Vega v. Tekoh

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 597 U. S. Part 1
Pages 134–158
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 23, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
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134 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
VEGA v. TEKOH
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 21–499. Argued April 20, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022
The case arose out of the interrogation of respondent, Terence Tekoh, by
petitioner, Los Angeles County Sheriff 's Deputy Carlos Vega. Deputy
Vega questioned Tekoh at the medical center where Tekoh worked re-
garding the reported sexual assault of a patient. Vega did not inform
Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. Tekoh
eventually provided a written statement apologizing for inappropriately
touching the patient's genitals. Tekoh was prosecuted for unlawful sex-
ual penetration. His written statement was admitted against him at
trial. After the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, Tekoh sued Vega
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the use of an un-
Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment and may support a § 1983 claim against the
offcer who obtained the statement.
Held: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a
§ 1983 claim. Pp. 141–152.
(a) Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting
under color of state law who “subjects” a person “to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” Tekoh argues that a violation of Miranda constitutes a violation
of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
That is wrong. Pp. 141–150.
(1) In Miranda, the Court concluded that additional procedural
protections were necessary to prevent the violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination when suspects who are in custody
are interrogated by the police. Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic
rules requiring that custodial interrogation be preceded by now-familiar
warnings and disallowing the use of statements obtained in violation
of these new rules by the prosecution in its case-in-chief. 384 U. S.,
at 444, 479. Miranda did not hold that a violation of the rules it es-
tablished necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. That
makes sense, as an un-Mirandized suspect in custody may make self-
incriminating statements without any hint of compulsion. The Miranda
Court stated that the Constitution did not itself require “adherence
to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interroga-
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135
Syllabus
tion process” and that its decision “in no way create[d] a constitutional
strait
jacket.” Id., at 467. Since Miranda, the Court has repeatedly
described Miranda rules as “prophylactic.” Pp. 141–143.
(2) After Miranda, the Court engaged in the process of charting
the dimensions of these new prophylactic rules, and, in doing so,
weighed the benefts and costs of any clarifcation of the prophylactic
rules' scope. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. 98, 106. Some post-
Miranda decisions found that the balance of interests justifed restric-
tions that would not have been possible if Miranda described the Fifth
Amendment right as opposed to a set of rules designed to protect that
right. For example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224–226, the
Court held that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda could be
used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even though an involun-
tary statement obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment could not
have been employed in this way. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 443,
450–452, n. 26, the Court held that the “fruits” of an un-Mirandized
statement can be admitted. In doing so, the Court distinguished police
conduct that “abridge[s] [a person's] constitutional privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination” from conduct that “depart[s] only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safe-
guard that privilege.” 417 U. S., at 445–446. Similarly, in Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, the Court, following the reasoning in Tucker, re-
fused to exclude a signed confession and emphasized that an offcer's
error “in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures . . . should
not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of
the Fifth Amendment itself.” Id., at 309.
While many of the Court's decisions imposed limits on Miranda's pro-
phylactic rules, other decisions found that the balance of interests called
for expansion. For example, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, the Court
held that silence following a Miranda warning cannot be used to im-
peach. The Court acknowledged that Miranda warnings are “prophy-
lactic,” 426 U. S., at 617, but it found that allowing the use of post-
warning silence would undermine the warnings' implicit promise that
silence would not be used to convict. Id., at 618. Likewise, in Withrow
v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, the Court rejected an attempt to restrict
Miranda's application in collateral proceedings based on the reasoning
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). Once again acknowledging that
Miranda adopted prophylactic rules, the Court balanced the competing
interests and found that the costs of adopting a Stone-like rule out-
weighed any benefts. In sum, the Court's post-Miranda cases ac-
knowledge the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules and engage in
cost-beneft analysis to defne their scope. Pp. 144–148.

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136 VEGA
v. TEKOH
Syllabus
(3) The Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S.
428,
did not upset the frmly established prior understanding of Mi-
randa as a prophylactic decision. Dickerson involved a federal statute,
18 U. S. C. § 3501, that effectively overruled Miranda by making the
admissibility of a statement given during custodial interrogation turn
solely on whether it was made voluntarily. 530 U. S., at 431–432. The
Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda by statute be-
cause Miranda was a “constitutional decision” that adopted a “constitu-
tional rule,” 530 U. S., at 438–439, and the Court noted that these rules
could not have been made applicable to the States if they did not have
that status, see ibid. At the same time, the Court made it clear that it
was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with an outright Fifth
Amendment violation. Instead, the Dickerson Court described the Mi-
randa rules as “constitutionally based” with “constitutional underpin-
nings,” 530 U. S., at 440, and n. 5. Those formulations obviously
avoided saying that a Miranda violation is the same as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment right. Miranda was a “constitutional decision”
and it adopted a “constitutional rule” in the sense that the decision was
based on the Court's judgment about what is required to safeguard that
constitutional right. And when the Court adopts a constitutional pro-
phylactic rule of this nature, Dickerson concluded, the rule has the sta-
tus of a “La[w] of the United States” that is binding on the States under
the Supremacy Clause (as Miranda implicitly held, since three of the
four decisions it reversed came from state court, 384 U. S., at 491–494,
497–499), and the rule cannot be altered by ordinary legislation. Dick-
erson thus asserted a bold and controversial claim—that this Court has
the authority to create constitutionally based prophylactic rules that
bind both federal and state courts—but Dickerson cannot be understood
any other way consistent with the Court's prior decisions. Subsequent
cases confrm that Dickerson did not upend the Court's understanding
of the Miranda rules as prophylactic. In sum, a violation of Miranda
does not necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution, and there-
fore such a violation does not constitute “the deprivation of [a] right . . .
secured by the Constitution” for purposes of § 1983. Pp. 148–150.
