . . . from the deliberate kind of behavior associ-
ated with violent criminal use of frearms.”
1
Id., at 146–
147.
The “otherwise” provision of Section 1512(c)(2) is similarly
limited by the preceding list of criminal violations. The of-
fenses enumerated in subsection (c)(1) cover someone who
“alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document,
or other object . . . with the intent to impair the object's
integrity or availability for use in an offcial proceeding.”
Complex as subsection (c)(1) may look, it simply consists of
many specifc examples of prohibited actions undertaken
with the intent to impair an object's integrity or availability
1
The dissent explains that we subsequently held the ACCA residual
clause void for vagueness. See post, at 512 (opinion of Barrett, J.) (cit-
ing Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015)). That our answer
to the narrow question presented in Begay did not resolve a broader con-
stitutional defect in the statute says little about whether the reasoning of
Begay is relevant here.

490 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
for use in an offcial proceeding: altering a record, altering a
document,
concealing a record, concealing a document, and
so on. That list is followed immediately by a residual clause
in (c)(2). Guided by the basic logic that Congress would not
go to the trouble of spelling out the list in (c)(1) if a neighbor-
ing term swallowed it up, the most sensible inference is that
the scope of (c)(2) is defned by reference to (c)(1).
If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers “all forms of
obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)'s focus on evi-
dence impairment,” Brief for United States 13, there would
have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specifc
examples at all. The sweep of subsection (c)(2) would con-
sume (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work to
do. Indeed, subsection (c)(1) would be an elaborate pump-
fake: a list of four types of highly particularized conduct,
performed with respect to a record, document, or object and
“with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availabil-
ity for use in an offcial proceeding,” followed in the very
next subsection—in the same sentence, no less—by a super-
seding prohibition on all means of obstructing, infuencing,
or impeding any offcial proceeding. Construing Section
1512 in such a way gets the “familiar” analysis we apply to
these types of statutes “exactly backwards,” eliminating spe-
cifc terms because of broad language that follows them,
rather than limiting the broad language in light of narrower
terms that precede it. Bissonnette, 601 U. S., at 252, 255.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recog-
nizes the distinct purpose of each provision. See A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law 208 (2012) (“evident purpose” helps
defne scope of catchall provision). As we have explained,
subsection (c)(1) refers to a defned set of offense conduct—
four types of actions that, by their nature, impair the integ-
rity or availability of records, documents, or objects for use
in an offcial proceeding. When the phrase “otherwise ob-
structs, infuences, or impedes any offcial proceeding ” is
read as having been given more precise content by that nar-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
491
Opinion of the Court
rower list of conduct, subsection (c)(2) makes it a crime to
i
mpair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or
objects used in an offcial proceeding in ways other than those
specifed in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate
(c)(2) by creating false evidence—rather than altering in-
criminating evidence. See, e. g., United States v. Reich, 479
F. 3d 179, 185–187 (CA2 2007) (Sotomayor, J.) (prosecution
under subsection (c)(2) for transmitting a forged court order).
Subsection (c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for
impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in
an offcial proceeding beyond the “record[s], document[s], or
other object[s]” enumerated in (c)(1), such as witness testi-
mony or intangible information. See, e. g., United States v.
Mintmire, 507 F. 3d 1273, 1290 (CA11 2007) (prosecution
under subsection (c)(2) based in part on the defendant's at-
tempt to orchestrate a witness's grand jury testimony).
The dissent supposes that because the word “otherwise”
in (c)(2) can mean “in a different manner,” “by other means,”
or “in other respects,” (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct and in-
dependent prohibitions.” Post, at 507, 510 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). But the word “otherwise” is not by
itself “suffcient to demonstrate that the examples do not
limit the scope of the clause.” Begay, 553 U. S., at 144 (em-
phasis deleted). “Otherwise” can link a set of examples to
a general phrase and give it more defnite meaning—even in
statutory sentences that rival the complexity of Section
1512(c). See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431, 437–438 (1982);
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67, 91–92 (1989).
2
It makes sense to read subsection (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1)
in light of the history of the provision.
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 1512 imposed
criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly uses intimida-
tion or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades an-
other person” to, among other things, shred documents. 18

Page Proof Pending Publication
492 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
U. S. C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). But the Enron accounting
scanda
l revealed a loophole: Although Enron's “outside audi-
tor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically destroyed po-
tentially incriminating documents,” the statute curiously
failed to “impos[e] liability on a person who destroys records
himself.” Yates, 574 U. S., at 535–536 (plurality opinion).
As a result, prosecutors had to prove that higher-ups at
Enron and Arthur Andersen persuaded someone else to
shred documents rather than the more obvious theory that
someone who shreds documents is liable for doing so. See
S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 7 (2002).
The parties agree that to plug this loophole, Congress
enacted Section 1512(c)—the provision at issue here—as part
of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It would be peculiar to
conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress actually hid
away in the second part of the third subsection of Section
1512 a catchall provision that reaches far beyond the docu-
ment shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the leg-
islation in the frst place. The better conclusion is that sub-
section (c)(2) was designed by Congress to capture other
forms of evidence and other means of impairing its integrity
or availability beyond those Congress specifed in (c)(1).
B
1
The broader context of Section 1512 in the criminal code
confrms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal
obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target
specifc criminal acts and settings. See 18 U. S. C. ch. 73.
Much of that particularized legislation would be unnecessary
if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive conduct, as
the Government contends. Section 1503(a), for example,
makes it a crime to “corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening . . . communication, endeavor[ ] to infuence,
intimidate, or impede” any juror or court offcer. Section

