Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 2
Pages 366–376
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 9, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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366 OCTOBER
TERM, 2023
Syllabus
WARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC., et al. v. NEALY
et
al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 22–1078. Argued February 21, 2024—Decided May 9, 2024
Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must fle suit “within three years
after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. § 507(b). On one understanding
of that limitations provision, a copyright claim “accrue[s]” when “an in-
fringing act occurs.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S.
663, 670. But under an alternative view, the so-called discovery rule, a
claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should
have discovered,” the infringing act. Ibid., n. 4. That rule enables a
diligent plaintiff to raise claims about even very old infringements if
he discovered them within the three years prior to suit. In this case,
respondent Sherman Nealy invoked the discovery rule to sue Warner
Chappell Music for copyright infringements going back ten years.
Nealy argued that his claims were timely because he frst learned of the
infringing conduct less than three years before he sued. In the District
Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the
timeliness of Nealy's claims. But it argued that, even if Nealy could
sue under that rule for older infringements, he could recover damages
or profts for only those occurring in the last three years. The District
Court agreed. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim.
Held: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary
relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringe-
ment occurred. The Act's statute of limitations establishes a three-
year period for fling suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues
(here, the Court assumes without deciding, upon its discovery). That
provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering dam-
ages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act's
remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer
is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner's actual damages
and the infringer's profts. See § 504(a)–(c). There is no time limit on
monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is
entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringe-
ment occurred.
The Court's decision in Petrella also does not support a three-year
damages cap. There, the Court noted that the Copyright Act's statute

Cite
as: 601 U. S. 366 (2024)
367
Syllabus
of limitations allows plaintiffs “to gain retrospective relief running only
three
years back from” the fling of a suit. 572 U. S., at 672. Taken
out of context, that line might seem to address the issue here. But that
statement merely described how the limitations provision worked in
Petrella, where the plaintiff had long known of the defendant's infring-
ing conduct and so could not avail herself of the discovery rule to sue
for infringing acts more than three years old. The Court did not go
beyond the case's facts to say that even if the limitations provision
allows a claim for an earlier infringement, the plaintiff may not obtain
monetary relief.
Unlike the plaintiff in Petrella, Nealy has invoked the discovery rule
to bring claims for infringing acts occurring more than three years be-
fore he fled suit. The Court granted certiorari in this case on the as-
sumption that such claims may be timely under the Act's limitations
provision. If Nealy's claims are thus timely, he may obtain damages
for them. Pp. 371–374.
60 F. 4th 1325, affrmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gor-
such, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined,
post, p. 374.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Brian M. Lipshutz, Abigail
Frisch Vice, Jonathan Z. King, and Karen L. Stetson.
J. Wesley Earnhardt argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Antony L. Ryan, Dean M. Nick-
l es, Ch el sea A. Lew is, Chr is Kl e pp in, and Robe r t A.
Rosenberg.
Yaira Dubin argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Stewart, Daniel Tenny, Suzanne V. Wilson, and Emily L.
Chapuis.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Association
of American Publishers by Nicole Bergstrom and Edward H. Rosenthal;
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Adam
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368 W
ARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC. v. NEALY
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Copyright Act's statute of limitations provides that a
copyright owner must bring an infringement claim within
three years of its accrual. See 17 U. S. C. § 507(b). In this
case, we assume without deciding that a claim is timely
under that provision if brought within three years of when
the plaintiff discovered an infringement, no matter when the
infringement happened. We then consider whether a claim
satisfying that rule is subject to another time-based limit—
this one, preventing the recovery of damages for any in-
fringement that occurred more than three years before a
lawsuit's fling. We hold that no such limit on damages ex-
ists. The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to re-
cover damages for any timely claim.
I
This dispute had its start in a decades-old, short-lived
music venture. In 1983, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler
formed Music Specialist, Inc. That company recorded and
released one album and several singles, including the works
at issue. But the collaboration dissolved a few years later.
And Nealy soon afterward went to prison for drug-related
offenses. He served one prison term from 1989 to 2008, and
another from 2012 to 2015.
G. Unikowsky; and for the Recording Industry Association of America by
Elaine J. Goldenberg.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Intellectual Property Law Association by Benjamin J. Siders and Ann M.
