Badgerow v. Walters

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–35
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 31, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2021
BADGEROW v. WALTERS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 20–1143. Argued November 2, 2021—Decided March 31, 2022
The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a party to an arbitration agree-
ment to petition a federal court for various forms of relief. But the
Act's authorization of such petitions does not itself create the subject-
matter jurisdiction necessary for a federal court to resolve them.
Rather, the federal court must have an “independent jurisdictional
basis” to do so. Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S.
576, 582. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, this Court assessed
whether there was a jurisdictional basis to decide an FAA Section 4
petition to compel arbitration by means of examining the parties' under-
lying dispute. The Court reasoned that specifc language in Section 4
instructed a federal court to “look through” the petition to the “underly-
ing substantive controversy.” Id., at 62. If the dispute underlying a
Section 4 petition falls within the court's jurisdiction—for example, by
presenting a federal question—then the court may rule on the petition
to compel arbitration.
In this case, the question presented is whether that same “look-
through” approach to jurisdiction applies to applications to confrm or
vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. Petitioner
Denise Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against her em-
ployer's principals (collectively, Walters), alleging that she was unlaw-
fully terminated. After arbitrators dismissed Badgerow's claims, she
fled suit in Louisiana state court to vacate the arbitral award. Walters
1
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
Syllabus
removed the case to Federal District Court and applied to confrm the
award.
Badgerow then moved to remand the case to state court, ar-
guing that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the parties'
requests—under Sections 10 and 9 of the FAA, respectively—to vacate
or confrm the award. The District Court applied Vaden's look-through
approach, fnding jurisdiction in the federal-law claims contained in
Badgerow's underlying employment action. The District Court ac-
knowledged that Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA lack the distinctive text
on which Vaden relied, but it applied the look-through approach anyway
so that “consistent jurisdictional principles” would govern all kinds of
FAA applications. The Fifth Circuit affrmed.
Held: Vaden's “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction
does not apply to requests to confrm or vacate arbitral awards under
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. Pp. 7–19.
(a) Congress has granted federal district courts jurisdiction over two
main kinds of cases: suits between citizens of different States as to any
matter va lued at more than $75,000 (diversity cases), 28 U. S. C.
§ 1332(a), and suits “arising under” federal law (federal-question cases),
§ 1331. Normally, a court has federal-question jurisdiction whenever
federal law authorizes an action. But because this Court has held that
the FAA's provisions do not themselves support federal jurisdiction, a
federal court must fnd an independent basis for jurisdiction to resolve
an arbitral dispute. In this case, neither application reveals a jurisdic-
tional basis on its face. So to fnd an independent basis for jurisdiction,
the District Court had to look through the Section 9 and 10 applications
to the underlying substantive dispute, where a federal-law claim satisfy-
ing § 1331 indeed exists.
In Vaden, this Court approved the look-through approach for a Sec-
tion 4 petition by relying on that section's express language. That lan-
guage provides that a party to an arbitration agreement may petition
for an order to compel arbitration in a “United States district court
which, save for [the arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction”
over “the controversy between the parties.” “The phrase `save for [the
arbitration] agreement,' ” the Court stated, “indicates that the district
court should assume the absence of the arbitration agreement and deter-
mine whether [the court] `would have jurisdiction . . .' without it” by
looking through to the “underlying substantive controversy” between
the parties. 556 U. S., at 62.
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA contain none of the statutory language
on which Vaden relied. So under ordinary principles of statutory con-
struction, the look-through method should not apply. “[W]hen Con-

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3
Syllabus
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it
in another section of the same Act,” this Court generally takes the
choice to be deliberate. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. –––, –––. That
holds true for jurisdictional questions, as federal “district courts may
not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 552. Because a statutory
basis for look-through jurisdiction is lacking in Sections 9 and 10, the
Court cannot reach the same result here as in Vaden. Pp. 7–12.
(b) Walters presents a two-part argument to justify exercising juris-
diction here. Walters frst claims that Section 4's language does not
authorize look-through jurisdiction, but is only a capacious venue provi-
sion designed to give applicants a broad choice among federal courts
possessing jurisdiction. Walters next construes Section 6—which re-
quires any FAA application to “be made and heard in the manner pro-
vided by law for the making and hearing of motions”—to provide the
basis for an FAA-wide look-through rule.
Walters's reading of Section 4 does not comport with how Vaden un-
derstood Section 4 or with the actual text of that provision, which never
mentions venue, and refers only to jurisdiction. And Walters's Section
6 argument fares no better. Courts do not possess jurisdiction to de-
cide ordinary motions by virtue of the look-through method. So Con-
gress would not have prescribed that method by telling courts, as
Section 6 does, to treat FAA applications like motions. Pp. 12–15.
(c) Walters also makes several policy arguments preaching the vir-
tues of adopting look-through as a uniform jurisdictional rule. Walters
claims that a uniform rule will promote “administrative simplicity”; that
the look-through approach will be “easier to apply” than a test ground-
ing jurisdiction on the face of the FAA application itself; and that the
look-through rule will provide federal courts with more comprehensive
control over the arbitration process. Brief for Respondents 27, 28.
But “[e]ven the most formidable policy arguments cannot overcome a
clear statutory directive.” BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Bal-
timore, 593 U. S. –––, –––. And anyway, Walters oversells the superior-
ity of his proposal. First, uniformity in and of itself provides no real
advantage here because courts can easily tell whether to apply look-
through or the normal jurisdictional rules. Second, the use of those
ordinary rules, in the context of arbitration applications, is hardly be-
yond judicial capacity. And third, there are good reasons why state,
rather than federal, courts should handle applications like the ones in
this case. Pp. 15–19.
975 F. 3d 469, reversed and remanded.

4 B
ADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and
Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett,
JJ., joined. Breyer, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 19.
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause and fled briefs for
petitioner.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondents. With her
on the brief were Sarah M. Harris, Katherine Moran Meeks,
Eve B. Masinter, E. Fredrick Preis, Jr., and Matthew M.
McCluer.*
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.,
authorizes a party to an arbitration agreement to seek sev-
eral kinds of assistance from a federal court. Under Section
4, for example, a party may ask the court to compel an arbi-
tration proceeding, as the agreement contemplates. And
under Sections 9 and 10, a party may apply to the court to
confrm, or alternatively to vacate, an arbitral award.
Yet the federal courts, as we have often held, may or may
not have jurisdiction to decide such a request. The Act's
authorization of a petition does not itself create jurisdiction.
Rather, the federal court must have what we have called
an “independent jurisdictional basis” to resolve the matter.
Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576,
582 (2008).
In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49 (2009), we as-
sessed whether there was a jurisdictional basis to decide a
Section 4 petition to compel arbitration by means of examin-
ing the parties' underlying dispute. The text of Section 4,
*Zachary D. Tripp and Jennifer B. Dickey fled a brief for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America as amicus curiae urging
affrmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Securities Industry and Finan-
cial Markets Association by Thomas G. Saunders, Peter G. Neiman, Mark
C. Fleming, and Eric L. Hawkins; and for Imre Stephen Szalai by Mr. Sza-
lai, pro se.
