Ramirez v. Collier

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 595 U. S. Part 2
Pages 411–467
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 24, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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TERM, 2021
411
Syllabus
RAMIREZ v. COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 21–5592. Argued November 9, 2021—Decided March 24, 2022
A Texas jury sentenced John Ramirez to death after he brutally murdered
Pablo Castro in 2004. On February 5, 2021, after years of direct and
collateral proceedings concerning Ramirez's conviction, sentence, and
aspects of his execution, Texas informed Ramirez that his execution
date would be September 8, 2021. Ramirez then fled a prison griev-
ance requesting that the State allow his long-time pastor to be present
in the execution chamber, which Texas initially denied. Texas later
changed course and amended its execution protocol to allow a prisoner's
spiritual advisor to enter the execution chamber. On June 11, 2021,
Ramirez fled another prison grievance asking that his pastor be permit-
ted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him during his execution,
acts Ramirez's grievance explains are part of his faith. Texas denied
Ramirez's request on July 2, 2021, stating that spiritual advisors are not
allowed to touch an inmate in the execution chamber. Texas pointed to
no provision of its execution protocol requiring this result, and the State
had a history of allowing prison chaplains to engage in such activities
during executions. Ramirez appealed within the prison system by fl-
ing a Step 2 grievance on July 8, 2021. With less than a month until
his execution date, and no ruling on his Step 2 grievance, Ramirez fled
suit in Federal District Court on August 10, 2021. Ramirez alleged
that the refusal of prison offcials to allow his pastor to lay hands on him
in the execution chamber violated his rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and the First
Amendment. Ramirez sought preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief barring state offcials from executing him unless they granted the
requested religious accommodation. On August 16, 2021, Ramirez's at-
torney inquired whether Ramirez's pastor would be allowed to pray au-
dibly with him during the execution. After prison offcials said no,
Ramirez fled an amended complaint seeking an injunction that would
allow his pastor to lay hands on him and pray with him during the
execution. Ramirez also sought a stay of execution while the District
Court considered his claims. The District Court denied the request,
as did the Fifth Circuit. This Court then stayed Ramirez's execution,
granted certiorari, and heard argument on an expedited basis.

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Syllabus
Held: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas's
restr
ictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution cham-
ber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of
furthering the State's compelling interests. Pp. 421–437.
(a) The question before the Court is whether Ramirez's execution
without the requested participation of his pastor should be halted pend-
ing full consideration of his claims on a complete record. To obtain the
relief Ramirez seeks—relief that the parties agree is properly character-
ized as a preliminary injunction—Ramirez “must establish that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Win-
ter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20. The
Court rejects the prison offcials' threshold contention that Ramirez can-
not succeed on his claims because he failed to exhaust all available reme-
dies before fling suit as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a). In the context of Texas's grievance sys-
tem, the Court fnds Ramirez properly exhausted administrative reme-
dies. Ramirez tried (unsuccessfully) to resolve the issue informally
with a prison chaplain. He then fled a Step 1 grievance requesting
that his pastor be allowed to “ `lay hands on me' & pray over me while
I am being executed.” Prison offcials denied that grievance, and Rami-
rez timely appealed. His Step 2 grievance reiterated the same re-
quests. Ramirez's grievances thus “clearly stated” that he wished to
have his pastor touch him and pray with him during his execution.
Respondents' various arguments to the contrary lack merit. Re-
spondents maintain that Ramirez failed to exhaust Texas's grievance
process because he fled suit six days before prison offcials ruled on his
Step 2 grievance, but any defect was arguably cured by Ramirez's fling
of an amended complaint the same day the State denied his Step 2 griev-
ance, and the Court need not defnitively resolve the issue as respond-
ents failed to raise it below. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709,
718, n. 7. While respondents correctly note that Ramirez's grievance
did not explicitly request “audible” prayer in the execution chamber, the
most natural understanding of Ramirez's request to permit his pastor
to “pray over” him during the execution is one that conveys a request
for “audible” prayer. Finally, the Court rejects respondents' argument
that Ramirez should have fled his grievance earlier. Ramirez fled the
grievance that sparked this litigation just three days after he learned
of the prohibition on religious touch, and the Court fnds his grievance
timely. Pp. 421–424.
(b) Turning to the merits of Ramirez's RLUIPA claims, RLUIPA pro-
vides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confned to an institution”

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413
Syllabus
unless the government demonstrates that the burden imposed on that
person
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govern-
mental interest. 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc–1(a). A plaintiff bears the initial
burden of proving that a prison policy “implicates his religious exer-
cise.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352, 360. A prisoner's requested reli-
gious accommodation “must be sincerely based on a religious belief and
not some other motivation.” Id., at 360–361. The burden on the pris-
oner's religious exercise must also be “substantial[ ].” Id., at 361.
Pp. 424–433.
(1) Ramirez is likely to succeed in proving that his religious re-
quests are “sincerely based on a religious belief.” Id., at 360–361.
Both the laying on of hands and prayer are traditional forms of religious
exercise, and Ramirez's pastor confrmed that prayer accompanied by
touch is a signifcant part of their shared faith tradition. Neither the
District Court nor the Court of Appeals doubted that Ramirez had a
sincere religious basis for his requests. Texas's argument to the con-
trary—which stems from a complaint Ramirez fled in 2020 in which he
sought his pastor's presence and prayer in the chamber, but disclaimed
any need for touch—does not outweigh ample evidence of the sincerity
of Ramirez's beliefs. Respondents do not dispute that any burden their
policy imposes on Ramirez's religious exercise is substantial. Pp. 425–
426.
(2) Given the current record, the State has not shown that it is
likely to carry the burden of demonstrating that its refusal to accommo-
date Ramirez's religious exercise is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering the government's compelling interests. Pp. 426–433.
(i) Despite a historical tradition of clerical prayer at the time of
a prisoner's execution that stretches back well before the founding and
continues today, prison offcials insist that a categorical ban on audible
prayer is the least restrictive means of furthering two compelling gov-
ernmental interests. First, they assert that absolute silence is neces-
sary to monitor the inmate's condition during the delicate process of
lethal injection without the potential interference of audible prayer.
Respondents fail to show that a categorical ban on audible prayer is the
least restrictive means of furthering this compelling interest, and they
do not explain why other jurisdictions can accommodate audible prayer
but Texas cannot feasibly do so. Texas asks the Court to defer to its exe-
cution chamber policy determinations, but RLUIPA requires more when
a policy imposes a substantial burden on sincere religious exercise. Fur-
ther, no basis for deference exists given the State's history of allowing
prison chaplains to audibly pray with the condemned during executions.
Second, prison offcials say that if they allow spiritual advisors to pray
aloud during executions, the opportunity “could be exploited to make a
statement to the witnesses or offcials, rather than the inmate.” Texas
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414 RAMIREZ
v. COLLIER
Syllabus
has a compelling interest in preventing disruptions of any sort and
mai
ntaining solemnity and decorum in the execution chamber. But the
record here provides no indication that Ramirez's pastor would cause
the sorts of disruptions that respondents fear. Conjecture alone fails
to satisfy the sort of case-by-case analysis that RLUIPA requires. See
Holt, 574 U. S., at 363. Further, prison offcials have less restrictive
ways to handle any concerns. Pp. 427–430.
(ii) Ramirez is also likely to prevail on his claim that Texas's cate-
gorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber is inconsistent
with his rights under RLUIPA. Respondents point to three compelling
governmental interests it says the ban on touch furthers: security in the
execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering of the prisoner,
and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim's family members.
But respondents fail to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least
restrictive means of accomplishing any of these commendable goals.
Indeed, Texas does nothing to rebut obvious alternatives, and its sug-
gestion that Ramirez must identify other less restrictive means that
would accomplish the government's interests gets RLUIPA's burden
shifting backward. Texas may eventually face more problematic re-
quests than those made by Ramirez here, but RLUIPA requires that
courts consider only “the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
religion is being substantially burdened.” Holt, 574 U. S., at 363.
Pp. 430–433.
(c) Having found that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his
RLUIPA claims, the Court concludes other factors justify preliminary
relief. See Winter, 555 U. S., at 20. Ramirez is likely to suffer irrepa-
rable harm absent injunctive relief because he will be unable to engage
in protected religious exercise in the fnal moments of his life. This is
a spiritual harm that compensation paid to his estate would not remedy.
Additionally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez's
favor. RLUIPA recognizes that prisoners like Ramirez have a strong
interest in avoiding substantial burdens on their religious exercise. At
the same time, “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an impor-
tant interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill v. Mc-
Donough, 547 U. S. 573, 584. Because it is possible to accommodate
Ramirez's sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his
execution, the Court concludes the balance of equities and the public
interest favor his tailored request for injunctive relief. The record does
not support respondents' assertion that Ramirez has engaged in litiga-
tion misconduct that should preclude equitable relief here. Pp. 433–435.
