Lindke v. Freed

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 1
Pages 187–204
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 15, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
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Syllabus
LINDKE v. FREED
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 22–611. Argued October 31, 2023—Decided March 15, 2024
James Freed, like countless other Americans, created a private Facebook
profle sometime before 2008. He eventually converted his profle to a
public “page,” meaning that anyone could see and comment on his posts.
In 2014, Freed updated his Facebook page to refect that he was ap-
pointed city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, describing himself as
“Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administra-
tive Offcer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed continued to
operate his Facebook page himself and continued to post prolifcally (and
primarily) about his personal life. Freed also posted information re-
lated to his job, such as highlighting communications from other city
offcials and soliciting feedback from the public on issues of concern.
Freed often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by
city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasion-
ally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.”
After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted about it. Some
posts were personal, and some contained information related to his job.
Facebook user Kevin Lindke commented on some of Freed's posts, un-
equivocally expressing his displeasure with the city's approach to the
pandemic. Initially, Freed deleted Lindke's comments; ultimately, he
blocked him from commenting at all. Lindke sued Freed under 42
U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that Freed had violated his First Amendment
rights. As Lindke saw it, he had the right to comment on Freed's Face-
book page because it was a public forum. The District Court deter-
mined that because Freed managed his Facebook page in his private
capacity, and because only state action can give rise to liability under
§ 1983, Lindke's claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affrmed.
Held: A public offcial who prevents someone from commenting on the
offcial's social-media page engages in state action under § 1983 only if
the offcial both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State's
behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that author-
ity when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. Pp. 194–204.
(a) Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State” deprives someone of a federal constitutional or

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statutory right. (Emphasis added.) Section 1983's “under color of ”
text
makes clear that it is a provision designed as a protection against
acts attributable to a State, not those of a private person. In the run-
of-the-mill case, state action is easy to spot. Courts do not ordinarily
pause to consider whether § 1983 applies to the actions of police offcers,
public schools, or prison offcials. Sometimes, however, the line be-
tween private conduct and state action is diffcult to draw. In Griffn
v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 130, for example, it was the source of the power,
not the identity of the employer, which controlled in the case of a depu-
tized sheriff who was held to have engaged in state action while em-
ployed by a privately owned amusement park. Since Griffn, most
state-action precedents have grappled with whether a nominally private
person engaged in state action, but this case requires analyzing whether
a state offcial engaged in state action or functioned as a private citizen.
Freed's status as a state employee is not determinative. The distinc-
tion between private conduct and state action turns on substance, not
labels: Private parties can act with the authority of the State, and state
offcials have private lives and their own constitutional rights—including
the First Amendment right to speak about their jobs and exercise edito-
rial control over speech and speakers on their personal platforms.
Here, if Freed acted in his private capacity when he blocked Lindke and
deleted his comments, he did not violate Lindke's First Amendment
rights—instead, he exercised his own. Pp. 194–197.
(b) In the case of a public offcial using social media, a close look is
defnitely necessary to categorize conduct. In cases analogous to this
one, precedent articulates principles to distinguish between personal
and offcial communication in the social-media context. A public off-
cial's social-media activity constitutes state action under § 1983 only if
the offcial (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State's behalf,
and (2) purported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social
media. The appearance and function of the social-media activity are
relevant at the second step, but they cannot make up for a lack of state
authority at the frst. Pp. 197–204.
(1) The test's frst prong is grounded in the bedrock requirement
that “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be
fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U. S. 922, 937 (emphasis added). Lindke's focus on appearance skips
over this critical step. Unless Freed was “possessed of state authority”
to post city updates and register citizen concerns, Griffn, 378 U. S., at
135, his conduct is not attributable to the State. Importantly, Lindke
must show more than that Freed had some authority to communicate
with residents on behalf of Port Huron. The alleged censorship must
be connected to speech on a matter within Freed's bailiwick. There

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Syllabus
must be a tie between the offcial's authority and “the gravamen of the
plai
ntiff 's complaint.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1003.
To misuse power, one must possess it in the frst place, and § 1983 lists
the potential sources: “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.”
Determining the scope of an offcial's power requires careful attention
to the relevant source of that power and what authority it reasonably
encompasses. The threshold inquiry to establish state action is not
whether making offcial announcements could ft within a job descrip-
tion but whether making such announcements is actually part of the
job that the State entrusted the offcial to do. Pp. 198–201.