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
493
Opinion of the Court
1504 covers attempting to infuence jurors through written
communicati
ons. Section 1505 covers anyone who corruptly
obstructs congressional inquiries or investigations. Section
1507 covers picketing or parading in certain locations “with
the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the
administration of justice.” Section 1509 covers the obstruc-
tion of the exercise of rights or performance of duties under
court orders. Section 1510(a) covers obstruction of federal
criminal investigations through bribery. Section 1511(a)
covers certain obstruction of state or local law enforcement
with the intent to facilitate illegal gambling. And Sections
1516, 1517, and 1518 address obstructive acts in specifc con-
texts, including federal audits, examinations of fnancial in-
stitutions, and inquiries into healthcare-related offenses.
If the Government were correct, then the “otherwise
obstructs, infuences, or impedes any offcial proceeding ”
provision—which is buried in subsection (c)(2) of Section
1512—would largely obviate the need for that broad array of
other obstruction statutes. In light of our obligation to give
meaning where possible to each word and provision in the
Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, our narrower interpretation
of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one.
2
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would
also render superfuous the careful delineation of different
types of obstructive conduct in Section 1512 itself. That
section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen means
of committing obstruction, with varying degrees of culpabil-
ity and penalties ranging from three years to life in prison,
or even death. Section 1512(a)(2)(B)(iv), for example, au-
thorizes up to 30 years' imprisonment for someone who uses
or attempts to use physical force against another person with
the intent of causing him to be absent from an offcial
proceeding. See § 1512(a)(3)(B)(ii) (specifying punishment).
Page Proof Pending Publication

494 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Section 1512(d)(1), by contrast, authorizes only three years'
i
mprisonment for someone who harasses another person and
thereby dissuades him from attending an offcial proceeding.
Reading (c)(2) to cover all forms of obstructive conduct
would override Congress's careful delineation of which pen-
alties were appropriate for which offenses. Most instances
of those prohibited acts would instead fall under subsection
(c)(2)'s sweeping reach, which provides a 20-year maximum
term of imprisonment. Such a reading of subsection (c)(2)
would lump together disparate types of conduct for which
Congress had assigned proportionate penalties in (a)(2) and
(d)(1).
2
3
The Government's responses to this surplusage problem
are not convincing.
It frst argues that because other provisions in Section
1512 would allow conviction in some circumstances on a
“lesser mens rea than `corruptly,' ” they have “a broader
compass” than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34. For in-
stance, the Government contends that subsection (b) can be
violated by “knowing use of intimidation or threats, or mis-
leading conduct.” Id., at 35. But the Government concedes
that “Congress did not defne `corruptly' for purposes of Sec-
tion 1512.” Id., at 44. And while the Government suggests
that “corruptly” is “ `normally associated with wrongful, im-
moral, depraved, or evil' conduct,” ibid. (quoting Arthur An-
dersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 705 (2005)), it
never persuasively explains how “knowingly us[ing] intimi-
2
The dissent maintains we have “ `glosse[d] over the absence of any
prescribed minimum. ' ” Post, at 519 (quoting Yates, 574 U. S., at 569
(Kagan, J., dissenting)). Congress might have thought (c)(2) prohibited
conduct of varying severity. But it does not follow that it designed (c)(2)
to reach forms of conduct already covered in Chapter 73 with far lower
maximum sentences. It would be improper to substitute for those fne-
grained statutory distinctions the charging discretion of prosecutors and
the sentencing discretion of district courts.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
495
Opinion of the Court
dation” or “threat[s]” against someone is not “wrongful.”
§
1512(b). The same is true for most other subparts of Sec-
tion 1512 that the Government identifes as having a lesser
mens rea than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34; see, e. g.,
§ 1512(a)(1)(A) (criminalizing anyone who “kills or attempts
to kill another person, with intent to” prevent attendance in
an offcial proceeding); § 1512(a)(2)(B)(iv) (criminalizing any-
one who “uses physical force . . . against any person” intend-
ing to cause them to be absent from an offcial proceeding).
None of those other provisions has a mens rea the Govern-
ment may more readily establish than the “corruptly” mens
rea of subsection (c)(2).
The Government also contends that its interpretation cre-
ates no surplusage because Section 1512's other “provisions
sweep more broadly than an offcial proceeding.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 64; Brief for United States 34. To be sure, subsections
(a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2) criminalize various means of pre-
venting someone from giving a judge or law enforcement of-
fcer information relating to the commission or possible com-
mission of a federal offense or a violation of conditions of
supervised release. And subsections (d)(3) and (4) make it
a crime to harass someone and thereby dissuade them from
arresting or prosecuting a person alleged to have committed
a federal offense. None of these crimes requires an “offcial
proceeding.” But not much if any conduct covered by those
provisions would escape the Government's expansive inter-
pretation of subsection (c)(2). For a person to have violated
(c)(2), “an offcial proceeding need not be pending or about to
be instituted.” § 1512(f )(1). And because interference with
an arrest or with communications to authorities about fed-
eral offenses could very well obstruct the initiation of future
offcial proceedings, the Government's reading of (c)(2) would
still often consume violations of (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2),
(3), and (4).
The dissent tries to solve this surplusage problem by ar-
guing that conduct only violates (c)(2) if it has a “ `relation-
Page Proof Pending Publication

496 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
ship in time, causation, or logic' ” with an offcial proceeding.
P
ost, at 516 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593,
599 (1995)). Assuming there is such a requirement, it would
simply mean that the defendant's actions “must have the nat-
ural and probable effect” of interfering with the proceeding.
Id., at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a bar
on prosecutions based on “speculative” theories of obstruc-
tion, id., at 601, would hardly cabin the reach of (c)(2).
The dissent points out that our reading creates some sur-
plusage, too. See post, at 517. In a wide-ranging scheme
like Chapter 73, it is true that some provisions will inevitably
cover some of the same conduct. But “surplusage is none-
theless disfavored,” and our “construction that creates sub-
stantially less of it is better than a construction that creates
subst antia l ly more. ” 64 F. 4th, at 374 (Katsas, J.,
dissenting).
III
On the Government's theory, Section 1512(c) consists of a
granular subsection (c)(1) focused on obstructive acts that
impair evidence and an overarching subsection (c)(2) that
reaches all other obstruction. Even setting surplusage
aside, that novel interpretation would criminalize a broad
swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyists
alike to decades in prison. As the Solicitor General ac-
knowledged at oral argument, under the Government's inter-
pretation, a peaceful protester could conceivably be charged
under § 1512(c)(2) and face a 20-year sentence. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 51–52. And the Government would likewise have no
apparent obstacle to prosecuting under (c)(2) any lobbying
activity that “infuences” an offcial proceeding and is under-
taken “corruptly.” Those peculiar results “underscore[ ] the
implausibility of the Government's interpretation.” Van
Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 394 (2021).
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist
reading ” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall”
statute, as the Government would have us do here. Yates,
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
497
Opinion of the Court
574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion); see also Marinello v.
U
nited States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–11 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544
U. S., at 703–704. And there is no reason to depart from
that practice today. Nothing in the text or statutory history
suggests that subsection (c)(2) is designed to impose up to 20
years' imprisonment on essentially all defendants who com-
mit obstruction of justice in any way and who might be sub-
ject to lesser penalties under more specifc obstruction stat-
utes. See, e. g., §§ 1503(b)(3), 1505. If Congress had wanted
to authorize such penalties for any conduct that delays or
infuences a proceeding in any way, it would have said so.
Instead, Section 1512 mentions “record,” “document,” or
other “object” 26 times. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(B),
(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), 1512(b)(2)(A), (B), (C), 1512(c)(1), 1512(f ).
Rather than transforming this evidence-focused statute
into a one-size-fts-all solution to obstruction of justice, we
cabin our reading of subsection (c)(2) in light of the context
of subsection (c)(1). Doing so affords proper respect to “the
prerogatives of Congress” in carrying out the quintessen-
tially legislative act of defning crimes and setting the penal-
ties for them. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600. We have long rec-
ognized that “the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department,” United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820), and we have as a result
“ `traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of
a federal criminal statute,' ” Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11 (quot-
ing Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600). The Government's reading
of Section 1512 would intrude on that deliberate arrange-
ment of constitutional authority over federal crimes, giving
prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20-year maximum sen-
tence for acts Congress saw ft to punish only with far
shorter terms of imprisonment—for example, three years for
harassment under § 1512(d)(1), or ten years for threatening a
juror under § 1503.
For all these reasons, subsection (c)(2)'s “surrounding
words” suggest that we should not give this “otherwise” pro-
Page Proof Pending Publication

