Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 366–410
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 23, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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366 OCTOBER TERM, 2021
Syllabus
SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
REHABILITATION AND RE-
ENTRY v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 20–1009. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided May 23, 2022*
Respondents David Martinez Ramirez and Barry Lee Jones were each
convicted of capital crimes in Arizona state court and sentenced to
death. The Arizona Supreme Court affrmed each case on direct re-
view, and each prisoner was denied state postconviction relief. Each
also fled for federal habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, arguing that
trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to conduct adequate investi-
gations. The Federal District Court held in each case that the prison-
er's ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted because it
was not properly presented in state court. To overcome procedural
default in such cases, a prisoner must demonstrate “cause” to excuse
the procedural defect and “actual prejudice.” Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U. S. 722, 750. To demonstrate cause, Ramirez and Jones relied on
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, which held that ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel may be cited as cause for the procedural default
of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In Ramirez's case,
the District Court permitted him to supplement the record with evi-
dence not presented in state court to support his case to excuse the
procedural default. Assessing the new evidence, the court excused the
procedural default but rejected Ramirez's ineffective-assistance claim
on the merits. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for more evi-
dentiary development to litigate the merits of Ramirez's ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In Jones' case, the District Court held
a lengthy evidentiary hearing on “cause” and “prejudice,” forgave his
procedural default, and held that his state trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance. The State of Arizona petitioned this Court in
both cases, arguing that § 2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to
order evidentiary development simply because postconviction counsel is
alleged to have negligently failed to develop the state-court record.
*Together with Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections,
Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al. v. Jones (see this Court's Rule 12.4),
also on certiorari to the same court.

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Held: Under § 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evi-
dentiary
hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court
record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction coun-
sel. Pp. 375–391.
(a) To respect federal-state dual sovereignty, see Printz v. United
States, 521 U. S. 898, 918, the availability of federal habeas relief is nar-
rowly circumscribed, see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 132–134.
For example, only rarely may a federal habeas court hear a claim or
consider evidence that a prisoner did not previously present to the state
courts in compliance with state procedural rules. Pp. 375–382.
(1) Federal habeas review overrides the States' core power to en-
force criminal law—an intrusion that “imposes special costs” on the fed-
eral system. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128. Two of those costs are
particularly relevant here. First, a federal order to retry or release a
state prisoner overrides the State's sovereign power to enforce “societal
norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538,
556. Second, federal intervention imposes signifcant costs on state
criminal justice systems. See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72,
90. Pp. 376–377.
(2) In light of these costs, this Court recognizes that federal habeas
review is not “a substitute for ordinary error correction through ap-
peal,” but is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “ex-
treme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103. To ensure that federal habeas retains
its narrow role, both Congress and federal habeas courts have set out
strict rules requiring prisoners to raise all of their federal claims in
state court before seeking federal relief. The Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to
“exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seek-
ing federal habeas relief. § 2254(b)(1)(A). And the doctrine of proce-
dural default—“an important `corollary' to the exhaustion requirement,”
Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. 521, 527—generally prevents federal courts
from hearing any federal claim that was not presented to the state
courts “consistent with [the State's] own procedural rules,” Edwards
v. Carpenter, 529 U. S. 446, 453. Together, exhaustion and procedural
default promote federal-state comity by affording States “an initial op-
portunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' fed-
eral rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S. 1, 3 (per curiam), and by
protecting against “the signifcant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural rules, Coleman,
501 U. S., at 750. Pp. 377–379.
(3) Nonetheless, a federal court is not required to automatically
deny unexhausted or procedurally defaulted claims. For instance,

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when a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court can forgive the
defau
lt and adjudicate the claim if the prisoner provides an adequate
excuse. And if the state-court record for that defaulted claim is unde-
veloped, the prisoner must show that factual development in federal
court is appropriate. Pp. 379–382.
(i) Federal courts may excuse procedural default only if a pris-
oner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at
750. With respect to cause, “attorney error cannot provide cause to
excuse a default” “in proceedings for which the Constitution does not
guarantee the assistance of counsel at all.” Davila, 582 U. S., at 529.
But in Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception” to that
rule, holding that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel
may constitute “cause” to forg ive procedura l defau lt of a tr ia l-
ineffective-assistance claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to
raise such claims for the frst time during state collateral proceedings.
566 U. S., at 9. Pp. 379–380.
(ii) Excusing a prisoner's failure to develop the state-court rec-
ord faces an even higher bar. Section 2254(e)(2) applies when a pris-
oner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim,” i. e., is “at fault”
for the undeveloped record in state court, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S.
420, 432. If a prisoner is “at fault,” a federal court may hold “an eviden-
tiary hearing on the claim” in only two limited scenarios not relevant
here. See §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii). The prisoner also must show that
further factfnding would demonstrate, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that he is innocent of the crime charged. Pp. 381–382.
(b) Although respondents do not satisfy § 2254(e)(2)'s narrow excep-
tions, the Court of Appeals forgave respondents' failures to develop the
state-court record because, in its view, they each received ineffective
assistance of state postconviction counsel. The Court of Appeals erred.
Pp. 382–391.
(1) Respondents primarily argue that a prisoner is not “at fault”
for the undeveloped record if state postconviction counsel negligently
failed to develop the state record for a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. But under AEDPA and this Court's precedents, state
postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance in developing the state-
court record is attributed to the prisoner. Pp. 382–388.
(i) A prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney
errors made in the course of the representation.” Coleman, 501 U. S.,
at 754. And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state
postconviction proceedings, a prisoner must ordinarily “bea[r] responsi-
bility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Williams, 529
U. S., at 432, including responsibility for counsel's negligent failure to

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develop the state postconviction record. This Court's prior cases make
th
is point clear. See, e. g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1; Wil-
liams, 529 U. S. 420; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (per curiam).
Thus, a prisoner is “at fault” even when state postconviction counsel is
negligent. Pp. 382–384.
(ii) Respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective
assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner's failure to
develop the state-court record under § 2254(e)(2). But unlike judge-
made exceptions to procedural default, § 2254(e)(2) is a statute, and thus,
this Court has no power to redefne when a prisoner “has failed to de-
velop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” Nor is it
plausible, as respondents contend, that Congress might have enacted
§ 2254(e)(2) with the expectation that this Court would one day open the
door to allowing the ineffective assistance of state postconviction coun-
sel to be cause to forgive procedural default. Finally, Martinez itself
cuts against respondents' proposed result. Martinez foreclosed any ex-
tension of its holding beyond the “narrow exception” to procedural de-
fault at issue in that case. See 566 U. S., at 9. That assurance has bite
only if the State can rely on the state-court record. The cases here
demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the States when Martinez
applies beyond its narrow scope, with the sprawling evidentiary hearing
in Jones' case being particularly poignant. Pp. 384–388.
(2) Respondents propose a second reading of § 2254(e)(2) that sup-
posedly permits consideration of new evidence in their habeas cases.
First, they argue that because § 2254(e)(2) bars only “an evidentiary
hearing on the claim,” a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether there is cause and prejudice. Second, respond-
ents contend that the habeas court may then consider that new evidence
to evaluate the merits of the underlying ineffective-assistance claim.
By considering already admitted evidence, respondents reason, the ha-
beas court is not holding a “hearing ” prohibited by § 2254(e)(2). But,
in Holland, this Court explained that § 2254(e)(2)'s “restrictions apply
a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence without an
evidentiary hearing.” 542 U. S., at 653 (emphasis deleted). Therefore,
when a federal habeas court convenes an evidentiary hearing for any
purpose, or otherwise reviews any evidence for any purpose, it may not
consider that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner's defaulted
claim unless the exceptions in § 2254(e)(2) are satisfed. Pp. 388–391.
937 F. 3d 1230 and 943 F. 3d 1211, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Soto-

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370 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Syllabus
mayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Kagan, JJ.,
joi
ned, post, p. 391.
Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General of Arizona, ar-
gued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were
Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, Lacey Stover Gard, Jo-
seph A. Kanefeld, and Laura P. Chiasson, Ginger Jarvis,
William Scott Simon, and Jeffrey L. Sparks, Assistant At-
torneys General.
Robert M. Loeb argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Thomas M. Bondy, Paul David Meyer,
Jon M. Sands, Dale A. Baich, Timothy M. Gabrielsen, and
Cary Sandman.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Texas
et al. by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Judd E. Stone II, Solici-
tor General, Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General, Ari
Cuenin, Assistant Solicitor General, and Beau Carter, Assistant Attorney
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley
Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Theodore E. Rokita of
Indiana, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn
Fitch of Mississippi, Eric C. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Mon-
tana, Douglas J. Peterson of Nebraska, Dave Yost of Ohio, Ellen F. Rosen-
blum of Oregon, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of
South Dakota, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Vir-
ginia; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger
and Kymberlee C. Stapleton; and for Jonathan F. Mitchell et al. by Allyson
N. Ho, Elizabeth A. Kiernan, and Adam K. Mortara, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Bar Association by Reginald M. Turner and Alan E. Schoen feld; for the
Arizona Capital Representation Project et al. by Natman Schaye, Emily
K. Skinner, Amy Armstrong, and Rose Daly-Rooney; for Bipartisan For-
mer Department of Justice Offcials et al. by Aaron Katz; for Federal De-
fender Capital Habeas Units by Paul Alessio Mezzina and Joshua N. Mitch-
ell; for Former State Supreme Court Justices et al. by Jeffrey R. Johnson;
for Habeas Scholars Valena Beety et al. by Meaghan VerGow; for Habeas
Scholars John H. Blume et al. by Boris Bershteyn and Thania Charmani;
and for the Innocence Network by Collin P. Wedel and Joshua J. Fougere.