(2) For social-media activity to constitute state action, an offcial
must not only have state authority, he must also purport to use it. If
the offcial does not speak in furtherance of his offcial responsibilities,
he speaks with his own voice. Here, if Freed's account had carried a
label—e. g., “this is the personal page of James R. Freed”—he would be
entitled to a heavy presumption that all of his posts were personal, but
Freed's page was not designated either “personal” or “offcial.” The
ambiguity surrounding Freed's page requires a fact-specifc undertaking
in which posts' content and function are the most important considera-
tions. A post that expressly invokes state authority to make an an-
nouncement not available elsewhere is offcial, while a post that merely
repeats or shares otherwise available information is more likely per-
sonal. Lest any offcial lose the right to speak about public affairs in
his personal capacity, the plaintiff must show that the offcial purports
to exercise state authority in specifc posts. The nature of the social-
media technology matters to this analysis. For example, because Face-
book's blocking tool operates on a page-wide basis, a court would have
to consider whether Freed had engaged in state action with respect to
any post on which Lindke wished to comment. Pp. 201–204.
37 F. 4th 1199, vacated and remanded.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Allon Kedem argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Dana Or, Charles Birkel, Matthew L. Far-
ley, Philip L. Ellison, and Nicole Masiello.
Victoria R. Ferres argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Todd J. Shoudy and William L.
Fealko III.
Masha G. Hansford argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy

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Opinion of the Court
Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
e
ral Gannon, Sopan Joshi, and Daniel Tenny.*
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like millions of Americans, James Freed maintained a
Facebook account on which he posted about a wide range of
topics, including his family and his job. Like most of those
Americans, Freed occasionally received unwelcome com-
ments on his posts. In response, Freed took a step familiar
to Facebook users: He deleted the comments and blocked
those who made them.
For most people with a Facebook account, that would have
been the end of it. But Kevin Lindke, one of the unwelcome
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for American Athe-
ists, Inc., by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the American Civil Liberties Union
et al. by David D. Cole, Vera Eidelman, Esha Bhandari, and Daniel S.
Korobkin; for First Amendment Clinics et al. by Gregg P. Leslie, Sarah
Ludington, Lena Shapiro, and Jennifer Safstrom; and for the Foundation
for Individual Rights and Expression by Robert Corn-Revere.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Tennessee et al. by Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General of Tennessee,
Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General, J. Matthew Rice, Associate Solici-
tor General, and Gabriel Krimm and Philip Hammersley, Assistant Solic-
itors General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Phil Weiser
of Colorado, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana,
Brenna Bird of Iowa, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew Wrig-
ley of North Dakota, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry
of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and Marty J. Jackley of
South Dakota; for the State of Texas by Angela Colmenero, Provisional
Attorney General, Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General,
William F. Cole, Assistant Solicitor General, and Brent Webster, First
Assistant Attorney General; and for the NRSC by Michael E. Toner,
Brandis L. Zehr, Jeremy J. Broggi, and Ryan G. Dollar.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
et al. by David Greene and Sophia Cope; for the Local Government Legal
Center et al. by Caroline P. Mackie and Robert E. Hagemann; and for
NetChoice et al. by David M. Gossett, Ambika Kumar, Adam S. Sieff,
Carl M. Szabo, Matthew C. Schruers, and Alexandra J. Sternburg.

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commenters, sued Freed for violating his right to free
speech.
Because the First Amendment binds only the gov-
ernment, this claim is a nonstarter if Freed posted as a pri-
vate citizen. Freed, however, is not only a private citizen
but also the city manager of Port Huron, Michigan—and
while Freed insists that his Facebook account was strictly
personal, Lindke argues that Freed acted in his offcial ca-
pacity when he silenced Lindke's speech.
When a government offcial posts about job-related topics
on social media, it can be diffcult to tell whether the speech
is offcial or private. We hold that such speech is attribut-
able to the State only if the offcial (1) possessed actual au-
thority to speak on the State's behalf, and (2) purported to
exercise that authority when he spoke on social media.
I
A
Sometime before 2008, while he was a college student,
James Freed created a private Facebook profle that he
shared only with “friends.” In Facebook lingo, “friends” are
not necessarily confdants or even real-life acquaintances.
Users become “friends” when one accepts a “friend request”
from another; after that, the two can generally see and com-
ment on one another's posts and photos. When Freed, an
avid Facebook user, began nearing the platform's 5,000-
friend limit, he converted his profle to a public “page.”
