Kemp v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 2
Pages 528–542
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 13, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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528 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
KEMP v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 21–5726. Argued April 19, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022
Petitioner Dexter Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of various
drug and gun crimes. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals
and, in November 2013, affrmed their convictions and sentences. In
April 2015, Kemp moved the District Court to vacate his sentence under
28 U. S. C. § 2255. The District Court dismissed Kemp's motion as un-
timely because it was not fled within one year of “the date on which
[his] judgment of conviction [became] fnal.” § 2255(f )(1). Kemp did
not appeal. Then, in June 2018, Kemp sought to reopen his § 2255 pro-
ceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes
a court to reopen a fnal judgment under certain enumerated circum-
stances. As relevant here, a party may seek relief within one year
under Rule 60(b)(1) based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus-
able neglect.” A party may also seek relief “within a reasonable time”
under Rule 60(b)(6) for “any other reason that justifes relief,” but relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only when the other grounds for relief
specifed in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5) are inapplicable. Kemp's motion to re-
open his § 2255 proceedings invoked Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion sought
reopening based on a “mistake” covered by Rule 60(b)(1). Specifcally,
Kemp argued that the 1-year limitations period on his § 2255 motion did
not begin to run until his codefendants' rehearing petitions were denied
in May 2014, making his April 2015 motion timely. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit agreed with Kemp that his § 2255 motion was timely but concluded
that because Kemp alleged judicial mistake, his Rule 60(b) motion fell
under Rule 60(b)(1), was subject to Rule 60(c)'s 1-year limitations pe-
riod, and was therefore untimely.
Held: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law.
Because Kemp's motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable
under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)'s 1-year limitations
period. Pp. 533–539.
(a) As a matter of text, structure, and history, a “mistake” under Rule
60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law. When the Rule was adopted
in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “miscon-
ception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment.” Web-
ster's New International Dictionary 1383. Likewise, in its legal usage,

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529
Syllabus
“mistake” included errors “of law or fact.” Black's Law Dictionary
1195.
Thus, regardless whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) carries its
ordinary meaning or legal meaning, it includes a judge's mistakes of law.
Rule 60(b)(1)'s drafters could have used language to connote a narrower
understanding of “mistake,” yet they chose not to qualify that term.
Similarly, the Rule's drafters could have excluded mistakes by judges
from the Rule's reach. In fact, the Rule used to read that way. When
adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to “his”—i. e., a party's—
“mistake,” so judicial errors were not covered. The 1946 revision to
the Rule deleted the word “his,” thereby removing any limitation on
whose mistakes could qualify. Pp. 534–535.
(b) Neither the Government nor Kemp offers a reason to depart from
this reading of Rule 60(b)(1). Pp. 535–539.
(1) The Government contends that the term “mistake” encompasses
only so-called “obvious” legal errors. This contention—also held by
several Courts of Appeals—is unconvincing. None of the dictionaries
from the time the Rule was adopted and revised suggests this “obvious-
ness” gloss. Nor does the text or history of Rule 60(b)(1) limit its reach
only to fagrant cases that would have historically been corrected by
courts sitting in equity. Finally, requiring courts to decide not only
whether there was a mistake but also whether that mistake was suff-
ciently “obvious” raises questions of administrability. Pp. 535–536.
(2) Kemp's arguments for limiting Rule 60(b)(1) to non-judicial,
non-legal errors are also unconvincing. He claims that Rule 60(b)(1)'s
other grounds for relief—“inadvertence,” “surprise,” and “excusable ne-
glect”—involve exclusively non-legal, non-judicial errors, and thus “mis-
take” should be similarly limited. But courts have found that excusable
neglect may involve legal error, see, e. g., Lenaghan v. Pepsico, Inc., 961
F. 2d 1250, 1254–1255, and they have a similar history of granting relief
based on “judicial inadvertence,” Larson v. Heritage Square Assocs.,
952 F. 2d 1533, 1536. Kemp argues that Rule 60's structure favors in-
terpreting the term “mistake” narrowly to include only non-legal errors,
and the Court's contrary interpretation would create confusing overlap
between Rule 60(b)(1) and relief available under other parts of Rule 60
not subject to Rule 60(c)'s 1-year limitations period. But the overlap
Kemp suggests would exist even if “mistake” reached only factual er-
rors. Courts of Appeals have well-established tests for distinguishing
between these Rules. And should such overlap ever create an irrecon-
cilable confict, courts may then resort to ordinary interpretive rules to
determine which Rule to apply. As for Kemp's worry that the Court's
interpretation would allow parties to evade other time limits by, for
example, repackaging a tardy motion under Rule 59(e), the risk Kemp

530 KEMP
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Opinion of the Court
identifes would exist even under his own interpretation. And, in any
e
vent, the alleged specter of litigation gamesmanship and strategic
delay is overstated because a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, like all Rule 60(b)
motions, must be made “within a reasonable time.” Finally, Kemp pro-
tests that this Court's reading is inconsistent with the history of Rule
60(b). But his argument is based on the mistaken notions that Rule
60(b)(1)'s list of grounds for reopening was understood to be a “term of
art” when adopted, and that Rule 60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford
relief for judicial legal errors that had previously been remedied by bills
of review. Pp. 536–539.