Mueting; for the Authors Guild, Inc., et al. by Benjamin H. Diessel; for
the National Society of Entertainment & Arts Lawyers by Scott Alan
Burroughs and Steven T. Lowe; and for Ralph Oman by Vincent Levy,
Brendon DeMay, and Brian T. Goldman.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
et al. by Mitchell L. Stoltz and Michael Barclay; for McHale & Slavin,
P. A., by Andrew D. Lockton and Edward F. McHale; for Krystina Cavazos
et al. by Robert C. Lind and Michael M. Epstein, both pro se; and for
Tyler T. Ochoa, pro se.
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as: 601 U. S. 366 (2024)
369
Opinion of the Court
Meanwhile, Butler (unbeknownst to Nealy) entered into an
agreement
with Warner Chappell Music, Inc. to license
works from the Music Specialist catalog. And Warner
Chappell found quite a few takers. One Music Specialist
work (“Jam the Box”) was interpolated into Flo Rida's hit
song “In the Ayer,” which sold millions of copies and reached
No. 9 on the Billboard chart. Use of that song was in turn
licensed to several popular television shows, including “So
You Think You Can Dance.” Other Music Specialist songs
found their way into recordings by the Black Eyed Peas and
Kid Sister.
In 2018, following his second prison stint, Nealy sued
Warner Chappell for copyright infringement. Nealy alleged
that he held the copyrights to Music Specialist's songs and
that Warner Chappell's licensing activities infringed his
rights. The infringing activity, Nealy claimed, dated back
to 2008—so ten years before he brought suit. Nealy sought
damages and profts for the alleged misconduct, as the Copy-
right Act authorizes. See § 504.
For his claims to proceed, Nealy had to show they were
timely. Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must fle suit
“within three years after the claim accrued.” § 507(b). On
one understanding of that limitations provision, a copyright
claim “accrue[s]” when “an infringing act occurs.” Petrella
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670 (2014). So
a plaintiff can complain about infringements going back only
three years from the time he fled suit. If that rule gov-
erned, many of Nealy's claims would be untimely, because
they alleged infringements occurring as much as ten years
earlier. But under an alternative view of the Act's limita-
tions provision, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers,
or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing
act. Ibid., n. 4. That so-called discovery rule, used in the
Circuit where Nealy sued, enables a diligent plaintiff to raise
claims about even very old infringements if he discovered
them within the prior three years. Nealy urged that all his
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370 W
ARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC. v. NEALY
Opinion of the Court
claims were timely under that rule because he did not learn
of
Warner Chappell's infringing conduct until 2016—just
after he got out of prison and less than three years before
he sued.
In the District Court, though, Nealy ran into a different
timing objection, related not to his ability to bring suit but
to his recovery of damages. Warner Chappell accepted that
the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy's claims.
But it argued that even if Nealy could sue under that rule
for infringements going back ten years, he could recover
damages or profts for only those occurring in the last three.
The District Court agreed. Relying on a decision from the
Second Circuit, the court held that even when claims for old
infringements are timely, monetary relief is “limited” to “the
three years prior to the fling ” of the action. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 26a (citing Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., 959 F. 3d 39,
51–52 (CA2 2020)). So Nealy could bring claims for infring-
ing acts beyond that three-year period, but could not recover
any money for them. Appreciating the impact of that rul-
ing, the District Court certifed it for interlocutory appeal.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a; 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely
claim. The court “assume[d] for the purposes of answering ”
the certifed question that all of Nealy's claims were “timely
under the discovery rule.” 60 F. 4th 1325, 1331 (2023).
And on that assumption, the court ruled, he could recover
full damages. Allying itself with the Ninth rather than the
Second Circuit, the court held that a plaintiff with a timely
claim under the discovery rule may obtain “retrospective re-
lief for [an] infringement” even if it “occurr[ed] more than
three years before the lawsuit's fling.” Ibid. (citing Starz
Entertainment v. MGM, 39 F. 4th 1236, 1244 (CA9 2022)).
“[T]he plain text of the Copyright Act,” the Eleventh Circuit
stated, “does not support the existence of a separate dam-
ages bar for an otherwise timely copyright claim.” 60

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371
Opinion of the Court
F. 4th, at 1334. And imposing such a bar, the court rea-
soned,
“would gut the discovery rule by eliminating any
meaningful relief ” for the very claims it is designed to pre-
serve. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 600 U. S. ––– (2023), to resolve the
Circuit split noted above, and we now affrm the Eleventh
Circuit's decision.
II
The question on which this Court granted certiorari is
“[w]hether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the
circuit courts,” a copyright plaintiff “can recover damages
for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before
the fling of a lawsuit.” Ibid. That question, which the
Court substituted for Warner Chappell's, incorporates an as-
sumption: that the discovery rule governs the timeliness of
copyright claims. We have never decided whether that as-
sumption is valid—i. e., whether a copyright claim accrues
when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered an in-
fringement, rather than when the infringement happened.