(d) Timely resolution of RLUIPA claims in the prisoner context could
be facilitated if States were to adopt policies anticipating likely issues
and streamlined procedures for resolving requests. It should be the

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415
Syllabus
rare RLUIPA capital case that requires last-minute resort to the federal
cour
ts. The proper remedy in such a case is an injunction ordering the
accommodation, not a stay of the execution. This approach balances
the State's interest in carrying out capital sentences without delay and
the prisoner's interest in religious exercise. Texas must decide on re-
mand here where its interest lies, as further proceedings defending its
policies may delay carrying out Ramirez's sentence. If Texas resched-
ules Ramirez's execution and declines to permit audible prayer or reli-
gious touch, the District Court should enter appropriate preliminary
relief. Pp. 435–436.
10 F. 4th 561, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Breyer,
Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ.,
joined. Sotomayor, J., post, p. 437, and Kavanaugh, J., post, p. 439, fled
concurring opinions. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 446.
Seth Kretzer argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Erin Glenn Busby, Lisa R. Eskow, Mi-
chael F. Sturley, and Eric J. Allen.
Deputy Solicitor General Feigin argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party.
With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Flet-
cher, Assistant Attorney General Clarke, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Boynton, Christopher G. Michel, Melissa
N. Patterson, Michael S. Raab, Nicolas Y. Riley, and Lowell
V. Sturgill, Jr.
Judd E. Stone II, Solicitor General of Texas, argued the
cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Ken
Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Brent Webster, First As-
sistant Attorney General, Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, and Ari Cuenin, Natalie D. Thompson,
and Eric J. Hamilton, Assistant Solicitors General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Alliance De-
fending Freedom by Gordon D. Todd and William R. Levi; for the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty by Eric C. Rassbach, Lori H. Windham, Chris
Pagliarella, Michael W. McConnell, Joshua C. McDaniel, and James A.
Sonne; for Former Prison Offcials by David C. Frederick; for Religious-
Liberty Scholars by Douglas Laycock and Steven T. Collis, both pro se;
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416 RAMIREZ
v. COLLIER
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Cour
t.
A Texas jury sentenced John Ramirez to death for the bru-
tal murder of Pablo Castro. In this litigation, Ramirez does
not challenge his conviction. Nor does he challenge his sen-
tence. He asks instead that his long-time pastor be allowed
to pray with him and lay hands on him while he is being
executed. He says that the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42
U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq., requires this accommodation. Rami-
rez sought a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to permit
his religious exercise if the State went forward with his exe-
cution. The District Court and Court of Appeals declined
to grant such relief. We then stayed the execution and
granted certiorari.
for Spiritual Advisors et al. by Lisa S. Blatt, Charles L. McCloud, David
D. Cole, Daniel Mach, David C. Fathi, Heather L. Weaver, Jennifer A.
Wedekind, Cassandra Stubbs, and Brian Stull; and for the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. by Steven Levatino, Anthony R.
Picarello, Jr., Jeffrey Hunter Moon, and Michael F. Moses.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Arizona et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, Brunn W.
Roysden III, Solicitor General, Lacey Stover Gard, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, Ginger Jarvis, and Joseph A. Kanefeld, and by the Attorneys Gen-
eral for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama,
Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Theodore E.
Rokita of Indiana, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Austin Knudsen of Montana,
Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee
C. Stapleton; and for Maria Chavon Aguilar et al. by Allyson N. Ho, Brad-
ley G. Hubbard, and Christine A. Buaasoff.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Christian Legal Society et al.
by Kimberlee Wood Colby and Thomas C. Berg; for the First Liberty
Institute by Michael J. Walsh, Jr., Kelly J. Shackel ford, Hiram S. Sasser
III, and Stephanie N. Taub; for the Freedom from Religion Foundation
et al. by Rebecca S. Markert; and for Protect the First Foundation by
Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C.
Smith, and Kathryn E. Tarbert.
A brief of amici curiae was fled for Scholars of the PLRA et al. by
Jennifer S. Freel.

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417
Opinion of the Court
I
A
Pablo
Castro worked the night shift at the Times Market
convenience store in Corpus Christi, Texas. On July 19,
2004, Castro was outside closing up when Ramirez and an
accomplice approached him with a knife. Ramirez stabbed
Castro 29 times, searched his pockets, and made off with
$1.25. Castro died on the pavement, leaving behind 9 chil-
dren and 14 grandchildren.
Ramirez fed to Mexico, where he evaded authorities for
more than three years. In 2008, he was fnally apprehended
near the Mexican border. Texas charged Ramirez with
murdering Castro in the course of committing or attempting
to commit robbery—a capital offense. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 2019). Ramirez admitted to killing
Castro, but denied the robbery that made the murder a capi-
tal crime. A jury disagreed, found Ramirez guilty, and sen-
tenced him to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affrmed Ramirez's conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
See Ramirez v. State, No. AP–76100 (Mar. 16, 2011). Rami-
rez's attempts to collaterally attack his conviction in state
and federal court also proved unsuccessful. See Ramirez v.
Davis, 780 Fed. Appx. 110, 112–114 (CA5 2019) (discussing
Ramirez's past habeas flings), cert. denied, 589 U. S. –––
(2020).
B
Texas scheduled Ramirez's execution for February 2, 2017.
Less than a week before that date, Ramirez moved to stay
the execution, arguing that his habeas counsel had rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance. The District Court
granted a stay, but later rejected Ramirez's claim. The
Fifth Circuit then declined to issue a certifcate of appealabil-
ity. See Ramirez, 780 Fed. Appx. 110. Still, this last-
minute litigation had the effect of delaying Ramirez's execu-
tion for several years.
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Opinion of the Court
Texas rescheduled Ramirez's execution for September 9,
2020.
Ramirez then asked to have his pastor accompany
him into the execution chamber. Prison offcials denied the
request. They did so because, at the time, Texas's execution
protocol barred all spiritual advisors from entering the
chamber. App. 60. A prior version of the protocol had al-
lowed access for prison chaplains. Ibid. But Texas em-
ployed only Christian and Muslim chaplains. In 2019, when
a Buddhist inmate sought to have his spiritual advisor join
him in the execution chamber, Texas declined to grant the
accommodation. We stayed that execution pending certio-
rari, unless the State allowed a Buddhist spiritual advi-
sor into the execution chamber. Murphy v. Collier, 587
U. S. ––– (2019). In response, Texas amended its execution
protocol to bar all chaplains from entering the execution
chamber, so as not to discriminate among religions. See
Brief for Respondents 4–5; App. 111.
Ramirez fled suit, arguing that Texas's new execution pro-
tocol violated his rights under the First Amendment and
RLUIPA. Ramirez's complaint said that he was a Christian
and had received religious guidance from Pastor Dana Moore
since 2016. Id., at 61. Pastor Moore serves the Second
Baptist Church in Corpus Christi, of which Ramirez is a
member. Ramirez explained that he wanted his pastor “to
be present at the time of his execution to pray with him and
provide spiritual comfort and guidance in his fnal moments.”
Ibid. Ramirez's complaint focused on prayer and explained
that his pastor “need not touch [him] at any time in the exe-
cution chamber.” Ibid.
Texas withdrew Ramirez's death warrant before there
were any further flings. As a result, the parties jointly
agreed to dismiss the litigation without prejudice.
C
On February 5, 2021, Texas informed Ramirez that his new
execution date would be September 8, 2021. Ramirez then
fled a Step 1 prison grievance requesting that he “be al-

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419
Opinion of the Court
lowed to have [his] spiritual advisor present in the death
chamber
.” Id., at 50–51. Texas again denied the request,
but later changed course, amending its execution protocol
to permit a prisoner's spiritual advisor to be present in the
execution chamber. See id., at 133–152.
Our decisions in Gutierrez v. Saenz, 590 U. S. ––– (2020),
and Dunn v. Smith, 592 U. S. ––– (2021), seem to have precip-
itated the change. Both cases concerned prisoner requests
to have a spiritual advisor present in the execution chamber.
And in both cases, we declined to allow the executions to
proceed unless the inmate was granted that accommodation.
Justice Kavanaugh, dissenting in Dunn, explained that
States wishing to avoid such stays “should fgure out a way
to allow spiritual advisors into the execution room, as other
States and the Federal Government have done.” Id., at –––.
Texas's 2021 Execution Protocol did just that. It allows a
prisoner's spiritual advisor to enter the execution chamber,
accompanied by a prison security escort. This accommoda-
tion is subject to various procedural requirements. See
App. 133–137. For instance, the prisoner must notify the
warden of his choice of spiritual advisor within 30 days of
learning his execution date. Id., at 134. Additionally, the
spiritual advisor must pass a background check and undergo
training. Id., at 136. And if the spiritual advisor is “dis-
ruptive,” he is subject to “immediate removal.” Id., at 149.
The protocol says nothing about whether a spiritual advisor
may pray aloud or touch an inmate for comfort. But Texas
had long allowed its own prison chaplains to engage in such
activities during executions, and it was against this backdrop
that Texas enacted the new policy. See Brief for Petitioner
29–33; Brief for Former Prison Offcials as Amici Curiae
2–11.