(b) A § 1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation of any rights
. . . secured by the . . . laws.” But the argument that Miranda rules
constitute federal “law” that can provide the ground for a § 1983 claim
cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade the Court that this “law”
should be expanded to include the right to sue for damages under § 1983.
“A judicially crafted” prophylactic rule should apply “only where its
benefts outweigh its costs,” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106. Here, while the
benefts of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under § 1983
would be slight, the costs would be substantial. For example, allowing

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137
Syllabus
a claim like Tekoh's would disserve “judicial economy,” Parklane Ho-
si
ery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326, by requiring a federal judge or
jury to adjudicate a factual question (whether Tekoh was in custody
when questioned) that had already been decided by a state court.
Allowing § 1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also present many
procedural issues. Miranda and its progeny provide suffcient protec-
tion for the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
Pp. 150–152.
985 F. 3d 713, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opi ni on of the Cour t, i n wh ich Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor,
JJ., joined, post, p. 152.
Roman Martinez argued the cause for the petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Gregory G. Garre, Charles S.
Dameron, Rickey Ivie, and Antonio K. Kizzie.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for the United States as ami-
cus curiae supporting petitioner. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Polite, Deputy Solicitor General Feigin, Robert A.
Parker, and Daniel N. Lerman.
Paul L. Hoffman argued the cause for respondent. With
h i m o n t h e b r i e f w e r e Jo h n B u r t o n a n d E r w i n
Chemerinsky.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ari-
zona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Joseph A.
Kanefeld, Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Drew C. Ensign and
Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitors General, and Brian R. Coffman, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkan-
sas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence
G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of
Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn
Fitch of Mississippi, Eric S. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Mon-
tana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Dave Yost of Ohio, John M. O'Con-
nor of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of
South Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas,
Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for Local
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138 VEGA
v. TEKOH
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Th
is case presents the question whether a plaintiff may
sue a police offcer under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, based on the allegedly improper admission of an “un-
Mirandized”
1
statement in a criminal prosecution. The
case arose out of the interrogation of respondent, Terence
Tekoh, by petitioner, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy
Carlos Vega. Deputy Vega questioned Tekoh at his place of
employment and did not give him a Miranda warning.
Tekoh was prosecuted, and his confession was admitted into
evidence, but the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
Tekoh then sued Vega under § 1983, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of
Tekoh's un-Mirandized statement provided a valid basis for
a § 1983 claim against Vega. We now reject this extension
of our Miranda case law.
I
In March 2014, Tekoh was working as a certifed nursing
assistant at a Los Angeles medical center. When a female
patient accused him of sexually assaulting her, the hospital
staff reported the accusation to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, and Deputy Vega responded. Vega
Government Organizations by C. Harker Rhodes IV, Lisa Soronen, My-
riam Zreczny Kasper, and Suzanne Loose; and for the National Associa-
tion of Police Organizations by Jeffrey M. Harris.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Brett Max Kaufman, Jennesa Cal vo-
Friedman, David D. Cole, Cecillia D. Wang, Clark M. Neily III, and Jay
R. Schweikert; for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al. by
Charles D. Weisselberg, pro se, Stephen Dunkle, and John T. Philipsborn;
for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Bri-
anne J. Gorod, and Brian R. Frazelle; for False Confession and Wrongful
Conviction Scholars by Dan Stormer and William J. Aceves; for Histori-
ans of Criminal Procedure by Wesley M. Oliver; for the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Steve Art and Jeffrey L. Fisher; and
for the National Police Accountability Project by James Patrick Davy.
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
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139
Opinion of the Court
questioned Tekoh at length in the hospital, and Tekoh even-
tua
lly provided a written statement apologizing for inappro-
priately touching the patient's genitals. The parties dispute
whether Vega used coercive investigatory techniques to ex-
tract the statement, but it is undisputed that he never in-
formed Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966), which held that during a custodial interroga-
tion police offcers must inform a suspect that “he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attor-
ney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.”
Id., at 479.
Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court
with unlawful sexual penetration. At Tekoh's frst trial, the
judge held that Miranda had not been violated because
Tekoh was not in custody when he provided the statement,
but the trial resulted in a mistrial. When Tekoh was re-
tried, a second judge again denied his request to exclude the
confession. This trial resulted in acquittal, and Tekoh then
brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against Vega and
several other defendants seeking damages for alleged viola-
tions of his constitutional rights, including his Fifth Amend-
ment right against compelled self-incrimination.