498 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
vision the broadest possible meaning. Yates, 574 U. S., at
536
(plurality opinion). Although the Government's all-
encompassing interpretation may be literally permissible, it
defes the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and
(c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of
statutory text mere surplusage. Given that subsection (c)(2)
was enacted to address the Enron disaster, not some further
fung set of dangers, it is unlikely that Congress responded
with such an unfocused and “grossly incommensurate patch.”
64 F. 4th, at 376 (Katsas, J., dissenting). We therefore de-
cline to adopt the Government's interpretation, which is in-
consistent with “the context from which the statute arose.”
Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 860 (2014).
***
To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government
must establish that the defendant impaired the availability
or integrity for use in an offcial proceeding of records, docu-
ments, objects, or as we earlier explained, other things used
in the proceeding, or attempted to do so. See supra, at 491.
The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore vacated, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. On remand, the D. C. Circuit may assess the
suffciency of Count Three of Fischer's indictment in light of
our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2).
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, concurring.
On January 6, 2021, an angry mob stormed the United
States Capitol seeking to prevent Congress from fulflling its
constitutional duty to certify the electoral votes in the 2020
Presidential election. See ante, at 484. The peaceful trans-
fer of power is a fundamental democratic norm, and those
who attempted to disrupt it in this way inficted a deep
wound on this Nation. But today's case is not about the
immorality of those acts. Instead, the question before this
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
499
Jackson, J., concurring
Court is far narrower: What is the scope of the particular
cr
ime Congress has outlined in 18 U. S. C. § 1512(c)(2)?
In the United States of America, “men are not subjected
to criminal punishment because their conduct offends our pa-
triotic emotions or thwarts a general purpose sought to be
effected by specifc commands which they have not dis-
obeyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of offenses which
the statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to defne
and condemn.” Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 245
(1943). Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law
requires the courts to faithfully apply criminal laws as writ-
ten, even in periods of national crisis, see, e. g., Cramer v.
United States, 325 U. S. 1, 46–48 (1945), and even when the
conduct alleged is indisputably abhorrent, cf. Michaels v.
Davis, 601 U. S. –––, ––– (2024) (Jackson, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
Notwithstanding the shocking circumstances involved in
this case or the Government's determination that they war-
rant prosecution, today, this Court's task is to determine
what conduct is proscribed by the criminal statute that has
been invoked as the basis for the obstruction charge at issue
here. I join in the Court's opinion because I agree with the
majority that § 1512(c)(2) does not reach “ `all forms of ob-
structive conduct' ” and is, instead, “limited by the preceding
list of criminal violations” in § 1512(c)(1). Ante, at 489–490.
I write separately to explain why and how that interpreta-
tion of § 1512(c) follows from the legislative purpose that this
statute's text embodies.
I
Our goal in interpreting any statute should be “to give
effect to the intent of Congress.” United States v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940). There
is no question that intent is generally expressed through the
text of a statute. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). “[H]ewing closely to Congress's
will” as embodied in the statute that it wrote “is especially
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
500 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
important” when construing laws like this one, which impli-
cate
the possible imposition of punitive sanctions. Pugin v.
Garland, 599 U. S. 600, 612 (2023) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Here, the major ity r ightly i nter prets the scope of
§ 1512(c)(2) by “look[ing] for guidance from” the statutory
“examples [that] come before” it—those listed in § 1512(c)(1).
Ante, at 487. In my view, the examples that Congress opts
to include in the text of a statute evince its intentions con-
cerning what the rule covers and thereby help express a par-
ticular legislative purpose.
The majority's football-based example is illustrative. In a
football league, says the majority, “a rule that players must
not `grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other equip-
ment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise attack,
assault, or harm any player,' ” should not be interpreted as
being directed at hurt feelings, because the listed “prohibited
actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that might
infict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that kind.”
Ante, at 488. I agree. I would add that it is likewise clear
from the listed prohibited acts that such a rule is also not
addressing far more serious and unexpected conduct than
the kinds of acts that the preceding examples describe,
which can result in serious and foreseeable physical injuries
during a rough-and-tumble football game. By contrast, if a
player were to shoot or poison another player, the rule's
drafters would expect the police to be called, not a referee.
Thus, we conclude that the rule is best understood to be in-
apposite with respect to conduct at both extremes of the uni-
verse of harmful acts in which a player might conceivably
engage.
We recognize this intuitive fact—that there is a certain
category of conduct the rule is designed to prohibit—because
we recognize, albeit implicitly, that the drafters of this rule
have included these particular examples for a reason. We
understand that, given the preceding list of examples, this
rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning its scope.