Joel W. Nomkin fled a brief of amici curiae for the Arizona Justice
Project et al.

Cite as: 596 U. S. 366 (2022) 371
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
federal habeas court generally may consider a state
prisoner's federal claim only if he has frst presented that
claim to the state court in accordance with state procedures.
When the prisoner has failed to do so, and the state court
would dismiss the claim on that basis, the claim is “procedur-
ally defaulted.” To overcome procedural default, the pris-
oner must demonstrate “cause” to excuse the procedural de-
fect and “actual prejudice” if the federal court were to
decline to hear his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S.
722, 750 (1991). In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), this
Court explained that ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel is “cause” to forg ive procedura l defau lt of an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, but only if the
State required the prisoner to raise that claim for the first
time during state postconviction proceedings.
Often, a prisoner with a defaulted claim will ask a federal
habeas court not only to consider his claim but also to permit
him to introduce new evidence to support it. Under the
Antiterror ism and Effective Death Pena lty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), the standard to expand the state-court record is
a stringent one. If a prisoner has “failed to develop the fac-
tual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal
court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim”
unless the prisoner satisfes one of two narrow exceptions,
see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2)(A), and demonstrates that the new
evidence will establish his innocence “by clear and convinc-
ing evidence,” § 2254(e)(2)(B). In all but these extraordi-
nary cases, AEDPA “bars evidentiary hearings in federal ha-
beas proceedings initiated by state prisoners.” McQuiggin
v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 395 (2013).
The question presented is whether the equitable rule an-
nounced in Martinez permits a federal court to dispense with
§ 2254(e)(2)'s narrow limits because a prisoner's state post-
conviction counsel negligently failed to develop the state-
court record. We conclude that it does not.
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372 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
I
In
this case, we address two petitions brought by the State
of Arizona. See Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F. 3d 1230 (CA9
2019); Jones v. Shinn, 943 F. 3d 1211 (CA9 2019).
A
On May 25, 1989, David Ramirez fatally stabbed his girl-
friend, Mary Ann Gortarez, and her 15-year-old daughter,
Candie, in their home. 937 F. 3d, at 1234–1235; State v.
Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 119, 121, 871 P. 2d 237, 240, 242
(1994). Ramirez stabbed Mary Ann 18 times in the neck
with a pair of scissors, and Candie 15 times in the neck with
a box cutter. Id., at 121, 871 P. 2d, at 242. Police also found
physical evidence that Ramirez had raped Candie, and Rami-
rez later admitted that he had sex with the child on the night
of the murders and four times before. Ibid. A jury con-
victed Ramirez of two counts of premeditated frst-degree
murder. Ibid. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to death,
ibid., and the Arizona Supreme Court affrmed on direct re-
view, id., at 132, 871 P. 2d, at 253.
Ramirez then fled his frst petition for state postconvic-
tion relief. That petition raised myriad claims, but it did
not raise the one at issue here: that Ramirez's trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance for “failing to conduct a com-
plete mitigation investigation” or “obtai[n] and present avail-
able mitigation evidence at sentencing.” App. 402. Rami-
rez did not raise this ineffective-assistance claim until he
subsequently fled a successive state habeas petition, which
the state court summarily denied as untimely under Arizona
law. See ibid.
Ramirez also petitioned the U. S. District Court for the
District of Arizona for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U. S. C. § 2254. As relevant here, the District Court held
that Ramirez had procedurally defaulted his ineffective-
assistance claim by failing to raise it before the Arizona
courts in a timely fashion. See App. 402–403. Ramirez re-
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Opinion of the Court
sponded that the District Court should forgive the proce-
dura
l default because his state postconviction counsel was
himself ineffective for failing to raise the trial-ineffective-
assistance claim and develop the facts to support it.
The District Court permitted Ramirez to fle several decla-
rations and other evidence not presented to the state court
to support his request to excuse his procedural default. See
937 F. 3d, at 1238. Assessing the new evidence, the District
Court excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez's
ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. See id., at 1240.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Like the
District Court, it held that Ramirez's state postconviction
counsel's failure to raise and develop the trial-ineffective-
assistance claim was cause to forgive the procedural default.
See id., at 1247–1248. The Ninth Circuit also held that
Ramirez's underlying trial-ineffective-assistance claim was
substantial, and that Ramirez therefore had suffered preju-
dice. See id., at 1243–1247. But, unlike the District Court,
the Court of Appeals declined to decide the merits of Rami-
rez's claim. The court remanded the case for further fact-
fnding because, in its view, Ramirez was “entitled to eviden-
tiary development to litigate the merits of his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim.” Id., at 1248.
Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the
Ninth Circuit's remand for additional evidentiary develop-
ment violated 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). The Ninth Circuit de-
nied rehearing over an eight-judge dissent by Judge Collins.
See 971 F. 3d 1116 (2020).
B
On May 1, 1994, Barry Lee Jones repeatedly beat his girl-
friend's 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. See 943 F. 3d, at
1215–1216; State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 391, 937 P. 2d 310,
313 (1997). One blow to Rachel's abdomen ruptured her
small intestine. See id., at 391, 937 P. 2d, at 313. She also
sustained several injuries to her vagina and labia consistent
with sexual assault. Ibid. Early the next morning, Jones

374 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
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drove Rachel to the hospital, where she was pronounced
dead
on arrival. See ibid. Rachel died of peritonitis—“an
infection of the lining of the abdomen caused by a ruptured
intestine.” Ibid. A jury convicted Jones of sexual assault,
three counts of child abuse, and felony murder. Ibid. The
trial judge sentenced Jones to death, ibid., and the Arizona
Supreme Court affrmed on direct review, see id., at 401, 937
P. 2d, at 323.
Jones then petitioned for state postconviction relief. He
alleged ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, but not the
specifc trial-ineffective-assistance claim at issue here: that
his counsel “fail[ed] to conduct suffcient trial investigation.”
943 F. 3d, at 1218. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily
denied relief. See ibid.
Jones next fled a habeas petition in the U. S. District
Court for the District of Arizona. The District Court held
that Jones' trial-ineffective-assistance claim was procedur-
ally defaulted, so Jones, like Ramirez, invoked his postconvic-
tion counsel's ineffective assistance as grounds to forgive the
default. Ibid. To bolster his case for cause and prejudice,
Jones also moved to supplement the undeveloped state-court
record. Ibid. The District Court held a 7-day evidentiary
hearing with more than 10 witnesses and ultimately decided
to forgive Jones' procedural default. See id., at 1219, 1225–
1226. The court then relied on the new evidence from the
cause-and-prejudice hearing to hold, on the merits, that
Jones' trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. See
id., at 1219.
Arizona appealed, arguing that § 2254(e)(2) did not permit
the evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affrmed, hold-
ing that § 2254(e)(2) did not apply because Jones' state post-
conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the
state-court record for Jones' trial-ineffective-assistance
claim. See id., at 1220–1222.
As in Ramirez, Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc.
And, also as in Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit denied Arizona's
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Opinion of the Court
petition over the dissent of Judge Collins, joined by seven
other
judges. Jones v. Shinn, 971 F. 3d 1133 (2020).
C
As noted above, Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari
in both Ramirez and Jones. The State maintains that 28
U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to order
evidentiary development simply because postconvicti on
counsel is alleged to have negligently failed to develop the
state-court record. Respondents do not dispute, and there-
fore concede, that their habeas petitions fail on the state-
court record alone. We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. –––
(2021).*
II
A state prisoner may request that a federal court order
his release by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. See
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The writ may issue “only on the ground
that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States.” § 2254(a). To
respect our system of dual sovereignty, see Printz v. United
States, 521 U. S. 898, 918 (1997), the availability of habeas
relief is narrowly circumscribed, see Brown v. Davenport,
596 U. S. 118, 132–134 (2022). Among other restrictions,
only rarely may a federal habeas court hear a claim or con-
*Ramirez alleges that Arizona forfeited any § 2254(e)(2) argument in his
case because it did not object to some evidentiary development in the
District Court or before the Ninth Circuit panel. But Arizona did object
to further factfnding before the Ninth Circuit panel, see Respondents-
Appellees' Answering Brief in Ramirez v. Ryan, No. 10–99023 (CA9), ECF
Doc. 37, p. 58, and, in any event, the Ninth Circuit passed upon § 2254(e)(2)
when it ordered additional factfnding on remand, see United States v.
Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 41 (1992). Further, because we have discretion to
forgive any forfeiture, and because “our deciding the matter now will re-
duce the likelihood of further litigation” in a 30-year-old murder case,
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 14 (2009) (plurality opin-
ion), we choose to forgive the State's forfeiture before the District Court.
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376 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
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sider evidence that a prisoner did not previously present to
the
state courts in compliance with state procedural rules.
A
“From the beginning of our country, criminal law enforce-
ment has been primarily a responsibility of the States.”
Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U. S. –––, ––– (2020). The power to
convict and punish criminals lies at the heart of the States'
“residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” The Federalist No.
39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); see also Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019). Thus, “[t]he
States possess primary authority for defning and enforcing
the criminal law,” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982),
and for adjudicating “constitutional challenges to state con-
victions,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011).
Because federal habeas review overrides the States' core
power to enforce criminal law, it “intrudes on state sover-
eignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial
authority.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). That
intrusion “imposes special costs on our federal system.”