When this § 1983 case was frst tried, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of Vega, but the judge concluded that he
had given an improper jury instruction and thus granted a
new trial. Before the second trial, Tekoh asked the court to
instruct the jury that it was required to fnd that Vega vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination if it determined that he took a statement from
Tekoh in violation of Miranda and that the statement was
then improperly used against Tekoh at his criminal trial.
The District Court declined, reasoning that Miranda estab-
lished a prophylactic rule and that such a rule could not alone
provide a ground for § 1983 liability. Instead, the jury was

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140 VEGA
v. TEKOH
Opinion of the Court
asked to decide whether Tekoh's Fifth Amendment right had
been
violated. The court instructed the jury to determine,
based on “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,”
whether Tekoh's statement had been “improperly coerced or
compelled,” and the court explained that “[a] confession is
improperly coerced or compelled . . . if a police offcer uses
physical or psychological force or threats not permitted by
law to undermine a person's ability to exercise his or her
free will.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 119a. The jury found in
Vega's favor, and Tekoh appealed.
A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the “use of an
un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal
proceeding violates the Fifth Amendment and may support a
§ 1983 claim” against the offcer who obtained the statement.
Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 985 F. 3d 713, 722 (2021).
The panel acknowledged that this Court has repeatedly said
that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules designed to protect
against constitutional violations and that the decision did not
hold that the contravention of those rules necessarily consti-
tutes a constitutional violation. See 985 F. 3d, at 719–720.
But the panel thought that our decision in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), “made clear that the right
of a criminal defendant against having an un-Mirandized
statement introduced in the prosecution's case in chief is in-
deed a right secured by the Constitution.” 985 F. 3d, at 720.
Therefore the panel concluded that Tekoh could establish a
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled
self-incrimination simply by showing that Miranda had been
violated. See 985 F. 3d, at 720. The panel thus remanded
the case for a new trial.
Vega's petition for rehearing en banc was denied, but
Judge Bumatay, joined by six other judges, fled a dissent
from the denial of rehearing. Tekoh v. County of Los
Angeles, 997 F. 3d 1260, 1261, 1264–1272 (CA9 2021). We
then granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2022).

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Opinion of the Court
II
Sec
tion 1983 provides a cause of action against any person
acting under color of state law who “subjects” a person or
“causes [a person] to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws.” The question we must decide is whether
a violation of the Miranda rules provides a basis for a claim
under § 1983. We hold that it does not.
A
If a Miranda violation were tantamount to a violation of
the Fifth Amendment, our answer would of course be differ-
ent. The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1, 6 (1964), provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This
Clause “permits a person to refuse to testify against himself
at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant” and “also `priv-
ileges him not to answer offcial questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal pro-
ceedings.' ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 426 (1984)
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973)). In
addition, the right bars the introduction against a criminal
defendant of out-of-court statements obtained by compul-
sion. See, e. g., Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 565
(1897); Miranda, 384 U. S., at 466; Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 433, 440–442 (1974).
In Miranda, the Court concluded that additional proce-
dural protections were necessary to prevent the violation of
this important right when suspects who are in custody are
interrogated by the police. To afford this protection, the
Court required that custodial interrogation be preceded by
the now-familiar warnings mentioned above, and it directed
that statements obtained in violation of these new rules may
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142 VEGA
v. TEKOH
Opinion of the Court
not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief. 384 U. S.,
at
444, 479.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit held—and Tekoh now ar-
gues, Brief for Respondent 20—that a violation of Miranda
constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination, but that is wrong. Miranda
itself and our subsequent cases make clear that Miranda im-
posed a set of prophylactic rules. Those rules, to be sure,
are “constitutionally based,” Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 440, but
they are prophylactic rules nonetheless.
B
Miranda itself was clear on this point. Miranda did not
hold that a violation of the rules it established necessarily
constitute a Fifth Amendment violation, and it is diffcult to
see how it could have held otherwise. For one thing, it is
easy to imagine many situations in which an un-Mirandized
suspect in custody may make self-incriminating statements
without any hint of compulsion. In addition, the warn-
ings that the Court required included components, such as
notifcation of the right to have retained or appointed coun-
sel present during questioning, that do not concern self-
incrimination per se but are instead plainly designed to safe-
g uard that r ight. And the same is tr ue of M iranda's
detailed rules about the waiver of the right to remain silent
and the right to an attorney. 384 U. S., at 474–479.
At no point in the opinion did the Court state that a viola-
tion of its new rules constituted a violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. In-
stead, it claimed only that those rules were needed to safe-
guard that right during custodial interrogation. See id., at
439 (describing its rules as “procedures which assure that
the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment”); id., at 444 (describing rules as “procedural
safeguards”); id., at 457 (“appropriate safeguards”); id.,
at 458 (“adequate protec tive dev ices”); i d., at 467
(“safeguards”).