This meant that anyone could see and comment on his posts.
Freed chose “public fgure” for his page's category, “James
Freed” for its title, and “JamesRFreed1” as his username.
Facebook did not require Freed to satisfy any special criteria
either to convert his Facebook profle to a public page or to
describe himself as a public fgure.
In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager of Port Huron,
Michigan, and he updated his Facebook page to refect the
new job. For his profle picture, Freed chose a photo of
himself in a suit with a city lapel pin. In the “About” sec-
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tion, Freed added his title, a link to the city's website, and
the
city's general email address. He described himself as
“Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief
Administrative Offcer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.”
As before his appointment, Freed operated his Facebook
page himself. And, as before his appointment, Freed posted
prolifica lly (and primarily) about his persona l life. He
uploaded hundreds of photos of his daughter. He shared
about outings like the Daddy Daughter Dance, dinner with
his wife, and a family nature walk. He posted Bible verses,
updates on home-improvement projects, and pictures of his
dog, Winston.
Freed also posted information related to his job. He de-
scribed mundane activities, like visiting local high schools, as
well as splashier ones, like starting reconstruction of the
city's boat launch. He shared news about the city's efforts
to streamline leaf pickup and stabilize water intake from a
local river. He highlighted communications from other city
offcials, like a press release from the fre chief and an annual
fnancial report from the fnance department. On occasion,
Freed solicited feedback from the public—for instance, he
once posted a link to a city survey about housing and encour-
aged his audience to complete it.
Freed's readers frequently commented on his posts, some-
times with reactions (for example, “Good job it takes skills”
on a picture of his sleeping daughter) and sometimes with
questions (for example, “Can you allow city residents to have
chickens?”). Freed often replied to the comments, including
by answering inquiries from city residents. (City residents
can have chickens and should “call the Planning Dept for
det ai ls. ”) He occasi ona l ly deleted comments that he
thought were “derogatory” or “stupid.”
After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted about
that. Some posts were personal, like pictures of his family
spending time at home and outdoors to “[s]tay safe” and
“[s]ave lives.” Some contained general information, like
case counts and weekly hospitalization numbers. Others re-

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Opinion of the Court
lated to Freed's job, like a description of the city's hiring
freeze
and a screenshot of a press release about a relief pack-
age that he helped prepare.
Enter Kevin Lindke. Unhappy with the city's approach
to the pandemic, Lindke visited Freed's page and said so.
For example, in response to one of Freed's posts, Lindke
commented that the city's pandemic response was “abysmal”
and that “the city deserves better.” When Freed posted a
photo of himself and the mayor picking up takeout from a
local restaurant, Lindke complained that while “residents
[we]re suffering,” the city's leaders were eating at an expen-
sive restaurant “instead of out talking to the community.”
Initially, Freed deleted Lindke's comments; ultimately, he
blocked him. Once blocked, Lindke could see Freed's posts
but could no longer comment on them.
B
Lindke sued Freed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that
Freed had violated his First Amendment rights. As Lindke
saw it, he had the right to comment on Freed's Facebook
page, which he characterized as a public forum. Freed, Lin-
dke claimed, had engaged in impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination by deleting unfavorable comments and blocking
the people who made them.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Freed.
Because only state action can give rise to liability under
§ 1983, Lindke's claim depended on whether Freed acted in
a “private” or “public” capacity. 563 F. Supp. 3d 704, 714
(ED Mich. 2021). The “prevailing personal quality of
Freed's post[s],” the absence of “government involvement”
with his account, and the lack of posts conducting offcial
business led the court to conclude that Freed managed his
Facebook page in his private capacity, so Lindke's claim
failed. Ibid.
The Sixth Circuit affrmed. It noted that “the caselaw is
murky as to when a state offcial acts personally and when
he acts offcially” for purposes of § 1983. 37 F. 4th 1199, 1202
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(2022). To sort the personal from the offcial, that court
“asks
whether the offcial is `performing an actual or appar-
ent duty of his offce,' or if he could not have behaved as he
did `without the authority of his offce.' ” Id., at 1203 (quot-
ing Waters v. Morristown, 242 F. 3d 353, 359 (CA6 2001)).
Applying this precedent to the social-media context, the
Sixth Circuit held that an offcial's activity is state action if
the “text of state law requires an offceholder to maintain a
social-media account,” the offcial “use[s] . . . state resources”
or “government staff ” to run the account, or the “accoun[t]
belong[s] to an offce, rather than an individual offceholder.”