Engle, 456 U. S., at 128; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U. S. 436, 453, n. 16 (1986); Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. 521, 537–
538 (2017). Here, two of those costs are particularly relevant.
First, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner
overrides the State's sovereign power to enforce “societal
norms through criminal law.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U. S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That is so because habeas relief “frequently cost[s] society
the right to punish admitted offenders.” Engle, 456 U. S.,
at 127; see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021)
(“When previously convicted perpetrators of violent crimes
go free merely because the evidence needed to conduct a
retrial has become stale or is no longer available, the public
suffers, as do the victims”). “Only with real fnality can the
victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment
will be carried out.” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556. “To un-
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Opinion of the Court
settle these expectations is to infict a profound injury to the
power
ful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty, an
interest shared by the State and the victims of crime alike.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, federal intervention imposes signifcant costs on
state criminal justice systems. It “disturbs the State's sig-
nifcant interest in repose for concluded litigation,” Harring-
ton, 562 U. S., at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted), and
undermines the States' investment in their criminal trials.
If the state trial is merely a “ `tryout on the road' ” to federal
habeas relief, that “detract[s] from the perception of the trial
of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous
event.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90 (1977).
B
In light of these signifcant costs, we have recognized that
federal habeas review cannot serve as “a substitute for ordi-
nary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 562
U. S., at 102–103. The writ of habeas corpus is an “extraor-
dinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunc-
tions in the state criminal justice systems.” Id., at 102
( i nter na l quot ati on marks omitted); see a lso Brech t v.
Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–634 (1993). To ensure that
federal habeas corpus retains its narrow role, AEDPA im-
poses several limits on habeas relief, and we have prescribed
several more. See, e. g., Brown, 596 U. S., at 132–133. And
even if a prisoner overcomes all of these limits, he is never
entitled to habeas relief. He must still “persuade a federal
habeas court that law and justice require [it].” Id., at 134
(internal quotation marks omitted).
As relevant here, both Congress and federal habeas courts
have set out strict rules requiring prisoners to raise all of
their federal claims in state court before seeking federal re-
lief. First, AEDPA requires state prisoners to “exhaus[t]
the remedies available in the courts of the State” before
seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
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Ordinarily, a state prisoner satisfes this exhaustion require-
ment
by raising his federal claim before the state courts in
accordance with state procedures. See O'Sullivan v. Boerc-
kel, 526 U. S. 838, 848 (1999). If he does so, a federal habeas
court may hear his claim, but its review is highly circum-
scribed. In particular, the federal court may review the
claim based solely on the state-court record, see Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 180 (2011), and the prisoner must
demonstrate that, under this Court's precedents, no “fair-
minded juris[t]” could have reached the same judgment as
the state court, Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102; see § 2254(d).
State prisoners, however, often fail to raise their federal
claims in compliance with state procedures, or even raise
those claims in state court at all. If a state court would
dismiss these claims for their procedural failures, such claims
are technically exhausted because, in the habeas context,
“state-court remedies are . . . `exhausted' when they are no
longer available, regardless of the reason for their unavail-
ability.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 92–93 (2006). But
to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state procedure on
the way to federal court would defeat the evident goal of
the exhaustion rule. See Coleman, 501 U. S., at 732. Thus,
federal habeas courts must apply “an important `corollary'
to the exhaustion requirement”: the doctrine of procedural
default. Davila, 582 U. S., at 527. Under that doctrine,
federal courts generally decline to hear any federal claim
that was not presented to the state courts “consistent with
[the State's] own procedural rules.” Edwards v. Carpenter,
529 U. S. 446, 453 (2000).
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote
federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States “an initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
prisoners' federal rights,” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U. S.
1, 3 (1981) (per curiam), and procedural default protects
against “the signifcant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect” state procedural
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rules, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. Ultimately, “it would be
unseemly
in our dual system of government for a federal
district court to upset a state court conviction without [giv-
ing] an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitu-
tional violation,” Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950),
and to do so consistent with their own procedures, see Ed-
wards, 529 U. S., at 452–453.
C
Despite the many benefts of exhaustion and procedural
default, and the substantial costs when those doctrines are
not enforced, we have held that a federal court is not re-
quired to automatically deny unexhausted or procedurally
defaulted claims. When a claim is unexhausted, the pris-
oner might have an opportunity to return to state court to
adjudicate the claim. See, e. g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509,
520 (1982). When a claim is procedurally defaulted, a fed-
eral court can forgive the default and adjudicate the claim if
the prisoner provides an adequate excuse. Likewise, if the
state-court record for that defaulted claim is undeveloped,
the prisoner must show that factual development in federal
court is appropriate.
1
“Out of respect for fnality, comity, and the orderly admin-
istration of justice,” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 388
(2004), federal courts may excuse procedural default only if
a prisoner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,”
Coleman, 501 U. S., at 750. To establish cause, the prisoner
must “show that some objective factor external to the de-
fense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's
procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488
(1986). Then, to establish prejudice, the prisoner must show
not merely a substantial federal claim, such that “ `the errors
at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice,' ” but rather
that the constitutional violation “ `worked to his actual and

380 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
substantial disadvantage. ' ” Id., at 494 (quoting Uni ted
Sta
tes v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982)).
With respect to cause, “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadver-
tence” cannot excuse procedural default. Coleman, 501
U. S., at 753. “[T]he attorney is the petitioner's agent when
acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and
the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error.” Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “if the proce-
dural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for
the default be imputed to the State.” Murray, 477 U. S., at
488. That is not because a constitutional error “is so bad
that the lawyer ceases to be an agent” of the prisoner, but
rather because a violation of the right to counsel “must be
seen as an external factor” to the prisoner's defense. Cole-
man, 501 U. S., at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“It follows, then, that in proceedings for which the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at all, attor-
ney error cannot provide cause to excuse a default.” Dav-
ila, 582 U. S., at 528–529.
In Martinez, this Court recognized a “narrow exception”
to the rule that attorney error cannot establish cause to ex-
cuse a procedural default unless it violates the Constitution.
566 U. S., at 9. There, the Court held that ineffective assist-
ance of state postconviction counsel may constitute “cause”
to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance
claim, but only if the State requires prisoners to raise such
claims for the frst time during state collateral proceedings.
See ibid. One year later, in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413
(2013), this Court held that this “narrow exception” applies
if the State's judicial system effectively forecloses direct re-
view of trial-ineffective-assistance claims. Id., at 428. Oth-
erwise, attorney error where there is no right to counsel
remains insuffcient to show cause. Martinez, 566 U. S.,
at 16.
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Opinion of the Court
2
There
is an even higher bar for excusing a prisoner's fail-
ure to develop the st ate-cour t record. Shor tly before
AEDPA, we held that a prisoner who “negligently failed” to
develop the state-court record must satisfy Coleman's cause-
and-prejudice standard before a federal court can hold an
evidentiary hearing. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1,
9 (1992). In Keeney, we explained that “little [could] be said
for holding a habeas petitioner to one standard for failing to
bring a claim in state court and excusing the petitioner
under another, lower standard for failing to develop the fac-
tual basis of that claim in the same forum.” Id., at 10.
And, consistent with Coleman, we held that evidentiary de-
velopment would be inappropriate “where the cause asserted
is attorney error.” 504 U. S., at 11, n. 5.
Four years later, Congress enacted AEDPA and replaced
Keeney's cause-and-prejudice standard for evidentiary devel-
opment with the even “more stringent requirements” now
codifed at 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). Williams v. Taylor, 529
U. S. 420, 433 (2000) (Michael Williams). Section 2254(e)(2)
provides that, if a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual
basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal court
may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the claim” in only two
limited scenarios. Either the claim must rely on (1) a “new”
and “previously unavailable” “rule of constitutional law”
made retroactively applicable by this Court, or (2) “a factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.” §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i),
(ii). If a prisoner can satisfy either of these exceptions, he
also must show that further factfnding would demonstrate,
“by clear and convincing evidence,” that “no reasonable fact-
fnder” would have convicted him of the crime charged.
§ 2254(e)(2)(B). Finally, even if all of these requirements are
satisfed, a federal habeas court still is not required to hold
a hearing or take any evidence. Like the decision to grant
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382 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
habeas relief itself, the decision to permit new evidence must
be
informed by principles of comity and fnality that gov-
er n every federa l habeas case. Cf. Bro w n, 596 U. S.,
at 134.
Even though AEDPA largely displaced Keeney, § 2254(e)(2)
retained “one aspect of Keeney's holding.” Michael Wil-
liams, 529 U. S., at 433. Namely, § 2254(e)(2) applies only
when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim.” We interpret “fail,” consistent with Keeney, to mean
that the prisoner must be “at fault” for the undeveloped rec-
ord in state court. 529 U. S., at 432. A prisoner is “at
fault” if he “bears responsibility for the failure” to develop
the record. Ibid.
III
Respondents concede that they do not satisfy § 2254(e)(2)'s
narrow exceptions. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for-
gave respondents' failures to develop the state-court record
because, in its view, they each received ineffective assistance
of state postconviction counsel. We now hold that, under
§ 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evi-
dentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the
state-court record based on ineffective assistance of state
postconviction counsel.
A
Respondents' primary claim is that a prisoner is not “at
fault,” Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, and therefore has
not “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings,” § 2254(e)(2), if state postconviction coun-
sel negligently failed to develop the state record for a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But under AEDPA
and our precedents, state postconviction counsel's ineffective
assistance in developing the state-court record is attributed
to the prisoner.