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
501
Jackson, J., concurring
So, though a broad conception of “harm” is “literally covered
by
the language” of the rule, ibid., we appreciate that the
rule's drafters did not intend for that term to take on its
most expansive meaning. Instead, the examples help illumi-
nate what the drafters actually intended the rule to cover.
From the preceding list, we can confdently discern that the
drafters meant to proscribe only conduct that risks injuries
with severity akin to facemask pulling, not trash talk or
murder.
1
The upshot is that, when interpreting the scope of a partic-
ular statute or rule, our assessment of the words that the
drafters used informs our understanding of what the rule
was designed to do.
2
Discerning the rule's purpose is criti-
cal when a court is called upon to interpret the provision.
II
Turning to the statutory provision at issue here, the pur-
pose of § 1512(c), refected in its text, is clear. Subsection
(c)(1) is indisputably focused on persons who engage in a par-
ticular kind of obstructive conduct: Anyone who “corruptly
1
The majority invokes the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem gene-
ris to support this inference. See ante, at 487. Those canons are useful
interpretive tools, but in my view, they are ultimately only devices used in
furtherance of achieving our goal of determining “the intent of Congress.”
United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
“There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention.” Ibid.
As one treatise explains, such canons are “not . . . rule[s] of law” but rather
“one of various factors to be considered.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 212 (2012); see also id., at 196–
198. We apply these canons because we understand that their principles
are consistent with how users of language—including legislators—convey
meaning. See id., at 212 (“Any lawyer or legislative drafter who writes
two or more specifcs followed by a general residual term without the
intention that the residual term be limited may be guilty of malpractice”).
As such, they are valid indicia of Congress's purpose.
2
Other indicia of the drafters' intent, such as the rule's context or enact-
ment history, can further inform our understanding of the rule. See
in fra, at 502–505.
Page Proof Pending Publication

502 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
. . . alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu-
ment,
or other object, . . . with the intent to impair the ob-
ject's integrity or availability for use in an offcial proceed-
ing.” Subsection (c)(2), in turn, is directed at criminal
conduct that “otherwise” achieves a similar result. I there-
fore agree with the majority that § 1512(c)(2)'s reach is
narrower than the Government contends. As the majority
holds, § 1512(c)(2) “makes it a crime to impair the availability
or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an off-
cial proceeding in ways other than those specifed in (c)(1)”
and to “impai[r] the availability or integrity of other things
used in an offcial proceeding beyond the `record[s], docu-
ment[s], or other object[s]' enumerated in (c)(1).” Ante, at
491.
This understanding of § 1512(c)'s text and purpose is en-
tirely consistent with the statute's enactment history. Con-
gress enacted § 1512(c) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which “was prompted by the exposure of Enron's mas-
sive accounting fraud and revelations that the company's out-
side auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-
stroyed potentially incriminating documents.” Yates v.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 535–536 (2015) (plurality opin-
ion). When introducing what later became § 1512(c) on the
Senate foor, Senator Lott emphasized that its principal pur-
pose was to target document destruction, which was, at the
time, prohibited “only if . . . a subpoena ha[d] been issued for
the evidence that ha[d] been destroyed or altered.” 148
Cong. Rec. 12512 (2002). “[T]his section,” he explained,
“would allow the Government to charge obstruction against
individuals who acted alone, even if the tampering took place
prior to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena.” Ibid.
Similarly, the Senate Report accompanying the proposed
statute noted that “current federal obstruction of justice
statutes relating to document destruction [were] riddled
with loopholes and burdensome proof requirements.” S.
Rep. No. 107–146, p. 6 (2002). According to the Senate Re-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
503
Jackson, J., concurring
port, § 1512(c) was drafted to fll these gaps: “When a person
destroys
evidence with the intent of obstructing any type of
investigation and the matter is within the jurisdiction of a
federal agency, overly technical legal distinctions should nei-
ther hinder nor prevent prosecution and punishment.” Id.,
at 7.
Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Con-
gress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction
statute. As the majority notes, “[f]ederal obstruction law
consists of numerous provisions that target specifc criminal
acts and settings.” Ante, at 492. Outside of the Govern-
ment's proposed interpretation of § 1512(c), Congress has
never enacted “a one-size-fts-all solution to obstruction of
justice.” Ante, at 497.
3
Meanwhile, many States have done
just that. See J. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Ob-
struction of Justice in American Criminal Law, 65 La.
L. Rev. 49, 77, and n. 236 (2004) (collecting statutes).
4
The
drafters of the Model Penal Code, too, proposed such a gen-
eral obstruction crime. See ALI, Model Penal Code § 242.1,
p. 201 (1980) (“A person commits a misdemeanor if he pur-
posely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of
law or other governmental function by force, violence, physi-
cal interference or obstacle, breach of offcial duty, or any
other unlawful act”).
3
That is not to say, of course, that Congress could not enact such a
statute if it so chose. “We have traditionally exercised restraint in as-
sessing the reach of a federal criminal statute . . . out of deference to the
prerogatives of Congress,” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600
(1995), not because broad criminal proscriptions are beyond the scope of
Congress's power.
4
See also, e. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–8–102(1) (2023) (“A person commits
obstructing government operations if he intentionally obstructs, impairs,
or hinders the performance of a governmental function by a public serv-
ant, by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interference
or obstacle”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31(A) (Lexis 2024) (“No person
. . . shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public offcial in the per-
formance of the public offcial's lawful duties”).