37 F. 4th, at 1203–1204. These situations, the Sixth Circuit
explained, make an offcial's social-media activity “ `fairly at-
tributable' ” to the State. Id., at 1204 (quoting Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 937 (1982)). And it con-
cluded that Freed's activity was not.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to state action in the social-
media context differs from that of the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits, which focus less on the connection between the offcial's
authority and the account and more on whether the account's
appearance and content look offcial. See, e.g., Garnier v.
O'Connor-Ratcliff, 41 F. 4th 1158, 1170–1171 (CA9 2022);
Knight First Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928
F. 3d 226, 236 (CA2 2019), vacated as moot sub nom. Biden
v. Knight First Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 593 U. S. –––
(2021). We granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2023).
II
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives someone of a
federal constitutional or statutory right. (Emphasis added.)
As its text makes clear, this provision protects against acts
attributable to a State, not those of a private person. This
limit tracks that of the Fourteenth Amendment, which obli-
gates States to honor the constitutional rights that § 1983
protects. § 1 (“No State shall . . . nor shall any State de-

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195
Opinion of the Court
prive . . . ” (emphasis added)); see also Lugar, 457 U. S., at
929
(“[T]he statutory requirement of action `under color of
state law' and the `state action' requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment are identical”). The need for govern-
mental action is also explicit in the Free Speech Clause, the
guarantee that Lindke invokes in this case. Amdt. 1 (“Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
. . . ” (emphasis added)); see also Manhattan Community
Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U. S. 802, 808 (2019) (“[T]he
Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridg-
ment of speech,” not “private abridgment of speech”). In
short, the state-action requirement is both well established
and reinforced by multiple sources.
1
In the run-of-the-mill case, state action is easy to spot.
Courts do not ordinarily pause to consider whether § 1983
applies to the actions of police offcers, public schools, or
prison offcials. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386,
388 (1989) (police offcers); Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 504–505 (1969)
(public schools); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 98 (1976)
(prison offcials). And, absent some very unusual facts, no
one would credit a child's assertion of free speech rights
against a parent, or a plaintiff 's complaint that a nosy neigh-
bor unlawfully searched his garage.
Sometimes, however, the line between private conduct and
state action is diffcult to draw. Griffn v. Maryland is a
good example. 378 U. S. 130 (1964). There, we held that a
security guard at a privately owned amusement park en-
gaged in state action when he enforced the park's policy
of segregation against black protesters. Id., at 132–135.
Though employed by the park, the guard had been “depu-
1
Because local governments are subdivisions of the State, actions taken
under color of a local government's law, custom, or usage count as “state”
action for purposes of § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of So-
cial Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 690–691 (1978). And when a state or municipal
employee violates a federal right while acting “under color of law,” he can
be sued in an individual capacity, as Freed was here.
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tized as a sheriff of Montgomery County” and possessed
“
`the same power and authority' ” as any other deputy sher-
iff. Id., at 132, and n. 1. The State had therefore allowed
its power to be exercised by someone in the private sector.
And the source of the power, not the identity of the em-
ployer, controlled.
By and large, our state-action precedents have grappled
with variations of the question posed in Griffn: whether a
nominally private person has engaged in state action for
purposes of § 1983. See, e. g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S.
501, 502–503 (1946) (company town); Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U. S. 144, 146–147 (1970) (restaurant); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 151–152 (1978) (warehouse com-
pany). Today's case, by contrast, requires us to analyze
whether a state offcial engaged in state action or functioned
as a private citizen. This Court has had little occasion to
consider how the state-action requirement applies in this
circumstance.
The question is diffcult, especially in a case involving a
state or local offcial who routinely interacts with the public.
Such offcials may look like they are always on the clock,
making it tempting to characterize every encounter as part
of the job. But the state-action doctrine avoids such broad-
brush assumptions—for good reason. While public offcials
can act on behalf of the State, they are also private citizens
with their own constitutional rights. By excluding from
liability “acts of offcers in the ambit of their personal
pursuits,” Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 111 (1945)
(plurality opinion), the state-action requirement “protects
a robust sphere of individual liberty” for those who
serve as public offcials or employees, Halleck, 587 U. S.,
at 808.