1
As stated above, a prisoner “bears the risk in federal ha-
beas for all attorney errors made in the course of the repre-
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Opinion of the Court
sentation,” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754, unless counsel pro-
v
ides “constitutionally ineffective” assistance, Murray, 477
U. S., at 488. And, because there is no constitutional right
to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, see Davila,
582 U. S., at 529, a prisoner ordinarily must “bea[r] responsi-
bility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Mi-
chael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432. Among those errors, a
state prisoner is responsible for counsel's negligent failure to
develop the state postconviction record.
Both before and after AEDPA, our prior cases have made
this point clear. First, in Keeney, “material facts had not
been adequately developed in the state postconviction court,
apparently due to the negligence of postconviction counsel.”
504 U. S., at 4 (citation omitted). We required the prisoner
to demonstrate cause and prejudice to forgive postconviction
counsel's defcient performance, see id., at 11, and recognized
that counsel's negligence, on its own, was not a suffcient
cause, see id., at 10, n. 5.
Second, in Michael Williams, we confrmed that “the
opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney's threshold
standard of diligence, so that prisoners who would have had
to satisfy Keeney's [cause-and-prejudice] test . . . are now
controlled by § 2254(e)(2). ” 529 U. S., at 434. In other
words, because Keeney held a prisoner responsible for state
postconviction counsel's negligent failure to develop the
state-court record, the same rule applied under § 2254(e)(2).
For that reason, “a failure to develop the factual basis of a
claim,” as § 2254(e)(2) requires, “is not established unless
there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable
to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel.” 529 U. S., at 432
(emphasis added). We then applied that rule and held that
state postconviction counsel's “failure to investigate . . .
in anything but a cursory manner trigger[ed] the opening
clause of § 2254(e)(2).” Id., at 439–440.
Third, in Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (2004) (per cu-
riam), we again held a prisoner responsible for state post-
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384 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
conviction counsel's negligent failure to develop the state-
cour
t record. Seven years after the prisoner's conviction,
and after he had already been denied state postconviction
relief, the prisoner found a new witness to provide impeach-
ment testimony. See id., at 650–651. The prisoner claimed
that he discovered the witness so late because “state post-
conviction counsel did not heed his pleas for assistance.”
Id., at 653. Citing Coleman and Michael Williams, we re-
jected the prisoner's claim. “Attorney negligence,” we held,
“is chargeable to the client and precludes relief unless the
conditions of § 2254(e)(2) are satisfed.” 542 U. S., at 653.
In sum, under § 2254(e)(2), a prisoner is “at fault” even
when state postconviction counsel is negligent. In such a
case, a federal court may order an evidentiary hearing or
otherwise expand the state-court record only if the prisoner
can satisfy § 2254(e)(2)'s stringent requirements.
2
Respondents dispute none of this. Instead, they rely al-
most exclusively on Martinez's holding that ineffective as-
sistance of postconviction counsel can be “cause” to forgive
procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim if a
State forecloses direct review of that claim, as Arizona con-
cededly does. See 566 U. S., at 9. Respondents contend
that where, per Martinez, a prisoner is not responsible for
state postconviction counsel's failure to raise a claim, it
makes little sense to hold the prisoner responsible for the
failure to develop that claim. Thus, respondents propose ex-
tending Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconvic-
tion counsel can excuse a prisoner's failure to develop the
state-court record under § 2254(e)(2).
Congress foreclosed respondents' proposed expansion of
Martinez when it passed AEDPA. Martinez decided that,
in the exercise of our “equitable judgment” and “discretion,”
it was appropriate to modify “[t]he rules for when a prisoner
may establish cause to excuse a procedural default.” Id.,
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Opinion of the Court
at 13. Such “exceptions” to procedural default “are judge-
made
rules” that we may modify “only when necessary.”
Dretke, 541 U. S., at 394. Here, however, § 2254(e)(2) is a
statute that we have no authority to amend. “Where Con-
gress has erected a constitutionally valid barrier to habeas
relief, a court cannot decline to give it effect.” McQuiggin,
569 U. S., at 402 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C. J., for the
Court). For example, in McQuiggin, we explained that we
have no power to layer a miscarriage-of-justice or actual-
innocence exception on top of the narrow limitations already
included in § 2254(e)(2). See 569 U. S., at 395–396 (majority
opinion).
The same follows here. We have no power to redefne
when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of
a claim in State court proceedings.” § 2254(e)(2). Before
AEDPA, Keeney held that “attorney error” during state
postconviction proceedings was not cause to excuse an unde-
veloped state-court record. 504 U. S., at 11, n. 5. And, in
Michael Williams, we acknowledged that § 2254(e)(2) “raised
the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who were not diligent
in state-court proceedings,” 529 U. S., at 433, while reaf-
frming that prisoners are responsible for attorney error, see
id., at 432. Yet here, respondents claim that attorney error
alone permits a federal court to expand the federal habeas
record. That result makes factfnding more readily avail-
able than Keeney envisioned pre-AEDPA and ignores Mi-
chael Williams' admonition that “[c]ounsel's failure” to per-
form as a “diligent attorney” “triggers the opening clause
of § 2254(e)(2).” 529 U. S., at 439–440. We simply cannot
square respondents' proposed result with AEDPA or our
precedents.
Respondents propose that Congress may have actually in-
vited their judicial update. According to respondents, Mar-
tinez explained that Coleman left open whether ineffective
assistance of state postconviction counsel might one day be
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386 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
cause to forgive procedural default, at least in an “initial-
re
view collateral proceeding,” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 5,
“where state collateral review is the frst place a prisoner can
present a challenge to his conviction,” Coleman, 501 U. S.,
at 755. Respondents contend that Congress might have
enacted § 2254(e)(2) with the expectation that this Court one
day would open that door.
We do not agree. First, “[g]iven our frequent recognition
that AEDPA limited rather than expanded the availability
of habeas relief . . . it is implausible that, without saying so,”
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119 (2007), Congress intended
this Court to liberalize the availability of habeas relief gener-
ally, or access to federal factfnding specifcally. Second, in
Coleman, we “reiterate[d] that counsel's ineffectiveness will
constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional
violation,” and surmised that a hypothetical constitutional
right to initial-review postconviction counsel could give rise
to a corresponding claim for cause. 501 U. S., at 755; see
also Martinez, 566 U. S., at 8–9. Since then, however, we
have repeatedly reaffrmed that there is no constitutional
right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. See,
e. g., Davila, 582 U. S., at 529.
We also reject respondents' equitable rewrite of § 2254(e)
(2) because it lacks any principled limit. This Court's hold-
ing in Martinez addressed only one kind of claim: ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. See 566 U. S., at 9. We limited
our holding in that way to refect our “equitable judgment”
that trial-ineffective-assistance claims are uniquely impor-
tant. Id., at 12–13. Respondents propose that we similarly
should permit factual development under § 2254(e)(2) only for
trial-ineffective-assistance claims. But § 2254(e)(2) applies
whenever any state prisoner “failed to develop the factual
basis of a claim,” § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added), without limi-
tation to any specifc claim. There would be no reason to
limit respondents' reconstruction of § 2254(e)(2) as they pro-
pose. Unlike for procedural default, we lack equitable au-
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Opinion of the Court
thority to amend a statute to address only a subset of claims.
Thus,
if a prisoner were not “at fault” under § 2254(e)(2) sim-
ply because postconviction counsel provided ineffective as-
sistance, Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, the prisoner's
blamelessness necessarily would extend to any claim that
postconviction counsel negligently failed to develop. Not
even Martinez sweeps that broadly.
Finally, setting aside that we lack authority to amend
§ 2254(e)(2)'s clear text, Martinez itself cuts against respond-
ents' proposed result. Martinez was “unusually explicit
about the narrowness of our decision.” Trevino, 569 U. S.,
at 431 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). The Court left no doubt
that “[t]he rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited
circumstances recognized here.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 16
(emphasis added). “This aggressively limiting language was
not simply a customary nod to the truism that we decide only
the case before us.” Trevino, 569 U. S., at 432 (Roberts,
C. J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It
was instead an important part” of the Court's holding. Ibid.
In short, Martinez foreclosed any extension of its holding
beyond the “narrow exception” to procedural default at issue
in that case. 566 U. S., at 9.
To be sure, Martinez recognized that state prisoners often
need “evidence outside the trial record” to support their
trial-ineffective-assistance claims. Id., at 13. But Marti-
nez did not prescribe largely unbounded access to new evi-
dence whenever postconviction counsel is ineffective, as
respondents propose. Rather, Martinez recog nized our
overarching responsibility “to ensure that state-court judg-
ments are accorded the fnality and respect necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of
federalism.” Id., at 9. In particular, the Court explained
that its “holding . . . ought not to put a signifcant strain on
state resources,” because a State “faced with the question
whether there is cause for an apparent default . . . may an-
swer” that the defaulted claim “is wholly without factual
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388 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
support.” Id., at 15–16. That assurance has bite only if the
St
ate can rely on the state-court record. Otherwise, “fed-
eral habeas courts would routinely be required to hold evi-
dentiary hearings to determine” whether state postconvic-
tion counsel's factfnding fell short. Murray, 477 U. S.,
at 487.
The cases under review demonstrate the improper burden
imposed on the States when Martinez applies beyond its nar-
row scope. The sprawling evidentiary hearing in Jones is
particularly poignant. Ostensibly to assess cause and preju-
dice under Martinez, the District Court ordered a 7-day
hearing that included testimony from no fewer than 10 wit-
nesses, including defense trial counsel, defense postconvic-
tion counsel, the lead investigating detective, three forensic
pathologists, an emergency medicine and trauma specialist,
a biomechanics and functional human anatomy expert, and a
crime scene and bloodstain pattern analyst. See 943 F. 3d,
at 1219, 1225–1226. Of these witnesses, only one of the fo-
rensic pathologists and the lead detective testifed at the
original trial. See id., at 1223–1225. The remainder testi-
fed on virtually every disputed issue in the case, including
the timing of Rachel Gray's injuries and her cause of death.
