Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 2
Pages 685–723
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 15, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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TERM, 2021
685
Syllabus
YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO et al. v. TEXAS
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 20–493. Argued February 22, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022
This case represents the latest confict between Texas gaming offcials and
the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Indian Tribe. In 1968, Congress recognized
the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo as an Indian tribe and assigned its trust re-
sponsibilities for the Tribe to Texas. 82 Stat. 93. In 1983, Texas re-
nounced its trust responsibilities as inconsistent with the State's Consti-
tution. The State also expressed opposition to any new federal trust
legislation that did not permit the State to apply its own gaming laws
on tribal lands. Congress restored the Tribe's federal trust status in
1987 when it adopted the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Cous-
hatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act. 101 Stat. 666. The Res-
toration Act also “prohibited” as a matter of federal law “[a]ll gaming
activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas.” Id.,
at 668. Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted its own comprehensive
Indian gaming legislation: the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).
102 Stat. 2467. IGRA established rules for separate classes of games.
As relevant here, IGRA permitted Tribes to offer so-called class II
games—like bingo—in States that “permi[t] such gaming for any pur-
pose by any person, organization or entity.” 25 U. S. C. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
IGRA allowed Tribes to offer class III games—like blackjack and bacca-
rat—but only pursuant to negotiated tribal/state compacts. § 2703(8).
Pursuant to IGRA, the Tribe sought to negotiate a compact with
Texas to offer class III games. Texas refused, arguing that the Resto-
ration Act displaced IGRA and required the Tribe to follow all of the
State's gaming laws on tribal lands. In subsequent federal litigation,
the District Court held that Texas violated IGRA by failing to negotiate
in good faith. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Restoration
Act's directions superseded IGRA's and guaranteed that the entirety of
“Texas' gaming laws and regulations” would “operate as surrogate fed-
eral law on the Tribe's reservation.” 36 F. 3d 1325, 1326, 1334 (Ys-
leta I). In 2016, the Tribe began to offer bingo, including “electronic
bingo” machines, on the view that IGRA treats bingo as a class II game
for which no state permission is required so long as the State permits
the game to be played on some terms by some persons. The State then
sought to shut down all of the Tribe's bingo operations. Bound by Ys-
leta I, the District Court sided with Texas and enjoined the Tribe's

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bingo operations, but the court stayed the injunction pending appeal.
The
Fifth Circuit reaffrmed Ysleta I and held that the Tribe's bingo
operations were impermissible because they did not conform to Texas's
bingo regulations.
Held: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands
only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Pp. 695–708.
(a) Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on
the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo. It provides in subsection (a)
that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby
prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Subsection
(b) insists that the statute does not grant Texas “civil or criminal regula-
tory jurisdiction” with respect to matters covered by § 107. The State
reads the Act as effectively subjecting the Tribe to the entire body of
Texas gaming laws and regulations. The Tribe, however, understands
the Act to bar it from offering only those gaming activities the State
fully prohibits, and that if Texas merely regulates bingo, the Tribe
may also offer that game subject only to federal-law, not state-law,
limitations.
The language of § 107—particularly its dichotomy between prohibition
and regulation—presents Texas with a problem. Texas concedes that
its laws do not “forbid,” “prevent,” “effectively stop,” or “make impossi-
ble” bingo operations in the State. Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1813 (defning “prohibit”). Instead, the State admits that it
allows the game “according to rule[s]” that “fx the time,” place, and
manner in which it may be conducted. Id., at 1913 (defning “regulate”).
From this alone, Texas's bingo laws appear to fall on the regulatory
rather than prohibitory side of the line. In response, Texas describes
its laws as “prohibiting ” bingo unless the State's regulations are fol-
lowed and insists that it is merely seeking to do what subsection (a)
allows.
Texas's understanding of the word “prohibit” would risk turning the
Restoration Act's terms into an indeterminate mess. In Texas's view,
laws regulating gaming activities become laws prohibiting gaming activ-
ities—an interpretation that violates the rule against “ascribing to one
word a meaning so broad” that it assumes the same meaning as another
statutory term. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575. Indeter-
minacy aside, the State's interpretation would leave subsection (b)—
denying the State regulatory jurisdiction—with no work to perform.
As a result, Texas's interpretation also defes another canon of statutory
construction—the rule that courts must normally seek to construe Con-
gress's work “so that effect is given to all provisions.” Corley v. United
States, 556 U. S. 303, 314 (internal quotation marks omitted). Seeking

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to give subsection (b) real work to perform, Texas submits that the
prov
ision serves to deny its state courts and gaming commission “juris-
diction” to punish violations of subsection (a) by sending such disputes
to federal court instead. But that interpretation only serves to render
subsection (c), which grants federal courts “exclusive” jurisdiction over
subsection (a) violations, a nullity. A full look at the statute's structure
suggests a set of simple and coherent commands; Texas's competing in-
terpretation renders individual statutory terms duplicative and leaves
whole provisions without work to perform. Pp. 695–699.
(b) Important contextual clues resolve any remaining questions.
Congress passed the Restoration Act six months after this Court
handed down its decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U. S. 202. There, the Court interpreted Public Law 280—
a statute Congress had adopted in 1953 to allow a handful of States to
enforce some of their criminal laws on certain tribal lands—to mean
that only “prohibitory” state gaming laws could be applied on the Indian
lands in question, not state “regulatory” gaming laws. The Cabazon
Court held that California's bingo laws—materially identical to Texas's
laws here—fell on the regulatory side of the ledger. This Court gener-
ally assumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of this
Court's relevant precedents. Ryan v. Valencia Gonzales, 568 U. S. 57,
66. At the time Congress adopted the Restoration Act, Cabazon was
not only a relevant precedent; it was the precedent. In Cabazon's im-
mediate aftermath, Congress also adopted other laws governing tribal
gaming that appeared to reference and employ in different ways Caba-
zon's distinction between prohibition and regulation. See, e. g., Wampa-
noag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement Act of
1987, § 9, 101 Stat. 709–710.
None of this is to say that the Tribe may offer gaming on whatever
terms it wishes. The Restoration Act provides that a gaming activity
prohibited by Texas law is also prohibited on tribal land as a matter of
federal law. Other gaming activities are subject to tribal regulation
and must conform to the terms and conditions set forth in federal law,
including IGRA to the extent applicable. Pp. 700–703.
(c) The State's remaining arguments are unavailing. Pp. 703–707.
(1) Texas asks the Court to focus on subsection (a) of the Restora-
tion Act, which ends with the statement that “[t]he provisions of this
subsection are enacted in accordance with the tribe's request in Tribal
Resolution No. T.C.–02–86.” 101 Stat. 668–669. In that referenced
resolution, the Tribe announced its opposition to Texas's legislative ef-
forts to have its gaming laws apply on tribal lands. At the same time,
the Tribe also announced its own intention to prohibit gaming on its
reservation and authorized the acceptance of federal legislation prohib-

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688 YSLET
A DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS
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iting gaming on tribal lands. Texas claims that the reference to the
tr
ibal resolution suggests the Restoration Act should be read “broadly”
to allow Texas to apply its gaming regulations on tribal lands. As an
initial matter, subsection (a) does not purport to incorporate that resolu-
tion into federal law—something Congress knows how to do when it
wishes, see e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 5396(b). In addition, Texas's “broad” read-
ing suffers from the same interpretative challenges already mentioned
and defes Congress's apparent adoption of Cabazon's prohibitory/regu-
latory distinction. Finally, on this Court's interpretation of the Resto-
ration Act, Congress did legislate “in accordance with” the Tribe's reso-
lution by expressly granting the Tribe federal recognition and choosing
not to apply Texas gaming regulations as surrogate federal law on tribal
land. Pp. 703–705.
(2) Texas appeals to public policy and argues that attempts to dis-
tinguish between prohibition and regulation are sure to prove “un-
workable.” It is not, however, this Court's place to question whether
Congress adopted the wisest or most workable policy. That the Resto-
ration Act's prohibitory/regulatory distinction can and will generate
borderline cases hardly makes it unique among federal statutes. And
courts have applied the same prohibitory/regulatory framework for dec-
ades under Public Law 280. Moreover, Texas's alternative interpreta-
tion poses its own “workability” challenges, as federal courts would be
charged with enforcing the minutiae of state gaming regulations gov-
erning the conduct of permissible games. Pp. 706–707.
955 F. 3d 408, vacated and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Breyer, So-
tomayor, Kagan, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., fled a dis-
senting opinion, in which Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined,
post, p. 708.
Brant C. Martin argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Jeffrey W. Hellberg, Jr., Carter G.
Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and Eric D. McArthur.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae supporting petitioners. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney
General Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William
B. Lazarus, and Mary Gabrielle Sprague.
Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General of
Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the
brief were Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Brent Webster,

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Opinion of the Court
First Assistant Attorney General, Bill Davis, Deputy Solici-
tor
General, Michael R. Abrams and Kathryn M. Cherry,
Assistant Solicitors General, and Christopher J. F. Galiardo,
Assistant Attorney General.*
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Native American Tribes possess “inherent sovereign au-
thority over their members and territories.” Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.,
498 U. S. 505, 509 (1991). Under our Constitution, treaties,
and laws, Congress too bears vital responsibilities in the feld
of tribal affairs. See, e. g., United States v. Lara, 541 U. S.
193, 200 (2004). From time to time, Congress has exercised
its authority to allow state law to apply on tribal lands where
it otherwise would not. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S.
373, 392 (1976); Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945). In
this case, Texas contends that Congress expressly ordained
that all of its gaming laws should be treated as surrogate
federal law enforceable on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reser-
vation. In the end, however, we fnd no evidence Congress
endowed state law with anything like the power Texas
claims.
I
A
The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is one of three federally recog-
nized Indian Tribes in Texas. Its reservation lies near El
Paso, and the Tribe today includes over 4,000 enrolled
members. See About Us, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (June
2022), https://www.ysletadelsurpueblo.org/about-us. The
Tribe traces its roots back to the 1680 Pueblo Revolt against
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Alabama-
Coushatta Tribe of Texas by Danny S. Ashby, Justin R. Chapa, Megan
R. Whisler, Frederick R. Petti, and Patricia L. Briones; and for the Na-
tional Indian Gaming Association et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Daniel S.
Volchok, and Thomas G. Sprankling.
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the Spanish in New Mexico. In the revolt's aftermath, the
Spanish
retreated from Santa Fe to El Paso, and a large
number of Yslet a Pueblo Indians accompanied them.
S. Rep. No. 100–90, p. 6 (1987) (Senate Report); W. Timmons,
El Paso 18 (1990) (Timmons). Soon, tribal members built
the Ysleta Mission, the oldest church in Texas, and in 1751
Spain granted 23,000 acres to the Tribe for its homeland.
See Senate Report 6–7; Timmons 36.
Things changed for the Tribe after Texas gained statehood
in 1845. The State disregarded Spain's land grant and
began incorporating a town on tribal lands and issuing land
patents to non-Indians. Senate Report 6–7. Over the
years that followed, the Tribe repeatedly lost lands “without
recompense.” Timmons 181. Yet some tribal members re-
mained on parts of their homeland, “determin[ed] to preserve
[their] language, customs, and traditions.” Ibid. In the
late 1890s, the Tribe adopted a constitution to ensure “the
survival of [its] ancient tribal organization.” Ibid. After
years of struggle, the Tribe also won formal recognition from
Texas in 1967 and Congress the following year. Id., at 260–
261. In its 1968 legislation, Congress assigned its trust re-
sponsibilities for the Tribe to Texas. 82 Stat. 93. That
trust relationship was important, as it ensured the Tribe
would retain the remaining 100 acres of land it possessed and
gain access to certain tribal funding programs. See Tim-
mons 261; see also R. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
1213, 1233–1234 (1975) (discussing trust obligations).
This arrangement persisted until 1983. That year, Texas
renounced its trust responsibilities, asserting that they were
inconsistent with the State's Constitution. See 2019 WL
639971, *1 (WD Tex., Feb. 14, 2019). The Tribe responded
to this development by seeking new congressional legislation
to reestablish its trust relationship with the federal govern-
ment. But that effort quickly became bogged down in a dis-
pute. Of all things, it concerned bingo. Texas, it seems,
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worried that allowing tribal gaming would have a detrimen-
t
al effect on “existing charitable bingo operations in the
State of Texas.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 121. And because
Texas judged that its laws would be inapplicable on tribal
lands without federal approval, the State opposed any new
federal trust legislation unless it included a special provision
permitting it to apply its own gaming laws on the Tribe's
lands. See ibid.
B
Years of negotiations ensued. But one development dur-
ing this period turned out to have particular salience even
though it did not immediately concern either the Tribe or
Texas. In February 1987, this Court issued California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202. In it, the
Court addressed Public Law 280, a statute Congress had
adopted in 1953 to allow a handful of States to enforce some
of their criminal—but not certain of their civil—laws on par-
ticular tribal lands. See Bryan, 426 U. S., at 383–385.
Seeking to apply that statutory direction in the context of
Indian gaming, the Court held that, if a state law prohibits
a particular game, it falls within Public Law 280's grant of
criminal jurisdiction and a State may enforce its ban on
tribal lands. Cabazon, 480 U. S., at 209–210. But if state
laws merely regulate a game's availability, the Court ruled,
Public Law 280 does not permit a State to enforce its rules
on tribal lands. See id., at 210–211.
The Court then turned to apply this prohibitory/regula-
tory distinction to California's bingo laws. Much like Texas
today, California in 1987 permitted bingo in various circum-
stances (including for charitable purposes), but treated devi-
ations from its rules as criminal violations. See id., at 205,
208–209. Because California allowed some bingo to be
played, the Court reasoned, the State “regulate[d] rather
than prohibit[ed]” the game. Id., at 211. From this, it fol-
lowed that Public Law 280 did not authorize the State to
apply its own bingo laws on tribal lands. Id., at 210–211.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected California's
suggesti
on that its laws were prohibitory rather than regula-
tory because they were enforceable by criminal sanctions,
explaining that “an otherwise regulatory law” is not enforce-
able under Public Law 280 merely because a State labels it
“criminal.” Id., at 211. “Otherwise,” the Court explained,
Public Law 280's “distinction” between criminal and civil
laws “could easily be avoided.” Ibid.
It appears the Court's decision helped catalyze new legis-
lation. After Cabazon, “congressional efforts to pass [In-
dian gaming] legislation . . . that had been ongoing since 1983
gained momentum, with Indian tribes' position strength-
ened.” W. Wood, The (Potential) Legal History of Indian
Gaming, 63 Ariz. L. Rev. 969, 1027, and n. 353 (2021) (Wood).
In fact, just six months after the decision, in August 1987,
Congress fnally adopted the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Ala-
bama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act,
101 Stat. 666 (Restoration Act). In that law, Congress re-
stored the Tribe's federal trust status. And to resolve Tex-
as's gaming objections, Congress seemingly drew straight
from Cabazon, employing its distinction between prohibited
and regulated gaming activity. The Restoration Act “pro-
hibited” as a matter of federal law “[a]ll gaming activities
which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas.” 101
Stat. 668. But the Act also provided that it should not be
“construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdic-
tion to the State of Texas.” Id., at 669.
That was not all Congress did. Because Cabazon left cer-
tain States unable to apply their gaming regulations on In-
dian reservations, some feared the Court's decision opened
the door to a signifcant amount of new and unregulated
gaming on tribal lands. See R. Anderson, S. Krakoff, & B.
Berger, American Indian Law: Cases and Commentary 479–
480 (4th ed. 2020) (Anderson). In 1988, Congress sought to
fll that perceived void by adopting its own comprehensive
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(IGRA), 102 Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; Anderson
479
–482. IGRA established rules for three separate classes
of games. Relevant here, the law permitted Tribes to offer
so-called class II games—like bingo—in States that “permi[t]
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization
or entity.” § 2710(b)(1)(A). Meanwhile, the statute allowed
Tribes to offer class III games—like blackjack and bacca-
rat—but only pursuant to tribal/state compacts. § 2703(8);
Anderson 480. To ensure compliance with the statute's
terms, IGRA created the National Indian Gaming Commis-
sion. § 2704(a).
C
In the 1990s, the Tribe sought to negotiate a compact with
Texas to offer class III games pursuant to IGRA. But
Texas refused to come to the table. It argued that the Res-
toration Act displaced IGRA and required the Tribe to follow
all of the State's gaming laws on tribal lands.
That dispute quickly found its way to court. Initially, a
federal district court granted summary judgment for the
Tribe, holding that Texas violated IGRA by failing to negoti-
ate in good faith. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed. That court held that the Restoration Act's direc-
tions superseded IGRA's and guaranteed that all of “Texas'
gaming laws and regulations” would “operate as surrogate
federal law on the Tribe's reservation.” Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F. 3d 1325, 1326, 1334 (1994) (Ysleta I).
A quarter century of confusion and litigation followed.