504 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Jackson, J., concurring
Given that Congress has never before passed a similarly
broad
obstruction law when others have long existed, it is
highly unlikely that Congress intended for subsection (c)(2)
to establish a frst-of-its-kind general federal obstruction
crime. Nothing in the enactment history of § 1512(c) sug-
gests that Congress believed that it was creating an all-
encompassing statute that would obviate the need for any
other obstruction prohibitions.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, un-
like § 1512(c)(2), nearly all of the broad, all-purpose obstruc-
tion statutes that various States have enacted are classifed
as misdemeanors. See, e. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–8–102(3)
(2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2921.31(B) (Lexis 2024). As a
result, these types of obstruction crimes are generally pun-
ishable by up to a year of incarceration. See 1 W. LaFave,
J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 1.8(c),
pp. 557–558 (4th ed. 2015). That is so for a reason: As the
Model Penal Code's drafters explained, “the existence of a
residual misdemeanor offense” allows for the “appropriately
narrow defnition of the serious forms of obstruction carry-
ing felony penalties.” § 242.1, Comment 2, at 203. “A broad
residual offense . . . provides a hedge against the ingenuity
of offenders,” since “[n]ot all forms of obstruction can be
anticipated and precisely proscribed in specifc offenses.”
Ibid. But, at the same time, that kind of broad criminal
statute “must incorporate certain limitations lest it nullify
policy decisions expressed elsewhere. ” Ib id. In other
words, these broad misdemeanor obstruction statutes are
“amalgam[s] of generality and constraint.” Ibid.
The Government's interpretation of § 1512(c)(2), by con-
trast, exhibits all the generality of these catchall misde-
meanor obstruction provisions while displaying none of their
restraint. Section 1512(c)(2) is a felony, and it imposes a
20-year maximum sentence—one of the more severe poten-
tial punishments in Chapter 73 of the U. S. Code. That
stands in contrast with Congress's specifcation that other
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
505
Jackson, J., concurring
serious obstructive acts warrant “far shorter terms of im-
pr
isonment—for example, three years for harassment under
§ 1512(d)(1), or ten years for threatening a juror under
§ 1503.” Ante, at 497.
Finally, it is worth remembering the statutory context in
which Congress chose to prohibit the obstruction-related
conduct we are considering today. The statute Congress
wrote addresses this matter in a 13-word phrase, enumer-
ated “2,” that is located within subsection (c) of a much
broader § 1512, which itself consists of “a reticulated list of
nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction.” Ante,
at 493. However we might interpret Congress's drafting
choices in other contexts, we should be wary of fnding that
a statute addresses signifcant criminal conduct when none
of the available indicia of congressional intent, including the
prohibition's placement, suggest that Congress intended that
result. Here, it beggars belief that Congress would have
inserted a breathtakingly broad, frst-of-its-kind criminal ob-
struction statute (accompanied by a substantial 20-year max-
imum penalty) in the midst of a signifcantly more granular
series of obstruction prohibitions without clarifying its in-
tent to do so—not in the text of the provision itself, nor in
the surrounding statutory context, nor in any statement is-
sued during the enactment process.
***
In my view, the Court properly interprets § 1512(c)(2) in
the opinion it issues today. It also rightly vacates the judg-
ment below and remands this case for further proceedings.
Joseph Fischer was charged with violating § 1512(c)(2) by
corruptly obstructing “a proceeding before Congress, spe-
cifcally, Congress's certifcation of the Electoral College
vote.” App. 183. That offcial proceeding plainly used cer-
tain records, documents, or objects—including, among oth-
ers, those relating to the electoral votes themselves. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 65–67. And it might well be that Fischer's
Page Proof Pending Publication

506 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
conduct, as alleged here, involved the impairment (or the at-
tempted
impairment) of the availability or integrity of things
used during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than
those specifed in (c)(1).” Ante, at 491. If so, then Fischer's
prosecution under § 1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed.
That issue remains available for the lower courts to deter-
mine on remand.
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
Joseph Fischer allegedly joined a mob of rioters that
breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021. At the time, Con-
gress was meeting in a joint session to certify the Electoral
College results. The riot forced Congress to suspend the
proceeding, delaying it for several hours.
The Court does not dispute that Congress's joint session
qualifes as an “offcial proceeding ”; that rioters delayed the
proceeding; or even that Fischer's alleged conduct (which in-
cludes trespassing and a physical confrontation with law en-
forcement) was part of a successful effort to forcibly halt the
certifcation of the election results. Given these premises,
the case that Fischer can be tried for “obstructing, infuenc-
ing, or impeding an offcial proceeding ” seems open and shut.
So why does the Court hold otherwise?
Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant
what it said. Section 1512(c)(2) is a very broad provision,
and admittedly, events like January 6th were not its target.
(Who could blame Congress for that failure of imagination?)
But statutes often go further than the problem that inspired
them, and under the rules of statutory interpretation, we stick
to the text anyway. The Court, abandoning that approach,
does textual backfips to fnd some way—any way—to narrow
the reach of subsection (c)(2). I respectfully dissent.
I
The case for the Government's interpretation is straightfor-
ward. It can be accomplished in three paragraphs, as com-
pared to the Court's many, many more. Ante, at 486–494.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
507
Barrett, J., dissenting
Start with the verbs: To “obstruct” and to “impede” mean
to
“hinder” or “retard” something 's “passage” or “progress.”
10 Oxford English Dictionary 668 (2d ed. 1989); 7 id., at 705.
We have previously explained that these words are “broad.”
Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 7 (2018). To “infu-
ence” is similarly expansive, meaning “[t]o affect the condi-
tion of ” or “to have an effect on” something. 7 Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary, at 940. The object of these verbs is an
“offcial proceeding,” defned to include “a proceeding before
the Congress.” 18 U. S. C. § 1515(a)(1)(B).
1
So (c)(2) covers
all sorts of actions that affect or interfere with offcial
proceedings.
“[O]therwise,” which introduces 18 U. S. C. § 1512(c)(2),
does not narrow its scope. “Otherwise” means “in a differ-
ent manner,” “by other means,” or “in other respects.” 10
Oxford English Dictionary, at 984; Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 1598 (2002). It is often used to in-
troduce a “catchall phras[e].” Texas Dept. of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576
U. S. 519, 535 (2015). Here, “otherwise” tells the reader how
(c)(1) and (c)(2) ft together. Subsection (c)(1) prohibits “al-
ter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a record,
document, or other object” with “intent to impair [its] integ-
rity or availability for use in an offcial proceeding.” In
other words, (c)(1) targets document and object spoliation—
classic means of obstruction. Subsection (c)(2) then prohib-
its obstructing, infuencing, or impeding an offcial proceed-
ing by means different from those specifed in (c)(1), thereby
serving as a catchall. The “enumerated” crimes in (c)(1) and
the “unenumerated crimes” in (c)(2) are similar “on one spe-
cifc dimension”: “the particular similarity specifed after the
`otherwise.' ” Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137, 150–
151 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Here, that
1
The D. C. Circuit held, and this Court does not dispute, that Congress's
joint session on January 6, 2021, qualifes as an “ `offcial proceeding.' ” 64
F. 4th 329, 342 (2023).
Page Proof Pending Publication