See id., at 1226–1228. This wholesale relitigation of Jones'
guilt is plainly not what Martinez envisioned.
B
Martinez aside, respondents propose a second reading of
§ 2254(e)(2) that supposedly permits consideration of new evi-
dence in their habeas cases. Their interpretation proceeds
i n two steps. First, respondents arg ue that because
§ 2254(e)(2) bars only “an evidentiary hearing on the claim,”
a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether there is cause and prejudice. In respondents' view,
a so-called “Martinez hearing ” is not a “hearing on the
claim.” § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). Second, with that
evidence admitted for cause and prejudice, respondents
contend that the habeas court may then consider the new
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Opinion of the Court
evidence to evaluate the merits of the underlying ineffective-
a
ssistance claim. By considering already admitted evi-
dence, respondents reason, the habeas court is not holding a
“hearing ” that § 2254(e)(2) otherwise would prohibit. Ibid.
There are good reasons to doubt respondents' frst point,
but we need not address it because our precedent squarely
forecloses the second. In Ho ll and, we explained that
§ 2254(e)(2)'s “restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner
seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary
hearing.” 542 U. S., at 653 (emphasis deleted). The basis
for our decision was obvious: A contrary reading would have
countenanced an end-run around the statute. Federal ha-
beas courts could have accepted any new evidence so long as
they avoided labeling their intake of the evidence as a “hear-
ing.” Therefore, when a federal habeas court convenes an
evidentiary hearing for any purpose, or otherwise admits or
reviews new evidence for any purpose, it may not consider
that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner's de-
fau lted clai m unless the excepti ons i n § 2254(e)(2) are
satisfed.
Respondents all but concede that their argument amounts
to the same kind of evasion of § 2254(e)(2) that we rejected
in Holland. They nonetheless object that Holland renders
many Martinez hearings a nullity, because there is no point
in developing a record for cause and prejudice if a federal
court cannot later consider that evidence on the merits.
While we agree that any such Martinez hearing would serve
no purpose, that is a reason to dispense with Martinez hear-
ings altogether, not to set § 2254(e)(2) aside. Thus, if that
provision applies and the prisoner cannot satisfy its “strin-
gent requirements,” Michael Williams, 529 U. S., at 433, a
federal court may not hold an evidentiary hearing—or other-
wise consider new evidence—to assess cause and prejudice
under Martinez.
This follows from our decision in Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U. S. 465 (2007). There, we held that a federal court,
“[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, . . .
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390 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Opinion of the Court
must consider whether such a hearing could enable an appli-
cant
to prove . . . factual allegations [that] would entitle [him]
to federa l habeas relief. ” Id., at 474. “ Th is approach
makes eminent sense,” for if “district courts held evidentiary
hearings without frst asking whether the evidence the peti-
tioner seeks to present would satisfy AEDPA's demanding
standards, they would needlessly prolong federal habeas pro-
ceedings.” Cullen, 563 U. S., at 208–209 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Here, holding a Martinez hearing when the
prisoner cannot “satisfy AEDPA's demanding standards” in
§ 2254(e)(2) would “prolong federal habeas proceedings” with
no purpose. 563 U. S., at 209 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
And because a federal habeas court may never “needlessly
prolong ” a habeas case, ibid., particularly given the “essen-
tial” need to promote the fnality of state convictions, Calde-
ron, 523 U. S., at 555, a Martinez hearing is improper if the
newly developed evidence never would “entitle [the prisoner]
to federal habeas relief,” Schriro, 550 U. S., at 474.
C
Ultimately, respondents' proposed expansion of factfnding
in federal court, whether by Martinez or other means, con-
ficts with any appropriately limited federal habeas review.
In our dual-sovereign system, federal courts must afford un-
wavering respect to the centrality “of the trial of a criminal
case in state court.” Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 90. That is
the moment at which “[s]ociety's resources have been concen-
trated . . . in order to decide, within the limits of human
fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citi-
zens.” Ibid.; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 416
(1993); Davila, 582 U. S., at 531. Such intervention is also
an affront to the State and its citizens who returned a verdict
of guilt after considering the evidence before them. Federal
courts, years later, lack the competence and authority to re-
litigate a State's criminal case.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The dissent contends that we “overstat[e] the harm to
St
ates that would result from allowing ” prisoners to develop
evidence outside § 2254(e)(2)'s narrow exceptions. Post, at
407. Not so. Serial relitigation of fnal convictions under-
mines the fnality that “is essential to both the retributive
and deterrent functions of criminal law.” Calderon, 523
U. S., at 555; see also Engle, 456 U. S., at 126–127, and n. 32.
Further, broadly available habeas relief encourages prison-
ers to “ `sandba[g]' ” state courts by “select[ing] a few prom-
ising claims for airing ” on state postconviction review, “while
reserving others for federal habeas review” should state pro-
ceedings come up short. Murray, 477 U. S., at 492; see also
Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 89. State prisoners already have
a strong incentive to save claims for federal habeas proceed-
ings in order to avoid the highly deferential standard of re-
view that applies to claims properly raised in state court.
See § 2254(d); Harrington, 562 U. S., at 105. Permitting fed-
eral factfnding would encourage yet more federal litigation
of defaulted claims.
***
Because we have no warrant to impose any factfnding be-
yond § 2254(e)(2)'s narrow exceptions to AEDPA's “genera[l]
ba[r on] evidentiary hearings,” McQuiggin, 569 U. S., at 395,
we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This
Court has recognized that right as “a bedrock principle” that
constitutes the very “foundation for our adversary system”
of criminal justice. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1, 12 (2012).
Today, however, the Court hamstrings the federal courts' au-
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thority to safeguard that right. The Court's decision will
leave
many people who were convicted in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to face incarceration or even execution
without any meaningful chance to vindicate their right to
counsel.
In reaching its decision, the Court all but overrules two
recent precedents that recognized a critical exception to the
general rule that federal courts may not consider claims on
habeas review that were not raised in state court. Just 10
years ago, the Court held that a federal court may consider
a habeas petitioner's substantial claim of ineffective assist-
ance of trial counsel (a “trial-ineffectiveness” claim), even if
not presented in state court, if the State barred the peti-
tioner from asserting that claim until state postconviction
proceedings, and the petitioner's counsel in those proceed-
ings was also ineffective. See id., at 17; see also Trevino
v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413, 429 (2013). Martinez and Trevino
establish that such a petitioner is not at fault for any failure
to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court. Despite
these precedents, the Court today holds that such a peti-
tioner is nonetheless at fault for the ineffective assistance
of postconviction counsel in developing the evidence of trial
ineffectiveness in state court. The Court instead holds that
a petitioner in these circumstances, having received ineffec-
tive assistance of trial and postconviction counsel, is barred
from developing such evidence in federal court.
This decision is perverse. It is illogical: It makes no sense
to excuse a habeas petitioner's counsel's failure to raise a
claim altogether because of ineffective assistance in postcon-
viction proceedings, as Martinez and Trevino did, but to
fault the same petitioner for that postconviction counsel's
failure to develop evidence in support of the trial-ineffective-
ness claim. In so doing, the Court guts Martinez's and
Trevino's core reasoning. The Court also arrogates power
from Congress: The Court's analysis improperly reconfgures
the balance Congress struck in the Antiterrorism and Effec-
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) between state in-
terests
and individual constitutional rights.
By the Court's telling, its holding (however implausible) is
compelled by statute. Make no mistake. Neither AEDPA
nor this Court's precedents require this result. I respect-
fully dissent.
I
The majority sets forth the gruesome nature of the mur-
ders with which respondents were charged. Our Constitu-
tion insists, however, that no matter how heinous the crime,
any conviction must be secured respecting all constitutional
protections. The history of respondents' trials and their
state postconviction proceedings illustrates the breakdown
in the adversarial system caused by ineffective assistance of
counsel, a violation of the Sixth Amendment.
A
Respondent Barry Lee Jones was charged with the mur-
der of his girlfriend's 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. The
State argued that Rachel died as a result of an injury she
sustained while in Jones' care. Jones' trial counsel failed to
undertake even a cursory investigation and, as a result, did
not uncover readily available medical evidence that could
have shown that Rachel sustained her injuries when she was
not in Jones' care. Having heard none of this evidence, the
jury convicted Jones and the trial judge sentenced him to
death.
Jones fled for postconviction review in Arizona state
court. Under Arizona law, Jones was not permitted to
argue on direct appeal that his trial counsel rendered consti-
tutionally ineffective assistance; accordingly, state postcon-
viction review was his frst opportunity to raise his trial-
ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 39
P. 3d 525, 527 (2002). At this stage, however, Jones was met
with another egregious failure of counsel. Arizona state law
sets minimum qualifcations that attorneys must meet to be
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394 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
appointed in capital cases like Jones', but the Arizona Su-
preme
Court waived those requirements in Jones' case, and
the state court appointed postconviction counsel who lacked
those qualifcations. See Jones v. Ryan, 327 F. Supp. 3d
1157, 1214 (Ariz. 2018) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–4041
(2019)). Jones' new counsel conducted almost no investiga-
tion outside of the evidence in the trial record. In short,
Jones' postconviction counsel failed to investigate the ineffec-
tive assistance of Jones' trial counsel. Counsel moved for
the appointment of an investigator, but did so under the
wrong provision of Arizona law. The motion was denied.