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Opinion of the Court
In accordance with this understanding of the nature of the
r
ules it imposed, the Miranda Court stated quite clearly that
the Constitution did not itself require “adherence to any par-
ticular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interroga-
tion process” and that its decision “in no way create[d] a
constitutional straitjacket.” Ibid. The opinion added that
its new rules might not be needed if Congress or the States
adopted “other procedures which are at least as effective,”
ibid., and the opinion suggested that there might not have
been any actual Fifth Amendment violations in the four
cases that were before the Court. See id., at 457 (“In these
cases, we might not fnd the defendants' statements to have
been involuntary in traditional terms”). The Court could
not have said any of these things if a violation of the Mi-
randa rules necessarily constituted a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
Since Miranda, the Court has repeatedly described the
rules it adopted as “prophylactic.” See Howes v. Fields, 565
U. S. 499, 507 (2012); J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U. S.
261, 269 (2011); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. 98, 103 (2010);
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 794 (2009); Davis v.
United States, 512 U. S. 452, 458 (1994); Brecht v. Abraham-
son, 507 U. S. 619, 629 (1993); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S.
680, 691 (1993); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 176
(1991); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350 (1990); Duck-
worth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 203 (1989); Arizona v. Rober-
son, 486 U. S. 675, 681 (1988); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U. S. 523, 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 309
(1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654 (1984); South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 564, n. 15 (1983); United
States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 274 (1980); North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S.
590, 600 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 439; and
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 53 (1973).
2
2
Tekoh cites Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969), which characterized
the admission of an unwarned statement in the prosecutor's case-in-chief
as a “fat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
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C
Af
ter Miranda was handed down, the Court engaged in
the process of charting the dimensions of these new prophy-
lactic rules. As we would later spell out, this process en-
tailed a weighing of the benefts and costs of any clarifcation
of the rules' scope. See Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106 (“A judi-
cially crafted rule is `justifed only by reference to its pro-
phylactic purpose,' . . . and applies only where its benefts
outweigh its costs”).
Some post-Miranda decisions found that the balance of in-
terests justifed restrictions that would not have been possi-
ble if Miranda represented an explanation of the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set of rules de-
signed to protect that right. For example, in Harris v. New
York, 401 U. S. 222, 224–226 (1971), the Court held that a
statement obtained in violation of Miranda could be used to
impeach the testimony of a defendant, even though an invol-
untary statement obtained in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment could not have been employed in this way. See
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 398 (1978) (“[A]ny criminal
trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is
a denial of due process of law” (emphasis deleted)). Engag-
ing in the process we described in Shatzer, the Harris Court
considered the benefts of forbidding impeachment but dis-
missed “the speculative possibility” that this would discour-
age “impermissible police conduct,” and on the other side
of the scale, it feared that barring impeachment would turn
ment as construed in Miranda.” Id., at 326 (emphasis added); Brief
for Respondent 21, 29. But the Court made this assertion in a three-
paragraph opinion without any additional analysis, and did not purport to
go beyond Miranda, which, as we have explained, does not support the
proposition that a Miranda violation equates to a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion. See Orozco, 394 U. S., at 327 (“We do not . . . expand or extend
to the slightest extent our Miranda decision”). Likewise, the decision
predates the subsequent case law defning the scope of the Miranda rules.
See in fra this page and 145–148.
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Opinion of the Court
Miranda into “a license to use perjury by way of a defense.”
401
U. S., at 225–226.
A similar analysis was used in Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 443, 450–452, n. 26 (1974), where the Court held that
the “fruits” of an un-Mirandized statement can be admitted.
The Court noted that “the `fruits' of police conduct which
actually infringe[s]” a defendant's constitutional rights must
be suppressed. Id., at 445; see also Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) (applying the rule in the context
of a Fourth Amendment violation). But the Court distin-
guished police conduct that “abridge[s] [a person's] constitu-
tional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” from
conduct that “depart[s] only from the prophylactic standards
later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege.” 417 U. S., at 445–446. Because there had been
only a Miranda violation in that case, the Wong Sun rule of
automatic exclusion was found to be inapplicable. See 417
U. S., at 445–446. Instead, the Court asked whether the Mi-
randa rules' prophylactic purposes justifed the exclusion of
the fruits of the violation, and after “balancing the interests
involved,” it held that exclusion was not required. 417 U. S.,
at 447–452.
In New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654–657 (1984), the
Court held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda
need not be suppressed when the questioning is conducted
to address an ongoing “public safety” concern. The Court
reasoned that Miranda warnings are “ `not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution' ” and that “the need for an-
swers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public
safety outweigh[ed] the need for the prophylactic rule.” 467
U. S., at 654, 657.
Finally, in Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, the Court again distin-
guished between a constitutional violation and a violation of
Miranda. In that case, a suspect in custody was initially
questioned without receiving a Miranda warning, and the
statements made at that time were suppressed. 470 U. S.,
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at 301–302. But the suspect was later given Miranda warn-
i
ngs, chose to waive his Miranda rights, and signed a written
confession. 470 U. S., at 301. Asked to decide whether this
confession was admissible, the Court followed the reasoning
in Tucker and again held that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
rule that applies to constitutional violations does not apply
to violations of Miranda. 470 U. S., at 306–309, 318. The
Court refused to exclude the signed confession and em-
phasized that an offcer's error “in administering the prop-
hylactic Miranda procedures . . . should not breed the same
irremediable consequences as police infringement of the
Fifth Amendment itself.”