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Opinion of the Court
we reasoned, instructs a federal court to “look through” the
petiti
on to the “underlying substantive controversy” be-
tween the parties—even though that controversy is not be-
fore the court. Id., at 62. If the underlying dispute falls
within the court's jurisdiction—for example, by presenting a
federal question—then the court may rule on the petition to
compel. That is so regardless whether the petition alone
could establish the court's jurisdiction.
The question presented here is whether that same “look-
through” approach to jurisdiction applies to requests to con-
frm or vacate arbitral awards under the FAA's Sections 9
and 10. We hold it does not. Those sections lack Section
4's distinctive language directing a look-through, on which
Vaden rested. Without that statutory instruction, a court
may look only to the application actually submitted to it in
assessing its jurisdiction.
I
This case grows out of the arbitration of an employment
dispute. Petitioner Denise Badgerow worked as a fnancial
advisor for REJ Properties, a frm run by respondents Greg
Walters, Thomas Meyer, and Ray Trosclair. (For ease of
reference, we refer from now on only to Walters.) Badge-
row's contract required her to bring claims arising out of her
employment to arbitration, rather than to court. So when
she was (in her view, improperly) fred, she initiated an arbi-
tration action against Walters, alleging unlawful termination
under both federal and state law. The arbitrators sided
with Walters, dismissing Badgerow's claims.
What happened afterward—when Badgerow refused to
give up—created the jurisdictional issue we address today.
Believing that fraud had tainted the arbitration proceeding,
Badgerow sued Walters in Louisiana state court to vacate
the arbitral decision. Walters responded by removing the
case to Federal District Court—and, once there, applying
to confrm the arbitral award. Finally, Badgerow moved to
remand the case to state court, arguing that the federal
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
court lacked jurisdiction over the parties' requests—under
Sec
tions 10 and 9, respectively—to vacate or confrm the
award.
The District Court assessed its jurisdiction under the look
through approach this Court adopted in Vaden v. Discover
Bank. See 2019 WL 2611127, *1 (ED La., June 26, 2019).
That approach, as just noted, allows a federal court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over an FAA application when the parties'
underlying substantive dispute would have fallen within the
court's jurisdiction. See supra, at 4–5. The District Court
acknowledged that Vaden involved a different kind of arbi-
tration dispute: It concerned a petition to compel arbitration
under the FAA's Section 4, rather than an application to con-
frm or vacate an arbitral award under Section 9 or 10. And
Vaden's “reasoning was grounded on specifc text” in Section
4 that Sections 9 and 10 “do[ ] not contain.” 2019 WL
2611127, *2. But the court thought it should apply the look-
through approach anyway, so that “consistent jurisdictional
principles” would govern all kinds of FAA applications.
Ibid. And under that approach, the court had jurisdiction
because Badgerow's underlying employment action raised
federal-law claims. The court thus went on to resolve the
dispute over whether fraud had infected the arbitration pro-
ceeding. Finding it had not, the court granted Walters's ap-
plication to confrm, and denied Badgerow's application to
vacate, the arbitral award.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affrmed the District Court's fnding of jurisdiction, relying
on a just-issued Circuit precedent. See 975 F. 3d 469, 472–
474 (2020) (citing Quezada v. Bechtel OG&C Constr. Servs.,
Inc., 946 F. 3d 837, 843 (2020)). In that decision, the Fifth
Circuit had echoed the reasoning of the District Court here.
Yes, the language of Section 4 directing use of the look-
through approach “is in fact absent in” the FAA's other sec-
tions. 946 F. 3d, at 842. But, the court continued, a “princi-
ple of uniformity” applying to the FAA “dictates using the
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Opinion of the Court
same approach for determining jurisdiction under each sec-
ti
on of the statute.” Ibid.; but see id., at 845–846 (Ho, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting that asserted principle in favor of “[f ] i-
delity to text”). As applied to this case, that analysis meant
that the district court had jurisdiction over Walters's Sec-
tion 9 and Badgerow's Section 10 applications.
Courts have divided over whether the look-through ap-
proach used in Vaden can establish jurisdiction in a case like
this one—when the application before the court seeks not to
compel arbitration under Section 4 but to confrm, vacate, or
modify an arbitral award under other sections of the FAA.
1
We granted certiorari to resolve the confict, 593 U. S. –––
(2021), and now reverse the judgment below.
II
The district courts of the United States are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, defned (within constitutional bounds) by
federa l statute. See, e. g., Kokkonen v. G u ardi an Li fe
Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375, 377 (1994). Congress
has granted those courts jurisdiction over two main kinds
of cases. District courts have power to decide diversity
cases—suits between citizens of different States as to any
matter valued at more than $75,000. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 1332(a). And they have power to decide federal-question
cases—suits “arising under” federal law. § 1331. Typically,
an action arises under federal law if that law “creates the
cause of action asserted.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U. S. 251,
1
Compare Quezada v. Bechtel OG&C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F. 3d 837,
843 (CA5 2020) (holding that the look-through approach applies to applica-
tions to confrm, vacate, or modify an arbitral award); Ortiz-Espinosa v.
BBVA Securities of P. R., Inc., 852 F. 3d 36, 47 (CA1 2017) (same); Doscher
v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, 832 F. 3d 372, 381–388 (CA2 2016)
(same); McCormick v. America Online, Inc., 909 F. 3d 677, 680–684 (CA4
2018) (same), with Goldman v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 834 F. 3d
242, 252–255 (CA3 2016) (holding that the look-through approach does not
apply to those applications); Magruder v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., 818
F. 3d 285, 287–289 (CA7 2016) (same).
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Opinion of the Court
257 (2013). So when federal law authorizes the action, the
par
ty bringing it—once again, typically—gets to go to fed-
eral court.
But that is not necessarily true of FAA-created arbitration
actions. As noted above, the FAA authorizes parties to
arbitration agreements to fle specifed actions in federal
court—most prominently, petitions to compel arbitration
(under Section 4) and applications to confrm, vacate, or mod-
ify arbitral awards (under Sections 9 through 11). See
supra, at 4. But those provisions, this Court has held,
do not themselves support federal jurisdiction. See Hall
Street, 552 U. S., at 581–582; Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. (Were
it otherwise, every arbitration in the country, however dis-
tant from federal concerns, could wind up in federal district
court.) A federal court may entertain an action brought
under the FAA only if the action has an “independent juris-
dictional basis.” Hall Street, 552 U. S., at 582. That means
an applicant seeking, for example, to vacate an arbitral
award under Section 10 must identify a grant of jurisdiction,
apart from Section 10 itself, conferring “access to a federal
forum.” Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. If she cannot, the action
belongs in state court. The FAA requires those courts, too,
to honor arbitration agreements; and we have long recog-
nized their “prominent role” in arbitral enforcement. Ibid.;
see id., at 71; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 12–
16 (1984).