Repeatedly, the Tribe sought to conduct gaming operations
within the confnes of Ysleta I at its Speaking Rock Enter-
tainment Center, which houses restaurants, bars, and con-
cert venues. Repeatedly, Texas argued that the Tribe's ac-
tivities exceeded the Fifth Circuit's mandate. Faced with
these disputes, lower courts experimented with a variety of
approaches: enjoining all on-reservation gaming, instructing
the Tribe to seek licenses from Texas regulators, and even
requiring the Tribe to obtain preapproval from a federal
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A DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS
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court before offering any new gaming operations. One
cour
t described this process as having “transformed [it] into
a quasi-regulatory body overseeing and monitoring the mi-
nutiae of the [Tribe's] gaming-related conduct.” Texas v. Ys-
leta del Sur Pueblo, 2016 WL 3039991, *19 (WD Tex., May
27, 2016).
D
The current case represents just the latest in this long
line. In 2016, the Tribe began offering bingo. On its view,
it was free to offer at least this game because IGRA treats
bingo as a class II game for which no state permission is
required so long as the State permits the game to be played
on some terms by some persons. See 25 U. S. C. § 2710(b)
(1)(A). Citing IGRA, the Tribe did not just offer the sort of
bingo played in church halls across the country. It also of-
fered “electronic bingo,” a game in which patrons sit at “ma-
chines [that] look similar to a traditional slot machine.”
2019 WL 639971, *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike typical slot machines, however, “the underlying game
is run using historical bingo draws.” Ibid.
The State responded by seeking to shut down all of the
Tribe's bingo operations. Whatever IGRA may allow, Texas
argued, the Fifth Circuit was clear in Ysleta I that the Res-
toration Act forbids the Tribe from defying any of the State's
gaming regulations. And, Texas stressed, under its laws
bingo remains permissible today only for charitable purposes
and only subject to a broad array of regulations.
Finding itself bound by Ysleta I, the District Court sided
with Texas and enjoined the Tribe's bingo operations. But
the court also chose to stay its injunction pending appeal.
The court did so because it thought that either the Fifth
Circuit or this Court might wish to reconsider Ysleta I. See
2019 WL 5589051, *1 (WD Tex., Mar. 28, 2019). After all,
the Restoration Act effectively federalizes only those state
laws that prohibit gaming activities. The statute expressly
states that nothing in it may be read as authorizing Texas
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Opinion of the Court
to enforce criminal or civil regulations on tribal lands. And
when
it comes to bingo, the State permits at least some
forms of the game subject to regulation. In the District
Court's judgment, “the Tribe [had] a suffcient likelihood of
success on the merits” under the terms of the Restoration
Act “to support a stay.” Ibid. The District Court further
found that, without a stay, the injury to the Tribe would be
“truly irreparable.” Id., at *2. Speaking Rock's revenues
account for 60 percent of the Tribe's operating budget, which
supports “signifcant educational, governmental, and charita-
ble initiatives.” Ibid; Brief for Petitioners 17. And when
Speaking Rock closed due to one of the many previous dis-
putes, tribal unemployment rose from 3 to 28 percent. See
id., at 18.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit “re-reaffrm[ed]” Ysleta I and
held that the decision “resolve[d] this dispute.” 955 F. 3d
408, 414, 417 (2020). Ysleta I expressly held that all of
“Texas' gaming laws and regulations . . . operate as surro-
gate federal law on the Tribe's reservation.” 955 F. 3d, at
414 (emphasis deleted). And because the Tribe's bingo oper-
ations did not conform to the State's bingo regulations, the
court held, they were impermissible. Ibid.
After the Tribe fled a petition for certiorari, this Court
called for the views of the Solicitor General. The United
States argued that the Fifth Circuit's understanding of the
Restoration Act took a wrong turn in Ysleta I and urged us
to correct the error. See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 1. Ultimately, we agreed to take
up this case to consider that question. 595 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
A
Before us, the parties offer two very different accounts
of the Restoration Act. The State, in its only argument in
support of regulatory jurisdiction over the Tribe's gaming
activities, reads the Act as effectively subjecting the Tribe
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696 YSLET
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to the entire body of Texas gaming laws and regulations, just
as
the Fifth Circuit held in Ysleta I. The Tribe understands
the Act to bar it from offering only those gaming activities
the State fully prohibits. Consistent with Cabazon, the
Tribe submits, if Texas merely regulates a game like bingo,
it may offer that game—and it may do so subject only to the
limits found in federal law and its own law, not state law.
To resolve the parties' disagreement, we turn to § 107 of
the Restoration Act, where Congress directly addressed
gaming on the Tribe's lands and said this:
“SEC. 107. GAMING ACTIVITIES.
“(a) In General.—All gaming activities which are prohib-
ited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited
on the reservation and on lands of the tribe. Any violation
of the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be subject
to the same civil and criminal penalties that are provided
by the laws of the State of Texas. The provisions of this
subsection are enacted in accordance with the tribe's request
in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86 which was approved and
certifed on March 12, 1986.
“(b) No State Regulatory Jurisdiction.—Nothing in
this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal
regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas.
“(c) Jurisdiction Over Enforcement Against Mem-
bers.—[T]he courts of the United States shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over any offense in violation of subsection
(a) that is committed by the tribe . . . .” 101 Stat. 668–669.
Perhaps the most striking feature about this language is
its dichotomy between prohibition and regulation. On the
one hand, subsection (a) says that gaming activities prohib-
ited by state law are also prohibited as a matter of federal
law (using some variation of the word “prohibited” no fewer
than three times). On the other hand, subsection (b) insists
that the statute does not grant Texas civil or criminal regu-
latory jurisdiction with respect to matters covered by this
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“section,” a section concerned exclusively with gaming. The
i
mplication that Congress drew from Cabazon and meant for
us to apply its same prohibitory/regulatory framework here
seems almost impossible to ignore. See Part II–B, infra.
But before getting to that, we start with a careful look at
the statute's terms standing on their own. Often enough in
ordinary speech, to prohibit something means to “forbid,”
“prevent,” or “effectively stop” it, or “make [it] impossible.”
Webster's Third International Dictionary 1813 (1986) (Web-
ster's Third); see 7 Oxford English Dictionary 596 (2d ed.
1989) (OED); Black's Law Dictionary 1212 (6th ed. 1990)
(Black's). Meanwhile, to regulate something is usually un-
derstood to mean to “fx the time, amount, degree, or rate”
of an activity “according to rule[s].” Webster's Third 1913;
see 8 OED 524; Black's 1286. Frequently, then, the two
words are “not synonymous.” Id., at 1212.
That fact presents Texas with a problem. The State con-
cedes that its laws do not forbid, prevent, effectively stop,
or make bingo impossible. Instead, the State admits that it
allows the game subject to fxed rules about the time, place,
and manner in which it may be conducted. See Brief for
Respondent 5. From this alone, it would seem to follow that
Texas's laws fall on the regulatory rather than prohibitory
side of the line—and thus may not be applied on tribal lands
under the terms of subsection (b).
To be sure, Texas is not without a reply. It observes that
in everyday speech someone could describe its laws as “pro-
hibiting ” bingo unless the State's time, place, and manner
regulations are followed. After all, conducting bingo or any
other game in defance of state regulations can lead not just
to a civil citation, but to a criminal prosecution too. See
Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2001.551(c) (West 2019). In this sense,
the State submits, it seeks to do exactly what subsection
(a) allows—“prohibit” bingo that is not conducted for chari-
table purposes and compliant w ith a ll its state gami ng
regulations.

698 YSLET
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That much we fnd hard to see. Maybe in isolation or in
another
context, Texas's understanding of the word “pro-
hibit” would make sense. But here it risks rendering the
Restoration Act a jumble. No one questions that Texas
“regulates” bingo by fxing the time, place, and manner in
which the game may be conducted. The State submits only
that, in some sense, its laws also “prohibit” bingo—when the
game fails to comply with the State's time, place, and manner
regulations. But on that reading, the law's dichotomy be-
tween prohibition and regulation collapses. Laws regulat-
ing gaming activities become laws prohibiting gaming activi-
ties. It's an interpretation that violates our usual rule
against “ascribing to one word a meaning so broad” that it
assumes the same meaning as another statutory term. Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). It's a view
that defes our usual presumption that “differences in lan-
guage like this convey differences in meaning.” Henson v.
Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017).
And perhaps most tellingly, it is a construction that renders
state gaming regulations simultaneously both (permissible)
prohibitions and (impermissible) regulations. Rather than
supply coherent guidance, Texas's reading of the law renders
it an indeterminate mess.
The State's interpretati on of subsecti on (a) presents
another related problem. Suppose we could somehow over-
look the indeterminacy its interpretation yields and adopt
the State's view that it may “prohibit” bingo under subsec-
tion (a) not merely by outlawing bingo altogether but also
by dictating the time, place, and manner in which it is played.
