Brown v. Davenport

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 118–158
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 21, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
118 OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
Syllabus
BROWN, ACTING WARDEN v. DAVENPORT
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 20–826. Argued October 5, 2021—Decided April 21, 2022
Ervine Davenport was convicted of frst-degree murder following a jury
trial where, at times, he sat shackled at a table with a “privacy screen.”
On appeal, he argued that his conviction should be set aside in light of
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U. S. 622, in which this Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause generally forbids shackling a
criminal defendant at trial absent “a special need.” Id., at 626. Find-
ing no “special need” articulated in the record, the Michigan Supreme
Court agreed that a Deck violation had occurred and remanded the case
to the trial court to determine under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18, whether the prosecution could establish that the Deck error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On remand, the trial court con-
ducted an evidentiary hearing at which jurors testifed that the shackles
had not affected their verdict and concluded that the State had carried
its burden. Mr. Davenport appealed again, and the Michigan Court of
Appeals affrmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court de-
clined review.
Mr. Davenport petitioned for federal habeas relief. The District
Court found relief unwarranted under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, which limits the power of federal courts to
issue habeas relief to state prisoners. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). A di-
vided Sixth Circuit panel reversed, declining to analyze the case under
AEDPA. Instead, the court held that its review was governed only by
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, which held that a state prisoner
seeking to challenge his conviction on the basis of a state court's Chap-
man error must show that the error had a “ `substantial and injurious
effect or infuence' ” on the trial's outcome, id., at 637. Persuaded that
Mr. Davenport could satisfy Brecht, the Sixth Circuit granted federal
habeas relief and ordered Michigan either to retry or release Mr. Daven-
port. This Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit confict about
the proper interaction between the tests found in Brecht and AEDPA.
Held: When a state court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner's
claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both
the test this Court outlined in Brecht and the one Congress prescribed
in AEDPA; the Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief to Mr. Dav-

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
119
Syllabus
enport based solely on its assessment that he could satisfy the Brecht
st
andard. Pp. 127–145.
(a) When Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision,
federal courts must follow it. In AEDPA, Congress instructed that a
federal court “shall not. . . gran[t]” relief with respect to a claim that
has been adjudicated on the merits in state court “unless” certain condi-
tions are met. § 2254(d). To be sure, the court below in this case was
required to ensure that petitioner carried his burden under the terms
of Brecht. But satisfying Brecht is only a necessary condition to habeas
relief here; AEDPA must also be satisfed. The Sixth Circuit erred in
holding otherwise. P. 127.
(b) Since the founding, Congress has authorized federal courts to
issue habeas writs to federal custodians, and since the Civil War, Con-
gress has extended that authority to include issuance of writs to state
custodians. All along, Congress's statutes used permissive rather than
mandatory language; federal courts enjoy the “power to” grant writs of
habeas corpus in certain circumstances. That structure persists today;
federal courts “may” grant habeas relief “as law and justice require.”
28 U. S. C. §§ 2241, 2243.
Under the traditional understanding of habeas corpus, a prisoner
could not usually use the writ to challenge a fnal judgment of conviction
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. But by 1953, this Court
had begun to depart from that understanding. In Brown v. Allen, 344
U. S. 443, 458, it held that a state-court judgment “is not res judicata”
in federal habeas proceedings with respect to a petitioner's federal con-
stitutional claims. After Brown, federal courts struggled with an ex-
ploding caseload of habeas petitions from state prisoners.
Eventually, this Court responded by devising new rules aimed at sep-
arating the meritorious needles from the growing haystack of habeas
petitions. The Court's decision in Brecht—which reasoned that Chap-
man's harmless-error rule for direct appeals was inappropriate for use
in federal habeas review of fnal state-court judgments, 507 U. S., at
633–634—was part of that effort. Brecht, like this Court's other equita-
ble doctrines restricting habeas relief, stems ultimately from the discre-
tion preserved by Congress's habeas statutes.
Congress later introduced its own reforms in AEDPA, instructing
that, if a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits,
a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief “unless” the state court's
decision was (1) “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of ” clearly
established federal law, as determined by the decisions of this Court, or
(2) based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” presented in
the state-court proceeding. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). AEDPA thus left in-

Page Proof Pending Publication
120 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Syllabus
tact the equitable discretion invested in federal courts by earlier federal
habeas
statutes. Pp. 127–134.
(c) Mr. Davenport's two arguments in defense of the Sixth Circuit's
decision lack merit. Pp. 135–141.
(1) Mr. Davenport argues that because the AEDPA inquiry repre-
sents a logical subset of the Brecht test, the Sixth Circuit necessarily
found that he satisfed AEDPA when he satisfed Brecht. That argu-
ment is mistaken. Proof of prejudice under Brecht does not equate to
a successful showing under AEDPA. The inquiries under Brecht and
AEDPA are different. Where AEDPA asks whether every fair-minded
jurist would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only
whether a federal habeas court itsel f harbors grave doubt about the
petitioner's verdict. The legal materials a court may consult when an-
swering each test also differ. Where AEDPA requires state-court deci-
sions to be measured against this Court's clearly established holdings,
Brecht invites analysis based on the whole body of law. Assuming that
the Sixth Circuit's analysis was enough to satisfy Brecht, it was not
enough to warrant eligibility for relief under AEDPA. Pp. 135–137.
(2) Mr. Davenport argues that this Court's precedents in Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, and Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257, require a ruling
in his favor. But the holding in neither case helps Mr. Davenport, and
neither case resolved the question now before the Court. Instead,
Mr. Davenport focuses on a brief passage from Fry, repeated in Ayala—
“it certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both tests
(AEDPA /Chapman and Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the
former,” 551 U. S., at 120—that he believes supports the theory that a
court may grant relief without applying AEDPA. It does not. In any
event, this Court has long stressed that “the language of an opinion is
not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with [the] language
of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341. The Court
will not override a lawful congressional command on the basis of curated
snippets extracted from decisions with no reason to pass on the argu-
ments Mr. Davenport presses here. Pp. 137–141.
(d) Even assuming that Mr. Davenport's claim can survive Brecht, he
cannot satisfy AEDPA. Mr. Davenport argues the Michigan Court of
Appeals' disposition of his shackling claim is contrary to, or an unreason-
able application of, this Court's decision in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S.
560. Holbrook rejected the defendant's claim that he was denied a fair
trial due to the prejudicial effect of supplemental courtroom security on
the jury. Id., at 562. The language in Holbrook Mr. Davenport high-
lights casts doubt only on attempts to assess trial prejudice based on
speculative testimony by prospective jurors. Nothing in Holbrook is
inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals' reliance on post-trial

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
121
Syllabus
testimony from actual jurors concerning the effect on deliberations of
secur
ity measures at Mr. Davenport's trial. Nor did the Michigan court
unreasonably apply Chapman when it found that the prosecution had
established Mr. Davenport's shackling was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. This Court cannot say that every fairminded jurist apply-
ing Chapman must reach a different conclusion. Similarly, the Court
cannot say that every fairminded court would have both identifed and
adopted Mr. Davenport's forfeited theory that his shackling might have
infuenced the jury toward a frst-degree, rather than second-degree,
murder conviction. Pp. 141–145.
964 F. 3d 448, reversed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor,
JJ., joined, post, p. 145.
Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General of Michigan, ar-
gued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were
Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, and Jared
Schultz, Assistant Attorney General.
Tasha J. Bahal argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Reuven Dashevsky and Catherine M.
A. Carroll.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ar-
kansas et al. by Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of Arkansas, Nicholas
J. Bronni, Solicitor General, Vincent M. Wagner, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Asher L. Steinberg, Assistant Solicitor General, by Dawn Cash, Acting
Attorney General of Oklahoma, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of
Alaska, Mark Brnovich of Arizona, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Todd
Rokita of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Daniel
Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Missis-
sippi, Eric S. Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Douglas
J. Peterson of Nebraska, Aaron Ford of Nevada, Dave Yost of Ohio, Josh
Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravns-
borg of South Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton
of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foun-
dation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton; and for Jona-
than F. Mitchell et al. by Taylor A. R. Meehan, Thomas R. McCarthy, and
Adam K. Mortara, pro se.
Page Proof Pending Publication