D
On June 11, 2021, Ramirez fled the grievance that is at
the center of this case. Having successfully petitioned the
State to allow his pastor into the execution chamber, he re-
quested that his pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him
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Opinion of the Court
and “pray over” him while the execution was taking place.
App
. 52–53. Ramirez's grievance explains that it is “part of
my faith to have my spiritual advisor lay hands on me any-
time I am sick or dying.” Id., at 52. Texas denied the
grievance on July 2, 2021. It said that spiritual advisors are
“not allowed to touch an inmate while inside the execution
chamber,” though it did not point to any provision of its exe-
cution protocol requiring this result. Id., at 53.
Ramirez appealed within the prison system by fling a
Step 2 grievance on July 8, 2021. Id., at 155–156. But with
less than a month to go until his September 8 execution date,
prison offcials had still not ruled on that appeal. So on Au-
gust 10 he fled suit in Federal District Court. Ramirez al-
leged that the refusal of prison offcials to allow Pastor
Moore to lay hands on him in the execution chamber violated
his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Ram-
irez sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief bar-
ring state offcials from executing him unless they granted
the religious accommodation.
On August 16, 2021, Ramirez's attorney inquired whether
Pastor Moore would be allowed to pray audibly with Rami-
rez during the execution. Prison offcials responded three
days later that the pastor would not. Id., at 85–86. So on
August 22 Ramirez fled an amended complaint seeking an
injunction that would allow Pastor Moore to lay hands on
him and pray with him during the execution. Id., at 95–102.
Ramirez also sought a stay of execution while the District
Court considered his claims. The District Court denied the
request, as did the Fifth Circuit. See 10 F. 4th 561 (CA5
2021) (per curiam). Judge Dennis dissented. In his view,
Ramirez's RLUIPA claims were likely to succeed because
the prison's policies burdened religious exercise and were
not the least restrictive means of furthering the State's com-
pelling interest in the security of the execution. Id., at
566–568.
We then stayed Ramirez's execution, granted certiorari,
and heard arg ument on an expedited basis. See 594
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421
Opinion of the Court
U. S. ––– (2021). Ramirez's certiorari petition asked us to
deter
mine whether Texas's restrictions on religious touch
and audible prayer violate either RLUIPA or the Free Exer-
cise Clause. Ramirez's merits brief addresses only RLUIPA,
however, so we do not consider any standalone argument
under the Free Exercise Clause.
We are also mindful that, while we have had full briefng
and oral argument in this Court, the case comes to us in
a preliminary posture: The question is whether Ramirez's
execution without the requested participation of his pastor
should be halted, pending full consideration of his claims on
a complete record. The parties agree that the relief sought
is proper ly charac ter i zed as a prel i mi nary i n junc ti on.
Under such circumstances, the party seeking relief “must es-
tablish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi-
nary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008).
II
The prison offcials begin by arguing that Ramirez cannot
hope to succeed on his claims, because he failed to exhaust
all available remedies before fling suit. Such exhaustion is
mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA), 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a), even in the execution context.
See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 85 (2006); Porter v. Nus-
sle, 534 U. S. 516, 520 (2002). The Act requires compliance
with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules,” Wood-
ford, 548 U. S., at 90–91, with no exceptions for “special cir-
cumstances,” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 635 (2016). Thus,
if Ramirez failed to exhaust all available administrative rem-
edies, his suit may not proceed. Respondents argue that is
the case here. We disagree.
The Texas prison grievance process is straightforward.
See Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Offender Orientation
Handbook 73–75 (Feb. 2017) (Prison Handbook). Prior to
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v. COLLIER
Opinion of the Court
fling a grievance, an inmate must try to resolve the issue
i
nformally. If that does not work, the prisoner must fle a
Step 1 grievance within 15 days of the “alleged incident or
occurrence.” Id., at 74. When fling a grievance, an inmate
must “clearly state[ ]” “[t]he specifc action required to re-
solve the complaint.” Id., at 75. Prison offcials then have
40 days to decide the grievance. If the prisoner remains
dissatisfed, he may appeal by fling a Step 2 grievance
within 15 days. Prison offcials have another 40 days to
issue a decision on the appeal. Id., at 74. Only after ex-
hausting both steps of that grievance process may a prisoner
fle suit. See 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a).
We are persuaded—at least in the current posture of the
case—that Ramirez properly exhausted these administrative
remedies. The record indicates that Ramirez tried to re-
solve the issue informally with a prison chaplain. App. 52.
1
When that did not work, he fled a Step 1 grievance request-
ing that his pastor be allowed to “ `lay hands on me' & pray
over me while I am being executed.” Id., at 52–53. Prison
offcials denied that grievance, and Ramirez timely appealed.
Id., at 53, 155–156. His Step 2 grievance reiterated, “I wish
to have my Spiritual Advisor `lay hands on me' to pray over
me during my upcoming execution.” Id., at 155. Ramirez's
grievances thus “clearly stated” that he wished to have his
pastor touch him and pray with him during his execution.
Prison Handbook 75. In the context of Texas's grievance
system, that is enough.
Respondents briefy argue that Ramirez failed to exhaust
Texas's grievance process because he fled suit before prison
1
The dissent argues that Ramirez's effort at informal resolution was
either insuffcient or insuffciently documented. Post, at 462–463 (opinion
of Thomas, J.). Ramirez specifed on the grievance form the date he
raised the issue with the prison chaplain and attempted to resolve it. In
a one-sentence description of the chaplain's response, Ramirez mentioned
only the touching claim. Texas does not argue that this constituted fail-
ure to exhaust, and therefore forfeited any such argument.
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Opinion of the Court
offcials ruled on his Step 2 grievance. See Brief for Re-
spondents
28. It is true that prison offcials did not decide
that grievance until six days after Ramirez sued. Compare
App. 1 with id., at 155–156. But Ramirez fled an amended
complaint that same day, and he also fled a second amended
complaint after that. Id., at 2–3. The original defect was
arguably cured by those subsequent flings. See Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F. 3d 1002, 1005 (CA9 2010) (“As a general
rule, when a plaintiff fles an amended complaint, the
amended complaint supercedes the original, the latter being
treated thereafter as non-existent.” (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)) (PLRA case). In any event,
we need not defnitively resolve the issue as respondents
failed to raise it below. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S.
709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“we are a court of review, not of frst
view”).
Respondents also argue that Ramirez failed to properly
exhaust his request for audible prayer in the execution cham-
ber. The gist of their argument is that while his grievances
clearly requested prayer, they did not clearly request audi-
ble prayer. See Brief for Respondents 25–30. We disagree.
Ramirez asked that prison offcials permit his pastor to “lay
hands” on him and “pray over” him during the execution.
App. 53. While it is true that this language did not explic-
itly reference “audible” prayer, the language adequately con-
veyed such a request for several reasons. First, if Ramirez
had merely wanted silent prayer, his grievance need not
have mentioned prayer at all. He and his pastor could have
prayed silently and no one would have been the wiser. Sec-
ond, praying aloud is a common type of Christian prayer that
people engage in together. See Brief for Petitioner 21–22.
Even respondents concede that such prayer is “not uncom-
mon.” Brief for Respondents 30. Finally, Texas's historic
practice of allowing prison chaplains to pray audibly with
inmates inside the execution chamber further suggests that
Ramirez intended to invoke this practice. See Brief for

424 RAMIREZ
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Petitioner 32–33. A request for audible prayer is thus the
most
natural understanding of Ramirez's grievances.
Nor are we persuaded by respondents' argument that
Ramirez should have fled his grievance sooner. In Texas,
prisoners must raise a grievance within “15 days from the
date of the alleged incident or occurrence.” Prison Hand-
book 74. Respondents contend that Ramirez should have
fled his grievance within 15 days of when Texas issued its
revised execution protocol (April 21, 2021), or within 15 days
of when he learned that his pastor would be allowed inside
the chamber (May 4, 2021). See Brief for Respondents 26–
27. Both suggestions are untenable. Neither the revised
execution protocol nor the State's decision to admit Pastor
Moore put Ramirez on notice that religious touch and audible
prayer would be banned inside the execution chamber. To
the contrary, Texas had long permitted such activities. See
Brief for Petitioner 29–33; Brief for Former Prison Offcials
as Amici Curiae 6–11. Ramirez says—and respondents do
not dispute—that he frst learned of the prohibition on reli-
gious touch on June 8, 2021. Reply Brief 4. Ramirez fled
the grievance that sparked this litigation just three days
later, on June 11. App. 53. We thus have little trouble con-
cluding that the grievance was timely, and that we may pro-
ceed to the merits.
III
Congress enacted RLUIPA, and its sister statute the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42
U. S. C. § 2000bb et seq., in the aftermath of our decisions in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), and City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997). See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S.