On that account, subsection (b) would be left with no work
to perform, its terms dead letters all. Yes, subsection (b)
says that it does not federalize Texas's civil and criminal
gaming regulations on tribal land. But, the State effec-
tively suggests, we should turn a blind eye to all that. It's
a result that defes yet another of our longstanding canons
of statutory construction—this one, the rule that we must
normally seek to construe Congress's work “so that effect is
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given to all provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
super
fuous, void or insignifcant.” Corley v. United States,
556 U. S. 303, 314 (2009) ( i nter na l quot ati on marks
omitted).
Seeking a way around these problems, Texas only stum-
bles on another. The State submits that subsection (b) per-
forms real work even on its reading by denying its courts
and gaming commission “jurisdiction” to punish violations of
subsection (a) and sending disputes over “regulatory” viola-
tions to federal court instead. The dissent also embraces
this approach. See post, at 720–721 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.). But this understanding of subsection (b) only serves
to render still another portion of the statute—subsection
(c)—a nullity. Titled “Jurisdiction Over Enforcement
Against Members,” subsection (c) grants the federal courts
“exclusive” jurisdiction over violations of subsection (a), and
it also permits Texas to “brin[g] an action in [federal court]
to enjoin violations of [subsection (a)].” 101 Stat. 669. Put
differently, subsection (c) already precludes state courts and
state agencies from exercising jurisdiction over violations of
subsection (a). To make any sense of the statute, subsection
(b) must do something besides repeat that work.
Stepping back, a full look at the statute's structure sug-
gests a set of simple and coherent commands. In subsection
(a), Congress effectively federalized and applied to tribal
lands those state laws that prohibit or absolutely ban a par-
ticular gaming activity. In subsection (b), Congress ex-
plained that it was not authorizing the application of Texas's
gaming regulations on tribal lands. In subsection (c), Con-
gress granted federal courts jurisdiction to entertain claims
by Texas that the Tribe has violated subsection (a). Texas's
competing interpretation of the law renders individual statu-
tory terms duplicative and whole provisions without work
to perform.
1
1
The dissent offers a surplusage argument of its own, arguing that the
Court's reading of § 107 duplicates the work done by § 105(f ). See post, at
719. That is mistaken. Section 105(f ) does not specifcally address tribal
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B
E
ven if fair questions remain after a look at the ordinary
meaning of the statutory terms before us, important contex-
tual clues resolve them. Recall that Congress passed the
Act just six months after this Court handed down Cabazon.
See Part I–B, supra. In that decision, the Court inter-
preted Public Law 280 to mean that only “prohibitory” state
gaming laws could be applied on the Indian lands in question,
not state “regulatory” gaming laws. The Court then pro-
ceeded to hold that California bingo laws—laws materially
identical to the Texas bingo laws before us today—fell on the
regulatory side of the ledger. Just like Texas today, Califor-
nia heavily regulated bingo, allowing it only in certain cir-
cumstances (usually for charity). Just like Texas, California
criminalized violations of its rules. Compare Cabazon, 480
U. S., at 205, with Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2001.551. Still, be-
cause California permitted some forms of bingo, the Court
concluded that meant California did not prohibit, but only
regulated, the game. Cabazon, 480 U. S., at 211.
For us, that clinches the case. This Court generally as-
sumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of
this Court's relevant precedents. See Ryan v. Valencia
Gonzales, 568 U. S. 57, 66 (2013). And at the time Congress
adopted the Restoration Act, Cabazon was not only a rele-
gaming, but instead broadly extends Public Law 280 and its associated
jurisdictional rules to the Tribe's reservation. By contrast, § 107 speaks
only and specifcally to gaming. And while it does extend much of the
Public Law 280 regime to tribal gaming, it also departs from that frame-
work in at least two signifcant ways. First, § 107 incorporates Texas's
criminal gaming prohibitions as surrogate federal law, while Public Law
280 allows particular States to apply their own laws directly to tribal
lands. Second, it establishes unique jurisdictional rules for judicial re-
view of alleged violations of Texas's gaming prohibitions. See post, at
711–712. Where Public Law 280 grants state courts jurisdiction over vio-
lations of state criminal prohibitory laws, subsection (c) grants federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of § 107, “[n]otwith-
standing section 105(f ).” 101 Stat. 669. There is no superfuity here.
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vant precedent concerning Indian gaming; it was the prece-
dent.
See Part I–B, supra. In Cabazon, the Court drew a
sharp line between the terms prohibitory and regulatory and
held that state bingo laws very much like the ones now be-
fore us qualifed as regulatory rather than prohibitory in na-
ture. We do not see how we might fairly read the terms of
the Restoration Act except in the same light. After all,
“[w]hen the words of the Court are used in a later statute
governing the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-
gress and of the Court's own processes to give the words
the same meaning in the absence of specifc direction to the
contrary.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 434 (2000).
Even beyond that vital contextual clue lie others. In the
immediate aftermath of Cabazon, Congress adopted not just
the Restoration Act; it also adopted other laws governing
tribal gaming activities. In these laws, Congress again ap-
peared to reference and employ Cabazon's distinction be-
tween prohibition and regulation—and Congress did so in
ways demonstrating that it clearly understood how to grant
a State regulatory jurisdiction over a Tribe's gaming activi-
ties when it wished to do so. Cf. Lagos v. United States,
584 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2018).
Consider two examples. On the same day it passed the
Restoration Act, Congress adopted a statute involving the
Wampanoag Tribe. But, contrary to its approach in the
Restoration Act, Congress subjected that Tribe's lands to
“those laws and regulations which prohibit or regulate the
conduct of bingo or any other game of chance.” Wampanoag
Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement
Act of 1987, § 9, 101 Stat. 709–710 (emphasis added). Shortly
after the Restoration Act, Congress adopted another statute,
this one governing the Catawba Tribe's gaming activities.
In it, Congress provided that “all laws, ordinances, and regu-
lations of the State, and its political subdivisions, shall gov-
ern the regulation of . . . gambling or wagering by the Tribe
on and off the Reservati on. ” Catawba Indian Tribe of
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South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act of 1993, § 14(b),
107
Stat. 1136 (emphasis added).
That Congress chose to use the language of Cabazon in
different ways in three statutes closely related in time and
subject matter seems to us too much to ignore. See State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby,
580 U. S. 26, 34 (2016) (explaining that when Congress “use[s]
. . . explicit language in one provision,” that “cautions against
inferring the same limitation in another provision” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For two Tribes, Congress did
more than just prohibit on tribal lands those gaming activi-
ties prohibited by state law. It said state regulations should
apply as a matter of federal law too. Yet for this Tribe Con-
gress did something different. It did not subject the Tribe
to all Texas laws that “prohibit or regulate” gaming. It did
not subject the Tribe to all laws that “govern the regulation
of gambling.” Instead, Congress banned on tribal lands
only those gaming activities “prohibited” by Texas, and it did
not provide for state “regulatory jurisdiction” over tribal
gaming.
2
None of this is to say that the Tribe may offer any gaming
activity on whatever terms it wishes. It is only to say that
the Fifth Circuit and Texas have erred in their understand-
ing of the Restoration Act. Under that law's terms, if a
gaming activity is prohibited by Texas law it is also prohib-
ited on tribal land as a matter of federal law. Other gaming
activities are subject to tribal regulation and must conform
2
The dissent speculates about ways Congress could have even more
clearly communicated its intention to ban only those games prohibited by
Texas. See post, at 715. But rather than compare the Restoration Act
to hypothetical language Congress could have used, it seems more appro-
priate to compare the Act's terms to language Congress did use in closely
related statutes addressing precisely the same subject, including in one
passed the very same day as this Act. The dissent cannot and does not
deny that Congress could have employed the language it used in the Wam-
panoag and Catawba statutes. That Congress took a different approach
strongly suggests it had in mind a different set of rules for this Tribe.
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with the terms and conditions set forth in federal law, includ-
i
ng IGRA to the extent it is applicable. See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 31–33.
3
III
A
By this point, only two arguments remain for us to con-
sider. In the frst, Texas and the dissent focus heavily on
the fnal sentence in subsection (a). See post, at 715–717,
719–720. That sentence states that “[t]he provisions of this
subsection are enacted in accordance with the tribe's request
in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86.” 101 Stat. 668–669.