122 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Af
ter a state court determines that an error at trial did
not prejudice a criminal defendant, may a federal court grant
habeas relief based solely on its independent assessment of
the error's prejudicial effect under Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U. S. 619 (1993)? Or must a federal court also evaluate
the state court's decision under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)? The Sixth Cir-
cuit ruled that an individual who satisfes Brecht alone is
entitled to habeas relief. This was mistaken. When a state
court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner's claim, a
federal court cannot grant relief without frst applying both
the test this Court outlined in Brecht and the one Congress
prescribed in AEDPA.
I
A
One evening in 2007, Annette White attended a gathering
with Ervine Davenport. On the drive home, Mr. Davenport
killed Ms. White. At trial, the only questions concerned
why and how. Mr. Davenport claimed self-defense and testi-
fed to that effect. On his account, Ms. White grew angry
during the trip and tried to grab the steering wheel from
him while he was driving. Then she pulled out a box cutter
and cut his arm. Mr. Davenport responded by extending
one arm and pinning Ms. White against the passenger side
of the car, with his hand under her chin. Eventually, she
stopped struggling. On discovering that Ms. White was no
longer breathing, Mr. Davenport panicked and left her body
in a feld.
The prosecution offered a very different version of events.
It stressed that Ms. White was 5'2'' tall, 103 pounds, and had
a broken wrist, while Mr. Davenport was 6'5'' tall and
weighed nearly 300 pounds. The prosecution presented evi-
dence that Mr. Davenport had bragged to others before the
killing that, if he had a problem with someone, he would
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
123
Opinion of the Court
choke the person. Days before Ms. White's death, Mr. Dav-
enpor
t had done just that—strangling another woman until
she lost consciousness and urinated on herself. Nor, on the
prosecution's account, were Mr. Davenport's actions after
Ms. White's death consistent with his claim of self-defense.
Instead of contacting the police, he not only abandoned his
victim's body. He also fed the scene and later visited
Ms. White's home where he stole electronics and food. He
told a witness, too, that he “had to off ” Ms. White.
The prosecution offered additional proof. When police
questioned Mr. Davenport, he gave differing accounts and
i nitia l ly denied any i nvolvement in Ms. W h ite's death.
While authorities did locate a box cutter in the car, they did
not fnd it inside the cab of the vehicle but in the trunk and
untainted by blood. Also, a forensic pathologist testifed
that Ms. White died of manual strangulation. The patholo-
gist explained that a victim of strangulation may lose con-
sciousness after 30 seconds, but that death does not occur
until the victim is without air for at least four to fve minutes.
After Mr. Davenport testifed that he merely extended his
arm across Ms. White's neck to keep her from cutting him,
the forensic pathologist offered his view that this account
was not plausible. Ms. White's injuries, found on both sides
of her neck, were consistent with strangulation—but incon-
sistent with the application of broad force across the front of
her neck.
After a 7-day trial, a jury convicted Mr. Davenport of frst-
degree murder.
B
On direct appeal in state court, Mr. Davenport sought to
have his conviction set aside in light of Deck v. Missouri, 544
U. S. 622 (2005). In Deck, this Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause generally forbids
shackling a criminal defendant at trial absent “a special
need.” Id., at 626. Mr. Davenport noted that during his
trial (but not his testimony) offcials shackled one of his

124 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
hands, his waist, and his ankles. Those shackles may not
have
been visible to many in the courtroom because of a “pri-
vacy screen” around the table where Mr. Davenport sat.
But the trial court did not articulate on the record any spe-
cial need for its security measures.
Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the
trial court's actions violated Deck. At the same time, the
court sought to apply Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18
(1967). In Chapman, this Court held that a preserved claim
of constitutional error identifed on direct appeal does not
require reversal of a conviction if the prosecution can estab-
lish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., at 24. To answer Chapman's question, the Michigan Su-
preme Court remanded the case to the trial court with in-
structions to determine whether “the jury saw the defend-
ant's shackles” and, if so, “whether the prosecution can
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling
error did not contribute to the verdict against the defend-
ant.” People v. Davenport, 488 Mich. 1054, 794 N. W. 2d
616 (2011).
On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hear-
ing in which it heard from all 12 jurors. Five remembered
seeing Mr. Davenport's restraints; the remaining seven did
not. All 12 testifed that Mr. Davenport's shackles did not
enter into their deliberations or infuence their unanimous
verdict. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that
the State had carried its burden to show harmlessness be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Again, Mr. Davenport appealed. This time, Michigan's
appellate courts declined to disturb the judgment. For its
part, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that “the prosecu-
tion proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling
error did not affect the verdict.” People v. Davenport, 2012
WL 6217134, *3 (Dec. 13, 2012) (per curiam). In doing so,
the court relied on both the jurors' testimony and that “the
evidence at trial overwhelmingly established defendant's
guilt and belied his contention that he killed the 103-pound
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
125
Opinion of the Court
victim in self-defense, a theory that was explicitly disputed
by
expert medical testimony.” Id., at *2, n. 2. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court denied Mr. Davenport's request for dis-
cretionary review. People v. Davenport, 494 Mich. 875, 832
N. W. 2d 389, 390 (2013).
C
Mr. Davenport next sought relief in federal district court,
fling a habeas petition in the Western District of Michigan.
Under AEDPA, however, a federal court may disturb a fnal
state-court conviction in only narrow circumstances. As
relevant here, the statute provides that, when a state court
has already ruled on the merits of the habeas petitioner's
claim, he must show that decision was either (1) “contrary
to” or an “unreasonable application of ” clearly established
federal law, as determined by the decisions of this Court, or
(2) based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts”
presented i n the st ate-cour t proceedi ng. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d).
The District Court found relief unwarranted under this
standard. The Michigan state courts had ruled on the mer-
its of Mr. Davenport's claim of error. In doing so, they cor-
rectly identifed this Court's controlling harmless-error rule
from Chapman. And their conclusions involved neither an
unreasonable application of Chapman nor an unreasonable
determination of the facts. To the contrary, the District
Court agreed with a Magistrate Judge's assessment that the
state-court record contained no evidence “that the jurors
were infuenced” by his restraints and “overwhelming evi-
dence of [Mr. Davenport's] guilt.” Davenport v. MacLaren,
2016 WL 11262506, *4 (WD Mich., Nov. 7, 2016); see also
Davenport v. MacLaren, 2017 WL 4296808, *1–*2 (WD Mich.,
Sept. 26, 2017) (citing 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1)).
D
After that loss, Mr. Davenport appealed to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, where a div ided panel reversed. Da v enpo r t v.
MacLaren, 964 F. 3d 448 (2020).
Page Proof Pending Publication

126 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Unlike the District Court, the Sixth Circuit declined to
ana
lyze the case under AEDPA. Instead, it held, only this
Court's decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson governed its re-
view. Handed down before Congress adopted AEDPA,
Brecht sought to adapt Chapman's harmless-error rule, de-
veloped for cases on direct appellate review, for use in fed-
eral habeas proceedings. Brecht, 507 U. S., at 633–635.
Citing the need to afford appropriate respect to fnal state-
court decisions that have already endured direct appeal, in-
cluding potential review in this Court, Brecht effectively in-
verted Chapman's burden. 507 U. S., at 635. Rather than
require the prosecution to prove that a constitutional trial
error is harmless, Brecht held that a state prisoner seeking
to challenge his conviction in collateral federal proceedings
must show that the error had a “ `substantial and injurious
effect or infuence' ” on the outcome of his trial. Id., at 637.
Persuaded that Mr. Davenport could satisfy his burden
under Brecht, the panel majority ordered Michigan to retry
or release him promptly. 964 F. 3d, at 464–468.
Judge Readler dissented. He argued that Brecht and
AEDPA set forth independent tests, and that both must be
satisfed before habeas relief becomes permissible. In Judge
Readler's view, too, the District Court correctly rejected
Mr. Davenport's petition under AEDPA because the state
courts hearing his case had not acted contrary to, or unrea-
sonably applied, this Court's decisions. 964 F. 3d, at 469,
478.
The Sixth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 8
to 7. Davenport v. MacLaren, 975 F. 3d 537 (2020). Judges
Griffn and Thapar issued dissenting opinions. They ex-
pressed agreement with Judge Readler and observed that
the panel majority's decision conficted with those of other
circuits where petitioners are required to satisfy both Brecht
and AEDPA before becoming eligible for habeas relief. 975
F. 3d, at 552 (Thapar, J., dissenting) (citing decisions from the
Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). We granted
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
127
Opinion of the Court
Michigan's petition for certiorari to resolve the confict in the
federa
l courts of appeals about the proper interaction be-
tween these two tests. 593 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
When Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of
decision, federal courts must follow it. In AEDPA, Con-
gress announced such a rule. It instructed that a federal
court “shall not . . . gran[t]” relief with respect to a claim
that has been adjudicated on the merits in state court “un-
less” the state court's decision was (1) “contrary to” or an
“unreasonable application of ” clearly established federal law,
as determined by the decisions of this Court, or (2) based on
an “unreasonable determination of the facts” presented in
the state-court proceeding. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
The upshot of these directions for our case is straightfor-
ward. No one questions that a state court's harmless-error
determination qualifes as an adjudication on the merits
under AEDPA. See Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257, 269
(2015); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119 (2007); Early v.
Packer, 537 U. S. 3, 10–11 (2002) (per curiam). No one dis-
putes that such a decision exists here. Nor does Mr. Daven-
port pursue any claim to relief under § 2254(d)(2). From
this, it follows that he must satisfy § 2254(d)(1) to secure fed-
eral habeas relief. To be sure, where Brecht is implicated a
federal court must also ensure a habeas petitioner has car-
ried his burden under its terms before granting relief. But
in cases like ours satisfying Brecht is only a necessary, not a
suffcient, condition to relief. AEDPA too must be satisfed.
The Sixth Circuit erred in holding otherwise.
A
Some background helps explain this arrangement. From
the founding, Congress authorized federal courts to issue ha-
beas writs to federal custodians. § 14, 1 Stat. 81–82. After
the Civil War, Congress extended this authority, allowing
Page Proof Pending Publication