857 Fed. Appx. 573, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ.,
joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 540. Gor-
such, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 540.
Andrew L. Adler argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Lisa S. Blatt and Sarah M. Harris.
Benjamin W. Snyder argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Pre-
logar, Assistant Attorney General Polite, and Deputy Solic-
itor General Feigin.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) allows a party to
seek relief from a fnal judgment based on, among other
things, a “mistake.” The question presented is whether the
term “mistake” includes a judge's error of law. We conclude,
based on the text, structure, and history of Rule 60(b), that
a judge's errors of law are indeed “mistake[s]” under
Rule 60(b)(1).
I
In 2011, a federal jury convicted Dexter Kemp of various
drug and gun crimes, and he was sentenced to 420 months
*Margaret A. Little and Kara M. Rollins fled a brief for the New Civil
Liberties Alliance as amicus curiae urging reversal.
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in prison. Kemp, along with seven codefendants, appealed.
The
Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals and, in
November 2013, affrmed their convictions and sentences.
United States v. Gray, 544 Fed. Appx. 870. Kemp did not
seek rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit's judgment or petition
this Court for certiorari. Two of Kemp's codefendants did
seek rehearing, which the Eleventh Circuit denied in May
2014.
In April 2015, Kemp moved the U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida to vacate his sentence
under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. The Government objected
that Kemp's § 2255 motion was untimely. As relevant here,
such motions must be fled within one year of “the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes fnal.”
§ 2255(f )(1). For someone who, like Kemp, does not petition
this Court for certiorari, a judgment becomes fnal when
the time to seekcertiorari expires—ordinarily, 90 days after
judgment. See Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522,
525 (2003); this Court's Rule 13.1. In this case, the District
Court concluded that Kemp's judgment became fnal in
February 2014 (90 days after the Eleventh Circuit's judg-
ment affrming his conviction and sentence), making his
April 2015 motion over two months late. The District Court
dismissed Kemp's motion in September 2016, and Kemp did
not appeal.
In June 2018—almost two years later—Kemp attempted
to reopen his § 2255 proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), which authorizes a court to reopen a fnal
judgment under certain enumerated circumstances. Rule
60(b)(1) permits a district court to reopen a judgment for
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” so
long as the motion is fled “within a reasonable time,” and,
at most, one year after the entry of the order under review.
See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1), (c)(1). Meanwhile, Rule
60(b)(6) permits reopening for “any other reason that justi-

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fes relief,” so long as the motion is fled “within a reasonable
ti
me.” Rule 60(c)(1).
Kemp invoked Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion arguably
sought reopening based on a kind of “mistake” covered by
Rule 60(b)(1). Specifcally, Kemp argued that reopening
was warranted because this Court's Rule 13.3 prescribes that
the 90-day clock to seek certiorari does not begin to run until
all parties' petitions for rehearing are denied, and the Elev-
enth Circuit denied his codefendants' rehearing petitions in
May 2014. Thus, according to Kemp, the 1-year period to
fle his § 2255 motion began in August 2014, making his April
2015 motion timely.
The District Court rejected this timeliness argument and,
in the alternative, held that Kemp's Rule 60(b) motion was
itself untimely. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed. 857 Fed.
Appx. 573 (2021) (per curiam). While it agreed with Kemp
that his original § 2255 motion “appear[ed] to have been
timely,” the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless concluded that he
had fled his Rule 60(b) motion too late. Id., at 575–576.