3
Id., at 309.
It is hard to see how these decisions could stand if a viola-
ti on of M iranda constituted a v i olati on of the Fi f th
Amendment.
D
While these decisions imposed limits on Miranda's pro-
phylactic rules, other decisions found that the balance of in-
terests called for expansion. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S.
610, 617–619 (1976), the Court held that silence following a
Miranda warning cannot be used to impeach. The Court
3
Two other decisions fall into this same category, but in both there was
no opinion of the Court. In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760 (2003), the
suspect gave an un-Mirandized statement while in custody but was never
charged with a crime. The Court held that the suspect could not bring a
42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim against the offcer who questioned him, and Justice
Souter, who cast the necessary ffth vote on the issue, reached that conclu-
sion based on “a realistic assessment of costs and risks” of “expand[ing]
protection of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination to the
point of the civil liability” at issue. 538 U. S., at 778–779 (opinion concur-
ring in judgment).
In United States v. Patane, 542 U. S. 630 (2004), the Court once again
held that Miranda does not require the suppression of the fruits of a un-
Mirandized statement made during custodial questioning, and two of the
fve Justices in the majority engaged in the same type of balancing that
was used in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), and Elstad. See
Patane, 542 U. S., at 644–645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see
also id., at 641–644 (plurality opinion).
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acknowledged that Miranda warnings are “prophylactic,”
426
U. S., at 617, and it recognized the prosecution's need
to test a defendant's excu lpatory story through cross-
examination, id., at 616–618. But it found that allowing the
use of post-warning silence would undermine the warnings'
implicit promise that silence would not be used to convict.
Id., at 618.
Similarly, in Roberson, 486 U. S., at 682, the Court held
that a suspect's post-warning request for counsel with re-
spect to one offense barred later interrogation without coun-
sel regarding a different offense. Describing the Miranda
rules as “prophylactic protections,” 486 U. S., at 681, the
Court concluded that both law enforcement and criminal de-
fendants would beneft from a bright-line, id., at 681–682.
Finally, in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, the Court
rejected an attempt to restrict Miranda's application in col-
lateral proceedings based on the reasoning in Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court had held that
a defendant who has had a full and fair opportunity to seek
suppression of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may not obtain federal habeas relief on
that ground, id., at 494–495, and in Withrow, a state prison
warden argued that a similar rule should apply to a habeas
petitioner who had been given an opportunity to litigate a
Miranda claim at trial, see 507 U. S., at 688–690. Once
again acknowledging that Miranda adopted prophylactic
rules, the Court balanced the competing interests and found
that the costs of adopting the warden's argument outweighed
any benefts. On the cost side, the Court noted that enforc-
ing Miranda “safeguards `a fundamental trial right” and fur-
thers “the correct ascertainment of guilt” at trial. 507 U. S.,
at 691–692. And on the other side, the Court found that the
adoption of a Stone-like rule “would not signifcantly beneft
the federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or
advance the cause of federalism in any substantial way.”
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148 VEGA
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Opinion of the Court
Thus, all the post-Miranda cases we have discussed ac-
knowledged
the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules
and engaged in cost-beneft analysis to defne the scope of
these prophylactic rules.
E
Contrary to the decision below and Tekoh's argument here,
see Brief for Respondent 24, our decision in Dickerson, 530
U. S. 428, did not upset the frmly established prior under-
standing of Miranda as a prophylactic decision. Dickerson
involved a federal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3501, that effectively
overruled Miranda by making the admissibility of a state-
ment given during custodial interrogation turn solely on
whether it was made voluntarily. 530 U. S., at 431–432.
The Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda
by statute because Miranda was a “constitutional decision”
that adopted a “constitutional rule,” 530 U. S., at 438–439,
and the Court noted that these rules could not have been
made applicable to the States if it did not have that status,
see ibid.
At the same time, however, the Court made it clear that
it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with
an outright Fifth Amendment violation. For one thing, it
reiterated Miranda's observation that “the Constitution
would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from
the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were `at least
as effective in apprising accused persons' ” of their rights.
530 U. S., at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467).
Even more to the point, the Court rejected the dissent's
argument that § 3501 could not be held unconstitutional un-
less “Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in
the sense that nothing else will suffce to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements.” 530 U. S., at 442. The Court's an-
swer, in substance, was that the Miranda rules, though not
an explication of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment right,
are rules that are necessary to protect that right (at least
until a better alternative is found and adopted). See 530
U. S., at 441–443. Thus, in the words of the Dickerson
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Court, the Miranda rules are “constitutionally based” and
have
“constitutional underpinnings.” 530 U. S., at 440, and
n. 5. But the obvious point of these formulations was to
avoid saying that a Miranda violation is the same as a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment right.