128 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
federal courts to issue habeas writs to state custodians as
wel
l. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. But
these statutes used permissive rather than mandatory lan-
guage; federal courts had the “power to” grant writs of ha-
beas corpus in certain circumstances. That same structure
lives on in contemporary statutes, which provide that federal
courts “may” grant habeas relief “as law and justice require.”
28 U. S. C. §§ 2241, 2243; Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 285
(1992) (plurality opinion).
Over the centuries, a number of writs of habeas corpus
evolved at common law to serve a number of different func-
tions. See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 97–98 (1807); 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 129–
131 (1768). But the most notable among these writs was
that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, often called the
“Great Writ.” Id., at 131. When English monarchs jailed
their subjects summar ily and indefinitely, common-law
courts employed the writ as a way to compel the crown to
explain its actions—and, if necessary, ensure adequate proc-
ess, such as a trial, before allowing any further detention.
See Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch.1, ¶¶ 5, 8 (1628). The
Great Writ was, in this way, no less than “the instrument
by which due process could be insisted upon.” Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
At the same time, even this writ had its limits. Usually,
a prisoner could not use it to challenge a fnal judgment of
conviction issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Wilm. 77, 88,
97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36 (K. B. 1758). If the point of the writ was
to ensure due process attended an individual's confnement,
a trial was generally considered proof he had received just
that. See, e. g., Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 142–143, 124
Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P. 1670).
This traditional understanding extended from England to
this country and persisted through much of our history.
Asked to apply the Nation's frst habeas statute to a duly
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
129
Opinion of the Court
convicted pr isoner, Ch ief Justice Marsha ll invoked the
common-law
rule that a judgment of conviction after trial
was “conclusive on all the world.” Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.
193, 202–203 (1830). Acknowledging that Congress had au-
thorized the Court to “inquire into the suffciency of ” the
cause of the petitioner's detention, Marshall asked rhetori-
cally, “is not that judgment in itself suffcient cause?” Id.,
at 202 (emphasis added); see also Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18,
21–22 (1876); P. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,
465–469 (1963) (Bator).
If the answer was nearly always yes, an important excep-
tion existed in both English and American law: A habeas
court could grant relief if the court of conviction lacked juris-
diction over the defendant or his offense. See Watkins, 3
Pet., at 202–203; Bator 471–472. A perceived “error in the
judgment or proceedings, under and by virtue of which the
party is imprisoned, constitute[d] no ground for” relief.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 375 (1880). Instead, a ha-
beas court could “examin[e] only the power and authority of
the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions.”
Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442, 448 (1910). To be sure,
the line between mere errors and jurisdictional defects was
not always a “luminous beacon” and it evolved over time.
Bator 470; Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). But this Court generally sought
to police the doctrine's boundaries in cases involving federal
and state prisoners alike.
1
1
See, e. g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23 (1879) (distinguishing between
“erroneous and voidable” and “absolutely void” judgments); see also
Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 445–447 (1925) (“[T]he judgment of state
courts in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely
because some right under the Constitution . . . is alleged to have been
denied to the person convicted”); Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 228–
229 (1914); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, 427–429 (1912); Markuson v.
Boucher, 175 U. S. 184, 187 (1899); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 106
(1898); In re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 482–483 (1897); Bergemann v. Backer,
Page Proof Pending Publication

130 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
By 1953, however, federal habeas practice began to take
on
a very different shape. That year in Brown v. Allen this
Court held that a state-court judgment “is not res judicata”
in federal habeas proceedings with respect to a petitioner's
federal constitutional claims. 344 U. S. 443, 458 (1953). A
state court may reject the petitioner's claims after a fair
hearing. No appellate court, including this one, may see ft
to reverse that fnal judgment. Yet still, Brown suggested,
a federal district court approaching the same case years later
should be free to decide de novo whether the state-court pro-
ceedings “resulted in a satisfactory conclusion” and to issue
habeas relief if that conclusion is found wanting. Id., at 463;
see also Wright, 505 U. S., at 287–288 (plurality opinion).
The traditional distinction between jurisdictional defects and
mere errors in adjudication no longer restrained federal ha-
beas courts. Full-blown constitutional error correction be-
came the order of the day.
This shift did not go unnoticed. Concurring only in the
result, Justice Jackson contended that the Court's decision
“trivializ[ed] . . . the writ” and was inconsistent with the
presumption of fnality that traditionally attached to crimi-
nal convictions. Brown, 344 U. S., at 536, 543. He warned,
too, that the Court's ruling threatened “haystack[s]” of new
habeas petitions—and that federal courts would struggle to
identify the meritorious “needle[s]” among them. Id., at
537. Over the ensuing years, that prediction proved pre-
157 U. S. 655, 658–659 (1895); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, 276 (1895);
In re Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291, 297 (1891); In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 286–287
(1891); Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 330–331 (1885); Ex parte Crouch,
112 U. S. 178, 180 (1884); Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 21 (1876); 1 H. Black,
Law of Judgments §§ 170, 254 (2d ed. 1902); S. Thompson, Void Sentences,
4 Crim. L. Mag. 797, 798–799 (1883). This Court eventually came to view
the “limited” class of void judgments to include “(i) convictions based on
assertedly unconstitutional statutes” and “(ii) detentions based upon an
allegedly illegal [successive] sentence.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
476, and n. 8 (1976) (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Ex parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); Bator 465–474).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
131
Opinion of the Court
scient: Federal courts struggled with an exploding caseload
of
habeas petitions from state prisoners. See, e. g., Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 274, n. 37 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (“In 1971 . . . state prisoners alone fled 7,949
petitions for habeas in federal district courts, over 14 times
the number fled when Mr. Justice Jackson voiced his misgiv-
ings”); B. Garrett & L. Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus
135–136 (2013) (documenting the rise of habeas flings by
state prisoners).
2
2
The dissent does not dispute that habeas courts refused to engage in
full-blown constitutional error correction at the time of the founding. But
it contends the practice became the norm by some (unspecifed) point in
the “mid-19th century.” Post, at 147 (opinion of Kagan, J.). The dis-
sent's revisionist account contradicts this Court's understanding. See,
e. g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 663 (1996) (“[I]t was not until well
into this century that this Court interpreted [habeas statutes] to allow a
fnal judgment of conviction in a state court to be collaterally attacked”);
Stone, 428 U. S., at 475 (in the 19th century, “[t]he writ was extended to
state prisoners[,] . . . [b]ut the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion to consideration of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted”);
id., at 476 (Brown was a “landmark decision” that “expanded” habeas);
Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 285 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“[B]efore
[Brown], . . . [a]bsent an alleged jurisdictional defect, habeas corpus would
not lie” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The dissent also claims to
understand Brown better than its contemporaries did, ignoring Justice
Jackson's critique as well as Professor Hart's observation that Brown
“manifestly broke new ground.” The Supreme Court 1958 Term—Fore-
word: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106 (1959); see
also Bator 499–501; W. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus
257–259 (1980); C. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Ha-
beas Review Reconsidered, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1079, 1166–1168 (1999);
1 B. Means, Postconviction Remedies §§ 4:4, 4:10 (2021). To be sure, the
“category of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas purposes”
“[g]radually . . . expand[ed]” over time. Wright, 505 U. S., at 285 (plural-
ity opinion). But that hardly proves the dissent's ambitious thesis that
habeas has, from the mid-19th century, functioned as plenary review for
any “constitutional harms” that might lurk behind state-court judgments.
Post, at 150. In fact, some of the 19th century cases the dissent cites did
not even involve challenges to a court's fnal judgment. See, e. g., Ex
parte Wells, 18 How. 307, 309 (1856) (challenge to custody under a Presi-

132 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
B
E
ventually, this Court responded to the post-Brown ha-
beas boom by devising new rules aimed at separating the
meritorious needles from the growing haystack. The ha-
beas statutes themselves provided the starting place for
these efforts. Recall that Congress invested federal courts
with discretion when it comes to supplying habeas relief—
providing that they “may” (not must) grant writs of habeas
corpus, and that they should do so only as “law and justice
require.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241, 2243. This language, the
Court recognized, serves as “authorization to adjust the
scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and prudential
considerations.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 278
(2008); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 716
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Foremost among those considerations is the States' “power-
ful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.” Calde-
ron v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Granting habeas relief to a state
prisoner “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched
by few exercises of federal judicial authority.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Exercising its equitable discretion, and informed by these
concerns, the Court began to develop doctrines “aimed at
returning the Great Writ closer to its historic offce.” Ed-
dential pardon that supplanted a court's sentence); Ex parte Royall, 117
U. S. 241, 252–253 (1886) (challenge to pretrial custody). Other cases, in-
volving convictions under unconstitutional statutes and successive sen-
tences, treated the judgments at issue as void. See, e. g., n. 1, supra; In
re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 173 (1890); In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 183–185
(1889). And, as we have seen, 19th-century decisions routinely sought to
police the jurisdictional line. Supra, at 129–130, and n. 1. In any event,
what we have said remains true: By 1953, habeas had slipped its tradi-
tional moorings.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
133
Opinion of the Court
wards, 593 U. S., at ––– (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The
Cour
t established procedural-default standards to prevent
petitioners from evading independent and adequate state-
law grounds sustaining their convictions. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86–87 (1977). The Court held that some
claims are not cognizable in federal habeas if state courts
provide a mechanism for review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.
465, 494–495 (1976). The Court also applied new rules to
prevent cycles of repetitive flings. McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U. S. 467, 486–493 (1991).
Brecht was part of this effort. In Chapman, this Court
held that, when a defendant demonstrates on direct appeal
that a constitutional error occurred at his trial, his conviction
cannot stand unless the government proves the error's harm-
lessness “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U. S., at 24. In
Brecht, the Court resolved that this same standard was inap-
propriate for use in federal habeas review of fnal state-court
judgments. 507 U. S., at 633–634. Instead, the Court rea-
soned, a state prisoner should not receive federal “habeas
relief based on trial error unless” he can show the error had a
“substantial and injurious effect or infuence” on the verdict.
Id., at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching
its judgment, the Court stressed that undoing a fnal state-
court judgment is an “extraordinary remedy,” reserved for
only “ `extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice sys-
tem' ” and different in kind from providing relief on direct
appeal. Id., at 633–634. To allow a federal habeas court to
set aside a conviction based on nothing more than “specula-
tion that the defendant was prejudiced by trial error” would
be to give short shrift to the State's “sovereign interest”
in its fnal judgment. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U. S. 141,
146 (1998) (per curiam). Much as the Court had “flled the
gaps of the habeas statute with respect to other matters,” it
found it “necessary to do so” again, in a by-now familiar exer-
cise of its equitable discretion. Brecht, 507 U. S., at 633.
Page Proof Pending Publication