2
2
This Court has held that the FAA's core substantive requirement—
Section 2's command to enforce arbitration agreements like other con-
tracts—applies in state courts, just as it does in federal courts. See
Southland Corp., 465 U. S., at 12–16. We have never decided whether the
FAA's more procedural provisions, including Sections 4 and 9 through 11,
also apply in state courts. See Vaden, 556 U. S., at 71, n. 20; see also post,
at 25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that they do not). But
we have made clear that Section 2 “carries with it” a duty for States to
provide certain enforcement mechanisms equivalent to the FAA's. See
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 71 (referring specifcally to Sections 3 and 4). And
most, if not all, States in fact provide procedural vehicles, similar to those
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Opinion of the Court
The issue here is about where a federal court should look
to
determine whether an action brought under Section 9 or
10 has an independent jurisdictional basis. An obvious
place is the face of the application itself. If it shows that
the contending parties are citizens of different States (with
over $75,000 in dispute), then § 1332(a) gives the court diver-
sity jurisdiction. Or if it alleges that federal law (beyond
Section 9 or 10 itself ) entitles the applicant to relief, then
§ 1331 gives the court federal-question jurisdiction. But
those possibilities do Walters no good. He and Badgerow
are from the same State. And their applications raise no
federal issue. Recall that the two are now contesting not
the legality of Badgerow's fring but the enforceability of an
arbitral award. That award is no more than a contractual
resolution of the parties' dispute—a way of settling legal
claims. See Vaden, 556 U. S., at 63. And quarrels about
legal settlements—even settlements of federal claims—typi-
cally involve only state law, like disagreements about other
contracts. See Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 378–382. So the
District Court here, as Walters recognizes, had to go beyond
the face of the Section 9 and 10 applications to fnd a basis
for jurisdiction. See Brief for Respondents 26–27. It had
to proceed downward to Badgerow's employment action,
where a federal-law claim satisfying § 1331 indeed exists.
In other words, the court had to look through the Section 9
and 10 applications to the underlying substantive dispute,
although that dispute was not before it. Could the court
do so?
In Vaden, this Court approved the look-through approach
for a Section 4 petition, relying on that section's express lan-
in the FAA, to enforce arbitration agreements—including, as here, to re-
solve post-arbitration disputes by means of confrming, modifying, or va-
cating arbitral awards. See, e. g., Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of
2000 §§ 22–24, 7 U. L. A. 26 (2009) (adopted in 21 States and the District
of Columbia); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 1285–1287.6 (West 2022); N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §§ 7510–7511 (West 2022).
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Opinion of the Court
guage. Under Section 4, a party to an arbitration agree-
ment
may petition for an order to compel arbitration in a
“United States district court which, save for [the arbitration]
agreement, would have jurisdiction” over “the controversy
between the parties.”
3
That text, we stated, “drives our
conclusion that a federal court should determine its jurisdic-
tion by `looking through' a § 4 petition to the underlying sub-
stantive controversy”—to see, for example, if that dispute
“ `arises under' federal law.” 556 U. S., at 62.
To show why that is so, we proceeded methodically
through Section 4's wording. “The phrase `save for [the ar-
bitration] agreement,' ” we began, “indicates that the district
court should assume the absence of the arbitration agree-
ment and determine whether [the court] `would have juris-
diction . . .' without it.” Ibid. (frst alteration in original).
But “[ j]urisdiction over what?” Ibid. “The text of Section
4,” we continued, “refers us to `the controversy between
the parties.' ” Ibid. And that “controversy,” we explained,
could not mean the dispute before the court about “the exist-
ence or applicability of an arbitration agreement”; after all,
the preceding save-for clause had just “direct[ed] courts” to
assume that agreement away. Id., at 63. The “controversy
between the parties” instead had to mean their “underlying
substantive controversy.” Id., at 62 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Attending to the language” of Section 4
thus required “approv[ing] the `look through' approach” as
a means of assessing jurisdiction over petitions to compel
arbitration. Ibid. The opposite view was not merely
faulty; it was “textual[ly] implausib[le].” Id., at 65.
3
In full, the relevant sentence of Section 4 reads: “A party aggrieved by
the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a writ-
ten agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title
28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising
out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”

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Opinion of the Court
But Sections 9 and 10, in addressing applications to con-
fr
m or vacate an arbitral award, contain none of the statu-
tory language on which Vaden relied. Most notably, those
provisions do not have Section 4's “save for” clause. They
do not instruct a court to imagine a world without an arbitra-
tion agreement, and to ask whether it would then have juris-
diction over the parties' dispute. Indeed, Sections 9 and 10
do not mention the court's subject-matter jurisdiction at all.
4
So under ordinary principles of statutory construction, the
look-through method for assessing jurisdiction should not
apply. “[W]hen Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act,” we generally take the choice to be deliberate.
Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We have no warrant to redline the FAA,
importing Section 4's consequential language into provisions
containing nothing like it. Congress could have replicated
Section 4's look-through instruction in Sections 9 and 10. Or
for that matter, it could have drafted a global look-through
provision, applying the approach throughout the FAA. But
Congress did neither. And its decision governs.
Nothing in that conclusion changes because a jurisdictional
question is before us. The federal “district courts may
not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 552
(2005). And the jurisdiction Congress confers may not “be
expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 377.
4
Section 9 provides, in relevant part, that if an arbitration agreement
states “that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the [arbitral]
award,” then a “party to the arbitration may apply” within a year to the
federal court located where the award was made (or any other court speci-
fed) “for an order confrming the award, and thereupon the court must
grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modifed, or corrected”
as the Act otherwise prescribes.
Section 10 provides, in relevant part, that a United States court “may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration” if the award is tainted in any of four specifed ways.
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Those bedrock principles prevent us from pulling look-
through
jurisdiction out of thin air—from somehow fnding,
without textual support, that federal courts may use the
method to resolve various state-law-based, non-diverse Sec-
tion 9 and 10 applications. The look-through rule is a highly
unusual one: It locates jurisdiction not in the action actually
before the court, but in another controversy neither there
nor ever meant to be. We recognized that rule in Vaden
because careful analysis of Section 4's text showed that Con-
gress wanted it applied to petitions brought under that pro-
vision. See 556 U. S., at 62–65. But Congress has not so
directed in Sections 9 and 10. Congress has not authorized
a federal court to adjudicate a Section 9 or 10 application
just because the contractual dispute it presents grew out of
arbitrating different claims, turning on different law, that
(save for the parties' agreement) could have been brought in
federal court. And because a statutory basis for look-
through jurisdiction is lacking here, we cannot reach the
same result as in Vaden: That would indeed be jurisdictional
“expan[si on] by judicia l decree. ” Kokko nen, 511 U. S.,
at 377.
Walters contests that view of the statute. Unlike the
Courts of Appeals to have adopted his position, including the
Fifth Circuit below, see supra, at 6–7, he offers a reading of
the FAA's text to justify exercising jurisdiction here.