The Eleventh Circuit held that Kemp's reopening motion al-
leged “precisely the sort of judicial mistak[e] in applying the
relevant law that Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses,” and thus was
subject to Rule 60(b)(1)'s 1-year limitations period. Id., at
576.
Kemp petitioned this Court for review, and we granted
certiorari to resolve the Courts of Appeals' longstanding dis-
agreement whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a
judge's errors of law.
1
595 U. S. ––– (2022).
1
Compare Spinar v. South Dakota Bd. of Regents, 796 F. 2d 1060, 1063
(CA8 1986) (Rule 60(b)(1) does not cover claims “that the court erred as a
matter of law”); Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F. 2d 463, 467 (CA1 1984)
(same), with Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F. 3d 651, 659 (CA7 2013) (Rule
60(b)(1) “allows a district court to correct its own [ legal] errors”); In re
310 Assocs., 346 F. 3d 31, 35 (CA2 2003) (per curiam) (same); United States
v. Reyes, 307 F. 3d 451, 455 (CA6 2002) (same); Parks v. U. S. Life & Credit
Corp., 677 F. 2d 838, 839–840 (CA11 1982) (per curiam) (same).

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II
F
ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits “a party to
seek relief from a fnal judgment, and request reopening of
his case, under a limited set of circumstances.” Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 528 (2005). Under Rule 60(b)(1), a
party may seek relief based on “mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect.” Rules 60(b)(2) through (b)(5)
supply other grounds for reopening a judgment. Finally,
Rule 60(b)(6) provides a catchall for “any other reason that
justifies relief. ” This last option is available only when
Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable. See Liljeberg
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11
(1988). Even then, “ `extraordinary circumstances' ” must
justify reopening. Ibid.
Rule 60(c) imposes deadlines on Rule 60(b) motions. All
must be fled “within a reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1).
But for some, including motions under Rule 60(b)(1), that
“reasonable time” may not exceed one year. Rule 60(c)(1).
Motions under Rule 60(b)(6) are not subject to this additional
1-year constraint. Rule 60(c)(1).
Here, the parties dispute the extent to which a judge's
legal errors qualify as “mistake[s]” under Rule 60(b)(1).
The Government contends that Rule 60(b)(1) applies any
time a party alleges that a judge has made an “obvious” legal
error—e. g., the “failure to apply unambiguous law to record
facts.” Brief for United States 11. Kemp's motion, the
Government says, alleged an obvious legal error, so the
Eleventh Circuit was correct to apply Rule 60(b)(1). Ac-
cording to Kemp, however, Rule 60(b)(1) applies only to fac-
tual errors made by someone other than the judge. Brief
for Petitioner 3. So, in Kemp's view, his motion challenging
the District Court's timeliness ruling was cognizable under
Rule 60(b)(6), and the 1-year limit did not apply.
We ultimately disagree with Kemp and agree with the
Government to a point. As a matter of text, structure, and
history, the Government is correct that a “mistake” under
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534 KEMP
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Opinion of the Court
Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law. But we see
no
reason to limit Rule 60(b)(1) to “obvious” legal mistakes,
as the Government proposes. We frst explain why Rule
60(b)(1) covers all mistakes of law made by a judge, and then
address why the Government's and Kemp's contrary inter-
pretations of “mistake” do not persuade us.
A
The ordinary meaning of the term “mistake” in Rule
60(b)(1) includes a judge's legal errors. When the Rule was
adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” ap-
plied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault
in opinion or judgment.” Webster's New International Dic-
tionary 1383 (1914) (Webster's); see also Funk & Wagnalls
New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 1588
(1944) (Funk & Wagnalls) (defning “mistake” as an “error in
action, judgment, or perceptions,” including, e. g., “a mistake
in calculation”). In ordinary usage, then, a “mistake” was
not limited only to factual “misconception[s]” or “misunder-
standing[s],” or to mistakes by non-judicial actors. Web-
ster's 1383. Likewise, in its legal usage, “mistake” included
errors “of law or fact.” Black's Law Dictionary 1195 (3d ed.
1933) (Black's). Thus, regardless whether “mistake” in Rule
60(b)(1) carries its ordinary meaning or legal meaning, it in-
cludes a judge's mistakes of law.