The dispute between Lindke and Freed illustrates this dy-
namic. Freed did not relinquish his First Amendment
rights when he became city manager. On the contrary, “the
First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in cer-
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tain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters
of
public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 417
(2006). This right includes the ability to speak about “infor-
mation related to or learned through public employment,” so
long as the speech is not “itself ordinarily within the scope
of [the] employee's duties.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228,
236, 240 (2014). Where the right exists, “editorial control
over speech and speakers on [the public employee's] proper-
ties or platforms” is part and parcel of it. Halleck, 587 U. S.,
at 816. Thus, if Freed acted in his private capacity when he
blocked Lindke and deleted his comments, he did not violate
Lindke's First Amendment rights—instead, he exercised
his own.
So Lindke cannot hang his hat on Freed's status as a state
employee. The distinction between private conduct and
state action turns on substance, not labels: Private parties
can act with the authority of the State, and state offcials
have private lives and their own constitutional rights.
Categorizing conduct, therefore, can require a close look.
III
A close look is defnitely necessary in the context of a pub-
lic offcial using social media. There are approximately 20
million state and local government employees across the Na-
tion, with an extraordinarily wide range of job descrip-
tions—from Governors, mayors, and police chiefs to teachers,
hea lthcare professi ona ls, and transpor t ati on workers.
Many use social media for personal communication, offcial
communication, or both—and the line between the two is
often blurred. Moreover, social media involves a variety of
different and rapidly changing platforms, each with distinct
features for speaking, viewing, and removing speech. The
Court has frequently emphasized that the state-action doc-
trine demands a fact-intensive inquiry. See, e. g., Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 378 (1967); Gilmore v. Montgomery,
417 U. S. 556, 574 (1974). We repeat that caution here.
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That said, our precedent articulates principles that govern
cases
analogous to this one. For the reasons we explain
below, a public offcial's social-media activity constitutes
state action under § 1983 only if the offcial (1) possessed ac-
tual authority to speak on the State's behalf, and (2) pur-
ported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social
media. The appearance and function of the social-media ac-
tivity are relevant at the second step, but they cannot make
up for a lack of state authority at the frst.
A
The frst prong of this test is grounded in the bedrock re-
quirement that “the conduct allegedly causing the depriva-
tion of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State.”
Lugar, 457 U. S., at 937 (emphasis added). An act is not at-
tributable to a State unless it is traceable to the State's
power or authority. Private action—no matter how “off-
cial” it looks—lacks the necessary lineage.
This rule runs through our cases. Griffn stresses that
the security guard was “possessed of state authority” and
“purport[ed] to act under that authority.” 378 U. S., at 135.
West v. Atkins states that the “traditional defnition” of state
action “requires that the defendant . . . have exercised power
`possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only be-
cause the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.' ” 487 U. S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941)). Lugar emphasizes that state
action exists only when “the claimed deprivation has re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority.” 457 U. S., at 939; see also, e.g.,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 620 (1991)
(describing state action as the “exercise of a right or privi-
lege having its source in state authority”); Screws, 325 U. S.,
at 111 (plurality opinion) (police-offcer defendants “were au-
thorized to make an arrest and to take such steps as were
necessary to make the arrest effective”). By contrast, when
the challenged conduct “entail[s] functions and obligations in
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no way dependent on state authority,” state action does not
exist.
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 318–319 (1981)
(no state action because criminal defense “is essentially a
private function . . . for which state offce and authority are
not needed”); see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U. S. 345, 358–359 (1974).
Lindke's focus on appearance skips over this crucial step.
He insists that Freed's social-media activity constitutes state
action because Freed's Facebook page looks and functions
like an outlet for city updates and citizen concerns. But
Freed's conduct is not attributable to the State unless he
was “possessed of state authority” to post city updates and
register citizen concerns. Griffn, 378 U. S., at 135. If the
State did not entrust Freed with these responsibilities, it
cannot “fairly be blamed” for the way he discharged them.
Lugar, 457 U. S., at 936. Lindke imagines that Freed can
conjure the power of the State through his own efforts. Yet
the presence of state authority must be real, not a mirage.
Importantly, Lindke must show more than that Freed had
some authority to communicate with residents on behalf of
Port Huron. The alleged censorship must be connected to
speech on a matter within Freed's bailiwick. For example,
imagine that Freed posted a list of local restaurants with
health-code violations and deleted snarky comments made by
other users. If public health is not within the portfolio of
the city manager, then neither the post nor the deletions
would be traceable to Freed's state authority—because he
had none. For state action to exist, the State must be “re-
sponsible for the specifc conduct of which the plaintiff com-
plains.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1004 (1982) (em-
phasis deleted). There must be a tie between the offcial's
authority and “the gravamen of the plaintiff 's complaint.”
