Campos-Chaves v. Garland

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 602 U. S. Part 1
Pages 447–486
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 14, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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447
Syllabus
CAMPOS-CHAVES v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 22–674. Argued January 8, 2024—Decided June 14, 2024*
To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either
“inadmissible” under 8 U. S. C. § 1182 or “deportable” under § 1227, the
Federal Government must provide the alien with “written notice” of
the proceedings. §§ 1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of “written notice” are
described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides
that the alien be given a written “ `notice to appear,' ” or NTA, which
must set out, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.” Paragraph (2) states that “in the case of any
change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the
agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new time or
place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of failing to attend.
An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice “shall be
ordered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that “the written notice” was
provided and that “the alien is removable.” § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Three
scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of
which is when an alien “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in
accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” of § 1229(a). § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from
the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul
Daniel Mendez-Colín, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of
removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the re-
moval hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA,
but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing.
Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hear-
ing under § 1229(a)(2) which set out the specifc time and place of the
removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and
each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each
then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not re-
*Together with No. 22–884, Garland v. Singh and Garland v. Mendez-
Colín (see this Court's Rule 12.4), on certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

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448 CAMPOS-CHA
VES v. GARLAND
Syllabus
ceive a proper NTA under § 1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered
a
nd denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the
other two.
Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper § 1229(a)(2)
notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered
removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders
on the basis of defective notice under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Pp. 456–465.
(a) These cases turn on whether Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-
Colín can “demonstrat[e]” that they “did not receive notice in accordance
with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The
Government reads that provision to permit rescission only when the
alien did not receive notice of the hearing he failed to attend. Campos-
Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín, on the other hand, urge a reading of
the provision's word “or” that would distribute the phrase “did not re-
ceive notice in accordance with” across “paragraph (1) or (2).” They
argue that because each can “demonstrat[e]” that he “did not receive” an
NTA, they each can seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders.
Pp. 456–457.
(b) The Government's provision of a single notice under either para-
graph (1) or (2) defeats rescission under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The word
“ `or' ” is “ `almost always disjunctive.' ” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Na-
varro, 584 U. S. 79, 87. Thus, § 1229a(b)(5)'s ordinary meaning is that
either a paragraph (1) notice or a paragraph (2) notice can count as
“notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).” Statutory context
points in the same direction. For example, nearby § 1229a(b)(5)(A) also
refers to “paragraph (1) or (2)” notice. There, however, the “or” is unam-
biguously disjunctive, and there is no way to distribute language across
the “or” that can provide an alternative meaning. Furthermore, subpar-
agraph (A) requires the Government to establish that it provided “the
written notice,” indicating that only a single notice must be provided in a
single document. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155, 166. Pp. 457–459.
(c) In § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or
(2)” refers to the notice for the hearing the alien missed and at which
he was ordered removed. Notice under paragraph (2) supersedes the
NTA; when there is paragraph (2) notice, it is that notice which informs
the alien when to appear, not the NTA. As previously noted, § 1229a(b)
(5)(C)(ii)'s “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” must corre-
spond with § 1229a(b)(5)(A)'s “the written notice.” The only way to
make sense of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)'s reference to a single notice is for that
notice to be the one that informed the alien of the time and date of the
hearing the alien missed, and at which he was ordered removed. That
reading also gives the provision a “substantive effect that is compatible

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449
Syllabus
with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwo
od Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371. Pp. 459–461.
(d) Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín all received “notice in
accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” for the hearings they missed, and
thus their in absentia removal orders may not be rescinded on that
ground. The Government concedes that none of them received a com-
pliant NTA. Each did, however, receive a “notice in accordance with
paragraph . . . (2),” and each notice met all of the requirements for a
notice under that provision. After receiving a defective NTA, each
alien received a notice that provided a specifc time and place for their
remova l proceedi ngs. Those notices prov ided “ new” ti mes, and
thereby “change[d]” the time and place of their removal proceedings,
within the meaning of § 1229(a)(2). Pp. 461–465.
No. 22–674, 54 F. 4th 314, affrmed; No. 22–884, 24 F. 4th 1315, reversed
(Mendez-Colín) and vacated and remanded (Singh).
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., fled a
dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 465.
Charles L. McCloud argued the cause for the United
States in both cases. With him on the briefs were Solici-
tor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gene ral Boynt on, Deputy So l ici t ors General Kneedler
and Ganno n, John W. Bl akel ey, and El i zabe th K.
Fitzgerald-Sambou.
Easha Anand argued the cause for petitioner in No. 22–
674 and respondents in No. 22–884. With her on the brief
for respondent Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín in No. 22–884
were Christopher Stender, Martin Robles-Avila, Jeffrey L.
Fisher, and Pamela S. Karlan. Saad Ahmad and Martin
Robles-Avila fled a brief for respondent Varinder Singh in
No. 22–884. Raed Gonzalez, Ross Alan Miller, Alexandre
Afanassiev, Nadia Anguiano, Elizabeth G. Bentley, and
Amanda Lea Waterhouse fled a brief for petitioner Moris
Esmelis Campos-Chaves in No. 22–674.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 22–674 and affrmance in
No. 22–884 were fled for Forty-Two Former Immigration Judges et al. by
Richard W. Mark; for the National Immigrant Justice Center et al. by

450 CAMPOS-CHA
VES v. GARLAND
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
W
hen the Government seeks to remove an alien, it is re-
quired to notify the alien of the time and place of the removal
hearings. Title 8 U. S. C. § 1229(a) describes two types of
notice—an initial notice to appear under paragraph (1), and,
“in the case of any change or postponement in the time and
place of ” the removal proceedings, a notice of hearing under
paragraph (2). When an alien fails to appear at his removal
hearing despite receiving such notice, he “shall be ordered
removed in absentia” if the Government can make certain
showings. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). The alien can seek to have
that order rescinded, however, if the alien can demonstrate
that he “did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph
(1) or (2) of [§ 1229(a)].”
We granted certiorari in these cases to consider what it
means to “demonstrat[e] that the alien did not receive no-
tice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).” § 1229a(b)(5)
(C)(ii); 600 U. S. ––– (2023). Each of the aliens in these cases
argues that he may seek rescission because he did not re-
ceive a notice to appear that complies with paragraph (1).
We hold that, to rescind an in absentia removal order on the
ground that the alien “did not receive notice in accordance
with paragraph (1) or (2),” the alien must show that he did
not receive notice under either paragraph for the hearing at
which the alien was absent and ordered removed. Because
each of the aliens in these cases received a proper paragraph
(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they
were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their
Matthew E. Price, Michael J. DeMar, and Charles Roth; and for the Na-
tional Immigration Litigation Alliance et al. by Thomas G. Sprankling,
Kristin Macleod-Ball, and Trina Realmuto.
Christopher J. Hajec fled a brief for the Immigration Reform Law Insti-
tute as amicus curiae urging affrmance in both cases.
Michael D. Reif and Ellen Jalkut fled a brief for Lucas Champollion
et al. as amici curiae in both cases.
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Opinion of the Court
in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice
under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
I
A
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163,
as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., sets out “how persons
are admitted to, and removed from, the United States.”
Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U. S. 224, 227 (2021). An alien
is removable if he is either “inadmissible” under § 1182 or
“deportable” under § 1227. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(e)(2). When
the Federal Government decides to place an alien in removal
proceedings, the INA requires that the alien be provided
with “written notice.” §§ 1229(a)(1), (2).
That “written notice” can take one of two forms. First,
under paragraph (1) of § 1229(a), the alien “shall be given”
a “ `notice to appear,' ” or NTA. The NTA must set out,
among other things, “[t]he nature of the proceedings against
the alien,” “[t]he legal authority under which the proceedings
are conducted,” “[t]he time and place at which the proceed-
ings will be held,” and the consequences of failing to appear.
§ 1229(a)(1). In Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021),
we held that this information must be provided in a single
document in order to satisfy § 1229(a)(1). Id., at 160–162.
Second, under paragraph (2), “in the case of any change or
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the
agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new
time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of
failing to attend. § 1229(a)(2).
Aliens who receive such written notice are expected to
attend their hearings. Section 1229a(b)(5)(A) provides the
consequences for aliens who, “after written notice required
under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this title has
been provided,” fail to attend “a proceeding under this sec-
tion.” Such aliens “shall be ordered removed in absentia” if
the Government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and con-
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VES v. GARLAND
Opinion of the Court
vincing evidence that the written notice was so provided and
that
the alien is removable.” § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
There are three scenarios in which an in absentia removal
order may be rescinded. First, the alien can fle a motion
to reopen within 180 days of the order, and must demon-
strate that the failure to appear was because of “exceptional
circumstances.” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). Second, an alien can
seek to rescind his in absentia removal order if he “demon-
strates that the alien was in Federal or State custody and
the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.”