What all this boils down to is basically as follows. The
Miranda rules are prophylactic rules that the Court found to
be necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination. In that sense, Miranda was a
“constitutional decision” and it adopted a “constitutional
rule” because the decision was based on the Court's judg-
ment about what is required to safeguard that constitutional
right. And when the Court adopts a constitutional prophy-
lactic rule of this nature, Dickerson concluded, the rule has
the status of a “La[w] of the United States” that is binding
on the States under the Supremacy Clause
4
(as Miranda im-
plicitly held, since three of the four decisions it reversed
came from state court, 384 U. S., at 491–494, 497–499), and
the rule cannot be altered by ordinary legislation.
This was a bold and controversial claim of authority,
5
but
we do not think that Dickerson can be understood any other
way without (1) taking the insupportable position that a Mi-
randa violation is tantamount to a violation of the Fifth
Amendment, (2) calling into question the prior decisions that
were predicated on the proposition that a Miranda violation
is not the same as a constitutional violation, and (3) excising
4
U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2.
5
Whether this Court has the authority to create constitutionally based
prophylactic rules that bind both federal and state courts has been the
subject of debate among jurists and commentators. See, e. g., Dickerson,
530 U. S., at 445–446, 457–461 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting);
D. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190
(1988); J. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985); H. Monaghan, Fore-
word: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). But that
is what the Court did in Miranda, and we do not disturb that decision in
any way. Rather, we accept it on its own terms, and for the purpose of
deciding this case, we follow its rationale.
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Opinion of the Court
from the United States Reports a mountain of statements
descr
ibing the Miranda rules as prophylactic.
Subsequent cases confrm that Dickerson did not upend
the Court's understanding of the Miranda rules as prophy-
lactic. See, e. g., supra, at 143 (collecting post-Dickerson
cases).
In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily consti-
tute a violation of the Constitution, and therefore such a vio-
lation does not constitute “the deprivation of [a] right . . .
secured by the Constitution.” 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
III
This conclusion does not necessarily dictate reversal be-
cause a § 1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the . . .
laws.” (Emphasis added.) It may thus be argued that the
Miranda rules constitute federal “law” and that an abridg-
ment of those rules can therefore provide the ground for a
§ 1983 claim. But whatever else may be said about this ar-
gument,
6
it cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade us that
6
“[Section] 1983 does not provide an avenue for relief every time a state
actor violates a federal law.” Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S.
113, 119 (2005). If a § 1983 plaintiff demonstrates that the federal statute
“creates an individually enforceable right in the class of benefciaries to
which he belongs,” this gives rise to “ `a rebuttable presumption that the
right is enforceable under § 1983,' ” and “[t]he defendant may defeat this
presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that remedy
for a newly created right.” Id., at 120 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U. S. 329, 341 (1997)). In this case, the “law” that could confer the right
in question is not a statute but judicially created prophylactic rules. It
could be argued that a judicially created prophylactic rule cannot be the
basis for a § 1983 suit, but we need not decide that question because, as-
suming that such rules can provide the basis for a § 1983 claim, we would
be led back to a question that is very much like the one discussed supra,
at 144–148, namely, whether the benefts of allowing such a claim outweigh
the costs.
The dissent, by contrast, would apparently hold that a prophylactic rule
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this “law” should be expanded to include the right to sue for
damages
under § 1983.
As we have noted, “[a] judicially crafted” prophylactic rule
should apply “only where its benefts outweigh its costs,”
Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106, and here, while the benefts of per-
mitting the assertion of Miranda claims under § 1983 would
be slight, the costs would be substantial.
Miranda rests on a pragmatic judgment about what is
needed to stop the violation at trial of the Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination. That prophylac-
tic purpose is served by the suppression at trial of state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda and by the applica-
tion of that decision in other recognized contexts. Allowing
the victim of a Miranda violation to sue a police offcer for
damages under § 1983 would have little additional deterrent
va lue, and per mitti ng such clai ms wou ld cause many
problems.
Allowing a claim like Tekoh's would disserve “judicial
economy,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326
(1979), by requiring a federal judge or jury to adjudicate a
factual question (whether Tekoh was in custody when ques-
tioned) that had already been decided by a state court. This
re-adjudication would not only be wasteful; it would under-
cut the “ `strong judicial policy against the creation of two
conficting resolutions' ” based on the same set of facts.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 484 (1994). And it could
produce “unnecessary friction” between the federal and state
court systems by requiring the federal court entertaining
the § 1983 claim to pass judgment on legal and factual issues
that confers a personal right, is always cognizable under § 1983. There is
no sound reason to give this preferred status to such prophylactic rules.
The dissent contends that the Miranda rules merit this special treatment
because they are “secured by” the Constitution, see post, at 156, but in
fact, as we have shown, those rules differ from the right secured by the
Fifth Amendment and are instead secured for prophylactic reasons by
decisions of this Court.
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already settled in state court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U
. S. 475, 490–491 (1973).
Allowing § 1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also
present many procedural issues, such as whether a federal
court considering a § 1983 claim would owe any deference to
a trial court's factual fndings; whether forfeiture and plain
error r u les carry over from the crimina l trial; whether
harmless-error rules apply; and whether civil damages are
available in instances where the unwarned statement had no
impact on the outcome of the criminal case.