In the referenced 1986 resolution, the Tribe announced its
opposition to Texas's legislative efforts to have all its gaming
laws apply on tribal lands. Such a result, the resolution
said, would represent “a substantial infringement upon the
Tribe['s] power of self-government . . . [i]nconsistent with the
central purposes of restoration of the federal trust relation-
ship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 122. At the same time, to pre-
vent extension of Texas law to its reservation and to avoid
“jeopardiz[ing]” its request for renewed federal trust status,
the Tribe (1) announced its own intention to prohibit gaming
or bingo on its reservation, and (2) authorized its negotiators
in Washington to accept federal legislation prohibiting gam-
ing on tribal lands as an alternative to state regulation. Id.,
at 123. Before us, Texas does not question that the Tribe
was (and remains) free to change its own laws after adopting
that resolution. But, the State says, the fact that Congress
referenced the tribal resolution in subsection (a) suggests
that the Restoration Act should be read “broadly” to allow
3
In reaching this conclusion, we need not rely on the rule—long estab-
lished by our precedents—that “statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their bene-
ft.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 766 (1985). On our view,
Texas's interpretation fails even without recourse to that rule.
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Texas to apply its gaming regulations on tribal lands. Brief
for
Respondent 22.
It's an unsatisfying suggestion for at least a few reasons.
In the frst place, while subsection (a) explains that the Res-
toration Act was “enacted in accordance with” the Tribe's
resolution, it does not purport to incorporate that resolution
into federal law. Congress knows exactly how to adopt into
federal law the terms of another writing or resolution when
it wishes. It can and has said, for example, that a tribal law
or resolution “shall have the same force and effect as if it
were set out in full in this subchapter.” 25 U. S. C. § 5396(b).
But even Texas does not suggest that Congress went that
far in the Restoration Act.
With that possibility shelved, it is hard to see what's left.
Texas suggests that Congress's reference to the tribal reso-
lution at least augurs in favor of a “broa[d]” reading of sub-
section (a). Brief for Respondent 22; see also post, at 715–
717. But saying that tells us nothing about how much
broader the law should be read. And, as we have seen, the
only “broader” reading of subsection (a) Texas offers faces
its challenges— it requires us to believe that subsection (a)
swallows subsection (b) whole, makes a nullity of subsection
(c), and defes Congress's apparent adoption of Cabazon's
prohibitory/regulatory distinction.
There is still another and maybe more fundamental prob-
lem here. On our interpretation of the Restoration Act,
Congress did legislate “in accordance with” the Tribe's reso-
lution: It expressly granted the Tribe federal recognition and
chose not to apply Texas gaming regulations as surrogate
federal law on tribal land. Of course, Congress also sought
to act in accordance with at least some of Texas's concerns
by banning those games fully barred by Texas law. In the
end, it seems each got half a loaf.
By contrast, adopting Texas's alternative interpretation of
the Restoration Act would make a mockery of Congress's
statement that it sought to act “in accordance with” the
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regulations serve as surrogate federal law applicable on
tr
ibal lands. That's a result few would dare to describe as
“accord[ing] with” the tribal resolution. In fact, it's an out-
come more nearly the opposite of what the Tribe sought and
closer to what it described as a “wholly unsatisfactory . . .
infringement upon the Tribe['s] power of self government”
and “[i]nconsistent with the central purposes of restoration
of the federal trust relationship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 122.
To be sure and as Texas and the dissent both highlight,
the statutory terms Congress fnally settled on were in some
respects more generous to the Tribe than those its resolu-
tion authorized tribal negotiators in Washington to accept.
Rather than ban all gaming on tribal lands, Congress banned
only those games forbidden in Texas. But this development
is hardly surprising either. The Tribe adopted its resolution
in 1986 in connection with negotiations over a bill that even-
tually died in the Senate. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 3–4, 30. As talks continued the following
year, this Court issued Cabazon. And after that, as we have
seen, Tribes across the country saw their negotiating “posi-
tion strengthened.” Wood 1027, and n. 353; see also Part I–
B, supra. The dissent omits these essential details from its
account of how the Restoration Act became law. See post,
at 710. That omission leads the dissent to overlook one
plausible explanation for why the Tribe got the deal it did.
It may be that, thanks to Cabazon, the Tribe's representa-
tives were able to persuade Congress to impose a less draco-
nian ban—one that paralleled the terms this Court in Caba-
zon found applicable to many other Tribes under Public Law
280. Surely, too, as we have seen, if Congress had intended
a more complete federal ban, it could have easily said so.
Not by obliquely referencing a tribal resolution, but by say-
ing so clearly, just as it did for both the Wampanoag and
Catawba Tribes. See Part II–B, supra.
4
4
The dissent tries to reshape the tribal resolution to its liking by distill-
ing it down to a “single `request[ ]' ” to “ban on the reservation all gaming
as defned by Texas.” Post, at 710, 716. And it chides the Court for con-

706 YSLET
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Opinion of the Court
B
In
the end, Texas retreats to the usual redoubt of failing
statutory interpretation arguments: an unadorned appeal to
public policy. Echoing arguments voiced by the Cabazon
dissent, the State argues that attempts to distinguish be-
tween prohibition and regulation are sure to prove “unwork-
able.” Brief for Respondent 29 (citing 480 U. S., at 224
(opinion of Stevens, J.)). Indeed, the State suggests that
problems are likely to arise in this very case. Under our
reading, Texas highlights, courts on remand might be called
on to decide whether “electronic bingo” qualifes as “bingo”
and thus a gaming activity merely regulated by Texas, or
whether it constitutes an entirely different sort of gaming
activity absolutely banned by Texas and thus forbidden as a
matter of federal law. And, the State worries, any attempt
to answer that question may require evidence, expert testi-
mony, and further litigation.
We appreciate these concerns, but they do not persuade
us. Most fundamentally, they are irrelevant. It is not our
place to question whether Congress adopted the wisest or
most workable policy, only to discern and apply the policy
it did adopt. If Texas thinks good governance requires a
different set of rules, its appeals are better directed to those
who make the laws than those charged w ith fol low i ng
them.
Even on its own terms, we are not sure what to make of
Texas's policy argument. We do not doubt that the Restora-
tion Act's prohibitory/regulatory distinction can and will
generate borderline cases. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law 541–544 (N. Newton ed. 2012). It may even
sulting “excerpts from the resolution's preamble” that complicate the dis-
sent's narrative. Post, at 716. But the entire document is an expression
of the Tribe's views. If we are to rely on the resolution as a snapshot of
the Tribe's position, it makes little sense to ignore much of it. In any
event, courts regularly consult preambles and recitals even in statutes and
contracts. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 217–220 (2012).
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be that electronic bingo will prove such a case. But if apply-
i
ng the Act's terms poses challenges, that hardly makes it
unique among federal statutes. Nor is the line the Restora-
tion Act asks us to enforce quite as unusual as Texas sug-
gests. Courts have applied the same prohibitory/regulatory
framework elsewhere in this country under Public Law 280
for decades. See id., at 541–547. IGRA, too, draws a simi-
lar line to assess the propriety of class II gaming on Indian
reservations nationwide. See 25 U. S. C. § 2710(b)(1)(A); see
also K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian
Gaming, 4 Nev. L. J. 285, 289–290 (2004). In fact, Texas con-
cedes that another Tribe within its borders—the Kickapoo
Traditional Tribe of Texas—is already subject to IGRA and
offers class II games. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 91; see also Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 32. Why something
like the Cabazon test can work for one Tribe in Texas but
not another is not exactly obvious.
For that matter, Texas's alternative interpretation poses
its own “workability” challenges. Under the State's read-
ing, subsection (c) does not just charge federal courts with
enforcing on tribal lands a federal law banning gaming activi-
ties also banned by state law. It also charges federal courts
with enforcing the minutiae of state gaming regulations gov-
erning the conduct of permissible games—a role usually
played by state gaming commissions or the National Indian
Gaming Commission. It's a highly unusual role for federal
courts to assume. But on Texas's view, it's a role federal
courts must assume, as indeed they have sought to do since
Ysleta I. And far from yielding an easily administrable re-
gime, by almost anyone's account that project has engen-
dered a quarter century of confusion and dispute. See Part
I–C, supra.
*
Texas contends that Congress in the Restoration Act has
allowed all of its state gaming laws to act as surrogate fed-
eral law on tribal lands. The Fifth Circuit took the same
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
view in Ysleta I and in the proceedings below. That under-
st
anding of the law is mistaken. The Restoration Act bans
as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming
activities also banned in Texas. To allow the Fifth Circuit
to revise its precedent and reconsider this case in the correct
light, its judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Thomas,
Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh join, dissenting.
In order to obtain federal trust status, the Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo Tribe agreed that Texas's gambling laws should apply
on its reservation. Congress passed a bill codifying this ar-
rangement. The key statutory provision states, “[a]ll gam-
ing activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State
of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on
lands of the tribe.” Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and
Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, § 107(a),
101 Stat. 668 (Restoration Act). The Tribe now wishes to
engage in various high-stakes gaming activities that would
clearly violate Texas law—if Texas law applies. The ques-
tion presented in this case is whether all of Texas's gaming
laws apply on tribal land, or only those laws that categori-
cally ban a particular game.