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Third, there is the scenario implicated
by these cases: an alien can seek rescission if he “demon-
strates that the alien did not receive notice in accordance
with paragraph (1) or (2)” of § 1229(a). Ibid.
B
We consolidated three cases brought by aliens who moved
for rescission on the ground that they did not receive proper
notice. Though the facts vary, the key details are the same
in each case. The Government failed to provide a single-
document NTA, but eventually provided each alien with a
notice specifying the time and place of the removal hearing.
When each alien failed to show up for the hearing, an Im-
migration Judge entered an in absentia order of removal.
Each a l ien then sought rescissi on of that order under
§ 1229a( b)(5)(C)(i i). In a ll three cases, an Immigrati on
Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) refused
to reopen the proceedings, prompting the aliens to fle a peti-
tion for review in federal court. The Fifth Circuit consid-
ered and denied one of these petitions, but the Ninth Circuit
granted the other two.
1
Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves is the petitioner from the
Fifth Circuit. He is a native and citizen of El Salvador, and
he entered the United States in 2005 without inspection near
Laredo, Texas. Three days later, the Government initiated
removal proceedings by serving an NTA, charging that he

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Opinion of the Court
was removable under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). The NTA provided
the
address of the immigration court, but told Campos-
Chaves to appear on “a date to be set” and at “a time to be
set.” App. 54. The Government followed up a few months
later, sending Campos-Chaves a notice of hearing that set
the hearing date to be September 20, 2005, at 9 a.m.
Campos-Chaves never appeared. The Immigration Judge
noted his absence and the lack of any explanation for it.
Upon fnding that “clear, convincing, and unequivocal” evi-
dence established Campos-Chaves's removability, the Immi-
gration Judge ordered him removed in absentia. App. to
Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–674, p. 16a.
Thirteen years later, Campos-Chaves fled a motion to re-
open his removal proceedings on the theory that he never
received a proper NTA. He relied on our decision in Pereira
v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198 (2018), in which we held that
“[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the spe-
cifc time or place” of the removal proceedings “is not a
`notice to appear under section 1229(a).' ” Id., at 208–209
(quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(d)(1)). The Immigration Judge
denied Campos-Chaves's motion, and the BIA dismissed his
subsequent appeal. The BIA relied on prior precedent in
which it had held that an in absentia order of removal may
not be rescinded merely because the NTA lacked time and
place information “so long as a subsequent [notice of hearing]
specifying that information was properly sent to the alien.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–674, at 8a.
Campos-Chaves fled a petition for review in the Fifth Cir-
cuit. After withdrawing and amending one opinion, the
Fifth Circuit denied his petition, relying on the fact that
Campos-Chaves “d[id] not dispute that he . . . received the
subsequent [notice].” 54 F. 4th 314, 315 (2022).
2
Varinder Singh is one of the two respondents from the
Ninth Circuit. He is a native and citizen of India who en-
tered the United States in 2016 by climbing over a fence near
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VES v. GARLAND
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Calexico, California. Several weeks later, the Government
served
an NTA that charged Singh as removable under
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and indicated that the date and time of the
hearing was “TBD.” App. 11. Five days later, the Govern-
ment sent a notice of hearing to Singh's given address that
provided a specifc time and date. About two years later, in
October 2018, the immigration court sent a new notice of
hearing to Singh's address, rescheduling the hearing for No-
vember 26, 2018, at 1 p.m.
When that date arrived, Singh failed to appear. Because
the Government did not have his fle, however, the immigra-
tion court rescheduled the hearing for December 12, 2018, at
9 a.m., again sending a notice to Singh's address. Singh
failed to appear at that hearing as well. The Immigration
Judge determined that Singh was removable, and accord-
ingly entered an in absentia order of removal.
In April 2019, Singh sought to rescind his removal order.
Like Campos-Chaves, Singh argued that rescission was war-
ranted because he did not receive a proper NTA under Pe-
reira. The Immigration Judge and the BIA disagreed, so
Singh petitioned for review by the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit granted his petition. 24 F. 4th 1315,
1317 (2022). The panel held that the lack of a si ng le-
document NTA alone rendered Singh's in absentia removal
order rescindable. Id., at 1319–1320. The Government's
petition for rehearing en banc was denied. 51 F. 4th 371
(2022). Judge Collins, joined by 11 other judges, dissented.
Id., at 371–382.
3
Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, a native and citizen of Mexico,
is the other respondent from the Ninth Circuit. He at-
tempted to enter the United States in 2001 at San Luis, Ari-
zona, with two other aliens, falsely claiming that he was a
United States citizen. The next day, he was served an
NTA, which charged him with removability under § 1182(a)
(6)(E)(i). The NTA included the immigration court's ad-

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dress, but provided only that the date and time were “[t]o be
set.
” App. 46.
Soon thereafter, the immigration court mailed Mendez-
Colín a notice of hearing, with a specifc date and time for
a hearing later that year. Mendez-Colín appeared at that
hearing. The immigration court ultimately scheduled multi-
ple additional hearings to take place in 2002. For each, the
Immigration Judge provided a notice of hearing to either
Mendez-Colín or his attorney, who attended all of the 2002
hearings.
The Immigration Judge sustained the charge of removabil-
ity at the last of those hearings. Mendez-Colín expressed
his desire to apply for cancellation of removal, prompting
the immigration court to mail a notice to his attorney for an
individual hearing on September 15, 2003, at 9 a.m.
Days before the September 15 hearing, Mendez-Colín's at-
torney fled a motion to withdraw as counsel because of his
client's “fail[ure] to maintain contact.” Record in No. 20–
71846 (CA9), ECF Doc. 9–2, p. 77. Nonetheless, the attor-
ney attended the September 15 hearing, where the Immigra-
tion Judge granted the motion to withdraw but retained the
attorney for “the limited purpose of serv[ing any] in absentia
order.” Id., at 155. The Immigration Judge determined
that Mendez-Colín “abandoned any and all claim(s) for relief
from removal” and ordered him removed in absentia. Id.,
at 156.
Mendez-Colín fled two motions to reopen his removal pro-
ceedings in December 2003 and February 2004, respectively.
The Immigration Judge denied both. Mendez-Colín ap-
pealed the denial of his second motion to reopen, but the BIA
considered the appeal withdrawn when he was removed from
the United States during its pendency.
About 15 years later, Mendez-Colín moved to reinstate his
appeal, now claiming that his in absentia order of removal
was rescindable because of his defective NTA. The BIA de-
nied the motion, prompting Mendez-Colín to fle a petition
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VES v. GARLAND
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for review, which was heard by the same Ninth Circuit panel
that
heard Singh. 2022 WL 342959 (2022). The panel
granted the petition in an unpublished opinion, ibid., and the
full court denied the Government's en banc petition alongside
the en banc petition in Singh. 50 F. 4th 942, 946 (2022).
II
We granted certiorari in all three cases to decide whether
an alien can seek rescission of an in absentia removal order
indefnitely whenever the Government fails to provide a
single-document NTA. The Government concedes that, in
all three cases, the NTAs lacked a specifc time and date
and thus failed to comply with § 1229(a)(1). And before this
Court, each alien argues that he is eligible for rescission
under § 1229a( b)(5)(C)( i i). Thus, th is l itigati on tur ns
on whether Campos-Chaves, Si ngh, and Mendez-Colín
can “demonstrat[e]” that they “did not receive notice in ac-
cordance w ith paragraph (1) or (2) of secti on 1229(a). ”
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
The Government reads § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) to permit rescis-
sion only when the alien did not receive notice of the hearing
he failed to attend. In each of these cases, the alien was
ordered removed in absentia at a hearing for which he re-
ceived notice. The Government argues that those notices
of hearing complied with paragraph (2), and that each alien
thereby “receive[d] notice in accordance with paragraph (1)
or (2) of section 1229(a).” Ibid. That, continues the Gov-
ernment, means the aliens are ineligible for rescission of
their in absentia removal orders.
Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín read the statute
differently and urge a distributive reading of the “or” in
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). That is, they distribute the phrase “did
not receive notice in accordance with” across “paragraph (1)
or (2),” such that an alien can have his in absentia removal
order rescinded if he “demonstrates” that he “did not receive
notice in accordance with” paragraph (1) or that he “did
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not receive notice in accordance with” paragraph (2). Be-
cause
each alien can “demonstrat[e]” that he “did not re-
ceive” an NTA, they argue that they each can seek rescission
of their in absentia removal orders. Brief for Respondent
Singh 47.
We agree with the Government. An alien can have his in
absentia removal order rescinded under § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)
only if he can demonstrate that he “did not receive” a para-
graph (1) notice or a paragraph (2) notice—whichever corre-
sponds to the hearing at which he was ordered removed in
absentia. Each alien before us received paragraph (2) no-
tices for the hearings they missed. They are therefore ineli-
gible for rescission of their in absentia removal orders.
A
As always, we start with the text. Bartenwerfer v. Buck-
ley, 598 U. S. 69, 74 (2023). And here, the text provides that
to be eligible for rescission of his in absentia removal order
an alien must “demonstrat[e] that the alien did not receive
notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section
1229(a).” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The word “ `or' ” is “ `almost
always disjunctive,' ” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
584 U. S. 79, 87 (2018) (quoting United States v. Woods, 571
U. S. 31, 45 (2013)), and is generally used “to indicate . . . an
alternative,” Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1585 (1993); see also Woods, 571 U. S., at 45–46. So here,
§ 1229a(b)(5)'s ordinary meaning is that either a paragraph
(1) notice or a paragraph (2) notice can count as “notice in
accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).”
Of course, “statutory context can overcome the ordinary,
disjunctive meaning of `or.' ” Encino Motorcars, 584 U. S.,
at 87; see also Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 151
(2024) (“[C]onjunctions are versatile words, which can work
differently depending on context”). But statutory context
points in the same direction as the usual meaning here.
Consider § 1229a(b)(5)(A), just two subparagraphs earlier,
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which sets out the preconditions for an alien to be removed
i
n absentia in the frst place. That subparagraph provides:
“Any alien who, after written notice required under
paragraph (1) or (2) of [§ 1229(a)] has been provided
to the alien or the alien's counsel of record, does not
attend a proceeding under this section, shall be or-
dered removed in absentia if the Service establishes by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
written notice was so provided and that the alien is
removable.”
Just as in subparagraph (C), subparagraph (A) refers to
“paragraph (1) or (2)” notice. In subparagraph (A), how-
ever, the “or” is unambiguously disjunctive; there is no way
to distribute language across the “or” that can provide an
alternative meaning of the statute. On any reading, subpar-
agraph (A) does not require both paragraphs (1) and (2) no-
tice before an alien can be removed in absentia. It requires
only one.
Furthermore, subparagraph (A) requires the Government
to establish that it provided “the written notice.” § 1229a(b)
(5)(A) (emphasis added); see also ibid. (“The written notice
by the Attorney General shall be considered suffcient for
purposes of this subparagraph if provided at the most recent
address provided under section 1229(a)(1)(F)” (emphasis
added)). In Niz-Chavez, we concluded that the phrase “ `the
notice described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)' ”
indicated that the notice must be provided in one document.
593 U. S., at 166 (quoting § 1229a(b)(7)); see also id., at 165
(“[A]n article coupled with a singular noun . . . suggest[s] a
discrete document”). If “the notice” denotes a single docu-
ment, it certainly must denote a single notice. And as long
as the Government can show—under the given burden of
proof—that the alien is removable and was provided “the
written notice,” the alien “shall be ordered removed in ab-
sentia.” § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Subparagraph
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(A) clearly contemplates in absentia removal of aliens who
received
only one notice under paragraph (1) or (2).
Indeed, concluding otherwise would create a mismatch in
the statutory scheme. Under the aliens' theory, it is more
diffcult for the Government to defend an in absentia removal
order than it is to obtain one in the frst place. An alien can
be removed in absentia on the basis of receiving one notice,
but the aliens would read § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) to permit rescis-
sion of that order for failure to receive both types of notices.
Brief for Respondent Singh 22. We doubt that Congress in-
tended such an incongruity. See Dacostagomez-Aguilar v.
United States Atty. Gen., 40 F. 4th 1312, 1317 (CA11 2022)
(“It would be nonsensical to invalidate an in absentia re-
moval order because two kinds of notice were not received
when only one was required in the frst place”).
B
Our conclusion that a single notice defeats rescission under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) does not end the analysis, however. We
still must determine which notice the alien must show was
lacking in order to have his in absentia removal order re-
scinded. We hold that, in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), “notice in ac-
cordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” refers to the notice for
the hearing the alien missed, and at which he was ordered
removed.
Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) cross-references paragraphs (1)
and (2) of § 1229(a). Paragraph (1) notice—the NTA—is the
initial document notifying the alien of “removal proceedings
under” § 1229a. Paragraph (2) notice issues “in the case of
any change or postponement in the time and place of such
proceedings” and provides the “new time or place of the pro-
ceedings.” Thus, notice under paragraph (2) supersedes the
NTA; when there is paragraph (2) notice, it is that notice
which informs the alien when to appear, not the NTA.
Now turn back to § 1229a. As noted before, for the statu-
tory scheme to make sense, “notice in accordance with para-
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graph (1) or (2)” in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) must correspond with
“
the written notice” mentioned in § 1229a(b)(5)(A). And
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A) contemplates a very specifc process. An
alien “shall be ordered removed in absentia” when he “does
not attend a proceeding under this section” and the Govern-
ment establishes, among other things, that “the written no-
tice was so provided.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, “the writ-
ten notice” is tied to the singular proceeding missed, and at
which the alien was “removed in absentia.” Whether that
notice was issued under paragraph (1) as an NTA or under
paragraph (2), it is that notice which the Government must
prove was provided to remove an alien in absentia. And it
is that notice which the alien must prove was not provided
in order to have his in absentia removal order rescinded.
This reading aligns with common sense. See Koons
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 63 (2004)
(“ `[T]here is no canon against using common sense in con-
struing laws as saying what they obviously mean' ” (quoting
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339 (1929)). The Govern-
ment does not argue that either a paragraph (1) or a para-
graph (2) notice is always suffcient regardless of which
corresponds to the hearing the alien missed. A simple
hypothetical demonstrates why. Suppose the Government
sent a fully compliant NTA to the alien, specifying the time,
date, and place of the hearing. Suppose then that the Gov-
ernment changed the hearing date without sending any no-
tice whatsoever to the alien, and that the alien was ordered
removed in absentia at that hearing. Literally, the alien
received “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).”
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). But no one would say the alien is
thereby ineligible to seek rescission of a removal order en-
tered at a hearing for which he never received notice.
The only way to make sense of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)'s refer-
ence to a single notice is for that notice to be the one that
matters: the one that informed the alien of the time and date
of the hearing the alien missed, and at which he was ordered
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removed. That reading also gives the provision a “substan-
tive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”
United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Asso-
ciates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). Recall the other two
scenarios in which an in absentia removal order may be re-
scinded. In those, the alien must either demonstrate that
“the failure to appear was because of exceptional circum-
stances,” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), or that he “was in Federal or
State custody and the failure to appear was through no fault
of the alien,” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). For either, relief is condi-
tioned upon the alien's showing he was not at fault for failing
to appear. See § 1229a(e)(1) (defning “exceptional circum-
stances” to be “beyond the control of the alien”). We think
Congress had the same idea in the third scenario. The
alien's failure to appear is excused by his failure to receive a
paragraph (1) or (2) notice only if that notice would have
informed the alien of the relevant hearing.
C
Finally, we must decide whether Campos-Chaves, Singh,
and Mendez-Colín received “notice in accordance with para-
graph (1) or (2)” for the hearings they missed. We hold that
they did, and that their in absentia removal orders thus may
not be rescinded on that ground.
The Government concedes—as it must under Pereira and
Niz-Chavez—that none of the aliens received an NTA com-
pliant with § 1229(a)(1). Each alien's NTA provided only
that the time of the hearing was “TBD” or “to be set,” which
is the sort of language we found to be inadequate in Pereira.
See 585 U. S., at 206 (NTA which ordered alien to appear
“ `on a date to be set at a time to be set' ” was insuffcient to
satisfy § 1229(a)(1)). This litigation thus turns on whether
the aliens received “notice in accordance with paragraph . . .
(2).” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
They each did. Paragraph (2) provides that, “in the case
of any change or postponement in the time and place” of re-
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moval proceedings, “a written notice shall be given” to the
a
lien that includes “the new time or place of the proceedings”
and the consequences of “failing . . . to attend such proceed-
ings.” § 1229(a)(2)(A). Each requirement was met here.
Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín were notifed of
the time of the hearing and the consequences of failing to
appear. Those times were all “new”: those notices were the
frst time any of the aliens were informed when those specifc
hearings would take place. And those notices were for the
hearings which they missed, and at which they were ordered
removed. All three thus in fact received “notice in accord-
ance with paragraph (1) or (2)” within the meaning of
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
The aliens argue otherwise, focusing on the requirement
that paragraph (2) notice be given “in the case of any change
or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings.”
In their view, there cannot have been a “change” in the time
of the proceedings if no time had ever been set. The same
goes for the requirement that paragraph (2) notice give “the
new time or place of the proceedings.” According to the
aliens, there cannot be a “new” time without an old time.
In effect, the aliens think that there cannot be paragraph (2)
notice without an earlier paragraph (1) notice.
We reject both textual arguments. The aliens take too
narrow a reading of the term “change.” In their telling,
“change” means “substitution,” and substitution presupposes
that there was a date before. See Brief for Petitioner
Campos-Chaves 16–17. But to “change” can also mean “to
replace with another or others of the same kind or class,”
“to switch to another,” to “alter,” or to “modify.” Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 373–374 (1986). What
happened here fts under any of those defnitions. The no-
tice of hearing Campos-Chaves received “changed”—that is,
“replaced,” “switched,” or “substituted”—a “date to be set”
and a “time to be set” to “Sep 20, 2005,” and “9:00 A.M.,”
respectively. App. 50. The notice of hearing Singh re-

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ceived “changed” the “TBD” in his NTA to “Dec. 12, 2018,”
and
“9:00 A.M.” Id., at 1. And the notice of hearing
Mendez-Colín received “changed”—that is, “altered” or
“modifed”—the time and place of his proceedings by adding
a hearing on September 15, 2003, at 9 a.m. The a liens'
cramped reading of “change” is out of place here, especially
given that the statute refers to “any change.” § 1229(a)(2)
(emphasis added); see Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 338
(2022) (“[T]he word `any' has an expansive meaning ” (some
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The aliens' argument that a “new” time or place requires
an “old” time or place fares no better. In fact, it runs
against how that word is ordinarily used. No one thinks
that congratulating a couple on having a “new” baby implies
that the couple is replacing an “old” baby. The word “new”
describes something that has “originated or occurred lately,”
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 1522, or
is “novel,” ibid. The times provided by the aliens' notices
of hearing were all those things. The frst occasion on
which Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín were in-
formed of the time of the particular hearing was when they
received their hearing notices. Nonetheless, they failed to
show up at those hearings, and in their absence they were
ordered removed. They received a “notice in accordance
with” paragraph (2), and thus cannot seek rescission under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
Finally, the aliens argue that we have already decided that
a paragraph (2) notice requires that the alien has received
an adequate NTA. They point to our statement in Pereira
that “paragraph (2) presumes that the Government has al-
ready served [an NTA] that specifed a time and place”
because “[o]therwise, there would be no time or place to
`change or postpon[e]. ' ” 585 U. S., at 210 (quoti ng
§ 1229(a)(2)). That case concerned the “narrow question” of
the operation of the so-called stop-time rule. Id., at 202.
To be eligible for cancellation of removal relief, an alien must
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have been “physically present in the United States for a con-
ti
nuous period of not less than 10 years.” § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
Under the stop-time rule, however, an alien's time in the
country generally ceases to count when he “is served a notice
to appear under section 1229(a).” § 1229b(d)(1)(A). In Pe-
reira, we decided that, for a notice to qualify as an NTA and
to trigger the stop-time rule, it must include time and place
information. Id., at 202.
We did not reach out to decide today's question in that
case. The meaning of § 1229(a)(2) was not at issue in Pe-
reira. Indeed, when the Government in Pereira argued
that § 1229b(d)(1)(A)'s reference to a “notice to appear under
section 1229(a)” referred to paragraph (2) as well, the Court's
frst—and suffcient—response was that the “broad refer-
ence” to § 1229(a) was “of no consequence,” because “only
paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a `notice to appear.' ”
Id., at 209. Only then did the Court go on to state the lan-
guage on which the aliens rely so heavily—that paragraph
(2) “presumes” an adequate NTA, and that paragraph (2)
therefore, “[i]f anything,” “bolsters” the bottom-line conclu-
sion that an NTA must include time and place information.
Ibid. (emphasis added). To the extent Pereira discussed
paragraph (2), its language was mere dicta.
1
Today's decision does not mean that the Government is
free of its obligation to provide an NTA. That document
has an important place within the statutory scheme because
it contains information that aliens may need to present their
case, including the conduct for which they are charged and
1
The aliens' invocation of Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021),
fares no better. In that case, we recognized that § 1229(a)(2) “permits
[the Government] to send a supplemental notice amending the time and
place of an alien's hearing if logistics require a change.” Id., at 170.
Thus, if it turns out that the chosen time and place in the NTA is inconve-
nient, the Government is free to amend it through a paragraph (2) notice.
Ibid. That point remains true even if there are other instances in which
paragraph (2) notices may issue.
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Jackson, J., dissenting
the provisions of law they allegedly violated. See §§ 1229(a)
(1)(A)–(E
). Although an alien who receives only paragraph
(2) notice must still attend the hearing or face in absentia
removal, he can raise issues regarding incomplete notice at
that time. That gives the immigration judge a chance to
reschedule the hearing to cure any prejudice from the miss-
ing information. But § 1229a( b)(5)(C)(ii) does not allow
aliens to seek rescission of removal orders in perpetuity
based on arguments they could have raised in a hearing that
they chose to skip.
***
We affrm the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and reverse
the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Garland v. Mendez-Colín.
We vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Garland v. Singh,
and remand that case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
2
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor, Jus-
tice Kagan, and Justice Gorsuch join, dissenting.
Although Congress allows the Government to seek re-
moval of noncitizens in absentia, it tempers that power with
process. Mandatory removal of a noncitizen who fails to
attend a scheduled removal hearing is available. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A). But to obtain such a removal order, the
Government must satisfy certain procedural prerequisites.
See ibid. Relevant here, the Government must have pro-
vided the noncitizen with specifc forms of notice that contain
specifc information. Ibid. (referencing §§ 1229(a)(1)–(2)).
A noncitizen who has been ordered removed in absentia but
has not received the required notice may seek to have the
2
The Ninth Circuit's holding that Singh had shown that he failed to
receive “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” meant that it did
not reach his alternative argument that he could seek rescission under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). 24 F. 4th 1315, 1320 (2020). Neither do we.
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removal proceedings reopened and his removal order re-
sci
nded. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
For years, the Government has failed to ensure that one
form of required notice—a “notice to appear” (hereinafter
NTA)—contains all the information the statute mandates.
See § 1229(a)(1). Specifcally, the Government has issued
NTAs that lack the exact time (and date) of a noncitizen's
removal hearing. Contra, § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). This conspicu-
ous omission has twice before garnered our attention in cases
concerning a noncitizen's plea for discretionary relief from
removal—most recently, just three Terms ago. See Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155 (2021); Pereira v. Sessions,
585 U. S. 198 (2018). And twice over, this Court made clear
that when the Government issues an NTA, that document
must contain the time-and-place particulars that the statute
requires.
Today's cases arise because the Government persisted
with its practice of issuing facially defective NTAs in the
wake of our two prior pronouncements. But, apparently,
the third time is the charm, for the majority now fnally
blesses the Government's abject noncompliance with the
statute's unequivocal command. The Court concludes that a
noncitizen whose NTA does not contain the time-and-date
information that § 1229(a)(1) requires has no recourse from
an in absentia removal order if the Government subse-
quently provides some followup notice identifying the time
and date of the proceeding he missed. Ante, at 450–451.
But that holding defes the plain text and context of the stat-
ute, sidesteps our precedents, and upends the careful in ab-
sentia removal framework Congress has crafted. So, I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
Because a noncitizen may seek rescission only if he “dem-
onstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii),
I agree with the majority that the central question in this
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litigation is what it means to receive notice “in accordance
w
ith paragraph (1) or (2),” ibid. As the parties frame the
issue, the question is whether a noncitizen who has been or-
dered removed in absentia can seek rescission if the Govern-
ment initially fails to identify a time and date for the removal
hearing, as paragraph (1) requires, but provides such infor-
mation at a later date, purportedly under paragraph (2).