We therefore refuse to extend Miranda in the way Tekoh
requests. Miranda, Dickerson, and the other cases in that
line provide suffcient protection for the Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination. “The identifca-
tion of a Miranda violation and its consequences . . . ought
to be determined at trial.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S.
760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). And except in unusual circumstances, the “ex-
clusion of unwarned statements” should be “a complete and
suffcient remedy.” Ibid.
***
Because a violation of Miranda is not itself a violation of
the Fifth Amendment, and because we see no justifcation
for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue under § 1983,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
The Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966), affords well-known protections to suspects who are
interrogated by police while in custody. Those protections
derive from the Constitution: Dickerson v. United States
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tells us in no uncertain terms that Miranda is a “constitu-
ti
onal rule.” 530 U. S. 428, 444 (2000). And that rule
grants a corresponding right: If police fail to provide the Mi-
randa warnings to a suspect before interrogating him, then
he is generally entitled to have any resulting confession ex-
cluded from his trial. See 384 U. S., at 478–479. From
those facts, only one conclusion can follow—that Miranda's
protections are a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution”
under the federal civil rights statute. Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983. Yet the Court today says otherwise. It
holds that Miranda is not a constitutional right enforceable
through a § 1983 suit. And so it prevents individuals from
obtaining any redress when police violate their rights under
Miranda. I respectfully dissent.
Miranda responded to problems stemming from the in-
terrogation of suspects “incommunicado” and “in a police-
dominated atmosphere.” Miranda, 384 U. S., at 445. In
such an environment, Miranda said, there are “pressures”
which may “compel [a suspect] to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely.” Id., at 467. And so Miranda found
a “necessity for procedures which assure that the individual
is accorded his” Fifth Amendment privilege “not to be com-
pelled to incriminate himself.” Id., at 439. Miranda set
out protocols (including the now-familiar warnings) that
would safeguard the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. See id., at 478–479. And Miranda held that
if police failed to follow those requirements (without substi-
tuting equally effective ones), the prosecution could not use
at trial a statement obtained from the interrogation. See
id., at 479.
The question in this case is whether Miranda's protections
are a “right[ ]” that is “secured by the Constitution” within
the meaning of § 1983. If the answer is yes, then a person
may sue a state actor who deprives him of the right. In
past cases, the Court has given a broad construction to
§ 1983's broad language. See, e. g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498
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U. S. 439, 443 (1991). Under § 1983 (as elsewhere), a
“r
ight[ ]” is anything that creates specifc “obligations bind-
ing on [a] governmental unit” that an individual may ask the
judiciary to enforce. Id., at 449; see id., at 447, and n. 7.
And the phrase “secured by the Constitution” also has a ca-
pacious meaning. It refers to any right that is “protect[ed]
or ma[de] certain” by the country's foundational charter.
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.
496, 527 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Begin with whether Miranda is “secured by the Constitu-
tion.” We know that it is, because the Court's decision in
Dickerson says so. Dickerson tells us again and again that
Miranda is a “constitutional rule.” 530 U. S., at 444. It is
a “constitutional decision” that sets forth “ `concrete constitu-
tional guidelines.' ” Id., at 432, 435 (quoting Miranda, 384
U. S., at 442). Miranda “is constitutionally based”; or again,
it has a “constitutional basis.” 530 U. S., at 439, n. 3, 440.
It is “of constitutional origin”; it has “constitutional under-
pinnings.” Id., at 439, n. 3, 440, n. 5. And—one more—
Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.” 530 U. S., at 442.
Over and over, Dickerson labels Miranda a rule stemming
from the Constitution.
Dickerson also makes plain that Miranda has all the sub-
stance of a constitutional rule—including that it cannot be
“abrogate[d]” by any “legislation.” Miranda, 384 U. S., at
491; see Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 437. In Dickerson, the
Court considered a federal statute whose obvious purpose
was to override Miranda. Dickerson held that Miranda is
a “constitutional decision” that cannot be “overruled by” any
“Act of Congress.” 530 U. S., at 432. To be sure, Congress
may devise “legislative solutions that differ[ ] from the pre-
scribed Miranda warnings,” but only if those solutions are
“ `at least as effective.' ” Id., at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384
U. S., at 467). Dickerson therefore instructs (as noted
above) that Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.” 530
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Kagan, J., dissenting
U. S., at 442. No statute may provide lesser protection than
that
baseline.*
And Dickerson makes clear that the constitutional sub-
stance of Miranda does not end there. Rules arising from
“the United States Constitution” are applicable in state-
court proceedings, but non-constitutional rules are not. See
530 U. S., at 438 (explaining that the Court “do[es] not hold
a supervisory power over the courts of the several States”).
Too, constitutional rules are enforceable in federal-court ha-
beas proceedings, where a prisoner is entitled to claim he
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(a). Miranda checks both boxes. The Court has
“consistently applied Miranda's rule to prosecutions arising
in state courts.” Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 438. And prison-
ers may claim Miranda violations in federal-court habeas
proceedings. See 530 U. S., at 439, n. 3; Thompson v. Keo-
hane, 516 U. S. 99, 107, n. 5 (1995). So Dickerson is unequiv-
ocal: Miranda is set in constitutional stone.