5
Wal-
5
By contrast, the dissenting opinion reads, from start to fnish, more
like the decisions of the courts below: Even when that opinion fnally turns
to the FAA's text, it emphasizes something much like the lower courts'
uniformity principle. See post, at 27–29; supra, at 6–7. Because, the dis-
sent says, all the FAA's sections “describe connected components of a sin-
gle matter” (namely, a “court's arbitration-related enforcement power”),
and because those provisions serve the same “general purpose[ ],” the stat-
ute “permits” a court to hold that “Section 4's jurisdictional rule should
apply throughout.” Post, at 27–29. But the (nigh-inevitable) connection
among a statute's diverse provisions does not give a court carte blanche
to move rules or concepts from any one section to any or all others. For
the reasons already stated, we cannot read this non-uniform statute—
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Opinion of the Court
ters's argument comes in two parts. First, Walters says,
the
language in Section 4 that Vaden construed does not in
fact authorize the use of the look-through jurisdictional
method. In his view, that sentence is only a capacious
“venue provision,” serving to “expand[ ] venue to the limits
of [federal] jurisdiction” (and thus to give an applicant a
broad choice among federal courts possessing jurisdiction).
Brief for Respondents 12, 23. Second, Walters claims that
Section 6 provides the basis for an FAA-wide look-through
jurisdictional rule. Under Section 6, any FAA application
“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for
the making and hearing of motions.” That provision, Wal-
ters claims, requires use of the look-through approach be-
cause “[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction over motions when
they have jurisdiction over the underlying action.” Brief
for Respondents 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). So
to recap Walters's theory: Section 4 does not establish any
jurisdictional rule for applications to compel in particular,
while Section 6 establishes the look-through jurisdictional
rule for all kinds of FAA applications.
But Walters's understanding of Section 4 does not comport
with what it says. The language of that provision never
mentions “venue”; it refers only to “jurisdiction.” That is a
signal, sharp and clear, that the section provides a jurisdic-
tional rule. And even suppose (against all odds) that Con-
gress had meant to state the venue rule Walters proposes
without ever using the word “venue.” In that event, Con-
gress could have simply permitted fling the petition in any
district court with jurisdiction (or even more simply—be-
cause a court can never act without jurisdiction—in any dis-
trict court). Given that (in Walters's view) the jurisdic-
tional rule comes from another provision, Congress would
not have needed to (again) spell out its content. But spell-
setting out a jurisdictional rule in one section but conspicuously omitting
it in all others—as though it applied a single rule throughout. See supra,
at 11–12.
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ing out the rule's content—by describing the look-through
method—is
exactly what Section 4 does. That description
can serve one purpose only: to establish jurisdiction where
it would otherwise not exist.
And that is how Vaden understood Section 4. Our deci-
sion, like the relevant text, never once referred to venue.
Instead, we spoke, throughout the opinion, of the way Sec-
tion 4 provides for jurisdiction. We formulated the question
presented as whether the district court could “exercise juris-
diction over [the party's] § 4 petition.” 556 U. S., at 53; see
id., at 57 (stating that “[w]e granted certiorari” to decide
whether district courts could use the look-through method
“to determine whether federal-question jurisdiction exists
over [a] § 4 petition”). And we framed our holding as about
jurisdiction: “[A] federal court should determine its jurisdic-
tion by `looking through' a § 4 petition.” Id., at 62; see id.,
at 72 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (differing about the rule's
application, but agreeing that a court presented with a Sec-
tion 4 petition should use the look-through method “in deter-
mining whether it has jurisdiction”). In short, Section 4's
“save for” text “dr[ove] our conclusion” not about venue, but
about “jurisdiction.” Id., at 62. And so that text, as shown
above, contradicts Walters's position—for it appears in Sec-
tion 4 alone, rather than also in Sections 9 and 10. See
supra, at 11–12.
Walters's theory fares no better in construing Section 6's
mention of motions to prescribe a look-through rule for the
whole FAA. Here, Walters commits the opposite of his fault
in reading Section 4: He now reads a provision containing no
express reference to jurisdiction in fact to set out a jurisdic-
tional rule. There may be rare contexts in which courts can,
without such a reference, “infer that Congress has expanded
our jurisdiction”—but this is not one. Welch v. Texas Dept.
of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 474 (1987)
(plurality opinion). The look-through method, as noted be-
fore, is a jurisdictional outlier. See supra, at 12. For Con-

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Opinion of the Court
gress to prescribe it by telling courts, a la Section 6, to treat
F
AA applications like motions in other kinds of litigation
would be not just oblique but simply bizarre. Courts, after
all, do not possess jurisdiction to decide ordinary motions by
virtue of the look-through method. A motion (unlike a typi-
cal FAA application) is part of a case actually in court. Ju-
risdiction to decide the case includes jurisdiction to decide
the motion; there is no need to “look through” the motion in
search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court. And if the
look-through rule does not apply to motions, then Section 6's
reference to motions cannot direct the look-through rule.
We have formerly described that provision's function as
something different: Section 6, we said, ensures that FAA
applications “get streamlined treatment”—a kind of “expe-
dited review,” as compared to what a party would receive if
she brought a normal contract suit. Hall Street, 552 U. S.,
at 582, and n. 3. However hard we squint, we cannot also
discern in Section 6 an FAA-wide look-through rule; the only
such rule in the FAA, applying only to petitions to compel,
resides in Section 4.
Walters's more thought-provoking arguments sound not in
text but in policy. Here, Walters—now joined by the dis-
sent—preaches the virtues of adopting look-through as a
“single, easy-to-apply jurisdictional test” that will produce
“sensible” results. Brief for Respondents 28 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see post, at 22–27 (opinion of Breyer,
J.) (lauding the “advantages” of look-through's “practical con-
sequences”). First, Walters says, a uniform jurisdictional
rule, applying to all FAA applications alike, will necessarily
promote “administrative simplicity” because a court will not
have to fgure out which rule to apply. Brief for Respond-
ents 27. Second, he claims, the look-through rule is “easier
to apply” than a test that would ground jurisdiction on the
face of the FAA application itself. Id., at 28 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). In particular, he says, the latter ap-
proach confronts courts with “hard questions” about how to
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determine diversity jurisdiction (including its amount-in-
controversy
component) across a range of settings—for the
Section 9 and 10 applications at issue here, as well as for
Section 5 and 7 petitions (obviously not at issue) to appoint
arbitrators or compel the presence of witnesses. Id., at 41.
(The dissent's vaunted practical “advantages” also mostly con-
cern avoiding those diversity issues. Post, at 22; see post,
at 22–25.)
6
Finally, Walters contends that only the look-
through rule will provide federal courts with comprehensive
control over the arbitration process, including the period
after the award. The opposite position, he says, will “close
the federal courthouse doors to many” post-arbitration mo-
tions, even when they grow out of disputes raising “exclu-
sively federal claims.” Brief for Respondents 37, 46.
Walters himself quotes back to us the topline answer to
those theories, refecting its obviousness: “Even the most for-
midable policy arguments cannot overcome a clear statutory
directive.” Id., at 44 (quoting BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. –––, ––– (2021); alteration
omitted). Walters's (and the dissent's) what-makes-best-
sense assertions rest on the view that “the FAA contains
no” such clear “directive” limiting look-through jurisdiction
to Section 4. Brief for Respondents 44–45; see post, at 28.