1
The majority reads “notice in accordance with paragraph (1)
or (2) of section 1229(a),” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), to preclude a
motion to reopen under these circumstances. In my view,
the majority's reasoning is fawed and leads to the wrong
conclusion.
A
To understand why, one must frst be clear-eyed about the
Government's arguments, and also the majority's assertions.
No one disputes that § 1229(a) establishes a mandatory proc-
ess for the initiation of removal proceedings that compels the
Government to provide “written notice” to any noncitizen it
intends to remove as inadmissible or deportable.
Paragraph (1) states that “written notice (in this section
referred to as a `notice to appear') shall be given in person
. . . or, if personal service is not practicable, through service
by mail.” § 1229(a)(1). That provision then proceeds to list
not one or two but seven categories of information that must
1
I will assume, arguendo, that rescission is the only legal argument
implicated by these facts, given the parties' presentations. It is note-
worthy, however, that the same core question also arises two subdivisions
earlier—under § 1229a(b)(5)(A)—which authorizes the issuance of an in ab-
sentia removal order in the frst place only “after written notice required
under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) . . . has been provided to the
[noncitizen],” and only if the Government “establishes by clear, unequivo-
cal, and convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided.”
Thus, it is not at all clear that defects on the face of an NTA should be
addressed as a matter of reopening and rescission (with the noncitizen
bearing the burden) rather than as part of an assessment of the validity
of the removal order itself, given the Government's burden of proof and
the arguable facial invalidity of the notice.
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be “specif[ied]” in the NTA—including “[t]he acts or con-
duc
t alleged to be in violation of [the] law,” § 1229(a)(1)(C);
the fact that the noncitizen “may be represented by counsel”
during the removal proceedings, § 1229(a)(1)(E); and “[t]he
ti me and place at wh ich the proceedings w i ll be held, ”
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
Paragraph (2) also requires the Government to provide “a
written notice” to removable noncitizens under specifed cir-
cumstances. § 1229(a)(2). But, unlike paragraph (1), that
provision applies only “in the case of any change or postpone-
ment in the time and place of such proceedings.” Ibid. It
requires that “a written notice shall be given in person,” or
“through service by mail” if “personal service is not practica-
ble.” Ibid. Paragraph (2) further specifcally identifes the
two categories of information that this particular notice must
contain: “(i) the new time or place of the proceedings, and
(ii) the consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of this title of
failing, except under exceptional circumstances, to attend
such proceedings.” Ibid.
So far, so good. Everyone agrees up to this point. The
dispute here arises because the Government insists that
its chronic fai lure to prov ide co mpl e te NTAs under
§ 1229(a)(1)—e. g., notices that contain time-and-date infor-
mation—is of no moment with respect to any subsequent in
absentia removal effort. So long as the Government pro-
vides the noncitizen with a paragraph (2) notice of the time
and date of a removal hearing that the noncitizen subse-
quently misses, the noncitizen cannot reopen his removal
proceeding, the Government claims.
Consider the cases before us. As the majority has ex-
plained, ante, at 452, each of the noncitizens here received a
statutorily defcient NTA—defcient because it was missing
the time and date of a removal proceeding. The NTAs the
Government provided instead stated that information as
either “TBD” or “to be set.” App. 10–12, 44–46, 53–54.
Both the majority and the Government acknowledge that
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such notices were defcient under the statute. See ante, at
461;
Brief for Attorney General 26. Each of the noncitizens
later received one or more followup documents that provided
time-and-date information for a removal hearing. Each of
the noncitizens ultimately failed to attend a hearing noticed
by such a followup document and was ordered removed in
absentia. And each of the noncitizens then sought to have
his in absentia removal order rescinded on grounds of def-
cient notice.
According to the Government, having received notice of
the time and date of their removal hearings through a subse-
quent notice issued per paragraph (2), these noncitizens can-
not show that they “did not receive notice in accordance with
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
Therefore, their removal proceedings cannot be reopened, or
their removal orders rescinded. Brief for Attorney General
16–17.
The majority agrees with this reading of the statute, mak-
ing three analytical moves to justify its conclusion. One: It
declares that, for purposes of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), receipt of
either an NTA or a paragraph (2) notice can suffce to defeat
rescission of an in absentia removal order. Ante, at 457–459.
The majority similarly reads § 1229a(b)(5)(A), the in absentia
removal provision, to allow a noncitizen to be removed in
absentia after he is provided with either form of notice.
Ibid. (But the majority also appears to realize that, taken
“[l]iterally,” this reading would allow a noncitizen to be re-
moved without recourse whenever he receives a notice to
appear, even if the Government later changes the hearing
date without telling him. Ante, at 460.) So two: The ma-
jority declares that the notice “that matters” is the one that
informed the noncitizen of the time and date of the hearing
he missed. Ante, at 460–461; see also ante, at 460 (explain-
ing that, under § 1229a(b)(5)(A), “ `the written notice' ” the
Government must provide “is tied to the singular proceeding
missed, and at which the alien was `removed in absentia' ”).

470 CAMPOS-CHA
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Thus, three: The majority concludes that, despite the Gov-
er
nment's provision of a defective NTA, all the noncitizens
here “received a proper paragraph (2) notice for the hearings
they missed and at which they were ordered removed,” so
“they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal or-
ders on the basis of defective notice.” Ante, at 450–451; see
also ante, at 461–462.
As I explain in Parts I–B and I–C, infra, the primary
problem with the majority's statutory analysis is that it
unjustifably cleaves the paragraph (2) notice from para-
graph (1)'s NTA requirement. In the majority's view, the
Government can provide the statutorily required notice if it
issues either form of notice to a noncitizen, so long as the
notice the Government provided and the noncitizen received
corresponds with the hearing the noncitizen missed. See
ante, at 457–461. But this maneuver misreads the plain text
of the statute in at least two critical respects: It ignores the
fact that the statute Congress wrote makes an NTA issued
under paragraph (1) indispensable, and, relatedly, it disre-
gards the obviously supporting and secondary role that para-
graph (2) notices play with respect to this statutory scheme.
B
The text of § 1229(a) plainly refutes the majority's conten-
tion that either an NTA under paragraph (1) or a subsequent
notice under paragraph (2) suffces because the notice that
“matters” for the purpose of in absentia removal is which-
ever one corresponds to the missed hearing at which removal
is ordered. Ante, at 460–461.
Paragraph (1) unequivocally states that “[i]n removal pro-
ceedings under section 1229a of this title,” an NTA “shall be
given” to the noncitizen. § 1229(a)(1) (emphasis added). An
NTA is “the basis for commencing a grave legal proceeding,”
akin to “ `an indictment in a criminal case [or] a complaint in
a civil case.' ” Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 163–164 (quoting Tr.
of Oral Arg. in Pereira v. Sessions, O. T. 2017, No. 17–459,
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p. 39; alteration in original). Nothing in the text of § 1229(a)
betrays
any hint that paragraph (1)'s dictates are optional.
And the Government does not contest this; it acknowledges
that an NTA under paragraph (1) of § 1229(a) is indispensable
because this particular form of notice is what initiates the
removal process as a matter of law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49.
Furthermore, as I mentioned previously, a paragraph (1)
NTA must contain certain specifc information, all of which
Congress apparently thought important for a noncitizen fac-
ing removal to have at the outset. §§ 1229(a)(1)(A)–(G).
Much of the required information is unique to NTAs issued
per paragraph (1). See, e. g., §§ 1229(a)(1)(C)–(D) (requir-
ing notice of the “acts or conduct alleged to be in violation
of law” and the “charges against the” noncitizen). Section
1229(a)(1) a lso treats a l l of the required i nfor mati on
equally—none of the listed elements is more or less dispens-
able than any other.
To be sure, two pieces of information that Congress has
mandated be provided in an NTA—the time and place of a
removal proceeding, § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), and the consequences
of failing to appear, § 1229(a)(1)(G)(ii)—overlap in kind with
information that must be provided in a paragraph (2) notice.
But that fact does not undermine the mandatory nature of
paragraph (1)'s requirements. We have already held that an
NTA that does not contain the requisite time-and-place in-
formation does not qualify as an NTA at all. Pereira, 585
U. S., at 202. Nor does an NTA that is defcient in this way
become retroactively transformed into one that satisfes
§ 1229(a)(1) if the Government backflls that missing infor-
mation using a later notice. Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 170.
Instead, “the government must issue a single statutorily
compliant document.” Id., at 163.