134 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
C
Three
years after Brecht, and apparently fnding the
Court's equitable doctrines insuffcient, Congress introduced
its own reforms in AEDPA.
In many ways, the statute represented a sea change in
federal habeas law. As we have seen, Congress instructed
that, if a state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim
on the merits, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief
“unless” certain conditions are satisfed. § 2254(d). Some
of these conditions were new to the law at the time of their
adoption; all are demanding. See Richter, 562 U. S., at 102.
Still, Congress did not wash away everything that came
before. While AEDPA announced certain new conditions to
relief, it did not guarantee relief upon their satisfaction. In-
stead, Congress left intact the equitable discretion tradition-
ally invested in federal courts by preexisting habeas stat-
utes. So even a petitioner who prevails under AEDPA must
still today persuade a federal habeas court that “law and
justice require” relief. § 2243. See Fry, 551 U. S., at 119;
Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). And
whatever else those inquiries involve, they continue to re-
quire federal habeas courts to apply this Court's precedents
governing the appropriate exercise of equitable discretion—
including Brecht. See Banks, 536 U. S., at 272; Johnson v.
Acevedo, 572 F. 3d 398, 404 (CA7 2009); see also Edwards,
593 U. S., at –––, n. 5 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Today, then, a federal court must deny relief to a state
habeas petitioner who fails to satisfy either this Court's equi-
table precedents or AEDPA. But to grant relief, a court
must fnd that the petitioner has cleared both tests. The
Sixth Circuit erred when it held Mr. Davenport to just one
of these burdens. It granted relief after fnding for him on
Brecht. But it failed to ask the further question whether he
satisfed AEDPA. In doing so, the court disregarded Con-
gress's instruction that habeas relief “shall not be granted”
unless AEDPA's terms are satisfed. § 2254(d).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
135
Opinion of the Court
III
Mr
. Davenport advances two arguments—one logical, one
doctrinal—in defense of the Sixth Circuit's decision. We
consider them in turn.
A
Mr. Davenport frst suggests the Sixth Circuit's failure to
discuss AEDPA amounted to no more than a forgivable pec-
cadillo. On his account, the AEDPA inquiry represents a
logical subset of the Brecht test. So even though the Sixth
Circuit did not formally fnd that he satisfed AEDPA, it im-
plicitly did so when it found his case cleared Brecht.
This theory is mistaken. Proof of prejudice under Brecht
does not equate to a successful showing under AEDPA. In-
stead, the inquiries are “entirely different in kind.” J.
Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 Houston
L. Rev. 59, 113, n. 297 (2016) (emphasis deleted). They pose
courts with different questions to resolve and require courts
to answer those questions based on different legal materials.
Take the questions the two tests pose. When a state
court has applied Chapman, § 2254(d)(1) requires a habeas
petitioner to prove that the state court's decision was unrea-
sonable. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 181 (2011); Fry,
551 U. S., at 119. To accomplish that, a petitioner must per-
suade a federal court that no “fairminded juris[t]” could
reach the state court's conclusion under this Court's prece-
dents. Ayala, 576 U. S., at 269 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similarly, if a petitioner alleges the state court's
decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts” under § 2254(d)(2), it is not enough to show that “rea-
sonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the
fnding in question.” Brumfeld v. Cain, 576 U. S. 305, 314
(2015) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
By contrast, under Brecht a petitioner may prevail by per-
suading a federal court that it alone should harbor “grave
doubt”—not absolute certainty—about whether the trial
Page Proof Pending Publication

136 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
error affected the verdict's outcome. O'Neal v. McAninch,
513
U. S. 432, 435 (1995). In sum, where AEDPA asks
whether every fairminded jurist would agree that an error
was prejudicial, Brecht asks only whether a federal habeas
court itself harbors grave doubt about the petitioner's
verdict.
Next, consider the legal materials a court may consult
when applying the two tests. Section 2254(d)(1) limits ha-
beas relief to cases where a state-court decision contravenes
or unreasonably applies “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” It
is not enough that the state-court decision offends lower fed-
eral court precedents. See, e. g., Glebe v. Frost, 574 U. S. 21,
24 (2014) (per curiam). This Court's dicta cannot supply a
ground for relief. See, e. g., White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415,
419 (2014). Nor can holdings that speak only at a high level
of generality. See, e. g., Lopez v. Smith, 574 U. S. 1, 6 (2014)
(per curiam); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664
(2004). Under AEDPA too, “ [s]tate-court decisions are
measured against this Court's precedents as of `the time the
state court renders its decision' ” and cannot be held unrea-
sonable only in light of later decided cases. Pinholster, 563
U. S., at 182 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–
72 (2003)). None of these restrictions applies under Brecht.
There, a federal habeas court may consult and draw on the
whole body of law. So, for example, a petitioner might be
able to prevail under Brecht thanks to favorable circuit case
law but still lose under AEDPA because no comparable hold-
ing exists in this Court's precedents.
Today's case illustrates how these differences matter.
The Sixth Circuit granted relief to Mr. Davenport after con-
cluding that it harbored grave doubts about the jury's ver-
dict. It did not claim that every reasonable jurist would
share its doubts. Nor did it purport to hold that the Michi-
gan state courts had acted contrary to or unreasonably ap-
plied a decision of this Court. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
137
Opinion of the Court
said only that the state-court decisions in this case could not
be
reconciled with a roughly analogous precedent from the
Ninth Circuit. 964 F. 3d, at 467. Even assuming the Sixth
Circuit's analysis was enough to permit relief under Brecht,
none of its reasoning was enough to warrant relief under
AEDPA. Nor can any of this come as a surprise. As we
have seen, if AEDPA makes winning habeas relief more dif-
fcult, it is because Congress adopted the law to do just that.
3
B
Failing in his frst argument, Mr. Davenport offers an al-
ternative. Even if all we have said is true as a matter of
logic, he suggests, we should rule for him anyway as a mat-
ter of precedent thanks to Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, and
Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257.
Here, too, we cannot agree. Start with Fry. Because no
state court had ruled on the merits of the petitioner's Chap-
man claim, everyone in Fry agreed that AEDPA did not
apply to his federal habeas petition. Seeking to leverage
3
The dissent attempts to paper over the differences between Brecht and
AEDPA in two strokes. First, it suggests that asking Brecht's question
whether one jurist harbors grave doubt about the prejudicial effect of a
trial error is effectively the same thing as asking AEDPA's question
whether any fairminded jurist could reach the Chapman decision a state
court did. Post, at 156–157. Second, to work its way around the fact
that Brecht and AEDPA require courts to consult different bodies of law,
the dissent argues for the creation of a new version of Brecht in which
habeas courts must “confn[e themselves] to using AEDPA-approved mate-
rials.” Post, at 153. Call it Brecht 2.0. Neither move succeeds. Brecht
and AEDPA ask analytically distinct questions—and AEDPA's test alone
is statutorily mandated. Until today, too, Brecht has permitted courts to
consult the full body of law. Besides, if the dissent really believes Brecht
and AEDPA always lead to the same result, it is unclear why it objects so
strongly to our judgment today. The dissent does not quibble with how
we apply AEDPA to Mr. Davenport's case. See Part IV, in fra. And,
manifestly, the Court of Appeals did not confne itself to consulting
“AEDPA-approved materials,” but relied in part on circuit case law to
overturn Mr. Davenport's conviction. See supra, at 136 and this page.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
138 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
that fact to his further advantage, the petitioner argued that
Congress
implicitly swept away this Court's equitable ha-
beas precedents when it adopted AEDPA. 551 U. S., at 119.
The upshot? On the petitioner's view, this meant a federal
habeas court had to apply Chapman (not Brecht or AEDPA)
to his case. Ultimately, the Court rejected this argument,
confrming instead that our equitable precedents remain ap-
plicable “whether or not” AEDPA applies. 551 U. S., at 121.
None of this answers the question we face today. Where
the petitioner in Fry sought to suggest that AEDPA ren-
dered Brecht a dead letter, the petitioner here argues nearly
the opposite. And the Court's ruling in Fry is, if anything,
affrmatively unhelpful to Mr. Davenport. Not only did Fry
hold that this Court's equitable precedents like Brecht coex-
ist side-by-side with AEDPA, it expressly recognized that
AEDPA “sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas
relief . . . not an entitlement to it.” 551 U. S., at 119–
120. Rather than suggest Brecht duplicates AEDPA or vice
versa, Fry thus stands as a reminder that the two tests im-
pose analytically distinct preconditions to relief.
Mr. Davenport offers no persuasive reply. Instead, he in-
vites us to overlook all of this and train our attention to a
brief passage at the end of Fry's relevant analysis. There,
he notes, the Court said this: “[I]t certainly makes no sense
to require formal application of both tests (AEDPA /Chap-
man and Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the
former.” 551 U. S., at 120. On Mr. Davenport's telling,
whatever else Fry did or said, this language means it
adopted his theory that a court applying Brecht necessarily
applies AEDPA along the way.
We do not see how we might read so much into so little.
Doubtless, there are some cases “when” Brecht does “sub-
sum[e]” AEDPA, just as Fry says. 551 U. S., at 120. As
we have seen, and as was the case in Fry, if a state court
has not adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits,
AEDPA falls away. Likewise, if a federal court determines