Counsel ultimately fled a petition for postconviction relief
that failed to advance any argument that Jones' trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate the State's medical
evidence. Arizona courts denied the petition. See ante,
at 373–375.
Jones then sought federal habeas relief, at last represented
by competent counsel, and alleged that his trial counsel pro-
vided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to investi-
gate his case. The District Court held an evidentiary hear-
ing at which Jones presented evidence that the injuries to
Rachel could not have been inficted at the time the State
alleged that Jones was with her, and that this evidence would
have been readily available to Jones' trial and state postcon-
viction counsel, had they investigated the case. The District
Court concluded that Jones' postconviction counsel had ren-
dered ineffective assistance in failing to raise this claim in
state postconviction proceedings and therefore held that
Jones could raise it for the frst time in federal court under
Martinez. The District Court also relied on this evidence
to hold, on the merits, that Jones received ineffective assist-
ance at trial. The court found that there was a “reasonable
probability that the jury would not have unanimously con-
victed [Jones] of any of the counts” if Jones' trial counsel had
“adequately investigated and presented medical and other
expert testimony to rebut the State's theory” of Jones' guilt.
327 F. Supp. 3d, at 1211.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Arizona moved to stay the granting of the habeas writ by
arg
uing that 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2), a provision enacted as
part of AEDPA, barred the District Court from considering
on the merits the evidence that Jones developed to satisfy
Martinez's requirements. The District Court denied the
motion, and the Ninth Circuit affrmed in relevant part. Re-
lying on Martinez's recognition that “ `[c]laims of ineffective
assistance at trial often require investigative work,' ” the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Ҥ 2254(e)(2) does not prevent a
district court from considering new evidence, developed to
overcome a procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan,
when adjudicating the underlying claim on de novo review.”
943 F. 3d 1211, 1222 (2019) (quoting Martinez, 566 U. S.,
at 11).
B
Respondent David Ramirez was convicted for the capital
murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. At the sentenc-
ing phase, the state court appointed a psychologist to con-
duct a mental health evaluation. Ramirez's counsel failed to
provide the psychologist with evidence that Ramirez had an
intellectual disability and failed to develop a claim of intellec-
tual disability to present in mitigation against the imposition
of a death sentence and in support of the imposition of a
sentence of life without parole. Ramirez was sentenced to
death.
As in Jones' case, an Arizona state court appointed Rami-
rez counsel for his state postconviction claim. And as in
Jones' case, state postconviction proceedings were Ramirez's
frst opportunity to raise a claim of trial ineffectiveness.
Ramirez's postconviction attorney, however, did not conduct
any investigation beyond the existing trial record, despite
being aware of indications that Ramirez might have intellec-
tual disabilities, including that his mother drank when she
was pregnant with him and that he demonstrated develop-
mental delays as a child. Nor did Ramirez's postconviction
counsel argue that Ramirez's trial counsel provided ineffec-
tive assistance by failing to develop and present this mitigat-
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396 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ing evidence. Arizona courts denied Ramirez's postconvic-
ti
on petition.
Citing “ `concerns regarding the quality' ” of Ramirez's
prior counsel, a Federal District Court appointed the Ari-
zona Federal Public Defender to represent him in federal
habeas proceedings. Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F. 3d 1230, 1238
(CA9 2019). In his habeas petition, Ramirez raised a claim
concerning the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. In sup-
port of his claim, Ramirez submitted evidence from family
members, whom trial counsel and state postconviction coun-
sel had never contacted, revealing the depths of abuse and
neglect Ramirez experienced as a child and the life-long
manifestati ons of h is possible disability. The evidence
showed that Ramirez grew up eating on the foor and sleep-
ing on dirty mattresses in houses flthy with animal feces;
that Ramirez's mother would beat him with electrical cords;
and that Ramirez displayed multiple apparent developmental
delays, including “delayed walking, potty training, and
speech” and inability to maintain basic hygiene or to use
utensi ls to eat. Id., at 1239. In additi on, the cour t-
appointed psychologist who evaluated Ramirez during the
sentencing phase of trial averred to the habeas court that if
trial counsel had provided him with Ramirez's school records
and prior IQ scores, he would have thought they suggested
intellectual disability and insisted on more comprehensive
testing.
1
Finally, Ramirez's trial counsel submitted an aff-
davit stating that she had not been “prepared to handle `the
representation of someone as mentally disturbed as . . . Ra-
mirez' ” and explaining that the evidence from Ramirez's
1
This evidence would have been relevant for the jurors' penalty deliber-
ations. Arizona law requires the penalty phase jury to consider, in
deciding whether to impose a death sentence, certain “mitigating circum-
stances,” including the “defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–751(G)(1) (2020). The
Constitution guarantees convicted capital defendants the right to present
mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982).
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
family members, had she uncovered it in an investigation,
“
`would have changed the way [she] handled both [Ramirez's]
guilt phase and his sentencing phase.' ” Id., at 1240. In
light of this evidence, Ramirez sought an opportunity to
develop his trial-ineffectiveness claim further.
2
The D istr ic t Cour t denied rel ief on Ramirez's tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claim and declined to allow further eviden-
tiary development. On appeal, Arizona conceded that Rami-
rez's postconviction counsel performed deficiently. The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Ramirez
had satisfed the requirements of Martinez because postcon-
viction counsel had provided ineffective representation and
Ramirez's trial-ineffectiveness claim was substantial. The
Ninth Circuit directed the District Court to allow eviden-
tiary development of Ramirez's trial-ineffectiveness claim,
recognizing that he had been “precluded from such develop-
ment because of his post-conviction counsel's ineffective rep-
resentation.” 937 F. 3d, at 1248.
II
Martinez and Trevino afford habeas petitioners like Jones
and Ramirez the oppor tunity to br i ng cer t ai n tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claims for the frst time in federal court.
The question before the Court is whether Jones and Ramirez
can make good on that opportunity by developing evidence
in support of these claims, or whether AEDPA nevertheless
requires them to rely on the state-court records, constructed
by ineffective trial and postconviction counsel, because they
2
The District Court initially denied Ramirez's petition, and Ramirez ap-
pealed. While his appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, this Court
decided Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), and the Ninth Circuit re-
manded Ramirez's appeal to the District Court in light of that decision.
See App. 452–453. On remand, the District Court ordered supplemental
briefng, and Ramirez submitted affdavits from his family members and
trial counsel in support of his trial-ineffectiveness claim. See id., at 454–
455, 473–474.
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398 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
“failed to develop the factual basis of [the ineffective assist-
a
nce] claim[s] i n State cour t proceedings. ” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(e)(2).
Under this Court's precedents, the answer is clear. Mar-
tinez and Trevino establish that petitioners are not at fault
for any failure to raise their claims in state court in these
circumst ances. Other precedents hold that AEDPA's
§ 2254(e)(2)'s “failed to develop” language, too, incorporates a
threshold requirement that the petitioner be at fault for not
developing evidence. A petitioner cannot logically be fault-
less for not bringing a claim because of postconviction coun-
sel's ineffectiveness, yet at fault for not developing its evi-
dentiary basis for exactly the same reason.
A
This Court's precedents, culminating in Martinez and
Trevino, explain the circumstances under which habeas peti-
tioners are deemed accountable for their attorneys' failures
to present claims in state court. A petitioner who does not
properly present a claim in a state proceeding generally may
not raise the claim in federal court, because the claim has
been “procedurally defaulted.” See, e. g., Murray v. Car-
rier, 477 U. S. 478, 486 (1986).
A federal court, however, can excuse a procedural default
and permit a petitioner to raise a claim for the frst time in
federal court if the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for the
procedural default in state court and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Maples v.
Thomas, 565 U. S. 266, 280 (2012) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). This Court has held that “[c]ause
for a procedural default exists where something external to
the petitioner . . . that cannot fairly be attributed to him
impeded his efforts to comply with the State's procedural
r u le. ” Ib i d. ( inter na l quotation marks and a lterations
omitted).
As a general matter, attorney error does not constitute
cause to excuse procedural default because courts attribute
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
attorneys' errors to their clients. Coleman v. Thompson,
501
U. S. 722, 753 (1991). In certain situations, however, at-
torney error will instead “be seen as an external factor” and
therefore constitute cause. Id., at 754. In Maples, we held
that where an attorney abandoned his client without notice,
“principles of agency law and fundamental fairness” required
fnding cause to excuse a procedural default, as the petitioner
had been “disarmed by extraordinary circumstances quite
beyond his control.” 565 U. S., at 289. In Coleman, we ex-
plained that “[a]ttorney error that constitutes ineffective as-
sistance of counsel” similarly demonstrates cause to excuse
procedural default in the context of a direct appeal. 501
U. S., at 753–754. Coleman explained that error that “con-
stitutes a violation of petitioner's right to counsel . . . must
be seen as an external factor, i. e., `imputed to the State' ”
because the Sixth Amendment places the burden of guaran-
teeing effective assistance of counsel on the State. Id.,
at 754.
Coleman left unanswered the question whether ineffective
assistance of counsel at the postconviction stage, where de-
fendants generally do not have a constitutional right to coun-
sel, could also constitute cause to excuse default. See id., at
755. This question is critical in Arizona and other States
that do not allow defendants to raise trial-ineffectiveness
claims on direct appeal, where individuals are constitution-
ally entitled to effective counsel, and instead require them to
raise these claims for the frst time in collateral proceedings,
in which this Court has not recognized a constitutional right
to counsel.