The indispensability of a complete NTA issued under para-
graph (1) has consequences for the reasoning the majority
puts forward here. It means that providing this particular
form of notice always and inevitably “matters” to the in ab-
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sentia removal process, notwithstanding the majority's effort
to
hide that ball by directing our attention to whichever no-
tice “informed the alien of the time and date of the hearing
the alien missed, and at which he was ordered removed”—
as if that is the notice that counts under the statute. Ante,
at 460–461.
Put another way, whatever “notice in accordance with
paragraph (1) or (2)” might mean in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), if the
Government has to issue an NTA that satisfes paragraph (1),
which it does, that language cannot mean the Government
can choose to provide either a paragraph (1) or paragraph (2)
notice and still be in compliance with the statute, as the
majority suggests. And without that “either/or” pillar, the
majority's analysis collapses.
C
The majority's reasoning further suggests that the indis-
pensability of an NTA per the statute is essentially irrele-
vant because, for rescission purposes, an incomplete NTA
can be cured with a paragraph (2) notice, standing alone.
By its nature, however, a paragraph (2) notice cannot stand
alone. This is apparent on the face of the relevant statutory
provisions, which plainly establish, as the Ninth Circuit held,
that “there can be no valid notice under paragraph (2) with-
out valid notice under paragraph (1).” 24 F. 4th 1315, 1319
(2022) (case below). Given this, even if we read § 1229a(b)
(5)(C)(ii)'s “paragraph (1) or (2)” language to preclude rescis-
sion when noncitizens receive either a statutorily compliant
NTA under paragraph (1) or a valid hearing notice under
paragraph (2), the noncitizens here did not receive either
one. The majority's contrary conclusion rests on a mis-
conception of the nature of the notice that paragraph (2)
requires.
1
Analogizing to another common situation: A paragraph (2)
notice is the functional equivalent of a change order. See
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1A P. Bruner & P. O'Connor, Construction Law § 4:1, p. 282
(2016)
(describing a “ `change' ” in the construction context
as “ `an alteration to an existing contract requirement con-
cerning work that is already required to be done' ”). That
is what the plain text of § 1229(a)(2) calls for, and it is how a
paragraph (2) notice plainly operates. Assuming that the
Government has complied with its pre-existing obligation
under paragraph (1) to provide written notice of the nonciti-
zen's duty to appear at removal proceedings at a particular
time and place, paragraph (2) requires the Government to
issue a supplemental notice “specifying . . . the new time or
place of the proceedings” and reiterating the consequences
of failing to attend, if sometime after the issuance of the
NTA the time or place of the scheduled removal hearing
changes. § 1229(a)(2) (emphasis added).
The analogy to change orders in the construction context
illuminates the unavoidably interconnected relationship be-
tween a compliant NTA issued under paragraph (1) and the
notice the Government must provide under paragraph (2).
Ask any homebuilder. A customer who wants a new den,
for example, submits a written request to the builder that
specifes the details of her order—e. g., construct a 12- by
12-foot room with two 48-inch fxed picture windows at a
designated spot on the back of her house. Those are the
indispensable terms of the mandate. But, if the customer
later changes her mind about some aspect of this project—
say, she wants the windows moved, or she wants the room
enlarged to 16 by 16 feet—she submits a written change
order notifying the builder of those particular alterations.
The change order supplements the original request; it does
not entirely supplant it. And the change order supersedes
only the particular terms of the initial directive that have
been changed. Consequently, the change order is only cog-
nizable in relation to what came before.
So it is here. As the majority concedes, Congress has
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474 CAMPOS-CHA
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with a written NTA that specifcally and comprehensively
l
ists the terms of the removal proceeding mandate. That
notice has to include the time and place of the noticed re-
moval proceeding. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Congress has also au-
thorized the Government to make certain adjustments to
that notice under specifed circumstances, but only if the
Government similarly provides a written notice of those al-
tered terms. That is the work of a notice issued under para-
graph (2). And, just as in the construction context, a para-
graph (2) notice of the changed time or place has no effect
independent of the original directive. A notice of change
under paragraph (2) issues only if there is a changed circum-
stance, and it exists merely to update the terms that were
previously set.
2
Setting aside analogous circumstances and using a diction-
ary to bear down on the words Congress used in § 1229(a)(2)
leads to the same result. As a reminder, paragraph (2) pro-
vides that “[i]n removal proceedings . . . , in the case of any
change or postponement in the time and place of such pro-
ceedings, . . . a written notice shall be given in person” to
the noncitizen, and that notice must “specif[y] . . . the new
time or place of the proceedings” and the consequences of
failing to attend. §§ 1229(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).
Homing in on the word “change,” the majority frst accuses
the noncitizens of “tak[ing] too narrow a reading of th[at]
term,” since “change” can mean simply “ `to replace,' ” “ `to
switch,' ” “to `alter,' or to `modify.' ” Ante, at 462. As fur-
ther support for this broad interpretation of change, the ma-
jority points to “any”—the provision says “any change”—
which, according to the majority, suggests that Congress
contemplated that the paragraph (1) NTA could omit the
time and place of the removal proceeding, with the para-
graph (2) notice “chang[ing]” that “TBD” to the actual time
and place. Ante, at 463.
But the modifer “any” does not justify the majority's over-
broad reading of “change or postponement” in § 1229(a)
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(2)(A). It is true that “the word `any' has `an expansive
meani
ng.' ” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 338 (2022) (quot-
ing Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. 399, 405, n. 2 (2020)). But
“any” does work under the noncitizens' reading of paragraph
(2), too. It helps cover all potential changes to the pre-
existing time and place that paragraph (1) requires the Gov-
ernment to designate. Especially when one considers the
entire operative phrase—“any change or postponement in
the time and place of such proceedings”—“any change”
makes clear that notice must also issue when a hearing time
is moved up, or when a venue is switched from one location
to another.
In any event, the majority does not, and cannot, dispute
that an ordinary meaning of “change” is “the action of replac-
ing something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.” Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 374 (1993). The notice provi-
sions at issue here refect that kind of substitution on their
face, because § 1229(a) mandates in paragraph (1) that the
Government provide noncitizens with a complete NTA (with
the time and place for the removal proceeding included) at
the outset. The paragraph (2) notice only comes into play
“in the case of any change . . . in the time and place of
such proceedings.” § 1229(a)(2)(A). Thus, among the vari-
ous defnitional possibilities the majority offers, it is this
defnition that makes the most sense of this particular stat-
ute. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 179, n. 6
(2014) (“[C]ourt[s] should not interpret each word in a stat-
ute with blinders on, refusing to look at the word's function
within the broader statutory context”).
In short, use of the word “change” in the context of a stat-
ute that frst requires something—e. g., the setting of a time
and place—presumes the earlier existence of that thing to
be swapped out. The ordinary meaning of “postponement,”
too, requires the previous selection of a particular date or
time. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at
1773 (defning “postpone” as “to hold back to a later time”).
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And the word “new” runs in the same circles. “New” can
mean
“other than the former or old.” Id., at 1522. So a
“new” time likewise implies the earlier existence of an
“old” time.
Thus, dictionary defnitions indicate that in order for a no-
tice issued under paragraph (2) to “change” the time or place
of a proceeding to a “new” time or place, there must have
been an old time or place to begin with. If the NTA did not
comply with the statute in this way, then it is impossible for
paragraph (2) notice to comply, either.
3
Even so, defnitions alone often “do not equip us to re-
solve” a case. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 245 (2010).
We have long understood that words with “ `many dictionary
defnitions . . . must draw [their] meaning[s] from . . . con-
text.' ” Ibid. (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135
(1991)). “[S]tatutes must be read as a whole,” and, here,
notice under paragraph (2) “does not exist in a vacuum.”
Guam v. United States, 593 U. S. 310, 316 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
That brings me back to where I started—with the obser-
vation that, when read in context, paragraph (2) requires a
preceding written notice (like a standard change order does)
and thus presupposes a compliant NTA. Not to belabor the
point, but it bears noting that all the relevant context clues
support this reading of the statute.
For example, notice under paragraph (2) follows the re-
quired NTA under paragraph (1) in the text of the statute.
See § 1229(a). This ordering suggests the central role of
NTAs in Congress's removal scheme, with paragraph (2) no-
tices playing only a supporting part. Moreover, while para-
graph (2) notices can and do work together with NTAs to
convey essential information to noncitizens, they are hardly
a team of equals. Also, a paragraph (2) notice, which con-
tains far less content than an NTA, is patently supplemen-
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tal insofar as it may not ever need to be issued. See
§
1229(a)(2)(A).
The majority errs in interpreting “notice in accordance
with paragraph (1) or (2),” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), by treating
“or” as a standard disjunctive construct. See ante, at 457.