352, 356–358 (2015) (discussing this history). Both statutes
aim to ensure “greater protection for religious exercise than
is available under the First Amendment.” Id., at 357.
RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person re-
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siding in or confned to an institution”—including state pris-
oners—“e
ven if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that impo-
sition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
tal interest.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc–1(a). A plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proving that a prison policy “implicates
his religious exercise.” Holt, 574 U. S., at 360. Although
RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,”
§ 2000cc–5(7)(A), a prisoner's requested accommodation
“must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some
other motivation,” id., at 360–361. The burden on the pris-
oner's religious exercise must also be “substantial[ ].” Id.,
at 361. Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden
fips and the government must “demonstrate[ ] that imposi-
tion of the burden on that person” is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
§ 2000cc–1(a); see also id., at 362. This allocation of respec-
tive burdens applies in the preliminary injunction context.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Benefcente União do Vegetal,
546 U. S. 418, 429–430 (2006).
A
To begin, we think Ramirez is likely to succeed in proving
that his religious requests are “sincerely based on a religious
belief.” Holt, 574 U. S., at 360–361. Ramirez seeks to have
his pastor lay hands on him and pray over him during the
execution. Both are traditional forms of religious exercise.
See Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus
Curiae 3–19. As Ramirez's grievance states, “it is part of
my faith to have my spiritual advisor lay hands on me any-
time I am sick or dying.” App. 52. Pastor Moore, who has
ministered to Ramirez for four years, agrees that prayer ac-
companied by touch is “a signifcant part of our faith tradi-
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tion as Baptists.” Id., at 47. And neither the District
Cour
t nor the Court of Appeals doubted that Ramirez had a
sincere religious basis for his requested accommodations.
Respondents' argument to the contrary turns in large part
on a complaint Ramirez fled in 2020. See Brief for Re-
spondents 35–37. Ramirez fled the complaint while Texas's
prior execution protocol, which banned all spiritual advisors
from the execution chamber, was in place. See App. 56–70,
111. The complaint sought Pastor Moore's presence and
prayer in the chamber, but disclaimed any need for touch.
Id., at 61 (“When Plaintiff Ramirez is executed, Pastor Moore
will pray with him. Pastor Moore need not touch Mr. Rami-
rez at any time in the execution chamber.”). As respond-
ents see things, this shows that Ramirez's current request
for touch is insincere.
Ramirez responds that the 2020 complaint was inaccurate,
and that he would have amended it had the litigation contin-
ued. Brief for Petitioner 11, n. 3; Reply Brief 7, n. 5. The
litigation, however, did not proceed, because the parties
jointly agreed to dismiss the suit without prejudice less than
a week after it was fled. See Notice of Nonsuit Without
Prejudice in No. 2:20–cv–205 (SD Tex. 2020). Ramirez's
specifc statement in his prior complaint is certainly proba-
tive on the issue of sincerity; evolving litigation positions
may suggest a prisoner's goal is delay rather than sincere
religious exercise. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 278
(2005). Under the facts of this case, however, we do not
think the prior complaint—dismissed without prejudice and
by agreement one week after it was fled—outweighs the
ample evidence that Ramirez's beliefs are sincere. Re-
spondents do not dispute that any burden their policy im-
poses on Ramirez's religious exercise is substantial. See
Holt, 574 U. S., at 361.
B
Because Ramirez is likely to succeed in showing that Tex-
as's policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion, re-
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spondents must prove that their refusal to accommodate the
exercise
both (1) furthers “a compelling governmental inter-
est,” and (2) is the “least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc–
1(a). Under RLUIPA, the government cannot discharge
this burden by pointing to “broadly formulated interests.”
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 726
(2014). It must instead “demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfed through application of the challenged
law [to] the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of reli-
gion is being substantially burdened.” Holt, 574 U. S.,
at 363.
Here, the government has not shown that it is likely to
carry that burden.
1
As for audible prayer, there is a rich history of clerical
prayer at the time of a prisoner's execution, dating back well
before the founding of our Nation. See Brief for Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 3–15. For
example, at Newgate Prison—one of London's most notori-
ous jails—an Anglican priest would stand and pray with the
condemned in their fnal moments. A. McKenzie, Tyburn's
Martyrs 9–14 (2007). By the early 1700s, that practice had
evolved to permit prisoners to be “attended by a minister,
or even a priest, of their own communion.” Id., at 176; see
also id., at 176–182. Prayer at the time of execution was
also commonplace in the American Colonies. See, e. g.,
W. Smith, New-London Gazette, Sept. 11, 1772, reprinted in
W. DeLoss Love, Samson Occom and the Christian Indians
of New England 173–174 (1899) (“The Rev. Mr. Occom . . .
attended the Criminal to the Place of Execution, where he
made a short but well adapted Prayer to the Occasion.”);
see also W. Smith, The Convict's Visitor 85 (1791) (containing
model prayers for clergy attending to the condemned, includ-
ing at the “[g]iving [of] the signal”). And during the Revo-
lutionary War, General George Washington ordered that
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“prisoners under sentence of death” “be attended with such
Chaplai
ns, as they choose”—including at the time of their
execution. G. Washington, General Orders (June 9, 1777);
see also ibid. (May 1, 1780). These chaplains often spoke
and prayed with the condemned during their fnal moments.
See Pennsylvania Evening Post, June 6, 1780, vol. 6, p. 62,
col. 2 (“Upon the arrival of the criminals at the place of exe-
cution, the attending chaplain . . . prayed and recommended
them severally to God.”).
A tradition of such prayer continued throughout our Na-
tion's history. See S. Banner, The Death Penalty 35–36
(2002). When, for example, the Federal Government exe-
cuted four members of the conspiracy that led to the assassi-
nation of President Abraham Lincoln, the prisoners were ac-
companied by clergy of various denominations. See End of
the Assassins, N. Y. Times, July 8, 1865, p. 1, col. 1. These
“spiritual advisers” ministered to the condemned, and three
spoke public prayers shortly before the prisoners were
hanged. Id., at col. 5–6. And in the aftermath of World
War II, the United States Army even permitted Nazi war
criminals facing execution to be accompanied by a chaplain,
who “spoke” prayers on the gallows in the moments before
death. See H. Gerecke, I Walked to the Gallows With the
Nazi Chiefs, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 1, 1951, p. 58.
The practice continues today. In 2020 and 2021, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons allowed religious advisors to speak or
pray audibly with inmates during at least six federal execu-
tions. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24–
25. What's more, Texas itself appears to have long allowed
prison chaplains to pray with inmates in the execution cham-
ber, deciding to prohibit such prayer only in the last several
years. Id., at 2–3.
Despite this long history, prison offcials now insist that a
categorical ban on audible prayer in the execution chamber
is the least restrictive means of furthering two compelling
governmental interests.
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First, prison offcials say that absolute silence is necessary
i
n the execution chamber so they can monitor the inmate's
condition through a microphone suspended overhead. They
say that audible prayer might impede their ability to hear
subtle signs of trouble or prove distracting during an emer-
gency. See Brief for Respondents 46. We do not doubt
that prison offcials have a compelling interest in monitoring
an execution and responding effectively during any potential
emergency. And we recognize that audible prayer could
present a more serious risk of interference during the deli-
cate process of lethal injection than during the method of
execution (hanging) that was used in most of the historical
examples we have cited. But respondents fail to show that
a categorical ban on all audible prayer is the least restrictive
means of furthering their compelling interests.
Indeed, respondents offer only a conclusory defense of the
policy's tailoring. They acknowledge that both the Federal
Government and Alabama have recently permitted audible
prayer or speech in the execution chamber, but then assert
that, “under the circumstances in Texas's chamber, allowing
speech during the execution is not feasible.” Id., at 47.
Respondents do not explain why. Nor do they explore any
relevant differences between Texas's execution chamber or
process and those of other jurisdictions. Instead, they ask
that we simply defer to their determination. That is not
enough under RLUIPA. Nor is there a basis for deference,
given that Texas has “historically and routinely allowed
prison chaplains to audibly pray” with the condemned during
executions, a fact Texas does not dispute. Brief for Peti-
tioner 29; see also id., at 32–33.
Second, prison offcials say that if they allow spiritual advi-
sors to pray aloud during executions, the opportunity “could
be exploited to make a statement to the witnesses or offcials,
rather than the inmate.” Brief for Respondents 46. They
note that such statements might cause further trauma to the
victim's family or otherwise interfere with the execution.
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Ibid. We agree that the government has a compelling inter-
est
in preventing disruptions of any sort and maintaining
solemnity and decorum in the execution chamber. But
there is no indication in the record that Pastor Moore would
cause the sorts of disruptions that respondents fear. Re-
spondents' argument thus comes down to conjecture regard-
ing what a hypothetical spiritual advisor might do in some
future case. “Such speculation is insuffcient to satisfy” re-
spondents' burden, see Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S.
–––, ––– (2021), and fails to engage in the sort of case-by-case
analysis that RLUIPA requires, see Holt, 574 U. S., at 363.