The Court today concludes that the latter reading of the
statute is the better one. I disagree. A straightforward
reading of the statute's text makes clear that all gaming ac-
tivities prohibited in Texas are also barred on the Tribe's
land. The Court's contrary interpretation is at odds with
the statute's plain meaning, conficts with an unambiguous
tribal resolution that the Act was “enacted in accordance
with,” id., at 668–669, and makes a hash of the statute's
structure. The Court's approach also winds up treating
gambling violations more leniently than other violations of
Texas law. This makes little sense, as the whole point of the
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
provision at issue was to further restrict gaming on the
Tr
ibe's lands. I respectfully dissent.
I
A
The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe sits on a 100-acre reserva-
tion near El Paso, Texas. The Tribe frst received federal
recognition in 1968. At that time, Congress simultaneously
transferred the United States' trust responsibilities to the
State of Texas. See Tiwa Indians Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90–
287, 82 Stat. 93. Texas thereafter held the Tribe's land in
trust, and Texas law applied in full on the reservation.
The situation became tenuous, however, in 1983. That
year Texas's Attorney General issued an opinion concluding
that the State's trust relationship with a similarly situated
Tribe violated the Texas Constitution. This led to a great
deal of uncertainty about the Pueblo's future. Efforts began
to establish, for the frst time, a direct trust relationship be-
tween the Tribe and the Federal Government. But a key
sticking point soon emerged: the status of gaming on the
reservation.
Texas has long maintained strict controls on gambling.
Indeed, since 1876 the Texas Constitution has required the
State's legislature to “pass laws prohibiting ” such activities.
Art. III, § 47; see also Fort Worth v. Rylie, 602 S. W. 3d 459,
460 (Tex. 2020). While the Texas Constitution now contains
limited exceptions for charitable bingo and raffes, as well
as the State's offcial lottery, its ban on casino-style gaming
remains absolute. With the Pueblo seeking federal trust
status, Texas offcials worried that if the State's gaming laws
no longer applied on tribal lands, the Tribe's small reserva-
tion might soon become a large hub for high-stakes gaming.
In 1985, Congress considered a bill that would have
granted the Pueblo federal trust status. The bill also would
have authorized gaming on the Tribe's land, so long as it
occurred “pursuant to a tribal ordinance or law” that had
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
been “approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” H. R.
1344,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 107, p. 15. The bill passed the
House of Representatives but stalled in the Senate due to
opposition from Texas state offcials and members of the
Texas congressional delegation. They were concerned that
the bill “did not provide adequate protection against high
st akes gami ng operati ons on the Tr ibe's reservati on. ”
Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (WD
Tex. 2001).
In response, the Tribe adopted a resolution, which is of
central importance to this case. See Tr ibal Resoluti on
No. TC–02–86 (Mar. 12, 1986), App. to Pet. for Cert. 121–124.
The resolution's preamble contains a series of prefatory
clauses. One states that the Tribe has “[n]o interest in con-
ducting high stakes bingo or other gambling operations on
its reservation.” Id., at 121. Another says the Tribe re-
mains “frm in its commitment to prohibit outright any gam-
bling or bingo in any form on its reservation.” Id., at 123
(emphasis added). At the same time, other clauses assert
the Tribe's view that proposals “to make state gaming law
applicable on the reservation [are] wholly unsatisfactory” and
represent a “substantial infringement upon [tribal] self gov-
ernment.” Id., at 122. Still, the Tribe concluded, “the con-
troversy over gaming must not be permitted to jeopardize”
legislation granting it federal trust status. Id., at 123. So
the Tribal Council made a single “request[ ]”: that its con-
gressional representatives amend the pending legislation to
“provide that all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as de-
fned by the laws and administrative regulations of the State
of Texas, shall be prohibited on the Tribe's reservation or on
tribal land.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Tribe's request ultimately led to enactment of the
Restoration Act, which is the statute at issue in this case.
See 101 Stat. 666; see also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp.
2d, at 677–679. The Act contains various provisions setting
forth the relationship between the Tribe, the State of Texas,
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
and the United States. Two statutory provisions are partic-
u
larly pertinent. The frst addresses general application of
Texas law on the reservation, and the second addresses the
more specifc application of Texas's gaming laws.
First, in § 105(f ) of the Act, Congress made the Public Law
280 framework applicable to the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo. 101
Stat. 668. The Tribe, Texas, and the United States all em-
brace this interpretation of the Act. See Brief for Petition-
ers 25; Brief for Respondent 18; Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 12. Public Law 280 allows certain States to
apply in full their criminal laws, and some of their civil laws,
on tribal lands. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373
(1976); see also ante, at 691–692. The law was designed to
address “the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reser-
vations.” Bryan, 426 U. S., at 379. In California v. Caba-
zon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987), the Court
interpreted Public Law 280 to mean that state laws that are
“ `criminal/prohibitory' ” apply on designated reservations,
whereas those laws that are merely “ `civil/regulatory' ” do
not, id., at 209. Put differently, we said, “if the intent of a
state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls
within Pub. L. 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction [to the
State], but if the state law generally permits the conduct
at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classifed as civil/
regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its enforce-
ment on an Indian reservation.” Ibid. Because § 105(f )
grants Texas Public Law 280 authority on Pueblo lands, the
State may directly enforce all of its laws that generally pro-
hibit conduct.
Second, Congress adopted a more specifc rule to govern
gaming on the reservation, which is set forth at § 107 of the
Restoration Act. The provision has three parts. Section
107(a) begins with the primary rule. It states unequivocally
that “[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws
of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reserva-
tion and on lands of the tribe.” 101 Stat. 668. It continues
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by noting that this rule was “enacted in accordance with the
tr
ibe's request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86.” Id., at
668–669.
The next part, § 107(b), says that the section's prohibition
on gaming on the reservation should not be construed as a
“grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State
of Texas.” Id., at 669.
Finally, § 107(c) clarifes how the gaming provision is to
be enforced: “Notwithstanding section 105(f ), the courts of
the United States”—rather than Texas courts—“shall have
exclusive jur isdic ti on over any offense i n v i olati on of
[§ 107(a)].” Ibid. “However,” § 107(c) continues, “nothing
in this section shall be construed as precluding the State of
Texas from bringing an action in the courts of the United
States to enjoin violations of the provisions of this section.”
Ibid. This means that—unlike most state laws that apply
on tribal land, which Texas can directly enforce given its
authority under § 105(f )—Texas cannot directly enforce its
gaming laws in state court. Instead, if Texas determines
the Tribe is conducting prohibited gaming activities, it must
seek relief by way of a federal-court injunction.
B
It was not long before things wound up in federal court.
The Pueblo sued frst. Although the Tribe had previously
expressed its “frm” “commitment to prohibit outright any
gambling or bingo in any form on its reservation,” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 123, it now wished to host a bonanza of high-
stakes, casino-style games, including baccarat, blackjack,
craps, roulette, and more, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas,
36 F. 3d 1325, 1331, n. 12 (CA5 1994). The dispute made
its way to the Fifth Circuit, which ruled against the Tribe.
The court held that through the Restoration Act, “Con-
gress—and the Tribe—intended for Texas' gaming laws
and regulations to operate as surrogate federal law on the
Tribe's reservation in Texas.” Id., at 1334. The Tribe was
thus required to follow all of Texas's gaming rules unless it
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
could persuade Congress to repeal the Restoration Act. We
denied
certiorari. 514 U. S. 1016 (1995).
For more than 25 years, this straightforward interpreta-
tion of the Restoration Act held. Yet the Tribe continually
pushed the Act's limits, resulting in numerous successful re-
quests for injunctive relief from Texas to enforce its gaming
laws. See, e. g., 955 F. 3d 408, 412 (CA5 2020). In several
instances, federal courts had to hold tribal offcials in con-
tempt for disregarding injunctions. Ibid.
The present litigation traces back to 2016. After a Dis-
trict Court enjoined illegal “ `sweepstakes' ” games being
conducted by the Pueblo, the Tribe announced it would be
“ `transitioning to bingo.' ” Ibid. As noted, Texas outlaws
almost all gambling, though it does permit charitable bingo
activities in certain limited situations.
In 2017, Texas inspected the Pueblo's Speaking Rock En-
tertainment Center to determine whether it was complying
with state law. The answer appeared to be “no.” Slot ma-
chines are outlawed in Texas, as are “gambling device ver-
sions of bingo.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.01(4)(A) (West
2011); see also § 47.02(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2021). Yet in-
side the Tribe's casino, offcials found more than 2,000 ma-
chines that looked exactly like “ `Las-Vegas-style slot ma-
chines.' ” 955 F. 3d, at 412. Players press a button,
graphics spin, noise plays, and eventually players learn
whether they have won or lost. The machines are accessible
24 hours a day and, for added effect, are emblazoned with
names like “Big Texas Payday,” “Welcome to Fabulous Las
Vegas,” and “Lucky Duck.” 2019 WL 639971, *5 (WD Tex.,
Feb. 14, 2019). Although the machines resemble slot ma-
chines in every relevant respect, the Tribe insisted they
were a form of bingo, because whether a player wins turns
on “historical bingo draws.” Ibid.