Had the drafters of Rule 60(b)(1) intended a narrower
meaning, they “easily could have drafted language to that
effect.” Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
571 U. S. 161, 169 (2014). The difference between “mis-
take of fact” and “mistake of law” was well known at the
time. Both lay and legal dictionaries identifed them as dis-
tinct categories. See Funk & Wagnalls 1588; Black's 1195.
Thus, Rule 60(b)(1)'s drafters had at their disposal readily
available language that could have connoted a narrower un-
derstanding of “mistake.” Yet they chose to include “mis-
take” unqualifed.
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Opinion of the Court
Similarly, Rule 60(b)(1)'s drafters could just as easily have
excluded
mistakes by judges from the Rule's ambit. In fact,
the Rule used to read that way. When adopted in 1938,
Rule 60(b) initially referred to “his”—i. e., a party's—“mis-
take,” so judicial errors were not covered. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 60(b) (1938). In 1946, however, the Rule's amenders
deleted the word “his,” thereby removing any limitation on
whose mistakes could qualify. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
60(b)(1) (1946). Thus, as currently written, “mistake” in
Rule 60(b)(1) includes legal errors made by judges.
2
B
Both the Government's and Kemp's interpretations of Rule
60(b) depart from aspects of our reading. Their reasons for
doing so are unavailing.
1
The Government contends that the term “mistake” en-
compasses only so-called “obvious” legal errors. Brief for
United States 11. Several Courts of Appeals agree that
Rule 60(b)(1) may be used to correct only “ `obvious errors'
of law, such as overlooking controlling statutes or case law.”
In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. S. A., 728 F. 2d
699, 703 (CA5 1984). The Government argues that this limi-
tation “has historical roots” because courts of equity tradi-
tionally “could grant relief from legal errors, but only `in the
most unquestionable and fagrant cases.' ” Brief for United
States 18 (quoting Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85, 91
(1878)).
We are unconvinced. None of the English language or
legal dictionaries noted above, supra, at 534 and this page,
suggests this “obviousness” gloss. Nor does the Govern-
2
Here, Kemp alleged that the District Court erred by misapplying
controlling law to record facts. In deciding that this alleged error is a
“mistake,” we do not decide whether a judicial decision rendered errone-
ous by subsequent legal or factual changes also qualifes as a “mistake”
under Rule 60(b)(1).
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ment tie the equity practice it invokes to the text or history
of
Rule 60(b). Finally, we question the administrability of a
rule that requires courts to decide not only whether there
was a “mistake” but also whether that mistake was suff-
ciently “obvious.” The text does not support—let alone re-
quire—that judges engage in this sort of complex line-
drawing.
2
We are similarly unconvinced by Kemp's arguments for
limiting Rule 60(b)(1) to non-judicial, non-legal errors.
While Kemp does not dispute that “mistake” ordinarily
would cover both legal and factual errors, he argues that the
other grounds for relief in Rule 60(b)(1)—“inadvertence,”
“surprise, ” and “excusable neglect”—involve exclusively
non-legal, non-judicial errors, and the word “mistake” should
therefore be similarly limited. But courts have long found
that excusable neglect may involve legal error. See, e. g.,
Lenaghan v. Pepsico, Inc., 961 F. 2d 1250, 1254–1255 (CA6
1992) (per curiam) (“understandable, albeit mistaken, read-
ing of ” a local rule); A. F. Dormeyer Co. v. M. J. Sales &
Distribution Co., 461 F. 2d 40, 42–43 (CA7 1972) (misunder-
standing of summons and relevant legal rules); Provident Se-
curity Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F. 2d 839, 843 (CA9 1963)
(erroneous understanding of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12). And they have a similar history of granting relief based
on “judicial inadvertence.” Larson v. Heritage Square
Assocs., 952 F. 2d 1533, 1536 (CA8 1992) (emphasis added);
see also, e. g., O'Tell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 236
F. 2d 472, 475 (CA2 1956) ( judge's failure to deduct setoff
in entering judgment was “inadvertence” under Rule 60(b)).
Because the words surrounding “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1)
do not connote exclusively non-legal or non-judicial errors,
they do not favor Kemp's narrower reading.