What's more, there appear to be less restrictive ways to
handle any concerns. Prison offcials could impose reason-
able restrictions on audible prayer in the execution cham-
ber—such as limiting the volume of any prayer so that medi-
cal offcials can monitor an inmate's condition, requiring
silence during critical points in the execution process (includ-
ing when an execution warrant is read or offcials must com-
municate with one another), allowing a spiritual advisor to
speak only with the inmate, and subjecting advisors to imme-
diate removal for failure to comply with any rule. Prison
offcials could also require spiritual advisors to sign penalty-
backed pledges agreeing to abide by all such limitations.
Given the current record, respondents have not shown that
a total ban on audible prayer is the least restrictive means
of furthering their asserted interests.
2
Respondents' categorical ban on religious touch in the exe-
cution chamber fares no better. They point to three govern-
mental interests they say are compelling: security in the
execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering, and
avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim's family
members. All three goals are commendable. But again, re-
spondents fail to show that a categorical ban on touch is the
least restrictive means of accomplishing any of them.
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Respondents say that allowing a spiritual advisor to touch
an
inmate would place the advisor in harm's way because the
inmate might escape his restraints, smuggle in a weapon, or
become violent. Brief for Respondents 37–38. They also
contend that if a spiritual advisor were close enough to touch
an inmate, he might tamper with the prisoner's restraints or
yank out an IV line. Id., at 38–39. We agree that prisons
have compelling interests in both protecting those attending
an execution and preventing them from interfering with it
(though if an inmate smuggling a weapon into the execution
chamber is a serious prospect, the prison has broader issues
than those considered here). Even so, Texas's categorical
ban on religious touch is not the least restrictive means of
furthering such interests.
Under Texas's current protocol, spiritual advisors stand
just three feet from the gurney in the execution chamber.
Id., at 38. A security escort is posted nearby, ready to inter-
vene if anything goes awry. Ibid. We do not see how let-
ting the spiritual advisor stand slightly closer, reach out his
arm, and touch a part of the prisoner's body well away from
the site of any IV line would meaningfully increase risk.
And that is all Ramirez requests here. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
9–10 (Ramirez's counsel stating, “Pastor Moore can touch
Mr. Ramirez's foot, an extremity on the complete far end
of the body from the point at which the IV line will be in-
serted into his arm. . . . [T]hat would satisfy the religious
exercise.”).
Respondents next argue that allowing the pastor to touch
Ramirez in the execution chamber might lead to preventable
suffering. The theory is that Pastor Moore might acciden-
tally jostle, pinch, or otherwise interfere with an IV line,
and that this in turn might affect the administration of the
execution drugs in a way that results in greater pain or suf-
fering. See Brief for Respondents 38–39. We think that
preventing accidental interference with the prison's IV lines
is a compelling governmental interest. But we also think it

432 RAMIREZ
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is one reasonably addressed by means short of banning all
touch
in the execution chamber.
For example, Texas could allow touch on a part of the body
away from IV lines, such as a prisoner's lower leg. That
seems to have been the practice of many prison chaplains
during past Texas executions. Brief for Petitioner 29–33.
Additionally, Texas could require Ramirez's pastor to stand
in a location that gives the medical team an unobstructed
view of the IV lines, allowing them to watch for problems
and quickly respond. Texas could also restrict the time pe-
riod during which touching is permitted to minimize risk
during critical points in the execution process, such as the
insertion of the IV line. Finally, Texas could require that
the pastor undergo training so that he understands the im-
portance of staying away from IV lines and taking whatever
other precautions are necessary to avoid problems in the
chamber.
Texas does nothing to rebut these obvious alternatives,
instead suggesting that it is Ramirez's burden to “identify
any less-restrictive means.” Brief for Respondents 41.
That gets things backward. Once a plaintiff has made out
his initial case under RLUIPA, it is the government that
must show its policy “is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000cc–1(a)(2).
Finally, respondents say that allowing certain forms of re-
ligious touch might further traumatize a victim's family
members who are present as witnesses, reminding them that
their loved one received no such solace. Brief for Respond-
ents 39–40. As we have already noted, maintaining solem-
nity and decorum in the execution chamber is a compelling
governmental interest. But here what is at issue is allow-
ing Pastor Moore to respectfully touch Ramirez's foot or
lower leg inside the execution chamber. Respondents do
not contend that this particular act will result in trauma.
See ibid. Instead, their real concern seems to be with other,
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potentia l ly more problematic requests down the l i ne.
RL
UIPA, however, requires that courts take cases one at a
time, considering only “the particular claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Holt,
574 U. S., at 363. As a result, respondents' fnal argument
is unavailing.
We conclude that Ramirez is likely to prevail on his claim
that Texas's categorical ban on religious touch in the execu-
tion chamber is inconsistent with his rights under RLUIPA.
IV
A
Our conclusion that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the mer-
its of his RLUIPA claims does not end the matter. As noted
earlier, he must also show “that he is likely to suffer irrepa-
rable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the bal-
ance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter, 555 U. S., at 20.
We think these factors also favor an injunction. Ramirez
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunc-
tive relief because he will be unable to engage in protected
religious exercise in the fnal moments of his life. Compen-
sation paid to his estate would not remedy this harm, which
is spiritual rather than pecuniary.
Additionally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt
in Ramirez's favor. Ramirez “does not seek an open-ended
stay of execution.” Brief for Petitioner 44. Rather, he re-
quests a tailored injunction requiring that Texas permit au-
dible prayer and religious touch during his execution. By
passing RLUIPA, Congress determined that prisoners like
Ramirez have a strong interest in avoiding substantial bur-
dens on their religious exercise, even while confned. At the
same time, “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an
important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.”
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006). Given these
respective interests, a tailored injunction of the sort Ramirez
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seeks—rather than a stay of execution—will be the proper
for
m of equitable relief when a prisoner raises a RLUIPA
claim in the execution context. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3626(a)(2)
(“Preliminary injunctive relief [in a prison conditions suit]
must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary
to correct the harm the court fnds requires preliminary re-
lief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct
that harm.”). Because it is possible to accommodate Rami-
rez's sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding
his execution, we conclude that the balance of equities and
the public interest favor his requested relief.
B
Respondents argue that Ramirez has engaged in inequita-
ble conduct. As they see it, this should bar the equitable
relief that Ramirez seeks.
We agree that a party's inequitable conduct can make equi-
table relief inappropriate. When a party seeking equitable
relief “has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equita-
ble principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court
will be shut against him.” Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 245 (1933) (quoting 1 J. Pom-
eroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 397 (4th ed. 1918)). These
well-worn principles of equity apply in capital cases just as
in all others. Thus, late-breaking changes in position, last-
minute claims arising from long-known facts, and other “at-
tempt[s] at manipulation” can provide a sound basis for deny-
ing equitable relief in capital cases. Gomez v. United States
Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654
(1992) (per curiam); see also Hill, 547 U. S., at 584 (“A court
considering a stay must also apply a strong equitable pre-
sumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could
have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration
of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, however, the record does not support the conclusion
that Ramirez engaged in such misconduct. Respondents
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Opinion of the Court
argue that Ramirez inequitably delayed this litigation by fl-
i
ng suit just four weeks before his scheduled execution. But
this is not a case in which a litigant “slept upon his rights.”
Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 161 U. S. 573, 578
(1896) (quoting Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377, 387 (1887)).
To the contrary, Ramirez had sought to vindicate his rights
for months. He frst learned that prison offcials would not
allow his pastor to lay hands on him in the execution cham-
ber on June 8, 2021. See Part II, supra. That was a break
from Texas's longstanding practice. Ramirez fled a Step 1
grievance requesting both prayer and religious touch just
three days later. App. 52–53. When that grievance was
rejected, he quickly fled a Step 2 grievance. Id., at 155–
156. Yet respondents failed to issue a fnal decision until
August 16, 2021—39 days after Ramirez had fled his Step 2
grievance, and just a few weeks before the scheduled execu-
tion. To be sure, prison offcials issued their decision within
the 40 days allowed by Texas's grievance policy. See Prison
Handbook 74. But respondents can hardly complain about
the inequities of delay when their own actions were a sig-
nifcant contributing factor.
C
As we have explained, the resolution of RLUIPA claims
in the prisoner context requires a case-specifc consideration
of the particular circumstances and claims. At the same
time, timely resolution of such claims could be facilitated if
States were to adopt policies anticipating and addressing is-
sues likely to arise. Doing so would assist both prison off-
cials responsible for carrying out executions and prisoners
preparing to confront the end of life according to their reli-
gious beliefs.