That might generally be so. But here, the word “or” simply
cannot be taken to mean that either notice in accordance
with paragraph (1) or in accordance with paragraph (2) suf-
fces under the statute because those two notices are by no
means equivalent alternatives, as I have explained.
2
It is clear on the face of this statute, then, that a paragraph
(2) notice merely alters information that Congress has re-
quired be given previously, and, “especially when properly
read in sequence as integral parts of a whole,” the statute
plainly “anticipates a predicate” NTA that complies with
Congress's mandate. Guam, 593 U. S., at 317 (internal quo-
tation marks and alteration omitted). As its “text and place
within [the] comprehensive statutory scheme” show, id., at
320, a notice under paragraph (2) cannot exist in the absence
of a compliant NTA. The statute simply does not contem-
plate it.
II
Our precedents in Pereira and Niz-Chavez addressed the
relevant notice provisions and what they require of the Gov-
ernment, yet the majority barely pauses to acknowledge this.
Both Pereira and Niz-Chavez concerned noncitizens' eligibil-
ity for a form of discretionary relief called cancellation of
removal and the operation of the so-called stop-time rule.
See §§ 1229b(b)(1), (d)(1)(A). Noncitizens who have accrued
2
Considered in context, the word “or” in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) actually re-
inforces both the centrality of an NTA and the conditional nature of a
paragraph (2) notice. Recall that a paragraph (2) notice is required only
in the event of a change or postponement of the removal proceeding.
§ 1229(a)(2). The “or” in “paragraph (1) or (2)” thus expresses—in a way
that “and” could not—that a notice under paragraph (2) will sometimes,
but not always, be required.
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10 years of continuous physical presence in the United States
may
be eligible for cancellation of removal, but under the
stop-time rule, that period of continuous physical presence
ends when the noncitizen “is served a notice to appear under
section 1229(a).” Ibid. Then as now, the Government had
failed to send noncitizens NTAs that included time-and-place
information as § 1229(a)(1) requires.
In Pereira, we held that “[a] notice that does not inform a
noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceed-
ings is not a `notice to appear under section 1229(a)' and
therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule.” 585 U. S., at
202. In Niz-Chavez, we rejected the Government's view
that a defcient paragraph (1) NTA is “complete and the stop-
time rule kicks in whenever [the Government] fnishes deliv-
ering all the statutorily prescribed information.” 593 U. S.,
at 160. Rather, we said, the Government needs to supply
noncitizens with a single, fully compliant NTA if it wishes to
take advantage of the stop-time rule. Id., at 172.
In both of those cases, we interpreted the notice regime
just as the noncitizens do here. As the majority acknowl-
edges, ante, at 463, we specifcally observed in Pereira that,
“[b]y allowing for a `change or postponement' of the proceed-
ings to a `new time or place,' paragraph (2) presumes that
the Government has already served a `notice to appear under
section 1229(a)' that specifed a time and place as required
by § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).” 585 U. S., at 210. “Otherwise,” we
said, “there would be no time or place to `change or post-
pone.' ” Ibid. (alteration omitted). We thought then that
the Government could only “exercise that statutory author-
ity after it has served a notice to appear specifying the time
and place of the removal proceedings.” Id., at 218 (empha-
sis added).
In Niz-Chavez, we doubled down. We recognized that
“Congress expressly contemplated [the] possibility” that the
Government would “issu[e] notices to appear with all the in-
formation § 1229(a)(1) requires—and then amen[d] the time
or place information if circumstances required it” using
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§ 1229(a)(2). 593 U. S., at 159. We explained that “once the
go
vernment serves a compliant notice to appear, [the stat-
ute] permits it to send a supplemental notice amending the
time and place of an alien's hearing if logistics require a
change.” Id., at 170 (emphasis added). We also suggested
that an alternative reading would effectively nullify Con-
gress's work to change the notice regime from one permit-
ting the Government to specify the time and place for a non-
citizen's hearing “ `in the order to show cause or otherwise,' ”
to one where “time and place information must be included
in a notice to appear, not `or otherwise.' ” Id., at 167 (quot-
ing § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed.); emphasis in original). That
point is as salient now as it was then.
Our statements in Pereira and Niz-Chavez demonstrate
that the Court twice before thought obvious the reading of
the statute the noncitizens here propose. Yet the majority
now cries dicta. The Court says the meaning of § 1229(a)(2)
was not at issue in Pereira, which concerned the “ `narrow
question' ” of the operation of the stop-time rule. Ante, at
463. To be sure, “we are not necessarily bound by dicta
should more complete argument demonstrate that the dicta
is not correct.” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568
U. S. 519, 548 (2013). Here, however, “more complete argu-
ment” has served only to confrm our previous statements.
The argument the majority accepts today brushes aside
what we said in Pereira without explaining why our state-
ments—which are due a modicum of respect in any event,
see Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821)—were mis-
taken. Addressing Niz-Chavez in only a footnote, the ma-
jority maintains that our observation that paragraph (2) no-
tices allow the Government to change a “chosen time and
place in the NTA . . . remains true even if there are other
instances in which paragraph (2) notices may issue.” Ante,
at 464, n. 1. But that assertion simply fails to engage with
the antecedent point—that Congress expected the Govern-
ment to issue compliant NTAs frst—and the implications it
has for the interpretation of § 1229(a)(2).
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And, in the end, we were not wrong. Under the uncom-
pl
icated statutory reading that Pereira and Niz-Chavez
endorsed, the noncitizens here are not precluded from seek-
ing rescission of their in absentia removal orders, because
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) permits “a motion to reopen [removal pro-
ceedings] fled at any time” if the noncitizen can demonstrate
that he “did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph
(1) or (2)” of § 1229(a). Neither form of notice was provided
under the circumstances presented here. As all agree, none
of the noncitizens ever received a notice in accordance with
paragraph (1). See Pereira, 585 U. S., at 202. And because
a paragraph (2) notice presumes a statutorily compliant para-
graph (1) notice, none of the noncitizens received notice in
accordance with paragraph (2), either. That is true no mat-
ter how many would-be paragraph (2) notices the Govern-
ment sent.
3
III
One fnal faw bears mentioning. By snipping the thread
that connec ts the notices Congress required i n para-
graphs (1) and (2) of § 1229(a), today's decision mangles the
broader statutory scheme.
A
The long and short of this critique is that reading the stat-
ute in the way the majority does fails to fully account for
Congress's objectives when it comes to removal procedures,
which have long included ensuring that noncitizens facing
removal receive notice. The Government's statutory obliga-
tion to provide notice in the removal context has been a cru-
cial aspect of federal immigration policy since at least the
early 1950s. To this end, the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) of 1952 specifcally provided that a noncitizen
must be “given a reasonable opportunity to be present at
3
By the same logic, the Government should not have been able to obtain
the noncitizens' in absentia removal orders under § 1229a(b)(5)(A) in the
frst place.
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[the] proceeding ” in which his deportability or removability
is
to be determined. § 242(b), 66 Stat. 209, codifed at 8
U. S. C. § 1252(b) (1952 ed.). With respect to in absentia re-
moval, the INA further provided that if the noncitizen “with-
out reasonable cause fail[ed] or refuse[d] to attend or remain
in attendance,” a “special inquiry offcer” could “proceed to
a determination in like manner as if the alien were pres-
ent.” Ibid.
Notably, at that time, an immigration offcer's decision to
remove a noncitizen in absentia was discretionary. Ibid.
In 1990, however, Congress amended the INA to provide, in
certain circumstances, for mandatory in absentia deportation
of noncitizens who failed to appear for their proceedings.
See Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 5061–5065,
codifed at 8 U. S. C. § 1252b(c)(1) (1994 ed.). Nonetheless,
the Government still routinely encountered “[p]rocedural
[i]ssues” in its efforts to remove inadmissible or deportable
noncitizens. H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1, p. 122 (1996).
Those issues included deportable or inadmissible noncitizens
sometimes “frustrat[ing] removal through taking advantage
of certain procedural loopholes” in the process. For exam-
ple, some noncitizens facing removal would “simply fail to
appear for their deportation hearing,” and “some immigra-
tion judges . . . decline[d] to exercise their authority to order
an alien deported in absentia” due to “lapses (perceived or
genuine) in the procedures for notifying aliens of deportation
proceedings.” Ibid.
4
4
This Court has previously described the notice regime of that era.