Martinez, 566 U. S. 1, held that in these States, postconvic-
tion counsel's failure to raise a substantial trial-ineffectiveness
claim could constitute cause to excuse a procedural default.
The Court observed that where a state collateral proceeding
is the first ti me that a petiti oner can press a tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claim, the collateral proceeding is “the equiv-
alent of a prisoner's direct appeal,” and constitutes the peti-
tioner's “ `one and only appeal' ” as to that claim. Id., at 8,
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400 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
11 (quoting Coleman, 501 U. S., at 756). Because this result
was
occasioned by the State's “deliberat[e] cho[ice] to move
[such] claims outside of the direct-appeal process, where
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed,” the Court held that
the general attorney-attribution rule did not apply where
postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance, just
as it would not if appellate counsel on direct review had done
so. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13–14, 16. Instead, Martinez
held, for a habeas petitioner with a “substantial” underly-
ing trial-ineffectiveness claim who also has the misfortune
of being represented by ineffective postconviction counsel,
the fai lure of postconvicti on counsel to raise the tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claim is not properly attributable to the peti-
tioner. Id., at 14.
A year later, in Trevino, 569 U. S. 413, the Court reaf-
frmed and extended Martinez's core holding. Trevino held
that where a State does not offer “a meaningful opportunity
to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on
direct appeal,” a defendant whose collateral-review counsel
renders ineffective assistance has demonstrated cause to ex-
cuse the procedural default of his trial-ineffectiveness claim.
569 U. S., at 428.
3
B
There is no dispute here that respondents' tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claims clear the procedural default hurdle
under Martinez and Trevino. The question is whether a ha-
beas petitioner can be faultless for a procedural default
under Mar t inez and nonetheless barred by AEDPA's
§ 2254(e)(2) from seeking an evidentiary hearing in federal
court, subject to exceptions not applicable here, because the
3
While Martinez analyzed a state statutory regime that expressly re-
quired defendants to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim
on collateral review, Trevino confronted a state statutory regime that left
open the theoretical possibility of raising such a claim on direct appeal,
but made it “ `virtually impossible' ” for defendants to do so. 569 U. S.,
at 423.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
petitioner “failed to develop the factual basis of [the proce-
dura
lly defaulted] claim in State court proceedings.”
Precedent establishes that § 2254(e)(2) incorporates a
threshold, fault-based “fail[ure] to develop” standard that
must be understood in conjunction with the fault-based rea-
soning in Martinez. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420
(2000), this Court examined what it means to have “failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim” under § 2254(e)(2). The
Court concluded that this language imposes a fault-based
standard, meaning that it erects a bar only to those who bear
some responsibility for a lack of evidentiary development
in state-court proceedings. The Court acknowledged that
“fail” is “sometimes used in a neutral way, not importing
fault or want of diligence.” Id., at 431. As a matter of ordi-
nary meaning, however, the Court concluded that “fail” in
§ 2254(e)(2) connotes “some omission, fault, or negligence.”
Ibid. The Court explained that “a person is not at fault
when his diligent efforts to perform an act are thwarted” by
an external force. Id., at 432.
Williams found further support for its fault-based reading
of “failed to develop” in pre-AEDPA cases that foreshadowed
the language of § 2254(e)(2). Specifcally, Williams noted
the similarity between the text of § 2254(e)(2) and the lan-
guage of the Court's decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U. S. 1 (1992). The Williams Court reasoned that when
it enacted AEDPA, Congress had “raised the bar Keeney im-
posed on prisoners who were not diligent” (i. e., those who
were at fault) “in state-court proceedings.” 529 U. S., at 433
(emphasis added). At the same time, however, “the opening
clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifes Keeney's threshold standard of
diligence.” Id., at 434. Phrased differently, under AEDPA,
“[i]f there has been no lack of diligence at the relevant stages
in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not `failed to de-
velop' the facts under § 2254(e)(2)'s opening clause, and he
will be excused from showing compliance with the balance
of the subsection's requirements.” Id., at 437.
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402 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The reasoning of Martinez and Trevino applies with equal
force
to the threshold diligence/fault standard of Keeney,
Williams, and § 2254(e)(2). Under Williams, whether peti-
tioners who satisfy Martinez are nevertheless subject to
§ 2254(e)(2) turns on whether they were at fault for not devel-
oping evidence in support of their trial-ineffectiveness claims
in state postconviction proceedings. All agree that a habeas
petitioner is not at fault when the responsibility for an error
is properly imputed to the State or to some other external
factor. Martinez cases are among the rare ones in which
attorney error constitutes such an external factor. That is
because a State's “deliberat[e] cho[ice]” to move trial ineffec-
tiveness claims outside of direct appeal and into postconvic-
tion review “signifcantly diminishes prisoners' ability to fle
such claims.” Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13. There is nothing
nefarious about this choice, but it is “not without conse-
quences.” Ibid. Together, Martinez, Trevino, and Wil-
liams demonstrate that when a State both provides a crimi-
nal defendant with ineffective trial counsel and decides to
remove his trial-ineffectiveness claim from appellate review,
postconviction counsel's ineffectiveness cannot fairly be at-
tributed to the defendant, and he therefore has not “failed to
develop the factual basis of [his] claim.” § 2254(e)(2).
Any other reading hollows out Martinez and Trevino.
Mar t inez repeatedly recog ni zed that to prove a tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claim (or even to show that it is “substan-
tial”), habeas petitioners frequently must introduce evidence
outside of the trial record. See, e. g., 566 U. S., at 13
(“Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on evidence out-
side the trial record”). Ineffective-assistance claims fre-
quently turn on errors of omission: evidence that was not
obtained, witnesses that were not contacted, experts who
were not retained, or investigative leads that were not pur-
sued. Demonstrating that counsel failed to take each of
these measures by defnition requires evidence beyond the
trial record. See Trevino, 569 U. S., at 424 (observing that
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
“ `the inherent nature of most ineffective assistance' ” claims
means
that the “trial court record will often fail to `contai[n]
the information necessary to substantiate' the claim”); Brief
for Federal Defender Capital Habeas Units as Amici Curiae
4–6. Indeed, the very reason States like Arizona might
choose to reserve a trial-ineffectiveness claim for a collateral
proceeding is to allow development of the factual basis for
the claim. Martinez, 566 U. S., at 13. To hold a petitioner
at fault for not developing a factual basis because of postcon-
viction counsel's ineffectiveness in the Martinez context,
however, would be to eliminate altogether such eviden-
tiary development and doom many mer itor i ous tr ia l-
ineffectiveness claims that satisfy Martinez. Such a rule is
not only inconsistent with the reasoning of Martinez and
Trevino but renders those decisions meaningless in many, if
not most, cases.
C
Applying this interpretation of § 2254(e)(2) here makes
clear that Jones and Ramirez are not at fault for their attor-
neys' failures to develop the state-court record. In Jones'
case, the District Court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed,
that Jones satisfed the demanding requirements of Marti-
nez: Arizona appointed postconviction counsel who did not
meet the minimum qualifcations for appointment and who
failed to raise a substantial (indeed, meritorious) trial-
ineffectiveness claim. In Ramirez's case, too, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate Ramirez's upbringing (despite clear in-
dications of his disability) and for failing to raise or develop
a substantial claim of trial ineffectiveness. The lower courts
thus held that both respondents satisfed the demanding re-
quirements of Martinez, holdings that the Court does not
question.
By defnition, Jones and Ramirez are not at fault for their
state postconviction counsel's failures to develop evidence.
Jones and Ramirez acted diligently, but their attorneys' er-
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404 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
rors, paired with the State's choice of how to structure their
re
view proceedings, constituted external impediments. As
a result, Jones and Ramirez have not “failed to develop” the
factual bases of their claims, and AEDPA's § 2254(e)(2), prop-
erly interpreted, poses no bar to evidentiary development in
federal court.
III
Rejecting the teachings of Martinez and Trevino, the
Court adopts an irrati onal reading of § 2254(e)(2). The
Court begins with the uncontested proposition that, in the
ordinary case, a habeas petitioner “ `must bear the risk of
attorney error.' ” Ante, at 380 (quoting Coleman, 501 U. S.,
at 753). From there, the Court leaps to the conclusion that
a petitioner is at fault for not developing the evidentiary rec-
ord on a trial-ineffectiveness claim even if that lack of devel-
opment was the result of his postconviction counsel's ineffec-
tive assistance. Ante, at 381.
The Court's analysis rests on two fundamental errors.
First, the Court eviscerates Martinez and Trevino and mis-
characterizes other precedents. Second, the Court relies
upon its own mistaken understanding of AEDPA's policies
and the state interests at issue, recycling claims rejected by
the Martinez Court and ignoring the careful balance struck
by Congress. In doing so, the Court gives short shrift to
the egregious breakdowns of the adversarial system that oc-
curred in these cases, breakdowns of the type that federal
habeas review exists to correct.
A
The doctrinal consequence of the Court's distortion of
precedent is to render Martinez and Trevino dead letters in
the mine run of cases. As explained, those precedents are
premised on the understanding that a habeas petitioner is
not responsible for a postconviction attorney's ineffective
failure to assert a substantial trial-ineffectiveness claim in
States that do not offer petitioners a meaningful opportunity
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
to raise such claims on direct appeal. The Court, however,
does
not grapple with this logic on its own terms. Instead,
the Court limits Martinez and Trevino to their facts, empty-
ing them of all meaning in the ordinary case (where, as those
precedents explain, a trial-ineffectiveness claim will neces-
sarily rely on evidence beyond the trial record). Tellingly,
the Court relies on the dissent in Trevino to support its dis-
regard of these cases' reasoning. See ante, at 387.