The frst step would be to specify reasonable rules on the
time for prisoners to request religious accommodations, and
for prison offcials to respond. Cf. Woodford, 548 U. S., at
87–96. States could also adopt streamlined procedures for
claims involving requests like those at issue in this case, so
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that these potentially complicated matters can be litigated
at
all levels well in advance of any scheduled execution. If
spiritual advisors are to be admitted into the execution
chamber, it would also seem reasonable to require some
training on procedures, including any restrictions on their
movements or conduct. When a spiritual advisor would
enter and must leave could be spelled out. If the advisor is
to touch the prisoner, the State might also specify where and
for how long. And, as noted, if audible prayer is to occur, a
variety of considerations might be set forth in advance to
avoid disruption. See supra, at 430. It may also be reason-
able to document the advisor's advance agreement to comply
with any restrictions.
If States adopt clear rules in advance, it should be the rare
case that requires last-minute resort to the federal courts.
If such cases do arise and a court determines that relief is
appropriate under RLUIPA, the proper remedy is an injunc-
tion ordering the accommodation, not a stay of the execution.
This approach balances the State's interest in carrying out
capital sentences without delay and the prisoner's interest
in religious exercise.
One fnal point bears mentioning. Our holding today
arises in the context of a preliminary injunction. And our
analysis turns on Texas's specifc execution protocol, cham-
ber, and historical practices. Further proceedings on re-
mand, if necessary, might shed additional light on Texas's
interests, and on whether its policies are narrowly tailored.
But such proceedings might also contribute to further delay
in carrying out the sentence. The State will have to deter-
mine where its interest lies in going forward.
***
We hold that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of
his RLUIPA claims, and that the other preliminary injunc-
tion factors justify relief. If Texas reschedules Ramirez's
execution and declines to permit audible prayer or religious
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Sotomayor, J., concurring
touch, the District Court should therefore enter appropriate
prel
iminary relief. The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
The opinion of the Court, which I join in full, explains why
clear rules governing the presence of spiritual advisors at exe-
cutions are necessary to ensure that any disputes are resolved
in a timely fashion before a scheduled execution date. I write
separately to underscore the interaction between prison off-
cials' obligations to set such rules and the exhaustion require
ment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).
Under the PLRA, prison offcials and incarcerated individ-
uals share an obligation to act in good faith in resolving dis-
putes: Incarcerated individuals must timely raise their
claims through the prison grievance system, and prison off-
cials must ensure that the system is a functioning one. To
that end, the PLRA requires incarcerated individuals to ex-
haust the prison's administrative grievance process before
turning to the courts only where that process is actually
“available.” 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a). An administrative proc-
ess is not available if it is not “ `capable of use' to obtain
`some relief for the action complained of.' ” Ross v. Blake,
578 U. S. 632, 642 (2016). Availability is a practical determi-
nation that requires considering both whether the adminis-
trative system is accessible as designed and whether prison
administrators and offcers ensure meaningful access to it in
practice. See id., at 643–644.
A scheduled execution date may impose unique time con-
straints on grievance procedures, but it does not alter either
party's responsibilities under the PLRA. Just as incarcer-
ated individuals still bear the burden of timely raising
execution-related claims, prisons still must ensure that ad-
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ministrative remedies are available, which may require modi-
fy
ing procedures to account for the time constraints of a
scheduled execution as the Court describes, ante, at 435–436.
Where an administrative process does not facilitate address-
ing execution-related claims within the timeframe of a sched-
uled execution, it is likely not an “available” remedy that
must be exhausted under the PLRA.
To ensure that administrative remedies are available in
the execution context, prison offcials bear a twofold respon-
sibility. First, they must ensure that rules clearly and
timely inform an individual facing execution of any relevant
protocols, so that the individual in turn may timely raise con-
cerns. Second, the offcials must ensure that the adminis-
trative process proceeds swiftly enough to permit exhaustion
with suffcient time for the individual to seek judicial review,
if necessary, prior to a scheduled execution. Finally, to act
in good faith means that neither incarcerated individuals nor
prison offcials should unnecessarily wait to act until the end
of time available to them.
Because I agree with the Court that Ramirez exhausted
his administrative remedies, it is unnecessary to address
whether they qualifed as available such that exhaustion was
actually a prerequisite to suit.* It raises questions, how-
*The dissent both contends that Ramirez did not exhaust administrative
remedies and that Ramirez cannot claim that administrative remedies
were unavailable to him because he fled grievances and received re-
sponses. Post, at 461–465 (opinion of Thomas, J.). As the dissent re-
counts at length, however, many prison grievance systems require addi-
tional steps after fling a complaint and receiving a response in order to
“exhaust.” Ramirez received a response to his second grievance in early
July, yet his grievance remained pending in the prison's Step 2 process
through August despite his pending September execution date. If an ad-
ministrative system does not permit complete exhaustion of execution-
related claims in a timely manner before a scheduled execution, it may be
unavailable for the purposes of those claims even if it would be available
for other types of claims. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 642 (2016)
(evaluating administrative remedies in terms of their ability to grant relief
for “ `the action complained of ' ”).
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
ever, that the record indicates that the prison failed to pro-
v
ide Ramirez with notice of its restrictions on a spiritual
advisor's actions in the execution room. Timely notice of
policies is essential to ensure the ability to timely raise, or
seek informal resolution of, any claims related to those poli-
cies. It also raises questions that the prison took 39 days to
deny Ramirez's Step 2 grievance, even though the prison had
considered and rejected his request previously and main-
tains that its established policies foreclosed it. Such delay
creates an impression, whether valid or not, that the prison
is trying to “thwart inmates from taking advantage of [the]
grievance process” and cut short their opportunity to obtain
judicial review. Ross, 578 U. S., at 644.
At its heart, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act requires commitment on both sides to achieve a
timely resolution of disputes, as does the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement. Consistent with these principles, incarcerated
individuals should know that delays in raising their requests
can result in denial. They should not, however, be penalized
for delays attributable to prison administrators.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full, and I write separately to
add three points: one about the recent history of litigation
involving religious advisors in execution rooms; a second
about the diffculty of applying RLUIPA's compelling inter-
est and least restrictive means standards; and a third about
state execution procedures going forward.
First, the recent history. The question of religious advi-
sors in the execution room came to this Court three years
ago as a question of religious equality. Some States had
long permitted state-employed chaplains in the execution
room. But those state-employed chaplains were mostly
Christian. Those States did not allow inmates to have their
own religious advisors in the room. Therefore, a Christian
inmate could have the state-employed Christian chaplain in
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the room, but a Buddhist inmate, for example, could not have
a
Buddhist religious advisor in the room. The Court cor-
rectly determined that this practice constituted unlawful re-
ligious discrimination because it treated inmates of different
religions differently. See Murphy v. Collier, 587 U. S. –––
(2019).
At the same time, the Court stressed that an inmate had
to timely raise such a claim so that the execution would not
be unreasonably delayed to the detriment of the victims'
families, among others. For timeliness reasons, the Court
denied relief in the frst such claim to reach this Court. See
Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. ––– (2019). But the Court then
granted relief in the second such claim, which was timely
raised. Murphy, 587 U. S. –––.
The bedrock religious equality principle was easy for
States to apply: States could either (i) always allow a reli-
gious advisor into the execution room or (ii) always exclude
a religious advisor, including any state-employed chaplain.
But States could not allow religious advisors of some reli-
gions while excluding religious advisors of other religions.
Then, however, a different kind of claim emerged. In
States that equally barred all advisors from the execution
room, some inmates brought a religious liberty claim—a
claim seeking a religious exemption from an otherwise neu-
tral and generally applicable rule excluding all advisors.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000, known as RLUIPA, proscribes the State from sub-
stantially burdening an inmate's religious exercise except
when the State has a compelling interest and employs the
least restrictive means to achieve that interest. See 114
Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq. Suing under RLUIPA,
some inmates argued that the State did not have a suff-
ciently “compelling ” interest to exclude religious advisors
from the execution room—or at least that the State could
satisfy its asserted safety, security, and solemnity interests
by means less restrictive than excluding all religious advi-
sors from the room.
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And then, in this case, still another kind of claim emerged.
Ramirez
not only wants a religious advisor in the execution
room. He also wants the advisor to be able to engage in
audible prayer and even to be able to physically touch him
during the execution process. Ramirez argues that the
State does not have a suffciently “compelling ” interest to
prevent such activities by religious advisors, or at least could
satisfy its compelling interests by less restrictive means.
For example, security offcers in the room could prevent or
promptly respond to any disruption or interference.
As to those RLUIPA claims, the Court previously indi-
cated that a State may not completely exclude religious advi-
sors from the execution room, even if the State equally ex-
cludes all advisors on a neutral and generally applicable
basis. See ante, at 419; Gutierrez v. Saenz, 590 U. S. –––
(2020); Dunn v. Smith, 592 U. S. ––– (2021). And the Court
today further holds that the State may not prevent a reli-
gious advisor from engaging in at least some audible prayer
and physical touching of the inmate while in the execution
room. Although the Court concludes that the State has a
compelling interest in ensuring the safety, security, and so-
lemnity of the execution room, the Court decides that the
State can satisfy those interests by means less restrictive
than excluding religious advisors altogether or restricting
religious advisors from audible prayer and touching.