Having rejected that view, we cannot fnd much relevance in
his ideas, even if plausible, about the optimal jurisdictional
rule for the FAA. “It is not for this Court to employ unteth-
ered notions of what might be good public policy to expand
our jurisdiction.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 161
(1990). However the pros and cons shake out, Congress has
6
The dissent's lead item in this vein concerns a Section 5 petition to
appoint an arbitrator that is made “in tandem with” a Section 4 petition
over which a federal court has jurisdiction. Post, at 23. Because Section
5 is not at issue here, we do not express any view about whether the
relationship that the dissent hypothesizes would give the court jurisdic-
tion over the appointment request.
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Opinion of the Court
made its call. We will not impose uniformity on the stat-
ute'
s non-uniform jurisdictional rules.
And anyway, we think Walters oversells the superiority of
his proposal. First, uniformity in and of itself provides no
real advantage in this sphere. A court can tell in an instant
whether an application arises under Section 4 or, as here,
under Section 9 or 10; so it can also tell in an instant whether
to apply the look-through method or the usual jurisdictional
rules. Second, the use of those ordinary rules—most nota-
bly, relating to diversity jurisdiction—is hardly beyond judi-
cial capacity. Federal courts have faced, and federal courts
have resolved, diversity questions for over two centuries, in
diverse and ever-changing legal contexts. Throughout, they
have developed workable rules; and we see no reason to
think they will do differently here. Indeed, past practice
belies Walters's and the dissent's gloomy predictions. Al-
though they spin out hypotheticals designed to make the
project look ultra-confusing, they fail to identify any actual
problems that have arisen from courts' longstanding applica-
tion of diversity standards to FAA applications (without
using look-through). And Walters's solution does not even
avoid the (purported) diffculty of which he complains. For
he does not claim (nor could he) that look-through is the ex-
clusive means of establishing federal jurisdiction. Even if
the underlying action does not fall within a district court's
jurisdiction, the application still might do so—say, because
the parties have changed, and are now diverse. See supra,
at 9. So courts, on Walters's own view, will still have to
resolve questions about—and develop rules for—determin-
ing diversity in the FAA context. The difference is only
one of degree—and too small, under any plausible theory of
statutory interpretation, to adopt Walters's proposal to re-
write the law.
Finally, we can see why Congress chose to place fewer
arbitration disputes in federal court than Walters wishes.
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The statutory plan, as suggested above, makes Section 9 and
10
applications conform to the normal—and sensible—judi-
cial division of labor: The applications go to state, rather than
federal, courts when they raise claims between non-diverse
parties involving state law. See supra, at 8–9. As Walters
notes, those claims may have originated in the arbitration of
a federal-law dispute. But the underlying dispute is not
now at issue. Rather, the application concerns the contrac-
tual rights provided in the arbitration agreement, generally
governed by state law. And adjudication of such state-law
contractual rights—as this Court has held in addressing a
non-arbitration settlement of federal claims—typically be-
longs in state courts. See Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 381–382;
supra, at 9. To be sure, Congress created an exception to
those ordinary jurisdictional principles for Section 4 peti-
tions to compel. But it is one thing to make an exception,
quite another to extend that exception everywhere. See
post, at 26 (disregarding this point). As this Court has often
said, the “preeminent” purpose of the FAA was to overcome
some judges' reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements
when a party tried to sue in court instead. E. g., Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 221 (1985). We
have never detected a similar congressional worry about
judges' willingness to enforce arbitration awards already
made. So Congress might well have thought an expansion
of federal jurisdiction appropriate for petitions to compel
a lone. Applicati ons about arbitra l decisions could and
should follow the normal rules.
The result, as Walters laments, is to give state courts a
signifcant role in implementing the FAA. But we have long
recognized that feature of the statute. “[E]nforcement of
the Act,” we have understood, “is left in large part to the
state courts.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 25, n. 32 (1983); see Vaden,
556 U. S., at 59; Hall Street, 552 U. S., at 582. As relevant
here, Congress chose to respect the capacity of state courts
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Breyer, J., dissenting
to properly enforce arbitral awards. In our turn, we must
respec
t that evident congressional choice.
***
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
When interpreting a statute, it is often helpful to consider
not simply the statute's literal words, but also the statute's
purposes and the likely consequences of our interpretation.
Otherwise, we risk adopting an interpretation that, even if
consistent with text, creates unnecessary complexity and
confusion. That, I fear, is what the majority's interpretation
here will do. I consequently dissent.
I
The question presented arises in the context of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA). 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. The ques-
tion is technical and jurisdictional: How does a federal court
determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider a motion to
confrm or vacate an arbitration award? The FAA contains
several sections that seem to empower a federal court to
take certain specifed actions related to arbitration proceed-
ings. These include Section 4, which gives “any United
States district court” the power to “order” parties to a writ-
ten arbitration agreement to “proceed” to arbitration; Sec-
tion 5, which gives “the court” the power to “designate and
appoint an arbitrator”; Section 7, which gives “the United
States district court for the district” in which an arbitrator
is sitting the power to “compel the attendance” of witnesses
whom the arbitrator has “summoned”; Section 9, which gives
“the United States court in and for the district within which”
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an arbitration award “was made” the power to enter an
“order
confrming the award”; Section 10, which gives “the
United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbi-
tration] award was made” the power to “make an order va-
cating the award”; and Section 11, which gives “the United
States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration]
award was made” the power to “modif[y] or correc[t] the
award.” 9 U. S. C. §§ 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11. (Here, as throughout,
I have simplifed the descriptions of the FAA's sections; the
Appendix, infra, contains the full relevant statutory lan-
guage.) This case directly concerns jurisdiction under Sec-
tions 9 and 10, but the Court's reasoning applies to all the
sections just mentioned.
At frst blush, one might wonder why there is any question
about whether a federal court has jurisdiction to consider
requests that it act pursuant to these sections. The sec-
tions' language seems explicitly to give federal courts the
power to take such actions. Why does that language itself
not also grant jurisdiction to act? The answer, as the Court
notes, is that we have held that the FAA's “authorization of
a petition does not itself create jurisdiction.” Ante, at 4.
“Rather, the federal court must have what we have called
an `independent jurisdictional basis' to resolve the matter.”
Ibid. (quoting Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U. S. 576, 582 (2008)).
We made clear how this works in Vaden v. Discover Bank,
556 U. S. 49 (2009), a case involving Section 4. As just
noted, Section 4 gives a district court the power to order
parties (who have entered into a written arbitration agree-
ment) to submit to arbitration. We held “that a federal
court should determine its jurisdiction by `looking through'
a § 4 petition to the parties' underlying substantive contro-
versy.” Id., at 62. The court asks whether it would have
jurisdiction over that controversy, namely, whether that un-
derlying substantive controversy involves a federal question
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21
Breyer, J., dissenting
with a value of more than $75,000). See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331,
1332.