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
139
Opinion of the Court
that a habeas petition fails because of Brecht, there is
no
need to prolong the matter by “formal[ly] appl[ying]”
AEDPA as well. 551 U. S., at 120. But none of this means,
and Fry never said, that a Brecht inquiry always subsumes
an AEDPA inquiry. Nor did Fry even have reason to con-
sider the relationship between Brecht and AEDPA in cases
like ours—where a state court has issued a decision on the
merits of the petitioner's claim and AEDPA does apply. To
the extent Fry had anything to say about that scenario, all
it said was consistent with what we say today: In such cases,
the Court recognized, relief “may not be granted unless
the state court's adjudication” was “unreasonable” under
AEDPA. 551 U. S., at 119.
4
That leaves Davis v. Ayala, where a similar story unfolds.
There, the California Supreme Court did rule on the merits
of the petitioner's claim: It determined that any federal con-
stitutional errors in his trial-court proceedings were harm-
less under Chapman. Ayala, 576 U. S., at 263–264. In
later federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit applied
Brecht, found prejudice, and granted relief without pausing
to consider AEDPA directly. Ayala v. Wong, 756 F. 3d 656,
674 (CA9 2014). Instead, it asserted, much as Mr. Daven-
port does, that a favorable fnding for a petitioner under
4
As it must, the dissent concedes that Fry addressed arguments “differ-
[ent] from [Mr.] Davenport's.” Post, at 154. Even so, the dissent latches
onto Fry's passing description of AEDPA as “ `more liberal' ” than Brecht
and its statement that the latter “ `subsumes' ” the former. Post, at 146,
154, 155, 156. For reasons we have discussed, however, this dicta does
not transform Fry into a ruling that habeas courts must grant relief upon
satisfaction of Brecht without evaluating the state court's judgment under
AEDPA. But there is still another problem with the dissent's attempt to
invoke Fry as support for its position. Remember, the dissent's claim
that Brecht duplicates AEDPA depends on a premise wholly alien to the
Fry Court—a new rule (Brecht 2.0) requiring courts applying Brecht to
consult only “AEDPA-approved materials.” See n. 3, supra. The dis-
sent's argument thus boils down to an assertion that we should today
rewrite one precedent (Brecht) and then attribute clairvoyance about our
revisions to another past Court (Fry).
Page Proof Pending Publication

140 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Brecht necessarily answers AEDPA's distinct inquiry. 756
F
. 3d, at 674, n. 13. In the end, however, this Court re-
versed. We held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Brecht
and that a proper Brecht analysis precluded relief. Along
the way, we indicated that the petitioner could not prove
eligibility for relief under AEDPA's demanding standard
either.
With nothing in this holding to help him, Mr. Davenport
again asks us to focus on a carefully curated snippet. Bor-
rowing language from Fry, Ayala observed that “a prisoner
who seeks federal habeas corpus relief must satisfy Brecht,
and if the state court adjudicated his claim on the merits, the
Brecht test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA.”
Ayala, 576 U. S., at 270 (citing Fry, 551 U. S., at 119–120).
Again, though, it is hard to see how this much might carry
the day. When a federal court determines, as we did in
Ayala, that a petitioner has failed to carry his burden under
Brecht, that conclusion subsumes (or perhaps more precisely,
obviates the need for) a separate AEDPA inquiry; relief
must be denied. But none of this resolves the distinct ques-
tion we face today—whether a petitioner who can satisfy
Brecht also necessarily secures a victory under AEDPA.
The Ayala Court had no occasion to address that question.
And to the extent it spoke to it, it spoke much as Fry had,
taking pains to reject any suggestion “that Brecht some-
how abrogates the limitation on federal habeas relief that
§ 2254(d) plainly sets out.” Ayala, 576 U. S., at 268.
5
5
If Fry doesn't seal a win for Mr. Davenport, the dissent argues, Ayala
does the job on its own. Post, at 154–156. But Ayala does no more than
Fry to compel the dissent's Brecht 2.0 approach. To the contrary, the
Ayala Court reversed a lower court that had overturned a conviction
under Brecht “ `without regard for the state court's harmlessness determi-
nation.' ” Ayala, 756 F. 3d, at 674. It issued a stern reminder that “the
highly deferential AEDPA standard applies.” Ayala, 576 U. S., at 269.
And its harmless-error analysis deferred repeatedly to the state court's
fndings. Id., at 271–285. These are not the actions of a Court that saw
Brecht as a stand-alone gateway to habeas relief.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
141
Opinion of the Court
In the end, Mr. Davenport's appeals to Fry and Ayala
(
echoed by the dissent) rest on a misunderstanding of stare
decisis. At its best, that doctrine is a call for judicial humil-
ity. It is a reminder to afford careful consideration to the
work of our forbearers, their experience, and their wisdom.
But respect for past judgments also means respecting their
limits. This Court has long stressed that “the language of
an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were
dealing with [the] language of a statute.” Reiter v. Sono-
tone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979). Yet that is exactly
what Mr. Davenport and the dissent ask of us. They would
have us override a lawful congressional command—that no
federal habeas relief should issue “unless” AEDPA's applica-
ble conditions are satisfed. § 2254(d). And they would
have us do so on the basis of a handful of sentences extracted
from decisions that had no reason to pass on the argument
Mr. Davenport presents today. We neither expect nor hope
that our successors will comb these pages for stray com-
ments and stretch them beyond their context—all to justify
an outcome inconsistent with this Court's reasoning and
judgments and with Congress's instructions. Such an ex-
alted view of this Court's every passing remark would turn
stare decisis from a tool of judicial humility into one of judi-
cial hubris.
IV
Having concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred by failing
to apply AEDPA before granting habeas relief, one question
remains: Assuming Mr. Davenport can satisfy Brecht as the
Sixth Circuit held, can he satisfy AEDPA? The answer
helps illustrate how the two inquiries are distinct and why a
federal court must answer both before overturning a state-
court conviction.
Under the statute's terms, we assess the reasonableness
of the “last state-court adjudication on the merits of ” the
petitioner's claim. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 40 (2011).
In this case, that is the decision of the Michigan Court of

142 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Appeals. To be sure, after that intermediate court ruled
agai
nst Mr. Davenport he sought discretionary review in the
Michigan Supreme Court, which denied his request. See
494 Mich., at 875, 832 N. W. 2d, at 390. But a discretionary
denial of leave to appeal does not typically entail an “adjudi-
cation” of the underlying claim's “merits” under AEDPA's
terms. Instead, it usually represents “a decision by the
state supreme court not to hear the appeal—that is, not to
decide at all.” Greene, 565 U. S., at 40; cf. Ylst v. Nunne-
maker, 501 U. S. 797, 805–806 (1991) (“[T]he discretionary
denial of review on direct appeal by the California Supreme
Court is not even a `judgment' ”).
In this respect, the Michigan Supreme Court follows a fa-
miliar practice. “The denial of a writ of certiorari” in this
Court “imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of
the case.” United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923).
And the Michigan Supreme Court has long described its de-
nials of applications for leave to appeal in the same terms.
See, e. g., Malooly v. York Heating & Ventilating Corp., 270
Mich. 240, 246–247, 258 N. W. 622, 624 (1935); see also Mich.
Ct. Rules 7.303(B)(1), 7.305(B)(1)–(3) (2021). In the past,
too, this Court has treated lower Michigan court decisions
as the relevant AEDPA adjudication despite discretionary
denials of review by the State Supreme Court. Woods v.
Donald, 575 U. S. 312, 314–315, 317 (2015) (per curiam); Burt
v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 20 (2013); Lafer v. Cooper, 566 U. S.
156, 161, 173 (2012).
Turning to the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals,
Mr. Davenport principally argues that it was contrary to or
an unreasonable application of this Court's decision in Hol-
brook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986). But it is hard to see
how that could be the case. For one thing, Holbrook was a
decision about whether a constitutional trial error occurred
at all, not whether the alleged error was prejudicial. For
another, Holbrook rejected the defendant's claim that he
“was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when . . .
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
143
Opinion of the Court
the customary courtroom security force was supplemented
by
four uniformed state troopers sitting in the frst row of
the spectator's section.” Id., at 562. Nothing in that analy-
sis is inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals' dispo-
sition of Mr. Davenport's shackling claim.
Unable to make use of Holbrook's holding, Mr. Davenport
once more asks us to turn our attention elsewhere. In par-
ticular, he notes that the trial court in Holbrook asked poten-
tial jurors at the outset of trial whether the presence of state
troopers would affect their ability to consider fairly the de-
fendant's case; they said no. This Court indicated that such
questions and answers cannot alone “dispositive[ly]” resolve
the question whether security measures prejudice a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. Id., at 570. Instead, the Court
reasoned that “jurors will not necessarily be fully conscious
of the effect [such measures] will have on their attitude to-
ward the accused. This will be especially true when jurors
are questioned at the very beginning of the proceedings; at
that point, they can only speculate on how they will feel after
being exposed to a practice daily over the course of a long
trial.” Ibid. Mr. Davenport highlights that the Court in
Deck favorably quoted some of these passages too. 544
U. S., at 635.
Even bearing all this in mind, however, we cannot see how
the Michigan Court of Appeals acted contrary to or unrea-
sonably applied clearly established federal law. The Michi-
gan court found the shackling in Mr. Davenport's case harm-
less for two reasons—both because of the “overwhelmin[g]”
evidence against him, and because jurors testifed that his
shackling did not affect their verdict. 2012 WL 6217134, at
*1–*2, and n. 2. Holbrook does not compel a different ruling
on the frst score. It addressed a different evidentiary rec-
ord and affrmed the defendant's conviction.
Nor does the decision compel a different ruling on the sec-
ond score. Holbrook cast doubt only on attempts to assess
prejudice based on testimony from prospective jurors specu-