1
1
A photograph from the record of this version of “bingo” is appended
to this opinion. It confrms that the electronic bingo played at the Speak-
ing Rock Entertainment Center is about as close to real bingo as Bingo
the famous dog.

714 YSLET
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
In addition to these electronic gaming machines, the Tribe
a
lso offered live-called bingo 24 hours a day. But the condi-
tions under which these actual bingo games were conducted
violated Texas law in many ways. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann.
§ 2001.419 (West Cum. Supp. 2021) (setting forth certain
bingo restrictions).
Texas fled suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief
against the Tribe and tribal offcials. The District Court
granted an injunction, holding that “the Tribe's bingo opera-
tions fail to comply with Texas law.” 2019 WL 639971, *11.
The Fifth Circuit affrmed, concluding that in exchange for
federal trust status, “the Pueblo agreed that its gaming ac-
tivities would comply with Texas law,” including all of the
State's gaming regulations. 955 F. 3d, at 410. We granted
certiorari. 595 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
At this point in the litigation, the Tribe does not argue
that all of its gaming activities are consistent with Texas law.
Rather, it insists that Texas's gaming laws simply do not
apply to it, unless Texas categorically bans the playing of a
particular type of game altogether. The Tribe does not
make this argument based primarily on the text or structure
of the statute. It instead relies on Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 480 U. S. 202, which interpreted Public Law
280. The Tribe asks us to treat § 107 of the Restoration Act
as implicitly adopting Cabazon Band's framework, which dis-
tinguishes between laws that are “ `criminal/prohibitory' ”
and laws that are “ `civil/regulatory.' ” Id., at 209. Under
this framework, state laws that totally prohibit a type of
activity apply on tribal land, while state laws that simply
regulate the activity do not. And as the Tribe sees it, Texas
does not ban the playing of bingo under all circumstances,
so none of the State's restrictions on the game apply.
The Court today accepts the Tribe's position, but I am
not persuaded.
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
A
1
I
beg in w ith the statute's plain text. Sec ti on 107(a)
provides:
“All gaming activities which are prohibited by the
laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the
reservation and on lands of the tribe. Any violation of
the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be sub-
ject to the same civil and criminal penalties that are
provided by the laws of the State of Texas. The provi-
sions of this subsection are enacted in accordance with
the tribe's request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86
which was approved and certifed on March 12, 1986.”
101 Stat. 668–669.
The best reading of this statute is that all of Texas's gam-
bling rules apply in full on the Tribe's land. “All” gaming
activities prohibited by Texas are prohibited on the reserva-
tion. “Any” violation is subject to the same penalties that
Texas would ordinarily impose.
The Tribe posits that this plain text may be read to refer
only to the banning of entire games—such as poker, baccarat,
or roulette. See Brief for Petitioners 27–28. But had Con-
gress wished to adopt this narrower defnition of “gaming
activities,” it easily could have done so. For example, it
could have referred to “types of gambling,” or mentioned
that the prohibition would apply only if Texas “fatly,” “cate-
gorically,” or “completely” banned a particular type of game.
Congress did not do so.
2
Further textual evidence points decisively in the same di-
rection. Section 107(a) says that it was “enacted in accord-
ance with the tribe's request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–
02– 86. ” 101 Stat. 668– 669 (emphasis added). As noted
above, the Tribal Resolution contains just a single “re-
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quest[ ]”: that Congress enact “language which would pro-
v
ide that all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defned
by the laws and administrative regulations of the State of
Texas, shall be prohibited on the Tribe's reservation or on
tribal land.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 123. This language is
categorical. So the breadth of the Tribe's request, and Con-
gress's clear statement that it enacted § 107(a) in accordance
with that request, strongly indicate that Congress intended
to ban “all” gaming activities—“as defned by” Texas—that
are inconsistent with Texas law.
2
The Court does not view the Tribal Resolution as signif-
cant because Congress did not “purport to incorporate [it]
into federal law.” Ante, at 704. But this is not mere legis-
lative history; it is statutory text. Congress told us exactly
why it did what it did: It was acting in accord with the
Tribe's request that it ban on the reservation all gaming as
defned by Texas.
The Court says that “Congress did legislate `in accordance
with' the Tribe's resolution” because it “expressly granted
the Tribe federal recognition and chose not to apply Texas
gaming regulations as surrogate federal law on tribal land.”
Ibid. Texas, the Court suggests, should be happy to have
gotten what had never been in question from the begin-
ning—a ban on games fully barred by the State. That was
its “half a loaf.” Ibid.
In making this claim, the Court relies on cherry-picked
excerpts from the resolution's preamble. But the text of
§ 107(a) of the Restoration Act rules out the Court's analy-
sis. Section 107(a) expressly states that the provision was
2
The Court argues that we omit “essential details” from our account of
the tribal resolution—namely, the fact that California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987), was decided after the resolution's
enactment but before passage of the Restoration Act. Ante, at 705. The
Court says it is “plausible” this led to a better deal for the Tribe. Ibid.
But § 107(a) does not mention Cabazon Band. Instead, its express terms
say the provision was “enacted in accordance with the tribe's request” in
the resolution. 101 Stat. 668–669. The resolution is therefore the essen-
tial reference point.
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
“enacted in accordance with the tribe's request in Tribal
Resoluti
on No. T.C.–02–86.” 101 Stat. 668–669 (emphasis
added). As noted, the resolution contains only one single
“request[ ]”—that Congress ban on tribal lands “all gaming,
gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defned by the laws and admin-
istrative regulations of the State of Texas.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 123 (emphasis added). The resolution's preamble
makes up no part of this “request,” so the Court's reliance
on it is misplaced. “Or to put the point differently, operative
provisions should be given effect as operative provisions, and
prologues as prologues.” District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U. S. 570, 578, n. 3 (2008).
3
In sum, § 107(a) of the Restoration Act is best read to
mean that all of Texas's gaming laws apply on the Tribe's
reservation.
B
The Court rejects this straightforward interpretation of
the statute for one main reason: It adopts the Tribe's argu-
ment that the use of the word “prohibited” in § 107(a) implic-
itly incorporates the jurisdictional framework of Public Law
280 and Cabazon Band.
1
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of this ap-
proach. First, Congress knew how to incorporate the Public
Law 280 framework where it wished to do so. We know
that because that is precisely what Congress did in § 105(f )
of the Restoration Act. There is little reason to think that
3
The Court accuses the dissent of “reshap[ing] the tribal resolution to
its liking ” by focusing on the Tribe's request in the resolution. Ante, at
706, n. 4. The reason we focus on the “request” in the tribal resolution is
because that is precisely what Congress directed us to do. See 101 Stat.
668–669. Of course, as this opinion elsewhere makes clear, the resolu-
tion's preamble is emphatic in expressing the Tribe's intent to prohibit all
gaming activities and its willingness to compromise on the application of
state gaming law in order to secure federal trust status. See supra,
at 710.
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Congress would have done so elsewhere in the very same
A
ct with nothing more than a wink and a nudge.
Second, there is no evidence that Congress intended to use
the word “prohibited” in § 107(a) as a term of art. The word
“prohibit” appears thousands of times in the U. S. Code.
See Brief for Respondent 24, n. 6. The fact that our decision
in Cabazon Band used this generic term to describe the
bounds of Public Law 280 is hardly enough to turn it into a
term of art with a more particularized meaning.
Third, the text of § 107(a) of the Restoration Act bears
little resemblance to the statutory language of Public Law
280. Compare 18 U. S. C. § 1162 and 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (set-
ting forth provisions of Public Law 280) with § 107 of the
Restoration Act. Thus, this is not a situation where a more
recent enactment carries with it the “old soil” of a predeces-
sor statute or rule. See F. Frankfurter, Some Refections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947).