For example, the Government back then initiated removal proceedings by
issuing a written notice called an “ `order to show cause.' ” Niz-Chavez
v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155, 167 (2021). By statute, the Government was
permitted to specify the time and place for a noncitizen's hearing “ `in the
order to show cause or otherwise.' ” Ibid. (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1252b(a)
(2)(A) (1994 ed.); emphasis in original). But this statutory language pro-
vided fexibility, and meant that “orders to show cause did not necessarily
include time-and-place information.” Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198,
214, n. 9 (2018).
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Congress endeavored to address these kinds of problems,
among
other things, when it established the mandatory in
absentia removal provisions that govern these cases as part
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). See § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009–
587 to 3009–590; see also 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229(a), 1229a. Nota-
bly, however, Congress did not absolve the Government of
its obligation to provide notice of removal proceedings. Nor
did it make receipt of notice irrelevant to whether a nonciti-
zen who does not show up to his hearing can later contest
his removal. To the contrary, notice features prominently
in IIRIRA's in absentia removal process—it is specifcally
mentioned in four of the fve statutory subdivisions that con-
stitute Congress's in absentia mandatory removal direc-
tives.
5
And, rather than devising a process in which a non-
citizen who misses his hearing must be removed regardless,
Congress has made clear that the consequences for failing
to appear for scheduled removal proceedings can turn on
whether notice was provided, or received, under the terms
of the statute. See, e. g., § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
B
The resulting in absentia removal scheme constitutes a
balancing of interests and obligations that is well within Con-
gress's policy prerogatives. Congress has also clearly ex-
pressed its intent in this regard, for when paragraphs (1) and
(2) of § 1229(a) are read naturally, in context, and with an
understanding of Congress's objectives, the entire scheme
fows seamlessly.
5
See § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (authorizing in absentia removal only for nonciti-
zens who have been provided “written notice required under paragraph
(1) or (2) of section 1229(a)”); (B) (requiring “[n]o written notice” before in
absentia removal if a noncitizen failed to provide his address); (C) (permit-
ting motions to reopen at any time if a noncitizen demonstrates that he
“did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section
1229(a)”); (D) (limiting judicial review to, inter alia, the “validity of the
notice provided to the” noncitizen).
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To recap: If the Government issues, and the noncitizen re-
ceives,
the statutorily required notice—i. e., the notice man-
dated by paragraph (1) of § 1229(a), or, when necessary, by
paragraphs (1) and (2)—yet the noncitizen fails to appear at
the scheduled removal proceeding, she is subject to a manda-
tory, nonrescindable removal order. But if the Government
fails to provide notice in accordance with the statute, the in
absentia removal order is subject to reconsideration, mean-
ing that, upon request, the noncitizen's removal proceedings
may be reopened.
6
This symmetry of notice-related mandates and account-
ability incentivizes both noncitizens and the Government to
follow Congress's dictates. It also facilitates effcient re-
moval of deportable and inadmissible noncitizens while simul-
taneously preserving the fairness and procedural integrity of
the removal process in individual cases. The majority's in-
terpretation, which basically amounts to a refusal to accept
these policy choices, supplants this dual objective.
Indeed, and perhaps most concerning, under the majority's
reading of the statutory provisions at issue here, Congress's
goals are plainly thwarted, for a noncitizen may be removed
in absentia even if the Government fails to provide him with
information that complies in both form and substance with
Congress's commands. The removal scheme's orderly pro-
gression actually breaks down when the Government fails,
in systemic fashion, to send statutorily compliant NTAs.
And for years, that is exactly what has happened, because
the NTAs that the Government routinely issued lacked the
time, date, or place of a noncitizen's initial removal hearing.
Brief for Attorney General 50.
6
It is far from clear that rescission is automatic under the statute. See
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (providing that “[s]uch an order may be rescinded” (em-
phasis added)). Relevant regulations, too, give an immigration judge
“discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has estab-
lished a prima facie case for relief.” 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(3) (2021). But
that question is not before the Court.
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Rather than just complying with § 1229(a)'s notice require-
ments,
the Government now urges us to interpret § 1229a(b)
(5)(C)(ii) to preclude reopening of certain in absentia removal
proceedings, out of a worry that “hundreds of thousands” of
individuals who have “been ordered removed in absentia
would be able to undo those orders” under the noncitizens'
reading of the statute. Ib i d. But th is is a problem of
the Government's own making. And it is completely within
the Government's power to fx. At the very least, it seems
wildly counterintuitive for this Court to adopt the Govern-
ment's permissive reading of the statute—in contravention
of its plain text—so as to help the Government avoid the
prescribed consequences of its chronic noncompliance with
Congress's mandates.
There is also no rational limiting principle. Today, the
Government opts to omit from the NTA the time and date of
the removal proceeding. The majority now says that's no
problem—the Government may nevertheless seek and re-
ceive binding in absentia removal so long as the noncitizen
received a paragraph (2) notice that flled in the blanks. See
ante, at 458–460, 461–462. But what prevents the Govern-
ment from removing a noncitizen whose notice to appear is
defcient in other critical respects? The “next chapter in the
same story,” Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 159, might involve a
noncitizen whose notice to appear also failed to inform her
that she can be represented by counsel in removal proceed-
ings. See § 1229(a)(1)(E). That information is required only
in paragraph (1) notices, not paragraph (2) notices. By the
majority's logic, a noncitizen in that position could be ordered
removed in absentia and barred from seeking rescission of
her order without ever being informed of her ability to be
represented by an attorney. Even the Government has con-
ceded that nothing in its reading of the statute prevents that
outcome. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–21, 50–51.
One can imagine other troubling scenarios; for example, a
notice to appear that omits the charges against a noncitizen.
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See § 1229(a)(1)(D). That information, too, is required only
i
n a paragraph (1) notice. If a noncitizen receives such a
defective NTA followed by a purported paragraph (2) notice
and fails to attend her hearing, may she be removed in ab-
sentia having never learned the charges against her? The
Government assures us that statutory safeguards prevent
that outcome at the very least. It says that in those circum-
stances, it could not satisfy its burden of proving to an immi-
gration judge by “ `clear, unequivocal, and convincing evi-
dence' ” that the noncitizen is removable. Reply Brief 23
(quoting § 1229a(b)(5)(A)). But what if the removal hearing
is held in absentia, and the Government simply informs the
immigration judge of the charges against the noncitizen at
that time? Would it matter that the absent noncitizen was
kept completely in the dark about the charges? The major-
ity gives no answer, other than that noncitizens “could have
raised [this issue] in a hearing that they chose to skip.”
Ante, at 465.
The majority waves away these legitimate concerns about
how far the Government can go in deviating from what
§ 1229(a)(1) or (2) requires, by blithely declaring that today's
decision does not “free” the Government of its obligation to
provide a compliant NTA. Ibid. But it is hard to square
that statement with what is actually happening on the
ground. The Government has already fouted its NTA obli-
gation for years now. Though the Court might not be ex-
pressly authorizing this state of affairs, today's blunting of
the statutory consequence for the Government's systemic
failure to comply with § 1229(a) removes any possible incen-
tive for the Government to change course now.
Finally, the majority says that a noncitizen who receives a
noncompliant NTA followed by a paragraph (2) notice can
always “attend the hearing ” to protest the defcient NTA.
Ibid. That is entirely beside the point. Congress put the
burden on the Government to send complete NTAs to noncit-
izens facing removal every time it initiates a removal pro-
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486 CAMPOS-CHA
VES v. GARLAND
Jackson, J., dissenting
ceeding. Instead of requiring the Government to shoulder
that
burden, the majority effectively shifts it onto the noncit-
izens—individuals perhaps unfamiliar with this country and
its laws—tasking them with the responsibility of addressing
the Government's mistakes. That is not the statute Con-
gress wrote.
***
When the Government issues an NTA under paragraph (1)
that lacks time and date information but follows up with a
notice under paragraph (2) that sets the time and date of a
removal hearing that the noncitizen subsequently misses, I
fully understand the instinct to conclude that the Govern-
ment's initial lack of compliance was insignifcant. Some
might even think it unfair that noncitizens could seek rescis-
sion of their removal orders based on an initial notice that
seems only technically defective, given the Government's
subsequent action. My response to them is simple: Con-
gress thought otherwise. The statute it wrote specifcally
establishes the what, when, and how of the notice that is
due to noncitizens facing removal. The statute also allows
noncitizens who have been ordered removed in absentia to
seek rescission of the removal order if the required notice is
not received. I can no more judge that policy decision than
I can change it. Today, the Court makes the unfortunate
mistake of doing both.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None