If so, then the federal court has jurisdiction over a
Section 4 petition asking the court to order the parties to
resolve that controversy in arbitration.
The Vaden Court gave two reasons for adopting this “look-
through” approach. The frst, as the majority today empha-
sizes, was textual. See 556 U. S., at 62. Section 4 says that
a party seeking arbitration may petition for an order compel-
ling arbitration from
“any United States district court which, save for [the
arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction . . . in a
civil action . . . of the subject matter of a suit arising out
of the controversy between the parties.” (Emphasis
added.)
The words “save for [the arbitration] agreement,” we rea-
soned, tell a court not to fnd jurisdiction by looking to the
petition to enforce the agreement itself, but instead to the
underlying controversy between the parties. See id., at
62–63.
The second reason, which the majority today neglects, was
practical. Id., at 65. To fnd jurisdiction only where the
petition to enforce an arbitration agreement itself estab-
lished federal jurisdiction, we explained, would result in “cu-
rious practical consequences,” including unduly limiting the
scope of Section 4 and hinging jurisdiction upon distinctions
that were “ `totally artifcial.' ” Ibid. (quoting 1 I. MacNeil,
R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law
§ 9.2.3.3, p. 9:21 (1995) (hereinafter MacNeil)).
Today, the majority holds that this look-through approach
does not apply to Section 9 or 10 because those sections lack
Section 4's “save for” language. Ante, at 5. This reasoning
necessarily extends to Sections 5, 7, and 11 as well, for those
sections, too, lack Sections 4's “save for” language. Ibid.
(“Without [Section 4's] statutory instruction, a court may
look only to the application actually submitted to it in assess-
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
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ing its jurisdiction”). Although this result may be consist-
ent
with the statute's text, it creates what Vaden feared—
curious consequences and artifcial distinctions. See 556
U. S., at 65. It also creates what I fear will be consequences
that are overly complex and impractical.
II
I would use the look-through approach to determine juris-
diction under each of the FAA's related provisions—Sections
4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Doing so would avoid the same kinds
of “curious practical consequences” that drove the Vaden
Court to adopt the look-through approach in the frst place.
Ibid.; see also Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr.
Co., 529 U. S. 193, 202 (2000) (rejecting interpretation of the
FAA that “would create anomalous results”). Most notably,
this approach would provide a harmonious and compara-
tively simple jurisdiction-determining rule—advantages that
the majority's jurisdictional scheme seems to lack. Cf.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94 (2010) (rejecting
“[c]omplex jurisdictional tests” in favor of “straightforward”
and “[s]imple jurisdictional rules”).
Consider some of the likely consequences of the majority's
reading, which applies the look-through approach only to
Section 4 (where the “save for” language appears), but not
to the FAA's other sections (where it does not appear).
First, consider Section 5. That section says that, upon
application of one of the parties to an arbitration agreement,
“the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator.” 9
U. S. C. § 5 (emphasis added). What happens when the look-
through approach shows that the underlying controversy
raises a federal question, but the application to appoint an
arbitrator raises no federal question and does not establish
diversity? A party could ask a federal judge to order arbi-
tration under Section 4, but they could not then ask that
same (or any other) federal judge to appoint an arbitrator
for that very same arbitration under Section 5. That does
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Breyer, J., dissenting
not seem to be what Congress had in mind for these neigh-
bor
ing provisions—provisions that appear to assume that a
judge can appoint an arbitrator in tandem with ordering par-
ties to arbitration. Moreover, how is a federal court to de-
termine, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the amount at
stake in a motion to appoint an arbitrator without a look-
through approach? Surely not by assessing the value of the
arbitrator's request for pay.
Second, consider Section 7. It says that “upon petition
the United States district court for the district in which” an
arbitrator is sitting “may compel the attendance” of persons
whom the arbitrator has “summoned.” § 7. Suppose that
the underlying substantive controversy does not qualify for
federal jurisdiction, meaning that a federal court would not
have jurisdiction to order arbitration under Section 4. If
arbitration proceeds by other means, can a federal judge
nonetheless compel the attendance of a witness at that arbi-
tration, based on diversity jurisdiction, if a request to do so
shows that the summoned witness lives out of State? If
there are two witnesses, one in State and one out of State,
can the federal judge compel the attendance of the second,
but not the frst? Why would Congress have wanted parties
to toggle between federal and state court when seeking judi-
cia l enforcement of summons issued dur i ng a si ng le
arbitration?
And at a more basic level, who are the relevant parties to a
Section 7 request when determining, for diversity purposes,
whether the Section 7 dispute is between citizens of different
States? The arbitrator and summoned witness? The par-
ties in arbitration? Only the “summoning ” party and the
witness? Compare Washington National Insurance Co. v.
OBEX Group LLC, 958 F. 3d 126, 134 (CA2 2020) (evaluating
diversity based on summoning party and witness), with
Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Center of Del. Cty. Ltd., 95 F. 3d 562,
567–568 (CA7 1996) (evaluating diversity based on parties in
arbitration). And assume that a federal court fnds it does
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
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have jurisdiction over a Section 7 request, even though the
under
lying controversy involves neither a federal question
nor diversity. “Why would Congress have wanted federal
courts to intervene to enforce a subpoena issued in an arbi-
tration proceeding involving a controversy that itself is not
important enough, from a federalism standpoint, to warrant
federal-court oversight?” Maine Community Health Op-
tions v. Albertsons Cos., 993 F. 3d 720, 726 (CA9 2021) (Wat-
ford, J., concurring).
Moreover, diversity jurisdiction requires not only that the
relevant parties be from different States but also that the
amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 1332(a). How does a federal judge determine whether
summoning a witness is itself worth $75,000? By examining
the value of what the witness might say? By accounting for
travel expenses? See Maine Community Health, 993 F. 3d,
at 723–724. As courts have recognized, there is “very little
case law to guide [them] in determining whether enforce-
ment of an arbitration subpoena against a third party will
enable someone to recover more than $75,000 in an arbitra-
tion dispute with a different party.” Id., at 726 (Watford, J.,
concurring). These and other jurisdiction-related questions
do not arise if a federal judge can simply follow Vaden's prin-
ciple for all FAA motions: Look through the motions and
determine whether there is federal jurisdiction over the un-
derlying substantive controversy. See 556 U. S., at 62–63.
Third, consider now Sections 9 and 10, the FAA sections
directly before us, along with Section 11. Section 9 gives
“the United States court in and for the district within which
[an arbitration] award was made” the power to issue “an
order confrming the award.” Section 10 gives the same
court the power to “vacat[e]” the award for certain specifed
reasons. And Section 11 gives that court the power to
“modif[y] or correc[t] the award.” Where the parties' un-
derlying dispute involves a federal question (but the parties
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Breyer, J., dissenting
are not diverse), the majority holds that a party can ask a
federa
l court to order arbitration under Section 4, but it can-
not ask that same court to confrm, vacate, or modify the
order resulting from that arbitration under Section 9, 10, or
11. But why prohibit a federal court from considering the
results of the very arbitration it has ordered and is likely
familiar with? Why force the parties to obtain relief—con-
cerning arbitration of an underlying federal-question dis-
pute—from a state court unfamiliar with the matter?