144 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
lating about how the security measures might affect their
percepti
ons over the course of an upcoming trial. Nothing
in the decision purported to forbid courts from considering
post-trial testimony about how trial security measures actu-
ally affected juror deliberations. Nor may this or any
federal court use an AEDPA case as an opportunity to pass
on the wisdom of extending old precedents in new ways.
AEDPA permits relief only when a state court acts contrary
to or unreasonably applies this Court's preexisting and
clearly established rules. See, e. g., Marshall v. Rodgers,
569 U. S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam); Woodall, 572 U. S., at
424–426; Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6.
As a backup, Mr. Davenport suggests that the Michigan
Court of Appeals committed an independent error by unrea-
sonably applying Chapman. But Chapman merely an-
nounced the default burden of proof for evaluating constitu-
tional errors on direct appeal: The prosecution must prove
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U. S., at 24.
And this Court has repeatedly explained that, when it comes
to AEDPA, “the more general the [federal] rule[,] . . . the
more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in
case-by-case determinations” before their decisions can be
fairly labeled unreasonable. Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. 766,
776 (2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The case before us does not come close to exceeding that
leeway. The Michigan Court of Appeals properly identifed
the controlling standard. 2012 WL 6217134, at *1. It then
proceeded to fnd that the prosecution had established
Mr. Davenport's shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt in light of the jurors' testimony and the “overwhelm-
in[g]” evidence that “established defendant's guilt and belied
his contention that he killed the 103 pound victim in self-
defense, a theory that was explicitly disputed by expert med-
ical testimony.” Id., at *1–*2, and n. 2. Even if some fair-
minded jurist applying Chapman could reach a different
conclusion, we cannot say that every fairminded jurist must.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
145
Kagan, J., dissenting
Finally, in a variation on his Chapman argument, Mr. Dav-
enpor
t faults the Michigan Court of Appeals for unreason-
ably focusing on a “false choice between frst-degree murder
and self-defense.” Brief for Respondent 45. In his view,
the state court improperly ignored the possibility that
Mr. Davenport's shackling might have infuenced the jury
toward a conviction for frst-degree murder rather than
second-degree murder. But Mr. Davenport never presented
this theory to the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Brief
for Appellant in People v. Davenport, No. 306868, pp. 22–24
(arguing only that Mr. Davenport's shackling infuenced ju-
rors' receptiveness to his self-defense theory). Nor does it
directly respond to what the state court called the “over-
whelmin[g]” record evidence he committed murder in the
frst degree. In these circumstances we cannot say that
every fairminded court would have both identifed and
adopted Mr. Davenport's forfeited theory.
*
Even assuming Mr. Davenport met his burden under
Brecht, he cannot do so under AEDPA. And a federal court
cannot grant habeas relief unless a state prisoner like
Mr. Davenport satisfes both this Court's equitable prece-
dents and Congress's statute. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
Twice in recent years, this Court has addressed how a fed-
eral habeas court is to evaluate whether a state trial error
was harmless. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119–120
(2007); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257, 267–270 (2015). And
twice, we have made clear that the habeas court need apply
only the standard prescribed in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U. S. 619 (1993); it need not also run through the test set out
Page Proof Pending Publication

146 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDP
A). That is because, we have both times explained,
the Brecht standard “obviously subsumes” the “more liberal”
AEDPA one: If a defendant meets the former, he will “neces-
sarily” meet the latter too. Fry, 551 U. S., at 120; Ayala,
576 U. S., at 270.
Today, the Court discards those crystal-clear statements,
subscribed to on each occasion by every Justice. The major-
ity reverses the Court of Appeals for following our prior
guidance, allowing the use of the Brecht test alone. And
in declaring Brecht insuffcient, the majority consigns future
habeas courts to a regimen of make-work. Now those
courts will have to jump through AEDPA's hoops as well,
even though that extra analysis will never lead to a different
result. I respectfully dissent from that pointless demand.
I
Because the majority begins with some law-chambers his-
tory, see ante, at 127–131, I do too—though fair warning: My
discussion is no more relevant than the majority's to the
issue before us. Not surprisingly, neither of the parties to
this small and legally mundane case thought it a suitable
occasion for a from-Blackstone-onward theory of habeas
practice. Yet the majority, unprompted, embarks on that
project, perhaps hoping that the seeds it sows now will yield
more succulent fruit in cases to come. In the majority's
story, post-conviction habeas relief was all but unavailable
until the mid-20th century—when in an instant the Court in
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), upended the rules.
That account repeats the views expressed in a recent concur-
rence, authored by the same Justice as today delivers the
majority opinion. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S.
–––, ––– – ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id., at –––
(Habeas historically “provided no recourse for a prisoner
confned pursuant to a fnal judgment of conviction”). But
the theory, in its fundamentals, is wrong. Federal courts
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
147
Kagan, J., dissenting
long before Brown extended habeas relief to prisoners held
i
n violation of the Constitution—even after a fnal conviction.
This Court started reviewing post-conviction constitu-
tional claims under Congress's frst grant of habeas author-
ity, included in the Judiciary Act of 1789. That provision,
applying only to federal prisoners, did not specifcally pro-
vide for collateral review of constitutional claims. See Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81–82 (enabling federal courts
to grant habeas writs to “inquir[e] into the cause of [a federal
prisoner's] commitment”). But even without explicit per-
mission, the Court in the mid-19th century invoked the ha-
beas law to adjudicate those claims—including some from
petitioners already convicted and sentenced. See 1 R.
Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 2.4[d][i], p. 51 (7th ed. 2020). In Ex parte Wells,
18 How. 307 (1856), for example, only the dissent thought
that the fact of a conviction and sentence precluded granting
habeas relief (as today's opinion says was the frm rule).
See id., at 330 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (asserting that habeas
could not aid a person “imprisoned under a [circuit court's]
criminal sentence”). The majority, ignoring that objection,
scrutinized the merits of the claim in detail before deciding
that no constitutional violation had occurred and the appli-
cant should remain in prison. Id., at 315; see id., at 309–
315. And in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), the Court
(again acting under the original habeas law) went further: It
granted relief to a convicted prisoner after fnding a violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court explained that it
was carrying out a “sacred duty” in declaring that the pris-
oner was being held “without authority, and [that] he should
therefore be discharged.” Id., at 178.
When Congress amended the Judiciary Act after the Civil
War, the scope of federal habeas review—including over
post-conviction claims—grew far larger. The text of the
amendment (similar to current law) gave federal courts ex-
pansive power: “to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases

Page Proof Pending Publication
148 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty” in
v
iolation of the Federal Constitution. Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
14 Stat. 385; see 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3). And “any per-
son” in “all cases” meant just that: State prisoners, not just
federal ones, could now apply for habeas relief. Those state
cases of course involved separate sovereigns, acting under
their own laws. But even in that sphere, the Court soon
decided that the federal judiciary's authority extended to
hear i ng constituti ona l cha l lenges to fi na l conv ic ti ons.
Under the new statute, the Court explained, “a single [fed-
eral] judge on habeas corpus” could free “a prisoner, after
conviction in a State court,” upon fnding him unconstitution-
ally restrained. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 253 (1886).
Or as held in another decision, a “party [was] entitled to a
[writ of ] habeas corpus,” even after his case “had gone to
conviction and sentence,” when the state court “ha[d] no con-
stitutional authority or power to condemn” him. In re Niel-
sen, 131 U. S. 176, 184 (1889). A leading treatise of the time
summarized the state of the law: A federal court “may, on
habeas corpus, release one who is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the constitution of the United States, though held
under the criminal process of a state court, and either before
or after judgment.” W. Church, Writ of Habeas Corpus
§ 84, p. 117 (2d ed. 1893).
In line with that view, this Court granted habeas relief, on
an assortment of constitutional grounds, to both federal and
state prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.
The Court granted post-conviction relief to protect habeas
applicants' rights to a grand jury indictment, to a jury trial,
to assistance of counsel, and against self-incrimination. See,
e. g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 425–426, 429 (1885); Cal-
lan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 547–548, 556–557 (1888); Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 552, 585–586 (1892); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 467–469 (1938). The Court
granted post-conviction relief for violations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Ex Post