Second, the Court's holding implicates signifcant issues
about how the Court decides whether a State's asserted in-
terest is suffciently “compelling ” and how the Court as-
sesses whether less restrictive means could satisfy that com-
pelling interest. This case illustrates both the diffculty of
those inquiries and the important role that history and state
practice often play in the analysis.
The compelling interest standard of RLUIPA—like the
compelling interest standard that the Court employs when
applying strict scrutiny to examine state limitations on cer-
tain constitutional rights—necessarily operates as a balanc-
ing test. See generally B. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for
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the Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and Constitu-
ti
onal Exceptions, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1907, 1914–1919
(2017). The Court starts with a heavy presumption against
a state law that infringes the constitutional or statutory
right in question. The Court allows state infringement on
that right only when the State has a suffciently “compelling ”
interest. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. 433,
444 (2015).
But what does “compelling ” mean, and how does the Court
determine when the State's interest rises to that level?
And how does the Court then determine whether less re-
strictive means would still satisfy that interest? Good ques-
tions, for which there are no great answers. Sometimes, the
Court looks to a State's policy-based or commonsense argu-
ments. Often, the Court also examines history and contem-
porary state practice to inform the inquiries. Cf. Republi-
can Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 785–787 (2002)
(Scalia, J., for the Court).
1
Here, the State asserts that it has a compelling interest in
ensuring the safety, security, and solemnity of the execution
room. To further those interests, the State has sought to
restrict the number of people in the room, as well as their
activities. As the United States pointed out at oral argu-
ment, any disruption or interference could be “catastrophic.”
1
The strict scrutiny test requires the government to demonstrate a
“compelling interest” in order to justify imposing a burden on certain con-
stitutional rights. That test was frst applied by this Court in certain
First Amendment cases in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See R. Fallon,
Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1270–1271 (2007); S.
Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scru-
tiny, 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 355, 356–357 (2006). The test can be diffcult
to apply because it arguably “permits and even requires judges to engage
recurrently in only minimally structured appraisals of the signifcance of
competing values or interests in many cases.” R. Fallon, The Nature of
Constitutional Rights: The Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny
66–67 (2019). In RLUIPA, Congress used the term “compelling ” interest
without further defning it.
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Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. And a religious advisor would not ordi-
nar
ily be allowed in a public hospital's operating room during
a major life-or-death surgical procedure, so why should one
be allowed into the execution room?
The Court has no diffculty reaching the commonsense con-
clusion that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring
safety, security, and solemnity in the execution room. The
more diffcult question is: How much risk of disruption or
interference must the State tolerate in order to accommodate
the inmate's religious liberty claim under RLUIPA?
The Court concludes that, even if audible prayer and phys-
ical touching are allowed, the State can still suffciently en-
sure safety, security, and solemnity in the execution room.
The Court suggests that the risk of disruption or interfer-
ence is conjecture and can be addressed in other ways. For
example, security offcers in the room could immediately in-
tervene if the religious advisor accidentally or intentionally
disrupts or interferes with the execution.
Even so, it is undeniable that allowing an outside individ-
ual in an execution room and allowing touching would in-
crease the risk of a problem occurring, such as accidental or
intentional disruption of or interference with the execution.
So why can't the State choose to avoid any additional risk of
disruption or interference, especially given the potentially
catastrophic harm if the risked disruption or interference ac-
tually ensues?
That is a diffcult question to answer, in my view. The
core problem is that a State's understandable goal of avoid-
ing a higher risk of great harm does not easily map onto the
compelling interest/ least restrictive means standards. In
particular, it is diffcult for a court applying those standards
to know where to draw the line—that is, how much addi-
tional risk of great harm is too much for a court to order the
State to bear.
Here, if the Court's own intuitive policy assessment that
the State can reasonably tolerate the additional risk were
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
all that the Court could muster in response to the State's
arg
ument, I might have concluded that the State could ex-
clude religious advisors from the execution room, or at least
could restrict their activities in the room and not allow phys-
ical touching, for example.
Importantly, however, the Court does not merely point to
its own policy assessment of how much risk the State must
tolerate in the execution room. The Court also relies in part
on the history of religious advisors at executions. To be
sure, the Court acknowledges that some of the history is not
precisely on point because many executions historically were
outdoor public hangings where the presence of religious ad-
visors did not raise the same risks to safety, security, and
solemnity that their presence in a small execution room does.
And some of the other history involved state-employed chap-
lains, who arguably do not raise the same risks to safety,
security, and solemnity as outsiders in the execution room.
Still, the history generally demonstrates that religious advi-
sors have often been present at executions. And perhaps
even more relevant, the Federal Government and some
States have recently allowed inmates' religious advisors into
the execution room. Those religious advisors have been al-
lowed to engage in audible prayer and limited touching of
the inmate without apparent problems. See ante, at 428.
As the Court explains, experience matters in assessing
whether less restrictive alternatives could still satisfy the
State's compelling interest. Cf. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352,
368–369 (2015).
2
2
Of course, in assessing risk, a government need not wait for the food
before building the levee. But as the Court explains, the recent experi-
ence in other States can nonetheless be somewhat informative in analyzing
whether the State has a suffciently compelling interest and has employed
the least restrictive means of avoiding the risk of disruption or interfer-
ence from the presence of religious advisors. Courts must be discerning,
however, when relying on state practice. States are not necessarily re-
quired to follow the less restrictive practices of other States in a kind of
race to the top (or bottom). Moreover, state practice can fuctuate as
States change their approach to an issue over time. In any event, other
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445
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In short, as this case demonstrates, the compelling interest
and
least restrictive means standards require this Court to
make diffcult judgments about the strength of the State's
interests and whether those interests can be satisfed in
other ways that are less restrictive of religious exercise.
Although the compelling interest and least restrictive means
standards are necessarily imprecise, history and state prac-
tice can at least help structure the inquiry and focus the
Court's assessment of the State's arguments.
Third, turning from the doctrinal to the practical, States
seek clarity going forward. States understandably want to
know what they may and may not do to regulate the time
and manner of audible prayer and touching in the execution
room. In its opi ni on today, the Cour t suppl ies some
guidance.
Because the Court's guidance does not purport to answer
every question, however, a dose of caution for the States is
probably in order, especially given the Court's recent case
law on this issue and the extraordinary micromanagement of
the execution room that RLUIPA has ushered in. The
States of course may ensure the safety, security, and solem-
nity of the execution room. But to avoid persistent future
litigation and the accompanying delays, it may behoove
States to try to accommodate an inmate's timely and reason-
able requests about a religious advisor's presence and activi-
ties in the execution room if the States can do so without
meaningfully sacrifcing their compelling interests in safety,
security, and solemnity. Doing so not only would help
States avoid future litigation delays but also would serve the
exceptionally powerful interests of victims' families in fnally
obtaining closure.
With those comments, I join the Court's opinion in full.
States' practices nonetheless have sometimes informed judicial evaluation
of whether a State's interest rises to the level of “compelling,” and
whether a State has employed the least restrictive means of achieving
that interest.
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
P
etitioner John Henry Ramirez stabbed Pablo Castro 29
times during a robbery that netted $1.25. Castro bled to
death in a parking lot. Since that day, Ramirez has manu-
factured more than a decade of delay to evade the capital
sentence lawfully imposed by the State of Texas. This
Court now affords yet another chance for him to delay his
execution. Because I think Ramirez's claims either do not
warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred, I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
The saga of Ramirez's crimes and the ensuing litigation
warrants a fuller retelling than the majority provides.
A
On the night of July 19, 2004, John Henry Ramirez, Chris-
tina Chavez, and Angela Rodriguez ran out of drug money.
Wanting more, they drove through Corpus Christi, Texas, in
search of victims to rob. Ramirez v. Stephens, 641 Fed.
Appx. 312, 314 (CA5 2016).
Pablo Castro, a father of nine, was working the night shift
at the Times Market convenience store, as he had for years.
With midnight approaching, he and another employee pre-
pared to close up. Castro collected the trash and went out-
side to put it in the dumpster. Ramirez v. State, 2011 WL
1196886, *1–*5 (Tex. Crim. App., Mar. 16, 2011).
Ramirez and his confederates found Castro in the conven-
ience store's parking lot. Wielding a serrated knife, Rami-
rez slashed and stabbed Castro 29 times. Castro suffered
eight wounds on his forearm and hands as he struggled to
defend himself. He suffered many more wounds to the
head, neck, shoulders, and back. After Castro fell to the
ground, the attackers rifed through his pockets, collected
$1.25, and drove away. Ibid.
Two employees at a nearby store witnessed the attack.
When they reached Castro, he was still conscious. He had
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Thomas, J., dissenting
suffered a deep gash across his throat and was spitting up
blood.
Castro eventually lost consciousness and, by the
time frst responders arrived, he had stopped breathing. He
died in the parking lot. Ibid.