See Petrella, 572 U. S., at 670, n. 4. But that issue is not
properly presented here, because Warner Chappell never
challenged the Eleventh Circuit's use of the discovery rule
below. See supra, at 370; cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S.
709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of frst
view”). And as noted above, a division exists among the
many Courts of Appeals applying a copyright discovery rule
(11 at last count) about whether to superimpose a three-year
limit on damages. See supra, at 370–371; Petrella, 572
U. S., at 670, n. 4; Pet. for Cert. 4. We therefore confned
our review to that disputed remedial issue, excluding consid-
eration of the discovery rule and asking only whether a
plaintiff with a timely claim under the rule can get damages
going back more than three years.
1
1
Disregarding the limit in the reformulated question, Warner Chappell's
briefng in this Court focuses almost entirely on the discovery rule itself.
Compare Brief for Petitioners 15–41 and Reply Brief 1–18 (disputing the
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ARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC. v. NEALY
Opinion of the Court
The text of the Copyright Act answers that question in
favor
of copyright plaintiffs. The Act's statute of limitations
provides in full: “No civil action shall be maintained under
the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.” § 507(b); see supra, at
369. That provision establishes a three-year period for fl-
ing suit, beginning to run when a claim accrues—here, we
assume, upon its discovery. And that clock is a singular one.
The “time-to-sue prescription,” as we have called it, estab-
lishes no separate three-year period for recovering damages,
this one running from the date of infringement. Petrella,
572 U. S., at 686. If any time limit on damages exists, it
must come from the Act's remedial sections. But those pro-
visions likewise do not aid a long-ago infringer. They state
without qualifcation that an infringer is liable either for
statutory damages or for the owner's actual damages and the
infringer's profts. See § 504(a)–(c). There is no time limit
on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a
timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages, no mat-
ter when the infringement occurred.
The Second Circuit's contrary view, on top of having no
textual support, is essentially self-defeating. With one
hand, that court recognizes a discovery rule, thus enabling
some copyright owners to sue for infringing acts occurring
more than three years earlier. And with the other hand,
discovery rule) with Brief for Petitioners 41–44 and Reply Brief 19–21
(assuming the discovery rule's existence). That choice is especially sur-
prising given that Warner Chappell's own petition for certiorari raised the
broader discovery-rule issue only in a footnote, which acknowledged that
the issue was not raised below and is not the subject of a Circuit split.
See Pet. for Cert. 14, n. But even supposing Warner Chappell's petition
had urged us to opine on the discovery rule, our reformulation of the
question presented should have put an end to such arguments. “The
Court decides which questions to consider through well-established proce-
dures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter these ques-
tions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart
this system.” Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992).
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as: 601 U. S. 366 (2024)
373
Opinion of the Court
the court takes away the value in what it has conferred, by
pre
venting the recovery of damages for those older infringe-
ments. As the court below noted, the three-year damages
bar thus “gut[s]” or “silently eliminate[s]” the discovery rule.
60 F. 4th, at 1333–1334; see supra, at 371. Or said another
way, the damages bar makes the discovery rule functionally
equivalent to its opposite number—an accrual rule based on
the timing of an infringement.
2
As noted above, we do not
resolve today which of those two rules should govern a copy-
right claim's timeliness. See ibid. But we reject applying
a judicially invented damages limit to convert one of them
into the other.
And we have never before proposed that course. The
Second Circuit thought otherwise, relying on language in our
Petrella decision to support a three-year damages cap.
Sohm, 959 F. 3d, at 51–52. There we noted, as the Second
Circuit emphasized, that the Copyright Act's statute of limi-
tations allows plaintiffs “to gain retrospective relief running
only three years back from” the fling of a suit. 572 U. S.,
at 672; see id., at 677. Taken out of context, that line might
seem to address the issue here. But in making that state-
ment, we merely described how the limitations provision
works when a plaintiff has no timely claims for infringing
acts more than three years old. That was the situation in
Petrella. Because the plaintiff had long known of the de-
fendant's infringing conduct, she could not avail herself of
the discovery rule. Rather, she sued only for infringements
that occurred in the three years before her suit. The de-
fendant argued that she could not recover for even that much
under the doctrine of laches, which protects against unrea-
sonable delay in fling suit. We rejected that doctrine's ap-
2
Scholars have speculated about “exceptional case[s]” in which a copy-
right plaintiff could get some beneft out of a discovery rule even when
combined with a three-year damages bar. 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Copyright § 12.05[B][2][c][ii] (2023). Suffce to say that assuming those
cases exist at all, they are as rare as hen's teeth.