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
149
Kagan, J., dissenting
Facto Clause. See, e. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
373
–374 (1886); Nielsen, 131 U. S., at 190–191; In re Medley,
134 U. S. 160, 170–173 (1890). And as due process rights
expanded in the frst half of the 20th century, the Court held
post-conviction habeas relief proper for those claims too.
See, e. g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 90–92 (1923);
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104–105 (1942) (per cu-
riam); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 683–684 (1948).
The modern Court has repeatedly acknowledged that his-
tory. “[O]ver the years,” the Court explained (referencing
most of the cases cited above), “the writ of habeas corpus
evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any
confnement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental
law.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 485 (1973). Or
again: Citing Wells and Lange (among others), the Court de-
scribed how “judicial decisions [had] expand[ed] the avail-
ability of habeas relief ” to include challenges to fnal convic-
tions. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 79 (1977). Or
once more: The Court cited a string of 19th- and early 20th-
century cases to illustrate how habeas had expanded to rem-
edy “convictions obtained under an unconstitutional statute”
or “without adequate procedural protections for the defend-
ant.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 478 (1991); see also
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 317–318 (1995) (citing Mc-
Cleskey and Wainwright and noting the “broadening of the
scope of the writ” to “encompass review of constitutional
error” in criminal proceedings).
The majority tries to cram the many habeas decisions bely-
ing its position into a narrow jurisdictional “exception,” ante,
at 129—but its effort does no more than reveal the peril of
looking at history through a 21st-century lens. In the ma-
jority's view, a habeas court could grant relief only “if the
court of conviction lacked jurisdiction,” not if it committed
“errors in adjudication.” Ante, at 129, 130. But some of the
decisions the majority must contend with made no mention
at all of the convicting (or sentencing) court's jurisdiction.
Page Proof Pending Publication

150 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
See, e. g., Wells, 18 How., at 308–315; Yick Wo, 118 U. S.,
at
365–374. And those that did so often used the word to
mean something different from what it does today. The con-
cept of “jurisdictional defects” (ante, at 129) could at that
time include—rather than contrast with—constitutional er-
rors of the kind described above.
1
As one legal historian
puts the point: The jurisdictional inquiry was then (though
of course not now) often “merits based.” A. Woolhandler,
Demodeling Habeas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 575, 630 (1993). That
is why this Court could say in the late 19th century that
a court of conviction has jurisdiction only “when, in taking
custody of the accused, and in its modes of procedure to
the determination of the question of his guilt or innocence,
and in rendering judgment, the court keeps within the limi-
tations prescribed by the law.” In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242,
257 (1894). Or why a roughly contemporaneous habeas trea-
tise could state: “[N]o court has jurisdiction to imprison a
person or detain him in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion.” 1 W. Bailey, Law of Habeas Corpus and Special Rem-
edies § 25, p. 67 (1913). So the majority's supposedly narrow
jurisdictional exception in fact allowed expansive relief:
From the mid-1800s on, federal courts granted habeas writs
to prisoners, federal and state alike, who on the way to con-
viction or sentence had suffered serious constitutional
harms.
2
1
See, e. g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 429 (1885) (the lack of a grand
jury indictment meant that the court had “exceeded its jurisdiction”); Cal-
lan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 547, 557 (1888) (a denial of the jury trial right
rendered a conviction “void” and “without jurisdiction”); In re Nielsen,
131 U. S. 176, 185 (1889) (a sentence violating the Double Jeopardy Clause
was “beyond the jurisdiction of the court,” because “an express provision
of the Constitution[ ] bounds and limits all jurisdiction”); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 (1938) (the denial of the right to counsel is a
“jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction”).
2
A forthcoming article makes much the same point in addressing the
concurrence that anticipated today's historical musings. See supra, at
146–147; Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
151
Kagan, J., dissenting
Contrary to the majority, then, our decision in Brown built
on
decades and decades of history. No doubt, Brown was
signifcant—a landmark of a kind—because it “made ex-
plicit,” and delineated in precise style, the broad scope of
federal habeas. Wainwright, 433 U. S., at 79. But the deci-
sion, as the leading modern treatise on habeas explains,
“worked no revolution.” 1 Hertz & Liebman § 2.4[d][viii], at
73. Rather, the principles that Brown “nicely catalogue[d]”
were already “long established, to anyone with the patience
to search them out from among the literally hundreds of indi-
vidually unimportant cases in which they lay dispersed.” 1
Hertz & Liebman, at 73–75.
3
concurring). Professor Jonathan Siegel writes that the concurrence “re-
lies on quotations” invoking a court's jurisdiction “without fully acknowl-
edging the meaning that they had in their original context. [It] incor-
rectly ascribes to these quotations the meaning they might have if a court
wrote them today. One must, however, always remember that `the past
is a foreign country; they do things differently there.' Historical state-
ments must be understood in their historical context.” Habeas, History,
and Hermeneutics, 64 Ariz. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (draft, at 4), https://
ssrn.com/abstract/3899955 (footnote omitted).
3
A mountain of other scholarship confrms the treatise's account. See,
e. g., J. Siegel, 64 Ariz. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (draft, at 26) (“[T]he
distance between nineteenth century habeas practices and those approved
in Brown v. Allen is much smaller than Justice Gorsuch is prepared to
acknowledge”); J. Wert, Habeas Corpus in America: The Politics of Individ-
ual Rights 142 (2011) (Brown “merely formaliz[ed] earlier rules”); E.
Freedman, Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty 139
(2001) (“[O]ne can characterize Brown as a watershed only by shutting
one's eyes” to developments “under way long before the case was de-
cided”); A. Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N. Y. L. S.
J. Human Rights 375, 433 (1998) (“Far from constituting a sea change,
[Brown] merely modernized the language of the law”); S. Saltzburg, Ha-
beas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 Ohio St. L. J. 367,
382 (1983) (“Was [Brown] a departure from prior holdings? The only fair
answer is `no' ”); G. Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitiga-
tion, 16 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 579, 644 (1982) (Brown “did not
break any new ground” respecting “the scope of federal habeas review of
state court determinations of federal law”).

152 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
So the majority should not be so sure that it really wishes
judicia
lly developed habeas doctrines to “return[ ] the Great
Writ closer to its historic offce,” ante, at 132—at least if that
offce refers to the longstanding practice of the federal courts
under a statute broadly authorizing habeas writs. The ma-
jority might then fnd itself bound to grant habeas relief,
with more regularity and less compunction than it would
prefer, to address violations of convicted prisoners' constitu-
tional rights.
But let's be frank: My view of the history, just like the
majority's, has precious little—no, has nothing—to do with
resolving this case. Although it is more entertaining to play
amateur historian, it is past time to put in some work on the
technical issue before us: what standard(s) a habeas court
should use to decide whether a state trial court's constitu-
tional error was harmless.
II
Except that little work is in truth necessary—because we
have already, and unanimously, resolved that question twice
before.
To see how (and why) we have done so, frst consider the
two possible answers. As the majority frames it, the choice
is between (1) applying the Brecht standard alone (as Ervine
Davenport wants) and (2) applying both Brecht and AEDPA
(as the State desires). See ante, at 122, 134. (Trust me: I
will in a moment set out what those standards are.) That
formulation of the choice is appropriate as shorthand; indeed,
I will use it myself. But it remains an oversimplifcation.
For in arguing that the Brecht test suffces, Davenport does
not contend that a federal habeas court may simply ignore
AEDPA. Although the majority veils the point, Davenport
readily acknowledges that a court must always comply with
AEDPA's limitation on “the legal materials a court may con-
sult” and “draw on” to justify habeas relief. Ante, at 136;
see Brief for Respondent 16–17 (explaining that a court's
Brecht analysis is suffcient only if it relies exclusively “on
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
153
Kagan, J., dissenting
the legal and factual materials allowed” under AEDPA).
Al
l Davenport claims is that if the habeas court confnes it-
self to using AEDPA-approved materials, then it need only
fnd the Brecht standard met to grant relief.
4
That means
(here, fnally, is the Brecht standard) the court has to fnd
“actual prejudice”—more specifcally, that there is “grave
doubt” about whether an error had a “substantial and injuri-
ous effect or infuence” on a verdict. Brecht, 507 U. S., at
637; O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432, 436 (1995). But no
more is required: The court need not, Davenport says, sepa-
rately apply the AEDPA test. Which means it does not
have to analyze (here is the AEDPA test) whether the state
appellate court acted “unreasonabl[y],” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d),
when it decided, under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18
(1967), that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Is Davenport right?
This Court (frst) made clear in Fry v. Pliler that he is.
The question there was whether a federal habeas court
should assess harmless error under Brecht (rather than
Chapman) even when the state court had failed to make the
harmlessness fnding Chapman requires on direct review.
Justice Scalia, speaking for a unanimous Court, explained
why the habeas court should still apply Brecht: Use of the
defendant-friendly Chapman test on habeas would “under-
min[e] the States' interest in [the] fnality” of convictions.
551 U. S., at 117 (quoting Brecht, 507 U. S., at 637). But
Fry raised an objection. In recently enacting AEDPA, he
claimed, Congress had abolished the Brecht test—replacing
4
That view does not, as the majority recurrently claims, require “rewrit-
[ing]” Brecht to make it “Brecht 2.0.” Ante, at 139, n. 4; see ante, at 137,
n. 3, 140, n. 5. The question of what materials a court may consider is of
course different from the question of what standard the court must apply
in deciding to grant habeas relief. Brecht addresses the legal standard
alone. So Brecht could not possibly affect AEDPA's materials require-
ment—and Davenport properly recognizes as much. But Brecht could
obviate the need to apply AEDPA's standard—and as I'll describe, this
Court has not once but twice made clear that it does.
Page Proof Pending Publication