508 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
means that each crime represents one means through which
to
obstruct, infuence, or impede an offcial proceeding.
Joseph Fischer allegedly participated in a riot at the
Capitol that forced the delay of Congress's joint session on
January 6th. Blocking an offcial proceeding from moving
forward surely qualifes as obstructing or impeding the pro-
ceeding by means other than document destruction. Fi-
scher's alleged conduct thus falls within (c)(2)'s scope.
II
A
Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take
(c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the evidentiary
focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2) only by
“impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an offcial
proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . . other things
used in the proceeding.” Ante, at 498. Other means of ob-
structing a proceeding—say, by shutting it down—are out.
This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute, be-
cause the limit comes from a related provision rather than
thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and graft-
ing them onto another violates our normal interpretive prin-
ciples. “ `[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements
into a statute that do not appear on its face.' ” Dean v.
United States, 556 U. S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v.
United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29 (1997)). And “ `[w]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act,' ” we gener-
ally presume that Congress did so intentionally. Russello
v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972) (per cu-
riam)). The Court's reasons for departing from these rules
are thin.
1
The Court begins with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis canons. Ante, at 487. The noscitur canon counsels
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
509
Barrett, J., dissenting
that “words grouped in a list should be given related mean-
i
ngs.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law § 31, p. 195
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is particularly
useful when interpreting “ `a word [that] is capable of many
meanings.' ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 569
(2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303,
307 (1961)). See, e. g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561,
573–575 (1995) (employing the canon to interpret “communi-
cation” in the statutory list “ `prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, letter, or communication' ”). The ejusdem
canon applies when “a catchall phrase” follows “an enumera-
tion of specifcs, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other
animals.” Scalia & Garner § 32, at 199. We often inter-
pret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specifc
words.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105,
115 (2001). See, e. g., Washington State Dept. of Social and
Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S.
371, 375, 385 (2003) (employing the canon to construe the
general term in the statutory list “ `execution, levy, attach-
ment, garnishment, or other legal process' ”).
These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to
(c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks
like it might work, but using it botches the job. Unlike the
pattern to which the noscitur canon applies, § 1512(c) is not
a list of terms that includes an ambiguous word. So the
Court does not do what it does when applying noscitur: se-
lect between multiple accepted meanings of the words “ob-
structs,” “infuences,” and “impedes.” Instead, it modifes
those words by adding an adverbial phrase: obstructs, infu-
ences or impedes by “impair[ing] the availability or integ-
rity for use in an offcial proceeding of records, documents,
[or] objects.” Ante, at 498 (emphasis added). The ejusdem
canon is an equally poor ft. Unlike the pattern to which
ejusdem applies, (c)(2) is “not a general or collective term
following a list of specifc items to which a particular statu-
Page Proof Pending Publication

510 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
tory command is applicable.” United States v. Aguilar,
515
U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Instead, (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct
and independent prohibitions.” Ibid. Though they share a
subject and an adverb—“ [w]hoever corruptly”—the two
clauses contain different verbs that take different objects.
§ 1512(c). Moreover, (c)(1) has a separate mens rea provi-
sion that further disrupts the connection between the
clauses.
To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these
canons to a statute resembling § 1512(c). Rather than iden-
tify such a case, the Court invents examples of a sign at the
zoo and a football league rule. Ante, at 487–488. The zoo
example (“do not pet, feed, yell or throw objects at the ani-
mals, or otherwise disturb them”) does not help, because it
mimics the typical ejusdem format of specifc words followed
by a catchall. The list of specifc verbs makes clear that the
cleanup phrase (“otherwise disturb”) is limited to conduct
that involves direct interaction with the animals. But in
the absence of a laundry list followed by a catchall, it is
hard to see why the ejusdem canon fts. Ali v. Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008) (“The absence of
a list of specifc items undercuts the inference embodied in
ejusdem generis that Congress remained focused on the com-
mon attribute when it used the catchall phrase”). And
§ 1512(c) does not fol low the laundry-l ist-plus-catcha l l
pattern.
The Court's football example is only slightly better. As
a refresher:
“[A] football league might adopt a rule that players must
not `grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other
equipment with the intent to injure a player, or other-
wise attack, assault, or harm any player.' If a line-
backer shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts his
feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed the
rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
511
Barrett, J., dissenting
actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that
might
infict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of that
kind.” Ante, at 488.
Put aside that it is hard to imagine anyone describing “trash
talk” as inficting an “injury” or “harming ” a player in a
football game. The league rule plainly forecloses the possi-
bility. Consistent with the noscitur canon, “harm” takes its
meaning from its companions “attack” and “assault.” And
while the Court tries to track § 1512(c)'s structure by adding
an extra intent clause, the two clauses in its example are still
tightly focused on actions directed at the player. (After all,
who is wearing the facemask, helmet, or other equipment?)
Given that shared theme, it is easy to understand that the
first clause's focus on physica l conduct li mits the (only
slightly) more general clause. But § 1512(c)'s subsections
are not so closely related—(c)(1) focuses specifcally on ob-
jects in a proceeding, and (c)(2) broadens the lens to the pro-
ceeding itself.
Consider a rule that actually mirrors § 1512(c):
“Any player who:
“(1) punches, chokes, or kicks an opposing player with
the intent to remove him from the game; or
“(2) otherwise interrupts, hinders, or interferes with
the game, “shall be suspended.”
While the specifc verbs in the frst clause involve actions
directed at an opposing player, the second clause is a sepa-
rate prohibition with an entirely different object. Imagine
that, just before the opposing team's kicker attempts a feld
goal, players leave the sidelines and storm the feld, some
tackling referees in the process. Those players have surely
“interrupt[ed], hinder[ed], or interfer[ed] with the game,”
even though they have not physically injured any opponent.
This hypothetical, not the Court's, is analogous to § 1512(c)—
and it supports the Government's interpretation.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
512 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
2
The
Court next recruits help from Begay, which interprets
an “otherwise” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Ante, at 488; 553 U. S., at 140. The ACCA defnes a “violent
felony” as a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, in-
volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. ” 18
U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Begay holds that the example
crimes limit the catchall clause to “crimes that are roughly
similar . . . to the examples themselves.” 553 U. S., at 143.
So too here, the Court reasons, the list of crimes in (c)(1)
limits the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2).
But § 1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in
Begay. While § 1512(c) contains two distinct criminal prohi-
bitions—(c)(1) and (c)(2)—the statutory defnition in Begay
contained a list of examples followed immediately by a resid-
ual clause. The latter structure more readily supports in-
terpreting the general clause in light of the specifcs, much
like a statute to which the ejusdem canon would apply.
Moreover, the residual clause at issue in Begay called out
for a limiting principle—what is a “serious potential risk of
physical injury?” The breadth itself was a cue that the in-
terpreter should read back to fnd some limit. See id., at
142–143. Subsection (c)(2)'s “otherwise” clause, by contrast,
stands on its own.
Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held
ACCA's residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v.
United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is not
only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory
interpretation.
3
The Court argues that “there would have been scant rea-
son for Congress to provide any specifc examples” in (c)(1)
if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct. Ante,
at 490. Conduct like destroying and concealing records “ob-