Kemp also argues that Rule 60's structure favors in-
terpreting the term “mistake” narrowly. Our interpreta-
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Opinion of the Court
tion, he contends, would create confusing overlap between
Ru
le 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(a), which authorizes a court to
“correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from over-
sight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment,
order, or other part of the record.” We disagree. Because
Rule 60(a) covers a subset of “mistake[s]”—e. g., “clerical”
ones—whereas Rule 60(b)(1) covers “mistake[s]” simpliciter,
the overlap Kemp alleges would exist even if “mistake”
reached only factual errors. And the Courts of Appeals
have well-established rules for determining when Rule 60(a),
rather than Rule 60(b), should apply. See, e. g., United
States v. Griffn, 782 F. 2d 1393, 1397 (CA7 1986).
Kemp alleges that our interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1)
would create a similar problem with respect to Rules 60(b)(4)
and (b)(5), which authorize relief from voided judgments and
judgments that lack legal effect. Specifcally, Kemp con-
tends that a legal “mistake” could warrant relief under both
Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule (b)(5), and a confict
could then arise given that the latter Rules are not subject
to a 1-year time limit. But, again, that could occur even if
only factual errors count as “mistake[s],” since factual errors,
too, may justify relief under Rules 60(b)(4) and (b)(5). And,
regardless, should this overlap ever create an irreconcilable
confict, courts may then resort to ordinary rules of statutory
construction when selecting which provision would govern
in a particular case. See, e. g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel,
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. 639, 645 (2012) (“ `the
specifc governs the general' ”).
Kemp also worries that our interpretation would allow
parties to evade other time limits set forth in the Federal
Rules. For instance, Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend
a judgment must be fled within 28 days, and appeals must
generally be fled within 30 days, see Fed. Rule App. Proc.
4(a)(1)(a). Kemp suggests that our interpretation would
allow someone to repackage a tardy Rule 59(e) motion as a

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timely Rule 60(b)(1) motion, or to generate a right to an un-
ti
mely appeal by fling a Rule 60(b)(1) motion and appealing
once it is denied. We are unpersuaded because, yet again,
the risk Kemp identifes would exist even under his own in-
terpretation. For example, Kemp provides no explanation
why, under his interpretation of Rule 60(b), parties could not
repackage tardy Rule 59(e) motions based on legal errors as
motions under Rule 60(b)(6), or recharacterize tardy motions
based on factual errors as motions under Rule 60(b)(1). A
denial in either case would then permit the litigant to appeal
outside Appellate Rule 4's 30-day time limit.
In any event, the alleged specter of litigation gamesman-
ship and strategic delay is overstated. Rule 60(b)(1) mo-
tions, like all Rule 60(b) motions, must be made “within a
reasonable time.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1). And while
we have no cause to defne the “reasonable time” standard
here, we note that Courts of Appeals have used it to forestall
abusive litigation by denying Rule 60(b)(1) motions alleging
errors that should have been raised sooner (e. g., in a timely
appeal). See, e. g., Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F. 3d 651,
660 (CA7 2013).
Nor, contrary to Kemp's protestations, is our interpreta-
tion inconsistent with the history of Rule 60(b). Kemp
points out that Rule 60(b)(1) drew its text from existing state
procedural rules. See, e. g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473 (Deer-
ing 1937). And he argues that its list of grounds for reopen-
ing—“ `mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable ne-
glect' ”—was understood when Rule 60(b) was adopted to be
a “term of art” that excluded legal errors. Brief for Peti-
tioner 10. But while some States interpreted their rules
this way, see, e. g., Lucas v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 184 S. C. 119, 120, 191 S. E. 711, 712 (1937) (collecting
cases), others, like California, did not, see, e. g., Mitchell v.
California & O. C. S. S. Co., 156 Cal. 576, 578, 105 P. 590, 592
(1909). Moreover, at least one leading treatise from the era

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539
Opinion of the Court
maintained, consistent with our view, that “mistake” encom-
passed
legal errors. See 3 J. Moore & J. Friedman, Moore's
Federal Practice § 60.05, p. 3280 (1938). Although statutory
language “obviously transplanted from another legal source”
will often “bring the old soil with it,” Taggart v. Loren-
zen, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted), that principle applies only when a
term's meaning was “well-settled” before the transplanta-
tion, Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22 (1999). Here, it
was not.
Finally, Kemp invokes Rule 60(b)'s 1946 amendments re-
placing “bills of review” and other traditional, postjudgment
reopening mechanisms with Rules 60(b)(2) through (b)(6).