154 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
it with a new AEDPA/Chapman standard of review. That
arg
ument, of course, differs from Davenport's. See ante, at
138. But the Court's reply, in describing the relationship
between Brecht and AEDPA, answers today's question:
“Given our frequent recognition that AEDPA limited
rather than expanded the availability of habeas relief, it
is implausible that, without saying so, AEDPA replaced
the Brecht standard of actual prejudice with the more
liberal AEDPA /Chapman standard which requires only
that the state court's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt determination be unreasonable. That said, it cer-
tainly makes no sense to require formal application of
both tests (AEDPA /Chapman and Brecht) when the lat-
ter obviously subsumes the former.” 551 U. S., at 119–
120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
That passage is clear on its face, as Justice Scalia's opinions
typically are. But because the majority pretends it does not
say what it says, see ante, at 138–139, it is worth going over.
The key points are two. First, the Brecht standard is
harder for a prisoner to meet—i. e., less “liberal”—than the
AEDPA /Chapman standard. And second, because that is
so—because Brecht so “obviously subsumes” AEDPA /Chap-
man—it “makes no sense” to require a court to formally
apply both. Just apply Brecht and be done with it. Not in
“some cases,” and not in select “scenario[s],” as today's ma-
jority imagines. Ante, at 138–139. But as a rule. Because
if a prisoner can satisfy Brecht, he can “obviously” satisfy
AEDPA /Chapman, and courts should not have to do need-
less work.
But we need not take Fry's word for the point, because
the Court in Davis v. Ayala reaffrmed everything Justice
Scalia said. In Ayala, a federal court held on habeas that a
state trial error caused actual prejudice under Brecht. This
Court disagreed and reversed, but it made clear that the
Brecht test governed. See 576 U. S., at 267 (“In a collateral
proceeding, the test is” Brecht's “actual prejudice” standard).
After describing that standard (with stress on its strictness),
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
155
Kagan, J., dissenting
the Court addressed its relation to AEDPA. Brecht in no
way
“abrogates” AEDPA, the Court noted. 576 U. S., at
268. But the Court explained—several times over—that
Brecht makes AEDPA functionally immaterial on matters
relating to harmlessness. “In Fry,” the Ayala Court began,
“we held that the Brecht standard `subsumes' the require-
ments that [AEDPA] imposes when a federal habeas peti-
tioner contests a state court's determination that a constitu-
tional error was harmless under Chapman.” 576 U. S., at
268. Because that is so, Ayala continued (again quoting
Fry), “a federal habeas court need not `formal[ly]' apply both
Brecht and `AEDPA /Chapman.' ” 576 U. S., at 268 (alter-
ation in original). And if that were not clear enough, the
Court reprised: “In sum, a prisoner who seeks federal habeas
corpus relief must satisfy Brecht, and if the state court adju-
dicated his claim on the merits, the Brecht test subsumes the
limitations imposed by AEDPA.” Id., at 270. But still, the
Court was not done. In turning to whether the error at
issue had caused Ayala harm, the Court noted that he “nec-
essarily” would not satisfy Brecht if he had failed to satisfy
AEDPA /Chapman—which is the fipside of saying he neces-
sarily would satisfy AEDPA /Chapman if he had satisfed
Brecht. 576 U. S., at 270. Both are a function, once again,
of Brecht “obviously subsum[ing]” AEDPA /Chapman.
5
Today's majority contorts Ayala, too, beyond recognition.
The majority insists that only a “carefully curated snippet”
of that decision—one sentence, in fact—cuts against today's
holding. Ante, at 140. But see all the quotations above.
Ayala repeats the key point favoring Davenport—that a
court applying Brecht need not separately apply AEDPA—
multiple times over a span of more than three pages (with
the rest of that section providing supportive analysis). See
5
Only the Ayala Court's application of Brecht provoked a dissenting
opinion. The dissent explained that its disagreement did “not stem from
[the Court's] discussion of the applicable standard of review”—i. e., the
Brecht standard alone—“which simply restates the holding of Fry.” 576
U. S., at 291 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

156 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
576 U. S., at 267–270. Similarly, the majority asserts that
the
word “subsumes,” as introduced in Fry and echoed
in Ayala, does not really mean subsumes—which is to say,
fully “encompass[es] as” a “component element.” Merriam-
Webster 's Col leg iate D ic ti onary 1246 (11th ed. 2005).
Rather, when the greatest wordsmith in modern Supreme
Court history used the term to describe the relationship be-
tween two legal tests, he really meant (“more precisely”
meant (!), ante, at 140) that they merely overlapped—so that
sometimes a person meeting one test necessarily meets the
other, but then again, sometimes not. If all this shows “re-
spect for past judgments,” as the majority declares, ibid.,
then that phrase too has an unconventional meaning. What
Ayala held, adhering to Fry, was that anytime a habeas peti-
tioner satisfes Brecht, he of necessity satisfes AEDPA /
Chapman. And because that is so, a habeas court need not
apply both. I hate to assign homework to readers of Su-
preme Court opinions, but if you don't know what to make
of the majority's and my contrasting descriptions of Fry and
Ayala: well, just go read them.
The majority departs from those two decisions because it
disagrees with what they said. The straightforward basis
of Fry and Ayala, as just described, is that the AEDPA /
Chapman test is “more liberal” than the Brecht test—i. e.,
easier for the habeas petitioner to meet. Fry, 551 U. S., at
120. (That is why, Fry explained, the Congress enacting
AEDPA—intent as it was on limiting habeas—could not
have meant to replace Brecht.) The majority here asserts
that this view of the two tests is just not true. Its theory
goes: Whereas AEDPA asks whether “every fairminded ju-
rist” would fnd the requisite prejudice, Brecht asks only
whether “a federal habeas court itself ” would do so. Ante,
at 136 (emphasis in original).
But that description tells only part of the story—and not
the most important part. Consider a fuller description of
what a habeas court addressing the prejudicial effect of an
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 596 U. S. 118 (2022)
157
Kagan, J., dissenting
error asks under each standard. See supra, at 152–153.
Apply
ing AEDPA, the court asks whether the state court
acted “unreasonabl[y]” in fnding (under Chapman) that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—meaning
that there is no “reasonable possibility” it “might have con-
tributed to the conviction.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d); Chapman,
386 U. S., at 23–24. Applying Brecht, the court instead asks
whether the error was “actual[ly] prejudic[ial]”—meaning
that there is, at a minimum, “grave doubt” about whether an
error had a “substantial and injurious effect or infuence” on
a verdict. Brecht, 507 U. S., at 637; O'Neal, 513 U. S., at
435–436. The majority is quite right to note that AEDPA's
language of reasonableness directs a court to think about
how all fairminded jurists would approach a question, while
Brecht tells a court to decide a question for itself. Cf. ante,
at 137, n. 3 (somehow still asserting that I “paper over th[is]
difference[ ]”). But what the majority obscures is that those
two questions are starkly different. A court doing AEDPA
puts a reasonableness overlay on the Chapman question; a
court doing Brecht of course asks the Brecht question. And
the Chapman question—see just above—is far easier for a
defendant to prevail on. Accord, ante, at 133. (That is why
the Brecht test was created—to better protect the fnality of
convictions on habeas. See Brecht, 507 U. S., at 637–638.)
So much easier, indeed, that Fry thought it self-evident (“ob-
vious”) that even with the AEDPA overlay, the Chapman
inquiry would require the release of more prisoners. Fry,
551 U. S., at 120.
The relationship between Brecht and AEDPA /Chapman
means that today's holding will make no difference to habeas
outcomes. Consider a court that has found the Brecht test
satisfed: It has, at the least, “grave doubt” about the error
affecting the verdict. Will that same court say that a rea-
sonable jurist could fnd no such effect beyond a reasonable
doubt—that the jurist could deny there was even a “reason-
able possibility” of the error mattering? The answer is no.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
158 BROWN
v. DAVENPORT
Kagan, J., dissenting
And that is not just what our precedents say. It is also what
the
real world shows. Several Circuits formerly followed
the rule the majority announces today: Habeas courts there
could not grant relief before separately applying Brecht and
AEDPA /Chapman. Yet neither the majority nor the State
has come up with a single case (nor have I) in which a court
held that a petitioner satisfed Brecht but not AEDPA /
Chapman. Which for all the reasons Fry, Ayala, and I
have given is no wonder. Apply Brecht alone or apply both
Brecht and AEDPA: The same people will, and will not, re-
ceive habeas relief.
6
All today's holding does going forward is compel habeas
courts, and the parties before them, to spin their wheels.
All it does is what Fry observed “certainly makes no sense”:
require “formal application of [two] tests” when only one—
Brecht—matters. 551 U. S., at 120. Of course, it is not the
worst thing in the world to have to do unnecessary work of
this kind; parties and courts alike will fnd ways to limit the
ineffciencies involved. But really, why should they have to?
Our prior decisions got the question here right. The courts
that have followed their instructions did everything needed.
Better, by far, to have left it at that.
6
The decision here does not show otherwise, contra the majority's claim
that it “illustrates” how today's apply-both-tests directive “matter[s].”
Ante, at 136. The only way that claim could be true is if the majority
believed Davenport's claim passes the Brecht test (and yet fails AEDPA /
Chapman, as it holds). But the majority believes nothing of the sort.
The majority merely indulges the “assum[ption]” that the Sixth Circuit
could have found Brecht satisfed. Ante, at 137, 145. And the majority's
analysis shows how far-fetched it thinks that assumption is. Though
under the banner of AEDPA, the majority disagrees at every turn with
the Sixth Circuit's reasons for granting relief under Brecht—both the
Sixth Circuit's assessment of the record and its reading of this Court's
precedent. See ante, at 141–145. No one could read today's opinion and
think the majority harbors “grave doubt” that the trial error here affected
the verdict.

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None