The Court's analysis also rests on a misplaced view of Wil-
l i ams. The Court fixates on Will i ams' statement that
§ 2254(e)(2) “raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who
were not diligent in state-court proceedings.” 529 U. S., at
433; see ante, at 385. The Court emphasizes the frst part
of that statement wh ile ig nor ing its qua l ificati on: that
§ 2254(e)(2) raised the bar for “prisoners who were not dili-
gent.” In other words, it is undisputed that the “bar for
excusing a prisoner's failure to develop the state-court rec-
ord” is an onerous one, ante, at 381; the question is whether,
in this context, a habeas petitioner has failed to develop the
record in the frst place. Martinez and Trevino make clear
that habeas petitioners in Jones' and Ramirez's position do
not lack diligence and are not at fault for the failures of their
ineffective trial and postconviction counsel.
The Court further charges that respondents' interpreta-
tion of § 2254(e)(2) “lacks any principled limit.” Ante, at 386.
Here again, the Court resuscitates a complaint that pre-
viously was relegated to a dissent. See Martinez, 566 U. S.,
at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one really believes that
[the holding of Martinez] will remain limited to ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel cases”). The complaint is just as
unavailing now that it has captured a majority. Respond-
ents' interpretation only affects habeas petitioners raising
substantial trial-ineffectiveness claims in the subset of
States that limit such claims to postconviction review, just
as Martinez did. In that context, postconviction review is a
prisoner's “one and only appeal” of a trial-ineffectiveness
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406 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
claim, Coleman, 501 U. S., at 756 (internal quotation marks
omitted;
emphasis deleted), and the ineffective assistance of
counsel at that stage forecloses review of a crucially impor-
tant constitutional right. Any assertion that respondents'
interpretation of the statute would blow the door open to
myriad other claims is hyperbole that this Court, until today,
consistently has rejected.
Finally, the Court fnds it implausible that Congress would
have considered the threshold di l igence inquiry under
§ 2254(e)(2) to account for the Martinez context. Ante, at
385–386. But Congress legislated against the backdrop of
Coleman. Coleman, in turn, made clear (decades before
Martinez) that in certain circumstances where attorney
error could be “seen as an external factor, i. e., `imputed to
the State,' ” including the ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, the prisoner would not properly be deemed
at fault. Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754. Moreover, it is not
uncommon for Congress to adopt statutory language that in-
corporates an evolving judicial doctrine, see, e. g., Kimble v.
Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 461 (2015), and
there is no reason this Court should second-guess Congress'
choice to incorporate a judicially created diligence doctrine
here.
B
Much of the Court's opinion focuses not on the text of
§ 2254(e)(2), nor on the relevant precedents, but on what the
Court views as AEDPA's unyielding purpose: ensuring that
federal courts “afford unwavering respect” to state court
criminal proceedings. Ante, at 390; see also ante, at 375–
378, 387–388, 389–390. The Court seriously errs by suggest-
ing that AEDPA categorically prioritizes maximal deference
to state-court convictions over vindication of the constitu-
tional protections at the core of our adversarial system.
It is of course true that AEDPA's rules are designed to
“ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the fnality
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal pro-
ceedi
ngs within our system of federalism.” Martinez, 566
U. S., at 9. The enacting Congress, however, did not pursue
these aims at all costs. AEDPA does not render state judg-
ments unassailable, but strikes a balance between respecting
state-court judgments and preserving the necessary and
vital role federal courts play in “guard[ing] against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Har-
rington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Indeed, “ `Congress has recognized
that federal habeas corpus has a particularly important role
to play in promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition
of the death penalty.' ” Christeson v. Roper, 574 U. S. 373,
377 (2015) (per curiam). Absent that role, what this Court
regularly calls “the Great Writ” hardly would be worthy of
the label. See, e. g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649
(2010).
The Court today supplants the balance Congress struck
with its single-minded focus on fnality. In doing so, it over-
states the harm to States that would result from allowing
petitioners to develop facts in support of Martinez claims.
See ante, at 387. Importantly, Martinez applies only where
the underlying claim is one of trial ineffectiveness, and only
if a petitioner demonstrates that the claim is “substantial.”
566 U. S., at 14. The Court reaches to support its holding
by yet again repackaging a dissenter's warning, this time
that Martinez would “put a signifcant strain on state re-
sources.” Id., at 22 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Nearly a decade
of experience with Martinez, however, has proved this un-
founded prediction false. In a 9-year sample of three States
(Florida, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina), federal courts
adjudicated 1,200 habeas petitions raising Martinez claims.
See Brief for Habeas Scholars as Amici Curiae 7–8. These
courts held evidentiary hearings in less than two percent
of these cases. Ibid. The lower federal courts, in other
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408 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
words, are perfectly capable of policing Martinez's limits.
There
is no reason to expect that to change from an affrm-
ance here.
In the same vein, the Court bemoans the “sprawling evi-
dentiary hearing ” conducted by the District Court in Jones'
case. Ante, at 388. Of course, the scope of the District
Court's hearing (including evidence from medical experts, fo-
rensic experts, law enforcement personnel, and others) was
necessary only because trial counsel failed to present any of
that evidence during the guilt phase of Jones' capital case.
Far from constituting an inappropriate and “wholesale reliti-
gation of Jones's guilt,” ibid., the District Court's hearing
was wide-ranging precisely because the breakdown of the
adversarial system in Jones' case was so egregious.
The Court suggests that evidentiary hearings like Jones'
will “encourag[e] prisoners to ` “sandba[g]” ' state courts” by
strategically holding back claims from state postconviction
review to present them for the frst time in federal court.
Ante, at 391. That claim is odd, particularly in this context.
It is a State's decision to divert trial-ineffectiveness claims
from direct appeal to postconviction review, and then to pro-
vide ineffective postconviction counsel, that results in the
failure to raise or develop such claims before state courts.
No habeas petitioner or postconviction counsel could possibly
perceive a strategic beneft from failing to raise a meritori-
ous trial-ineffectiveness claim in an available forum. In-
deed, the whole thrust of Jones' and Ramirez's argument is
that their Sixth Amendment claims were so obvious that
their state postconviction attorneys were ineffective in fail-
ing to assert them.
On the other side of the ledger, the Court understates, or
ignores altogether, the gravity of the state systems' failures
in these two cases. To put it bluntly: Two men whose trial
attorneys did not provide even the bare minimum level of
representation required by the Constitution may be exe-
cuted because forces outside of their control prevented them

Cite as: 596 U. S. 366 (2022) 409
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from vindicating their constitutional right to counsel. It is
hard
to imagine a more “extreme malfunctio[n],” Harring-
ton, 562 U. S., at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted),
than the prejudicial deprivation of a right that constitutes
the “foundation for our adversary system,” Martinez, 566
U. S., at 12.
Nor will the damage be limited to these two cases. Even
before Martinez, this Court recognized that a trial record is
“often incomplete or inadequate” to demonstrate inadequate
assistance of counsel. Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S.
500, 505 (2003). A trial record “may contain no evidence
of alleged errors of omission,” like a failure suffciently to
investigate a case. Ibid. For a court to discern “whether
[any] alleged error was prejudicial,” too, it is obvious that
“additional factual development” may be required. Ibid.
The on-the-ground experience of capital habeas attorneys
confrms this commonsense notion. See Brief for Federal
Defender Capital Habeas Units as Amici Curiae 3–4. The
Court's decision thus reduces to rubble many habeas peti-
tioners' Sixth Amendment rights to the effective assistance
of counsel.
Contrary to the Court's account, the fundamental fairness
concerns that arise from this particular type of breakdown
are not unconditionally eclipsed by the need to accord fnality
and respect to state-court judgments. Ante, at 387. Final-
ity interests are at their apex when the “essential elements
of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were pres-
ent in the proceeding whose result is challenged.” Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984). The effective
assistance of counsel is one of those essential elements. See
Martinez, 566 U. S., at 12. When the effective assistance
of counsel is absent, leaving a severely diminished basis for
presuming fairness and accuracy, “fnality concerns are
somewhat weaker.” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 694. Neither
statute nor precedent supports the Court's assertion that the
virtues of fnality override fundamental fairness to such a
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410 SHINN v. MARTINEZ RAMIREZ
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
degree that meaningful review of life-or-death judgments
obt
ained through such deeply fawed proceedings should be
foreclosed.
Ultimately, the Court's decision prevents habeas petition-
ers in States like Arizona from receiving any guaranteed op-
portunity to develop the records necessary to enforce their
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
For the subset of these petitioners who receive ineffective
assistance both at trial and in state postconviction proceed-
ings, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee is now an empty one.
Many, if not most, individuals in this position will have no
recourse and no opportunity for relief. The responsibility
for this devastating outcome lies not with Congress, but with
this Court.
***
Text and precedent instruct that in States that limit
review of trial-ineffectiveness claims to postconviction pro-
ceedings, habeas petitioners who receive ineffective assist-
ance of both trial and postconviction counsel are not re-
sponsible for any failure to raise their substantial claim of
trial ineffectiveness, nor for any “fail[ure] to develop” evi-
dence in support of that claim under AEDPA's § 2254(e)(2).
By holding otherwise, the Court not only extinguishes the
central promise of Martinez and Trevino, but it makes illu-
sory the protections of the Sixth Amendment. I respect-
fully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None