Id., at 1003.
To be clear, the “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law,” constitutes state action. Classic, 313 U. S., at
326 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Screws, 325 U. S., at 110
(plurality opinion) (state action where “the power which

200 LINDKE
v. FREED
Opinion of the Court
[state offcers] were authorized to exercise was misused”).
W
hile the state-action doctrine requires that the State have
granted an offcial the type of authority that he used to vio-
late rights—e.g., the power to arrest—it encompasses cases
where his “particular action”—e. g., an arrest made with ex-
cessive force—violated state or federal law. Griffn, 378
U. S., at 135; see also Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 287–288 (1913) (the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses “abuse by a state offcer . . . of the
powers possessed”). Every § 1983 suit alleges a misuse of
power, because no state actor has the authority to deprive
someone of a federal right. To misuse power, however, one
must possess it in the frst place.
Where does the power come from? Section 1983 lists the
potential sources: “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage.” Statutes, ordinances, and regulations refer to writ-
ten law through which a State can authorize an offcial to
speak on its behalf. “Custom” and “usage” encompass
“persistent practices of state offcials” that are “so perma-
nent and well settled” that they carry “the force of law.”
Adickes, 398 U. S., at 167–168. So a city manager like Freed
would be authorized to speak for the city if written law like
an ordinance empowered him to make offcial announce-
ments. He would also have that authority even in the ab-
sence of written law if, for instance, prior city managers have
purported to speak on its behalf and have been recognized
to have that authority for so long that the manager's power
to do so has become “permanent and well settled.” Id., at
168. And if an offcial has authority to speak for the State,
he may have the authority to do so on social media even if
the law does not make that explicit.
Determining the scope of an offcial's power requires care-
ful attention to the relevant statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage. In some cases, a grant of authority over
particular subject matter may reasonably encompass author-
ity to speak about it offcially. For example, state law might
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201
Opinion of the Court
grant a high-ranking offcial like the director of the state
depar
tment of transportation broad responsibility for the
state highway system that, in context, includes authority to
make offcial announcements on that subject. At the same
time, courts must not rely on “ `excessively broad job de-
scriptions' ” to conclude that a government employee is au-
thorized to speak for the State. Kennedy v. Bremerton
School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 529 (2022) (quoting Garcetti, 547
U. S., at 424). The inquiry is not whether making offcial
announcements could ft within the job description; it is
whether making offcial announcements is actually part of
the job that the State entrusted the offcial to do.
In sum, a defendant like Freed must have actual authority
rooted in written law or longstanding custom to speak for
the State. That authority must extend to speech of the sort
that caused the alleged rights deprivation. If the plaintiff
cannot make this threshold showing of authority, he cannot
establish state action.
B
For social-media activity to constitute state action, an of-
fcial must not only have state authority—he must also pur-
port to use it. Griffn, 378 U. S., at 135. State offcials
have a choice about the capacity in which they choose to
speak. “[G]enerally, a public employee” purports to speak
on behalf of the State while speaking “in his offcial capacity
or” when he uses his speech to fulfll “his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.” West, 487 U. S., at 50. If the public
employee does not use his speech in furtherance of his offcial
responsibilities, he is speaking in his own voice.
Consider a hypothetical from the offine world. A school
board president announces at a school board meeting that the
board has lifted pandemic-era restrictions on public schools.
The next evening, at a backyard barbecue with friends whose
children attend public schools, he shares that the board has
lifted the pandemic-era restrictions. The former is state ac-
tion taken in his offcial capacity as school board president;
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202 LINDKE
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the latter is private action taken in his personal capacity as
a
friend and neighbor. While the substance of the an-
nouncement is the same, the context—an offcial meeting
versus a private event—differs. He invoked his offcial au-
thority only when he acted as school board president.
The context of Freed's speech is hazier than that of the
hypothetical school board president. Had Freed's account
carried a label (e. g., “this is the personal page of James R.
Freed”) or a disclaimer (e. g., “the views expressed are
strictly my own”), he would be entitled to a heavy (though
not irrebuttable) presumption that all of the posts on his
page were personal. Markers like these give speech the
beneft of clear context: Just as we can safely presume that
speech at a backyard barbeque is personal, we can safely
presume that speech on a “personal” page is personal (absent
signifcant evidence indicating that a post is offcial).