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
513
Barrett, J., dissenting
structs, infuences, or impedes a[n] offcial proceeding,” so
Congress
could have enacted just (c)(2) and been done with
it. On the Government's interpretation, the Court asserts,
the second prohibition swallows the frst. If (c)(1) has any
function, it must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2).
What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also elimi-
nates the need for (c)(1)'s examples. The Court's interpreta-
tion assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step ap-
proach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integrity or
availability of records, documents, or objects for use in an
offcial proceeding.” Ante, at 490. So why didn't Congress
just say that? And if the Court is right about what (c)(2)
means, why do we need the specifc examples in (c)(1)?
Those acts are already covered. The problem of (c)(2) sub-
suming (c)(1) is therefore not unique to my theory.
It bears emphasis, though, that the broad overlap makes
sense, given the statute's backstory. When the Enron scan-
dal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was
taken aback to discover that seemingly criminal conduct was
actually not a federal crime. As it then existed, § 1512 had
a loophole: It imposed liability on those who persuaded oth-
ers to destroy documents, but not on the people who them-
selves destroyed documents. Ante, at 491–492. Congress
enacted § 1512(c) to close this “Enron gap.” Subsection
(c)(1) deals with the particular problem at hand—document
destruction. Subsection (c)(2) refects Congress's desire to
avoid future surprises: It is “a catchall for matters not
specifcally contemplated—known unknowns.” Republic of
Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009).
So contrary to the Court's suggestion, it would not be “pe-
culiar” for (c)(2) to cover conduct “far beyond the document
shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legisla-
tion in the frst place.” Ante, at 492. Enron exposed more
than the need to prohibit evidence spoliation—it also ex-
posed the need to close statutory gaps. And in any event,
statutes often reach beyond the “principal evil” that ani-

514 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
mated them. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523
U. S. 75, 79 (1998). That is not grounds for narrowing
them, because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.” Ibid.
4
While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot
seem to settle on the “common attribute” in the frst subsec-
tion that cabins the second. See Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. On
one hand, the Court says that “(c)(2) makes it a crime to
impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or
objects used in an offcial proceeding.” Ante, at 491 (empha-
sis added). This “physical evidence” limitation tracks the
District Court's interpretation. See United States v. Miller,
589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022). On the other hand, the
Court says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or
integrity of other things used in an offcial proceeding,” such
as “witness testimony” or “intangible information.” Ante,
at 491. This broader “evidence impairment” theory resem-
bles Judge Katsas's interpretation. 64 F. 4th 329, 363
(CADC 2023) (dissenting opinion).
Both formulations are problematic—and not only because
both are atextual. The frst, focused solely on physical
items, would leave (c)(2) with almost no work to do. Subsec-
tion (c)(1) already prohibits “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat-
[ing], or conceal[ing]” documents, records, or objects. This
essentially covers the waterfront of acts that impair the
integrity or availability of objects. True, (c)(2) could also
encompass “cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false
entry in” a record or document. See 18 U. S. C. § 1519. But
it seems “unlikely” that Congress used the “expansive” lan-
guage of (c)(2) “to address such narrow concerns.” 64
F. 4th, at 344. The somewhat amorphous “other things” lim-
itation has the beneft of giving (c)(2) a wider berth, but it is
unclear how the Court landed on it. The term does not ap-
pear in (c)(1) or in § 1512's surrounding subsections, which
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
515
Barrett, J., dissenting
refer specifcally to records, documents, objects, and testi-
mony
. The “other things” formulation comes from the
Court, not Congress.
The Court's uncertainty about the relevant “common at-
tribute” is a tell that Congress did not intend to defne (c)(2)
by reference to (c)(1). Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to
limit [§ 1512(c)(2)]'s reach” as the Court asserts, it “easily
could have written” the catchall to say “otherwise impair
the integrity or availability of records, documents, objects,
or other things for use in an offcial proceeding.” Ali, 552
U. S., at 227; see ante, at 491.
2
It did not, and we should not
pretend that it did.
B
The Court relies on statutory context to “confr[m] that
(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1).” Ante, at 492. As
the Court sees it, interpreting (c)(2) according to its plain
text would render other obstruction provisions, within § 1512
and throughout Chapter 73, superfuous. Ante, at 492–494.
The Court exaggerates. Subsection (c)(2) applies only to
conduct that obstructs an “offcial proceeding.” The Court
highlights several provisions that cover obstruction of in-
vestigations. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§ 1510(a), 1511(a), 1516,
1517, 1518, 1519. The circuits have held that criminal inves-
tigations do not qualify as “offcial proceedings.” See, e. g.,
United States v. Ermoian, 752 F. 3d 1165, 1172 (CA9 2013);
United States v. Ramos, 537 F. 3d 439, 463 (CA5 2008).
Likewise, not every provision in § 1512 relates to an offcial
proceeding; instead, several target the obstruction of com-
munications to judges and law enforcement about the com-
2
Indeed, Congress could have looked to 18 U. S. C. § 1505 as a model.
That statute makes it a crime to “willfully withhol[d], misrepresen[t], re-
mov[e] from any place, concea[ l], cove[r] up, destro[y], mutilat[e], alte[r],
or by other means falsif[y] any documentary material, answers to written
interrogatories, or oral testimony” with the intent to obstruct “any civil
investigative demand.” § 1505 (emphasis added).
Page Proof Pending Publication