Or suppose that a party asks a federal court to vacate an
arbitration award under Section 10 because the arbitrator
“refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy.” § 10(a)(3). To determine at least one important
aspect of diversity jur isdicti on—the amount i n contro-
versy—must the court not look to the underlying dispute?
The same question arises with respect to a Section 11 motion
to modify an arbitral award on the ground that it “is imper-
fect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the contro-
versy.” § 11(c).
The majority says that these and other problems require
only that the parties bring their FAA requests to state
courts. Ante, at 17–18. But we cannot be sure that state
courts have the same powers under the FAA that federal
courts have. The FAA says nothing about state courts; it
only explicitly mentions federal courts. See § 7 (“United
States district court”); § 9 (“the United States court”); § 10
(same); § 11 (same). We have never held that the FAA provi-
sions I have discussed apply in state courts, and at least one
Member of this Court has concluded that they do not apply
there. See, e. g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U. S.
47, 59 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). State courts have
reached similar conclusions. See, e. g., Cable Connection,
Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1351, 190 P. 3d 586,
597 (2008) (holding that §§ 4, 10, and 11 apply only in federal
court); In re Beck's Superior Hybrids, Inc., 940 N. E. 2d
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
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352, 362–363 (Ind. App. 2011) (same for § 7); Henderson v.
Summe
rville Ford-Mercury Inc., 405 S. C. 440, 450, 748 S. E.
2d 221, 226 (2013) (same for § 9).
Relatedly, the majority also notes, correctly, that Section
9, 10, and 11 disputes about the enforceability of arbitral
awards “typically involve only state law.” Ante, at 9. It
thus makes sense, the majority says, that these disputes
would belong primarily in state court. See ante, at 18. But
the same can be said for Section 4 disputes about the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements. These, too, typically in-
volve only questions of state law. That the dispute does not
implicate federal questions thus does not explain why Con-
gress would have wanted more federal court involvement at
the Section 4 stage than during the later stages.
It may be possible to eliminate some of these problems
by using a federal-question lawsuit or Section 4 motion as a
jurisdictional anchor. If a party to an arbitration agreement
fles a lawsuit in federal court but then is ordered to resolve
the claims in arbitration, the federal court may stay the suit
and possibly retain jurisdiction over related FAA motions.
See § 3; Vaden, 556 U. S., at 65. Similarly, some courts have
held that if a federal court adjudicates a Section 4 motion
to order arbitration, the court retains jurisdiction over any
subsequent, related FAA motions. See Maine Community
Health, 993 F. 3d, at 725 (Watford, J., concurring); see also
McCormick v. America Online, Inc., 909 F. 3d 677, 684 (CA4
2018). But, as Vaden points out, to turn jurisdiction over
these later motions on the presence or absence of a federal
lawsuit or Section 4 motion is to turn jurisdiction on a “ `to-
tally artifcial distinction' ”—particularly when the very pur-
pose of arbitration is to avoid litigation. 556 U. S., at 65
(quoting 1 MacNeil § 9.2.3.3, at 9:21).
I relate these practical diffculties in part to illustrate a
more fundamental point. The majority has tried to split
what is, or should be, a single jurisdictional atom—a single
statute with connected parts, which parts give federal

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Breyer, J., dissenting
judges the power to facilitate a single arbitration proceeding
from
start to fnish: to order arbitration; appoint an arbitra-
tor; summon witnesses; and confrm, vacate, or modify an
arbitration award. The need for simplicity, comprehension,
workability, and fairness all suggest that these interrelated
provisions should follow the same basic jurisdictional ap-
proach, namely, as Vaden explai ns, the look-through
approach.
III
The majority's interpretation is also at odds with what this
Court has said about the purposes underlying the FAA. We
have recognized that the statute refects a clear “ `policy of
rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments.' ” Cortez Byrd Chips, 529 U. S., at 201 (quoting
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U. S. 1, 23 (1983)); see also id., at 22 (“Congress' clear
intent, in the Arbitration Act, [was] to move the parties to
an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible”).
We have thus interpreted the FAA to avoid “unnecessarily
complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute
that seeks to avoid it.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dob-
son, 513 U. S. 265, 275 (1995). “Why,” we asked, “would
Congress intend a test that risks the very kind of costs and
delay through litigation . . . that Congress wrote the Act to
help the parties avoid?” Id., at 278. In other words, the
FAA is a “sphere” in which “uniformity in and of itself pro-
vides [a] real advantage.” Ante, at 17.
IV
The majority's main point is straightforward: The text of
the statute compels the result. As the majority rightly
points out, we cannot disregard the statutory text or “ `over-
come a clear statutory directive.' ” Ante, at 16 (quoting
Brief for Respondents 44). A statute that says it applies
only to “fsh” does not apply to turnips. The majority also
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rightly points out that the “save for” language setting forth
the
look-through approach appears only in Section 4, and
does not appear in any of the later sections.
That fact, however, does not produce the “clear statutory
directive” upon which the majority relies. Nothing in the
text prohibits us from applying Section 4's look-through ap-
proach to the succeeding sections. The statute does not say
that Section 4's jurisdictional rule applies only to Section
4, or that the same look-through approach does not apply
elsewhere. Nor does any other section provide its own ju-
risdictional rule that would suggest Section 4's rule should
not apply there.
Moreover, when we consider Section 4's text setting forth
the look-through approach, we “consider not only the bare
meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and pur-
pose in the statutory scheme.” Bailey v. United States, 516
U. S. 137, 145 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 133 (2016).
Various aspects of the FAA's text and structure suggest that
Section 4's jurisdictional rule should apply throughout. Sec-
tion 5, for example, which grants the power to appoint an
arbitrator, simply refers to “the court.” Those words, most
naturally read, refer to the same court to which the immedi-
ately preceding section—Section 4—refers: a “United States
district court” with jurisdiction as determined by the look-
through approach. Requests under the FAA's various sec-
tions are also generally described in the text as “applica-
tions” or “motions.” See § 4 (“application”); § 5 (same); § 9
(same); § 10 (same); § 11 (same); see also § 6; § 12 (“motion
to vacate, modify, or correct”); § 13 (“application to confrm,
modify, or correct”). This implies that the requests are all
constituent parts of one broader enforcement proceeding, not
standalone disputes meriting individual jurisdictional inquir-
ies. See, e. g., In re Wild, 994 F. 3d 1244, 1257 (CA11 2021)
(en banc) (“the term `motion' has never been commonly un-
derstood to denote a vehicle for initiating a new and free-

Cite
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29
Breyer, J., dissenting
standing lawsuit”); A Modern Dictionary of the English Lan-
g
uage 446 (1911) (“motion in court” means “an application to
a court . . . to have a rule or order made which is necessary
to the progress of the action”).