Miranda's constitutional rule gives suspects a correlative
“right[ ]. ” § 1983. Under Miranda, a suspect typically
has a right to be tried without the prosecutor using his un-
Mirandized statement. And we know how that right oper-
ates in the real world. Suppose a defendant standing trial
was able to show the court that he gave an un-Mirandized
confession during a custodial interrogation. The court
would have no choice but to exclude it from the prosecutor's
case. As one judge below put it: “Miranda indisputably cre-
*Other constitutional rules, like Miranda, leave room for States to ex-
periment with procedures, so long as the procedures satisfy the constitu-
tionally mandated baseline. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U. S. 44, 58 (1991) (States may adopt different procedures for providing
probable-cause determinations for persons arrested without a warrant, so
long as those determinations are made promptly); Smith v. Robbins, 528
U. S. 259, 276–277 (2000) (States may adopt different procedures to ensure
effective appellate review for indigent defendants' claims, “so long as [the
State] reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a
way that is related to the merit of that appeal”).
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ates individual legal rights that are judicially enforceable.
(Any
prosecutor who doubts this can try to introduce an un-
Mirandized confessi on and then watch what happens.)”
Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 997 F. 3d 1260, 1263 (CA9
2021) (Miller, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
The majority basically agrees with everything I've just
explai ned. It concurs that, per D i cke rso n, M iranda
“adopted a `constitutional rule.' ” Ante, at 148 (quoting Dick-
erson, 530 U. S., at 439); see ante, at 148–149. How could it
not? That Miranda is a constitutional rule is what Dicker-
son said (and said and said). The majority also agrees that
Miranda “directed that statements obtained in violation of
[its] rules may not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-
chief ”—which is simply another way of saying that Miranda
grants suspects a right to the exclusion of those statements
from the prosecutor's case. Ante, at 141–142.
So how does the majority hold that a violation of Miranda
is not a “deprivation of [a] right[ ]” “secured by the Constitu-
tion”? § 1983. How does it agree with my premises, but
not my conclusion? The majority's argument is that “a vio-
lation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a violation
of the Constitution,” because Miranda's rules are “prophy-
lactic.” Ante, at 150. The idea is that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the use only of statements obtained by compulsion,
whereas Miranda excludes non-compelled statements too.
See ante, at 141–142. That is why, the majority says, the
Court has been able to recognize exceptions permitting cer-
tain uses of un-Mirandized statements at trial (when it could
not do so for compelled statements). See ante, at 144–146.
But none of that helps the majority's case. Let's assume,
as the majority says, that Miranda extends beyond—in
order to safeguard—the Fifth Amendment's core guarantee.
Still, Miranda is enforceable through § 1983. It remains a
constitutional rule, as Dickerson held (and the majority
agrees). And it grants the defendant a legally enforceable
entitlement—in a word, a right—to have his confession ex-
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cluded. So, to refer back to the language of § 1983, Miranda
grants
a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution.” Whether
that right to have evidence excluded safeguards a yet deeper
constitutional commitment makes no difference to § 1983.
The majority has no response to that point—except to repeat
what our argument assumes already. See ante, at 150, n. 6
(describing Miranda as prophylactic).
Compare the majority's holding today to a prior decision,
in which the Court “rejected [an] attempt[ ] to limit the types
of constitutional rights that are encompassed within” § 1983.
Dennis, 498 U. S., at 445. There, the Court held that a
plaintiff could sue under § 1983 for a violation of the so-called
dormant Commerce Clause, which safeguards interstate
commerce. To the Court, it did not matter that the Com-
merce Clause might be viewed as “merely allocat[ing] power
between the Federal and State Governments” over inter-
state commerce, rather than as “confer[ring] `rights.' ” Id.,
at 447. Nor did it matter that the dormant Commerce
Clause's protection is only “implied” by the constitutional
text. Ibid., n. 7. The dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court said, still provides a “right”—in the “ordinary” sense
of being “ `[a] legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.' ” Ibid. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (6th
ed. 1990)). That describes Miranda to a tee. And if a right
implied from Congress's constitutional authority over inter-
state commerce is enforceable under § 1983, how could it be
that Miranda—which the Court has found necessary to safe-
guard the personal protections of the Fifth Amendment—is
not also enforceable? The majority again has no answer.
***
Today, the Court strips individuals of the ability to seek a
remedy for violations of the right recognized in Miranda.
The majority observes that defendants may still seek “the
suppression at trial of statements obtained” in violation
of Miranda's procedures. Ante, at 151. But sometimes,
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such a statement will not be suppressed. And sometimes,
as
a result, a defendant will be wrongly convicted and spend
years in prison. He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in
getting the conviction reversed. But then, what remedy
does he have for all the harm he has suffered? The point of
§ 1983 is to provide such redress—because a remedy “is a
vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished con-
stitutional guarantees.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635, 639
(1980). The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the right
by denying the remedy. See, e. g., Egbert v. Boule, 596
U. S. 482 (2022). I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None