Finally, the language used in § 107 does not signal an in-
tent to adopt Cabazon Band's unique dichotomy between
laws that are “ `criminal/prohibitory' ” and those that are
“ `civil/regulatory.' ” 480 U. S., at 209. The Tribe points to
§ 107(a)'s use of the word “prohibited” and § 107(b)'s refer-
ence to the State lacking “regulatory jurisdiction” on tribal
lands to suggest that only Texas's gaming laws that are
“criminal/prohibitory” ought to apply. 101 Stat. 669. But
§ 107(a) also says that both Texas's “civil and criminal penal-
ties” apply when the Tribe engages in prohibited gaming ac-
tivities. Id., at 668 (emphasis added). And § 107(a) was
enacted “in accordance with” the Tribal Resolution, id., at
668–669, which specifes that the Restoration Act outlaws
“all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defned by the
laws and administrative regulations of the State of Texas,”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 123 (emphasis added). These express
references to “civil” penalties and “administrative regula-
tions” make it unlikely that Congress intended to implicitly
incorporate only Texas's gaming laws that are criminal/pro-
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
hibitory. To the extent Congress legislated with Cabazon
Band
's dichotomy in mind, the crosscutting language that
Congress used suggests it intended to incorporate both types
of laws.
2
The foregoing is confrmed by the structure of the Resto-
rati on Ac t and its st atutory h istory. As noted above,
§ 105(f ) incorporates the Public Law 280 framework. The
Tribe does not dispute this. See Brief for Petitioners 26–27.
Section 107(a) then provides a more specifc rule for gaming
activities. This is thus the common case where “[a] specifc
provision”—§ 107(a)—“controls [over] one of more general
application.” Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395,
407 (1991).
The Tribe disagrees. It argues that while § 105(f ) of the
Restoration Act incorporated Public Law 280's Cabazon
Band framework, § 107(a) did so as well. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 26–28. But if § 105(f )—and its incorporation of Ca-
bazon Band—already applied to gaming activities that were
generally prohibited in Texas, there would have been no
need for Congress to enact the more specifc rule of § 107(a).
The Tribe's proffered reading of the statute thus runs head-
long into the canon against surplusage. See A. Scalia & B.
Garner, Reading Law 174 (2012) (no provision “should need-
lessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate
another provision or to have no consequence” ( boldface
deleted)).
4
The Tribe's preferred interpretation is especially doubtful
given the history of the Restoration Act. The key roadblock
4
In response, the Court focuses on the different treatment of Texas's
gaming laws under §§ 107(b) and (c). See ante, at 699–700, n. 1. But the
Court does not dispute that under its reading of the Restoration Act,
§ 107(a) readopted the substantive Cabazon Band standard already re-
quired by § 105(f ), even though § 105(f ) comes just a few sentences earlier
in the statute and uses distinct language not present in § 107(a) to ex-
pressly adopt the Public Law 280 framework.
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to the Tribe obtaining federal trust status was a concern
that
it would permit gambling. The Tribe obtained federal
trust status only after striking a deal on this issue. See
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d, at 677. It would
make little sense for Congress to have enacted § 107(a)'s limi-
tations on gaming merely to duplicate the rules already set
forth in § 105(f ). And it would make even less sense for
Congress to have done so while simultaneously indicating
that it was enacting the gaming prohibition “in accordance
with the tribe's request,” § 107(a), 101 Stat. 668–669, that it
ban on tribal lands “all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo,
as defned by the laws and administrative regulations of the
State of Texas”—full stop, App. to Pet. for Cert. 123 (empha-
sis added).
What's more, the Tribe's interpretati on of § 107—em-
braced by the Court today—leads to a bizarre result: Viola-
tions of Texas's criminal gaming prohibitions receive more
lenient treatment than all other violations of Texas's criminal
laws. Under § 105(f ), Texas may directly enforce in state
court all of its laws that are “criminal/prohibitory.” But
under § 107(c), Texas may enforce its gaming laws only
through federal-court injunctions. This diminished enforce-
ment authority would make sense if the full breadth of Tex-
as's gaming prohibitions applied on tribal lands. But in a
universe where § 107(a) bars no conduct beyond what § 105(f )
already prohibits, it would make little sense for Texas to
have less enforcement authority over gaming when that was
the only sticking point prior to passage of the Restoration
Act. This is a sure-fre sign that something has gone badly
awry in the Court's interpretation of § 107.
The Tribal Resolution confrms this point. The House of
Representatives passed H. R. 1344 in December 1985. That
version of the bill already contained the pertinent language
applying Public Law 280 to the Tribe. See H. R. 1344,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 105(f ), at 6. Under that regime, the
Tribe would have had the same authority that other tribes
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
had under Public Law 280 to offer games not altogether
banned
by a State. But H. R. 1344 stalled in the Senate,
and the Tribe adopted its resolution. The resolution made
clear that the Tribe was offering a concession that would
limit its ability to offer gambling to a greater extent than
under H. R. 1344 and its existing incorporation of Public Law
280. That is why the Tribe objected that it was being un-
fairly “singl[ed] out . . . for treatment different than that
accorded other Tribes in this country.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 123.
Still, the Tribe wanted—and needed—federal trust status,
more than gambling. In fact, the Tribe asserted in the pre-
amble to the resolution that it had “no [i]nterest [in] conduct-
ing high stakes bingo or other gambling operations” and re-
mained “frm in its commitment to prohibit outright any
gambling or bingo in any form on its reservation.” Id., at
121, 123. Given its interest in federal trust status and its
lack of interest in gaming, the Tribe requested that Congress
“amend” H. R. 1344 to add language banning “all gaming,
gambling, lottery, or bingo” on its reservation. Ibid. Since
the then-existing text of H. R. 1344 already made Public Law
280 applicable to the Tribe, it is plain that the proposed addi-
tion in § 107 was designed to go further. The Court's con-
struction of § 107—as merely extending the Public Law 280
framework to gaming on Pueblo lands, and then watering
down that framework through § 107(c)'s limitation on reme-
dies—is untenable.
3
The Tribe insists that a contrary interpretation of § 107(a)
would render §§ 107(b) and (c) meaningless, or would at least
result in undue tension between those provisions and subsec-
tion (a). See, e. g., Brief for Petitioners 30–31. I disagree.
The Tribe focuses primarily on § 107(b). That provision
states, “Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant
of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of
Texas.” 101 Stat. 669. The Tribe and Court contend that
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this reservation of authority shows that Congress intended
to
adopt the Cabazon Band framework. Ante, at 696–697.
But if § 107(a) simply adopted Cabazon Band, why would
there have been any need to say so again in § 107(b)? Sec-
tion 107(b) only makes sense if § 107(a) raised questions
about how far Texas's authority reached beyond the limits of
Cabazon Band. Section 107(b) simply but importantly clari-
fes that § 107(a) adopts only Texas's substantive gaming
laws and associated penalties. What § 107(a) cannot be con-
strued to do—according to § 107(b)—is to authorize Texas to
exercise the regulatory authority of administrative agencies
or other enforcers of state law directly against the Tribe.
Thus, Texas correctly explains that its Lottery Commission
could not exercise “jurisdiction on the Tribe's reservation.”
Brief for Respondent 38. Likewise, its “local district attor-
neys” could not bring “criminal enforcement actions against
the Pueblo in state court for violations of what has been
adopted as federal law.” Id., at 38–39. Yet as § 107(a) de-
mands, the substance of the State's laws prohibiting certain
gaming activities would remain enforceable in full.
The next section, § 107(c), explains how: The State could
enforce its laws by “bringing an action in the courts of the
United States to enjoin violations of the provisions of this
section.” 101 Stat. 669.
***
The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe needed federal trust sta-
tus to secure its future. Texas objected that granting this
status might bring with it casino-style gaming. Categori-
cally denying any interest in gaming, the Tribe requested
that the pending bill conferring federal trust status be
amended to prohibit on the reservation all gambling as de-
fned by Texas law. The Tribe did so even though it ac-
knowledged this would result in it being treated differently
from other tribes. The proposal removed the State's objec-
tion and Congress passed the bill granting federal trust sta-
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Appendix to opinion of Roberts, C. J.
tus to the Tribe, while—in § 107(a)—specifcally prohibiting
on
the reservation gaming activities barred under Texas law.
At the same time, in § 107(b), Congress protected the Tribe's
interests by banning direct state enforcement on the reser-
vation. Under § 107(c), Texas would instead have to proceed
in federal court. This was a careful balance struck by
Congress.
The Court today throws out that balance, treating gaming
on this reservation as if it were just like any other Public
Law 280 reservation. I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
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Motion for Summary Judgt., Exh. A, in No. 3:17–cv–179 (WD
Tex., Nov. 11, 2018), ECF Doc. 146–1, p. 1.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 685, line 9: “Pueblo” is inserted after “Sur”
p. 685, line 14: “102 Stat. 2467” is inserted after “(IGRA)”
p. 686, line 22: “Webster's New Third” is replaced with “Webster's Third
New”
p. 692, line 16: “Pueblo” is inserted after “Sur”
p. 699, line 11: “(opinion of Roberts, C. J.)” is inserted after “720–721”
p. 700, n. 1, last line: “101 Stat. 669” is inserted after “105(f )”