516 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
mission of federal offenses. 18 U. S. C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(C),
(
a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (d)(1), (2).
The Court responds by stressing that for purposes of
§ 1512, “an offcial proceeding need not be pending or about
to be instituted.” § 1512(f )(1); ante, at 495. Because ob-
struction of investigations or communications could end up
obstructing the initiation of a future offcial proceeding, the
Court reasons that (c)(2) may still swallow those other provi-
sions. But we have previously construed federal obstruc-
tion offenses similar to § 1512(c) to require a tighter link be-
tween the obstructive conduct and the relevant proceeding.
Under the “nexus” requirement, the defendant's conduct
must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic” with
the proceeding. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 599 (adopting nexus
requirement for § 1503's omnibus clause). And the defend-
ant must act in “contemplation” of a “particular offcial pro-
ceeding.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S.
696, 708 (2005) (adopting nexus requirement for § 1512(b)(2)).
The circuits have unanimously applied this requirement
to § 1512(c). See United States v. Young, 916 F. 3d 368,
386 (CA4 2019) (collecting cases). This element eliminates
much of the overlap that the Court perceives between
(c)(2) and the provisions that do not require an “offcial
proceeding.”
Moreover, §§ 1512(a)(1)(A) and (d)(1) prohibit preventing
the mere attendance of any person in an offcial proceeding.
Preventing attendance will not always have the effect of
obstructing, infuencing, or impeding the proceeding. And
§ 1512(d)(1) makes it a crime to intentionally harass someone
and thereby dissuade her from testifying in an offcial pro-
ceeding. In contrast to (c)(2), this provision—which carries
a signifcantly lower maximum penalty—does not require a
defendant to act “corruptly.”
This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordi-
nary meaning—overlaps with several offenses in Chapter 73.
See ante, at 492–493. Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
517
Barrett, J., dissenting
amount of work for other obstruction offenses. And be-
sides,
“substantial” overlap “is not uncommon in criminal
statutes.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4
(2014); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 714,
n. 14 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J.). “The mere fact that two
federal criminal statutes criminalize similar conduct says
little about the scope of either.” Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U. S. 349, 358, n. 4 (2005). That is especially true
here, because Congress enacted (c)(2) after it had already
enacted other subsections of § 1512, as well as obstruction
offenses like §§ 1503 and 1505. The redundancy argument
would have more force if (c)(2) “render[ed] superfuous an
entire provision passed in proximity as part of the same
Act.” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plu-
rality opinion) (emphasis added). As it stands, the canon
against surplusage does not provide any reason to artifcially
narrow (c)(2)'s scope.
In any event, the Court's formulation does not begin to
cure the statutory overlap. Killing a person with the intent
to prevent the production of a record in an offcial proceeding
constitutes conduct that impairs the availability of a record
for an offcial proceeding. 18 U. S. C. § 1512(a)(1)(B). Using
physical force against a person to infuence testimony in an
offcial proceeding counts as impairing the integrity of “other
things” used in an offcial proceeding. § 1512(a)(2)(A). And
impairing the availability or integrity of documents for use
in an offcial proceeding will often “infuenc[e], obstruc[t], or
imped[e] . . . the due administration of justice.” § 1503(a);
see also § 1515(a)(1)(A) (“ `offcial proceeding ' ” includes “a
proceeding before a judge or court of the United States”).
Examples abound. See, e. g., §§ 1505, 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B),
(b)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1). “[T]he canon against surplusage merely
favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage”—and on
that score, the Court's interpretation fares no better than
mine. Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635
(2012).

Page Proof Pending Publication
518 FISCHER
v. UNITED STATES
Barrett, J., dissenting
In fact, the broader statutory context works against the
Cour
t's interpretation. Congress did not select the verbs
“obstruct, ” “influence, ” and “impede” at random. Those
words were already in § 1503, which prohibits “corruptly or
by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communi-
cation, infuenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] . . . the due
administration of justice.” We have described this “ `Omni-
bus Clause' ” as a “catchall,” because it follows several spe-
cifc proscriptions against coercive behavior toward jurors
and court offcers. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 598. Courts have
routinely declined to “rea[d] the omnibus clause” as limited
to “acts similar in manner to those prescribed by the stat-
ute's specifc language.” United States v. Howard, 569 F. 2d
1331, 1333, 1335 (CA5 1978) (collecting cases). And Justice
Scalia agreed that ejusdem generis did not apply to limit the
Omnibus Clause, “one of the several distinct and independent
prohibitions contained in § 1503 that share only the word
`Whoever,' which begins the statute, and the penalty provi-
sion which ends it.” Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 615 (opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Section 1512(c) fol-
lows the very same pattern.
C
The Court concludes with an appeal to consequences: Con-
struing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lobby-
ists alike to decades in prison.” Ante, at 496. This fear
is overstated.
To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof
that a defendant acted “corruptly.” The meaning of this
term is unsettled, but all of its possible defnitions limit the
scope of liability. On one proposed interpretation, a defend-
ant acts corruptly by “ `us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing]
with an unlawful purpose, or both.' ” United States v. Rob-
ertson, 103 F. 4th 1, 8 (CADC 2023) (approving jury instruc-
tions for (c)(2)). On another, a defendant acts “corruptly” if
he “act[s] `with an intent to procure an unlawful beneft

Cite
as: 603 U. S. 480 (2024)
519
Barrett, J., dissenting
either for himself or for some other person.' ” 64 F. 4th, at
352
(Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (quoting Marinello, 584 U. S., at 21 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); alterations omitted). Under either, the “cor-
ruptly” element should screen out innocent activists and lob-
byists who engage in lawful activity. And if not, those de-
fendants can bring as-applied First Amendment challenges.
The Court also emphasizes (c)(2)'s 20-year maximum pen-
alty. Ante, at 496–497. But it simultaneously “glosses over
the absence of any prescribed minimum.” Yates, 574 U. S.,
at 569 (Kagan, J., dissenting). “Congress presumably
enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums when it
thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut from major
to minor.” Ibid. Indeed, given the breadth of its terms,
(c)(2) naturally encompasses actions that range in severity.
Congress presumably trusted District Courts to impose sen-
tences commensurate w ith the defendant's par ticu lar
conduct.
***
There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an ex-
pansive statute. Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the
“pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly or
narrowly.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484
(1984). Once Congress has set the outer bounds of liability,
the Executive Branch has the discretion to select particular
cases to prosecute within those boundaries. By atextually
narrowing § 1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the
prerogatives of the political branches. Cf. ante, at 497. I
respectfully dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None