374 W
ARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC. v. NEALY
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
plication, explaining that the Act's limitations provision al-
ready
“takes account of delay” by—here is the language
again—allowing the plaintiff “to gain retrospective relief
running only three years back from” her suit's fling. Id., at
672, 677. But we did not go beyond the case's facts to say
that even if the limitations provision allows a claim for an
earlier infringement, the plaintiff may not obtain monetary
relief. To the contrary: The plaintiff in Petrella could get
damages “running only three years back” from fling because
she could sue for infringements occurring only within that
timeframe.
Nealy is in a different situation. He has invoked the dis-
covery rule to bring claims for infringing acts occurring
more than three years before he fled suit. And as we have
explained, we took this case on the assumption that such
claims may be timely under the Act's limitations provision.
See supra, at 371. If Nealy's claims are thus timely, he may
obtain damages for them. The Copyright Act contains no
separate time-based limit on monetary recovery.
Accordingly, we affrm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and Jus-
tice Alito join, dissenting.
The Court discusses how a discovery rule of accrual should
operate under the Copyright Act. But in doing so it side-
steps the logically antecedent question whether the Act has
room for such a rule. Rather than address that question,
the Court takes care to emphasize that its resolution must
await a future case. The trouble is, the Act almost certainly
does not tolerate a discovery rule. And that fact promises
soon enough to make anything we might say today about the
rule's operational details a dead letter.
“[O]rdinarily,” this Court has said, a claim “accrues when
a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Pet-
rella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670 (2014)
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Cite
as: 601 U. S. 366 (2024)
375
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “In
other
words, the limitations period generally begins to run
at the point when the plaintiff can fle suit and obtain relief.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We call this the
“incident of injury rule.” Ibid., n. 4. And we interpret
statutes with that “ `standard rule' ” in mind. Rotkiske v.
Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 13 (2019).
What of the discovery rule? It “starts the limitations pe-
riod when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for
the claim.” Petrella, 572 U. S., at 670, n. 4 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). We have said, however, that the
rule is not “applicable across all contexts.” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 27 (2001). Far from it: Unless the
statute at hand directs otherwise, we proceed consistent
with traditional equitable practice and ordinarily apply the
discovery rule only “in cases of fraud or concealment.”
Ibid. We have long warned lower courts, too, against tak-
ing any more “expansive approach to the discovery rule.”
Rotkiske, 589 U. S., at 14; see TRW Inc., 534 U. S., at 27–28.
There is little reason to suppose the Copyright Act's provi-
sions at issue in this case contemplate any departure from
the usual rules. Section 507(b) provides that “[n]o civil ac-
tion shall be maintained . . . unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.” As the Court ob-
served in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., standard
language like that calls for the application of the standard
incident of injury rule: “A copyright claim thus arises or `ac-
crue[s]' when an infringing act occurs,” not at some later
date. 572 U. S., at 670. What this should mean for the case
before us seems equally evident: Because everyone agrees
Sherman Nealy fled suit more than three years after many
of Warner Chappell's alleged infringing acts, see ante, at 369,
some (if not all) of his claims are untimely. Everyone
agrees, too, that he has not alleged any fraud or concealment
that would entitle him to equitable tolling. See Brief for

376 W
ARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC. v. NEALY
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Petitioners 39; Brief for Respondents 50–51. The discovery
r
ule thus has no role to play here—or, indeed, in the mine
run of copyright cases.
In one sense, the Court's decision to pass over this compli-
cation may be understandable. After all, none of the parties
before us questioned the application of a discovery rule in
proceedings below, but joined issue only over how it should
work. See ante, at 371, n. 1. And the Court may, as it does,
resolve the parties' dispute while leaving for another day the
antecedent question whether a discovery rule exists under
the Act. See ante, at 371.
But if that is a permissible course, it does not strike me as
the most sensible one. Nothing requires us to play along
with these particular parties and expound on the details of
a rule of law that they may assume but very likely does not
exist. Respectfully, rather than devote our time to this
case, I would have dismissed it as improvidently granted and
awaited another squarely presenting the question whether
the Copyright Act authorizes the discovery rule. Better, in
my view, to answer a question that does matter than one
that almost certainly does not.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None