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b) (1946). He argues that
Rule 60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford relief for judicial
legal errors that had previously been remedied by bills
of review, because such errors were not cognizable under
Rule 60(b)'s “mistake” provision or its predecessor state
rules prior to the 1946 amendments. But, as noted, the pre-
amendment Rule 60(b) covered only a party's mistakes, see
supra, at 535, and for that reason could not be grounds to
correct a judge's legal mistake. By eliminating that party-
specifc qualifer, the 1946 amendments opened Rule 60(b)(1)
to judicial mistakes of law previously remediable only by
bills of review.
***
In sum, nothing in the text, structure, or history of
Rule 60(b) persuades us to narrowly interpret the otherwise
broad term “mistake” to exclude judicial errors of law. Be-
cause Kemp's Rule 60(b) motion alleged such a legal error,
we affrm the Eleventh Circuit's judgment that the motion
was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1), subject to a 1-year limi-
tations period, and, therefore, untimely.
It is so ordered.
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540 KEMP
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I
join the Court's opinion holding that the term “mistake”
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) encompasses a
judge's mistake of law. I write separately to make two
points.
First, I join the Court's opinion with the understanding
that nothing in it casts doubt on the availability of Rule
60(b)(6) to reopen a judgment in extraordinary circum-
stances, including a change in controlling law. See, e. g.,
Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 126, 128 (2017) (concluding that
the petitioner was “entitle[d] to relief under Rule 60(b)(6)”
because of a change in law and intervening developments of
fact); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 531 (2005) (“[A] mo-
tion might contend that a subsequent change in substantive
law is a `reason justi fy i ng rel ief, ' Fed. Ru le Civ. Proc.
60(b)(6), from the previous denial of a claim”); Polites v.
United States, 364 U. S. 426, 433 (1960) (leaving open that a
“clear and authoritative change” in the law governing judg-
ment in a case may present extraordinary circumstances).
Today's decision does not purport to disturb these settled
precedents.
Second, I do not understand the Court's opinion to break
any new ground as to Rule 60(c)(1), which requires that all
Rule 60(b) motions be “made within a reasonable time.”
See 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2866 (3d ed. 2022) (“What constitutes reasonable
time necessarily depends on the facts in each individual
case”).
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
The Court took this case to determine whether a district
court's mistake of law is correctable under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6).
From the start, granting review was a questionable use of
judicial resources. The answer matters only under rare
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Cite
as: 596 U. S. 528 (2022)
541
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
circumstances: A losing party fails to appeal or secure relief
under
Rule 59(e), opting instead to fle a Rule 60(b) motion.
That motion comes more than a year after judgment but—
piling contingency on contingency—within what the court
would otherwise deem a “reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1).
By petitioner's own (uncontested) count, his is the frst peti-
tion ever to present today's question for this Court's review.
See Pet. for Cert. 24; Brief in Opposition 26. Beyond even
that, an alternative route exists to resolve the question
posed here. Congress has adopted the Rules Enabling Act.
See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2071–2077. Under its terms, a committee
composed of judges and practitioners may recommend to this
Court any warranted clarifcations to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. § 2073. Those recommendations gener-
ally take effect upon our approval and absent congressional
objection. § 2074.
Undeterred, the Court takes up and resolves this case any-
way. It holds that Rule 60(b)(1), not Rule 60(b)(6), applies.
In an unexpected twist, the Court adopts a further position
neither party saw ft to advance. Going forward, every judi-
cial legal error—not just an inadvertent or obvious “mis-
take”—is fodder for collateral attack under Rule 60(b)(1).
And what is the basis for all this? A mysterious 1946
amendment deleting the word “ `his.' ” See ante, at 535.
Respectfully, I would have dismissed the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted. Not only does this case fail to
meet our usual standards for review. See Supreme Court
Rule 10. At bottom, this dispute presents a policy question
about the proper balance between fnality and error correc-
tion. Should a district court be able to clean up a legal error
through a collateral proceeding on any reasonable timeline
within a year of judgment? Or do Rule 59(e) and the appel-
late process provide the necessary corrective measures in
ordinary cases, with Rule 60(b)(6) as a last, narrow avenue to
relief ? Questions like these are best resolved not through
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542 KEMP
v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
a doubtful interpretive project focused on a pronoun dropped
i
n 1946, but through the rulemaking process. There, policy
interests on both sides can be accounted for and weighed in
light of the “collective experience of bench and bar.” Mo-
hawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 114 (2009).
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None