2
Con-
versely, context can make clear that a social-media account
purports to speak for the government—for instance, when
an account belongs to a political subdivision (e. g., a “City
of Port Huron” Facebook page) or is passed down to whom-
ever occupies a particular offce (e. g., an “@PHuronCityMgr”
Instagram account). Freed's page, however, was not desig-
nated either “personal” or “offcial,” raising the prospect
that it was “mixed use”—a place where he made some posts
in his personal capacity and others in his capacity as city
manager.
2
An offcial cannot insulate government business from scrutiny by con-
ducting it on a personal page. The Solicitor General offers the particu-
larly clear example of an offcial who designates space on his nominally
personal page as the offcial channel for receiving comments on a proposed
regulation. Because the power to conduct notice-and-comment rule-
making belongs exclusively to the State, its exercise is necessarily govern-
mental. Similarly, a mayor would engage in state action if he hosted a
city council meeting online by streaming it only on his personal Facebook
page. By contrast, a post that is compatible with either a “personal capac-
ity” or “offcial capacity” designation is “personal” if it appears on a per-
sonal page.
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Categorizing posts that appear on an ambiguous page like
F
reed's is a fact-specifc undertaking in which the post's con-
tent and function are the most important considerations. In
some circumstances, the post's content and function might
make the plaintiff's argument a slam dunk. Take a mayor
who makes the following announcement exclusively on his
Facebook page: “Pursuant to Municipal Ordinance 22.1, I
am temporarily suspending enforcement of alternate-side
parking rules.” The post's express invocation of state au-
thority, its immediate legal effect, and the fact that the order
is not available elsewhere make clear that the mayor is pur-
porting to discharge an offcial duty. If, by contrast, the
mayor merely repeats or shares otherwise available informa-
tion—for example, by linking to the parking announcement
on the city's webpage—it is far less likely that he is purport-
ing to exercise the power of his offce. Instead, it is much
more likely that he is engaging in private speech “relate[d] to
his public employment” or “concern[ing] information learned
during that employment.” Lane, 573 U. S., at 238.
Hard-to-classify cases require awareness that an offcial
does not necessarily purport to exercise his authority simply
by posting about a matter within it. He might post job-
related information for any number of personal reasons, from
a desire to raise public awareness to promoting his prospects
for reelection. Moreover, many public offcials possess a
broad portfolio of governmental authority that includes rou-
tine interaction with the public, and it may not be easy to
discern a boundary between their public and private lives.
Yet these offcials too have the right to speak about public
affairs in their personal capacities. See, e.g., id., at 235–236.
Lest any offcial lose that right, it is crucial for the plaintiff
to show that the offcial is purporting to exercise state au-
thority in specifc posts. And when there is doubt, addi-
tional factors might cast light—for example, an offcial who
uses government staff to make a post will be hard pressed
to deny that he was conducting government business.
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One last point: The nature of the technology matters to
the
state-action analysis. Freed performed two actions to
which Lindke objected: He deleted Lindke's comments and
blocked him from commenting again. So far as deletion
goes, the only relevant posts are those from which Lindke's
comments were removed. Blocking, however, is a different
story. Because blocking operated on a page-wide basis, a
court would have to consider whether Freed had engaged in
state action with respect to any post on which Lindke wished
to comment. The bluntness of Facebook's blocking tool
highlights the cost of a “mixed use” social-media account: If
page-wide blocking is the only option, a public offcial might
be unable to prevent someone from commenting on his per-
sonal posts without risking liability for also preventing com-
ments on his offcial posts.
3
A public offcial who fails to
keep personal posts in a clearly designated personal account
therefore exposes himself to greater potential liability.
***
The state-action doctrine requires Lindke to show that
Freed (1) had actual authority to speak on behalf of the State
on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that
authority in the relevant posts. To the extent that this test
differs from the one applied by the Sixth Circuit, we vacate
its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
3
On some platforms, a blocked user might be unable even to see the
blocker's posts. See, e.g., Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff, 41 F. 4th, 1158,
1164 (CA9 2022) (noting that “on Twitter, once a user has been `blocked,'
the individual can neither interact with nor view the blocker's Twitter
feed”); Knight First Amdt. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F. 3d
226, 231 (CA2 2019) (noting that a blocked user is unable to see, reply to,
retweet, or like the blocker's tweets).
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None