And, more importantly, all the sections describe connected
components of a single matter: a federal court's arbitration-
related enforcement power. One can read these sections as
a single whole, with each section providing one enforcement
tool, and one section—Section 4—providing both an enforce-
ment tool and a jurisdictional rule applicable to the entire
toolbox. Read this way, the FAA provides one set of com-
plementary mechanisms through which a federal court might
facilitate a single arbitration—but only when the underlying
substantive controversy is one that, jurisdictionally speak-
ing, could be brought in a federal court had the parties not
agreed to arbitrate. There is no language in any of the sec-
tions that states, or suggests, that we cannot interpret the
Act in this way.
In brief, the text does not prevent us from reading the
statute in a way that better refects the statute's structure
and better fulflls the statute's basic purposes. See Allied
Bruce, 513 U. S., at 279 (adopting interpretation of FAA that
“the statute's language permits” and that is more consistent
with “[t]he Act's history”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S.
552, 563 (1988) (adopting outcome “that the text of the stat-
ute permits, and sound judicial administration counsels”).
V
The FAA's legislative history reinforces the view of the
statute that I have just described. The Senate Report on
the bill that became the FAA refers to the FAA's general
purposes. It makes clear Congress' hope to avoid proce-
dural complexity. It refers to parties' “desire to avoid the
delay and expense of litigation.” S. Rep. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). Proponents of the bill thought it
would successfully serve that purpose because it would pro-
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
Breyer, J., dissenting
vide “very simple machinery”; “simplify legal matters”; offer
“speedy”
and “plain justice”; and allow “no opportunity for
technical procedure.” Joint Hearings on S. 1005 et al. before
the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 16, 26, 27, 36 (1924) (hereinafter Joint Hear-
ings). These general purposes support a simplifed jurisdic-
tional rule.
The language of the House Report suggests more. It sug-
gests that the bill created a single jurisdictional procedure,
not a set of different procedures with distinct jurisdictional
rules. The Report says that the bill “provides a procedure
in the Federal courts for” enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)
(emphasis added). “The procedure,” the Report continues,
“is very simple, . . . reducing technicality, delay, and ex-
pense . . . .” Ibid. (emphasis added). That singular proce-
dure, the Report explains, encompasses not only the initial
request for a federal court to order arbitration under Section
4, but subsequent requests to vacate or modify an arbitration
award under Sections 10 and 11 as well. See ibid.
The principal drafter of the bill made the same point yet
more explicitly. He testifed that under the FAA, “Federal
courts are given jurisdiction to enforce [arbitration] agree-
ments whenever . . . they would normally have jurisdiction
of a controversy between the parties.” Joint Hearings 34
(statement of Julius H. Cohen) (emphasis added). Immedi-
ately following, he said that “such enforcement” includes the
power to appoint arbitrators under Section 5, which, of
course, lacks Section 4's “save for” language. Ibid. And he
then proceeded to discuss the FAA's other sections, all with-
out suggesting that their jurisdictional requirements were
any different. Ibid.; see also id., at 35–36.
Together, this history reinforces the interpretation of the
statute that I would adopt. It suggests that Congress in-
tended a single approach for determining jurisdiction of the
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31
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
FAA's interrelated enforcement mechanisms, not one ap-
proach
for the mechanism provided in Section 4 and a dif-
ferent approach for the mechanisms provided in all other
sections.
***
In this dissent I hope to have provided an example of what
it means to say that we do not interpret a statute's words
“in a vacuum.” Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169,
179 (2014). Rather, we should interpret those words “with
reference to the statutory context, structure, history and
purpose[,] . . . not to mention common sense.” Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Here, these considerations
all favor a uniform look-through approach. And the stat-
ute's language permits that approach. Interpretation of a
statute must, of course, be consistent with its text. But
looking solely to the text, and with a single-minded focus
on individual words in the text, will sometimes lead to an
interpretation at odds with the statute as a whole. And I
fear that is what has happened in this case.
I suggest that by considering not only the text, but con-
text, structure, history, purpose, and common sense, we
would read the statute here in a different way. That way
would connect the statute more directly with the area of law,
and of human life, that it concerns. And it would allow the
statute, and the law, to work better and more simply for
those whom it is meant to serve. With respect, I dissent.
APPENDIX
9 U. S. C. §§ 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11
Ҥ 4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United
States court having jurisdiction for order to compel arbitra-
tion; notice and service thereof; hearing and determination.
“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or re-
fusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
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ADGEROW v. WALTERS
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
arbitration may petition any United States district court
wh
ich, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days'
notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the
party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the man-
ner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfed that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and
proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the dis-
trict in which the petition for an order directing such arbitra-
tion is fled. If the making of the arbitration agreement or
the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in
default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty juris-
diction, the court shall hear and determine such issue.
Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in
default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the
return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial
of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an
order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may
specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury fnd that
no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that
there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding
shall be dismissed. If the jury fnd that an agreement for
arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default
in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order sum-
marily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration
in accordance with the terms thereof.”
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33
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
Ҥ 5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire
“If
in the agreement provision be made for a method of
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an um-
pire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be pro-
vided therein, or if a method be provided and any party
thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in flling a vacancy,
then upon the application of either party to the controversy
the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbi-
trators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as
if he or they had been specifcally named therein; and unless
otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be
by a single arbitrator.”
Ҥ 7. Witnesses before arbitrators; fees; compelling attendance
“The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title
or otherwise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing
any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness
and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book,
record, document, or paper which may be deemed material
as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance shall
be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the
United States courts. Said summons shall issue in the name
of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and
shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of them, and
shall be directed to the said person and shall be served in
the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before
the court; if any person or persons so summoned to testify
shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition
the United States district court for the district in which such
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel
the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitra-
tor or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons for con-
tempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the
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Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or
refusa
l to attend in the courts of the United States.”
Ҥ 9. Award of arbitrators; confir mati on; jur isdic ti on;
procedure
“If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judg-
ment of the court shall be entered upon the award made
pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then
at any time within one year after the award is made any
party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specifed
for an order confrming the award, and thereupon the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modi-
fed, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this
title. If no court is specifed in the agreement of the parties,
then such application may be made to the United States
court in and for the district within which such award was
made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the
adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdic-
tion of such party as though he had appeared generally in
the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the
district within which the award was made, such service shall
be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as pre-
scribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in
the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident,
then the notice of the application shall be served by the mar-
shal of any district within which the adverse party may be
found in like manner as other process of the court.”
Ҥ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
“(a) In any of the following cases the United States court
in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration—
“(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
“(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them;
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35
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
“(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusi
ng to postpone the hearing, upon suffcient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
“(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, fnal, and defnite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
“(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired,
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
“(c) The United States district court for the district
wherein an award was made that was issued pursuant to
section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of a person, other than a party to the
arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the
award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly incon-
sistent with the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.”
Ҥ 11. Same; modifcation or correction; grounds; order
“In either of the following cases the United States court
in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration—
“(a) Where there was an evident material miscalcula-
tion of fgures or an evident material mistake in the descrip-
tion of any person, thing, or property referred to in the
award.
“(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter
not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
“(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect
the intent thereof and promote justice between the
parties.”

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None