Having netted only $1.25 from Castro, Ramirez and the
others pursued new targets. Within minutes of murdering
Castro, they found April Metting waiting in the drive-
through of a Whataburger, with her 2-year-old son in the
back seat. While Chavez distracted Metting, Ramirez crept
up to the driver's side window, grabbed Metting by the back
of her neck, and held the now blood-stained serrated knife to
her throat. Metting implored the assailants not to harm her
in front of her child. Ramirez ordered: “ `Shut up, bitch.' ”
Metting surrendered her purse, and Ramirez let her go.
The assailants again fed in their van. Id., at *3–*4.
They next targeted Ruby Pena Hinojosa, who was sitting
in the drive-through line of a different Whataburger. As
before, one of the women distracted Hinojosa while Ramirez
approached her driver-side window to put the knife to her
neck. But Hinojosa was able to dodge the knife, roll up the
window, and back her car away from the assailants, who then
departed in their van. Ibid.
Not long after, responding offcers spotted the van and
pulled it over. When the offcers exited their patrol cruiser,
the van sped off. The police pursued, only to lose sight of it.
Ramirez, Rodriguez, and Chavez then abandoned the van in
an overgrown lot and continued on foot. Id., at *5. Police
soon found and arrested Rodriguez and Chavez, but they did
not fnd Ramirez. He fed to Mexico and hid there for over
three years before law enforcement apprehended him near
the U. S.-Mexican border. Id., at *6, n. 3.
B
In 2008, A Texas jury convicted Ramirez of capital murder
and sentenced him to death. The Texas courts upheld the
conviction on direct and state postconviction review. In Oc-
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Thomas, J., dissenting
tober 2013, Ramirez fled a federal habeas petition in the
U
. S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Seven years of habeas litigation followed, during which the
District Court intervened at the last minute to stay a 2017
execution. See Part II–A–1, infra. Ultimately, the Dis-
trict Court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court denied re-
lief. See Ramirez v. Davis, 580 U. S. 833 (2016) (denying
certiorari); Ramirez v. Davis, 589 U. S. ––– (2020) (same).
After the federal habeas proceedings had run their course,
Texas set a new execution date for September 9, 2020. But,
in August 2020, Ramirez sued under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983, to stop the execution, arguing that Texas'
then-operative ban on outside spiritual advisors in the execu-
tion chamber violated the First Amendment and the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq. Ramirez demanded
that his pastor, Dana Moore, be present with him during his
execution. But Ramirez also pleaded in his complaint that
“Pastor Moore need not touch [him] at any time in the execu-
tion chamber.” App. 61. Ultimately, Ramirez and Texas
agreed to recall the death warrant, withdraw the execution
date, and dismiss the complaint. Texas then changed its ex-
ecution protocols to permit vetted spiritual advisors into
the chamber.
On February 5, 2021, a Texas state court set Ramirez's
execution date for September 8, 2021. Two months passed
before Ramirez submitted an administrative grievance re-
questing that the prison allow his pastor into the execution
chamber. Id., at 50–51. Texas acquiesced on May 4. Id.,
at 55. Another month passed. Then, on June 11, Ramirez
submitted a new grievance requesting what his 2020 com-
plaint specifcally disclaimed: that his spiritual advisor be al-
lowed to “ `lay hands on [him]' during [his] upcoming execu-
tion.” Id., at 52. In the part of the grievance instructing
him to describe the “[a]ction [r]equested to resolve [his] [c]om-
plaint,” Ramirez asked that Texas permit Moore to lay

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Thomas, J., dissenting
hands on him and “pray over” him during the execution.
Id.,
at 53.
Texas denied that request on July 2. Ibid. Ramirez
sought administrative review of the decision on July 8. Id.,
at 155–156. On August 10, before the prison decided the
appeal, Ramirez again sued under § 1983, this time claiming
that the State's refusal to allow his pastor to lay hands on
him violated the First Amendment and RLUIPA.
On August 22—just 17 days before his execution date—
Ramirez amended his complaint. He still demanded that
the State allow his pastor to lay hands on him. But he now
specifed that he also wanted Moore to engage in “audible
praying ” during the execution. Id., at 96 (emphasis added).
In light of his belated § 1983 suit, Ramirez moved the Dis-
trict Court on August 18 to stay his execution. The State
responded that Ramirez's claims did not warrant equitable
relief and were not properly exhausted under the Prison Lit-
igation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a).
The District Court denied Ramirez's motion on September
2. 558 F. Supp. 3d 437 (SD Tex. 2021). A divided panel
of the Court of Appeals likewise denied relief. Concurring,
Chief Judge Owen observed: “[T]he shifting of Ramirez's liti-
gation posture indicates that the change in position is strate-
gic and that delay is the goal.” 10 F. 4th 561, 562 (CA5
2021). Nevertheless, just a few hours before Ramirez's exe-
cution was scheduled to take place on September 8, this
Court stayed the proceeding and granted his petition for a
writ of certiorari. See 594 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
This Court granted equitable relief in September, and
today it grants further relief pending proceedings below.
Ramirez presses two reasons why he merited—and continues
to merit—our intervention in Texas' enforcement of his capi-
tal sentence. First, he argues that the State would violate
RLUIPA by prohibiting his pastor from “laying hands” on
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him during his execution. Second, he argues that the State
wou
ld violate the same statute by prohibiting his pastor
from audibly praying during the execution. I do not think
either claim warranted relief on September 8. Nor do I
think either claim warrants further relief now.
A
First, I disagree with the majority that Ramirez's demand
for in-chambers touching merits relief.
An “equitable remedy,” such as a stay of execution or a
preliminary injunction, is “not available as a matter of right”
to a death-row inmate who has sued the State under § 1983.
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006). The parties
agree that Ramirez seeks a particular type of equitable re-
lief: a preliminary injunction. See ante, at 421. A federal
court may issue this “extraordinary remedy” only if the pris-
oner shows that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
will be irreparably injured absent the injunction, and that
the equities, taking the public interest into account, balance
in his favor. Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 432, 434 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Two components of the equitable balance are especially
relevant here. First, federal courts “should police carefully”
against abusive litigation designed “to interpose unjustifed
delay” and deny relief if they detect gamesmanship. Buck-
lew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019). Second, federal
courts “must take into consideration” the weighty interest
that States and victims have in carrying out capital sen-
tences in a timely manner. See id., at –––; Gomez v. United
States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653,
654 (1992) (per curiam). These equitable factors foreclose
Ramirez's request for extraordinary relief.
1
This Court has long recognized the “equitable principl[e]”
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Thomas, J., dissenting
disentitle him to the relief he seeks.” Sanders v. United
Sta
tes, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963); see also, e. g., Deweese v. Rein-
hard, 165 U. S. 386, 390 (1897) (“[I]f the conduct of the plain-
tiff be offensive to the dictates of natural justice, . . . he will
be held remediless in a court of equity”); Bein v. Heath, 6
How. 228, 247 (1848); 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
§ 397 (4th ed. 1918). Or, as the majority puts it, if a prisoner
acts inequitably, “ `the doors of the court will be shut against
him.' ” Ante, at 434 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen-
eral Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 245 (1933)).
This equitable rule is especially important in the death
penalty context. Unsurprisingly, death-row inmates gener-
ally employ any means available to stave off their sentences
and therefore often engage in abusive litigation. See Wood-
ard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 380 (1984) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (noting a “pattern”). And this Court has warned that,
while zealous “counsel for the condemned in a capital case”
understandably “lay hold of every ground which, in their
judgment, might tend to the advantage of their client,” they
should not “interfer[e] with “the administration of justice . . .
on mere pretexts.” Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U. S. 660, 662
(1895).
Prisoners engage in abusive litigation in several different
ways. For instance, some prisoners hold off bringing new
claims until the last minute in order to force courts to stay
or enjoin an execution simply to afford themselves more time
to consider the merits of the claims. See, e. g., Woodard, 464
U. S., at 377–380 (Powell, J., concurring); Bucklew, 587 U. S.,
at –––; Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari); Dunn v. Ray, 586 U. S. –––
(2019). Other prisoners bring any “meritless” claim avail-
able, no matter how frivolous, in hopes a sympathetic court
will grant relief. Ibid.; see also Hill, 547 U. S., at 584–585;
Lambert, 159 U. S., at 662. Still others litigate their claims
“piecemeal[,] . . . challenging one aspect” of their execution
“after another” in order to buy time. Hill, 547 U. S., at 581;
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see also Woodard, 464 U. S., at 380 (Powell, J., concurring);
Wi
lliams v. Kelley, 854 F. 3d 998, 1002 (CA8 2017) (per cu-
riam); cf. Sanders, 373 U. S., at 18 (noting that federal courts
should not “tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or . . . en-
tertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex,
harass, or delay”). And, in many other ways, yet more pris-
oners “deliberately engage in dilatory tactics” designed to
drag execution-delaying claims out “indefnitely.” Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 277–278 (2005); see also Ryan v. Valen-
cia Gonzales, 568 U. S. 57, 76–77 (2013). These tactics all
too often succeed. See, e. g., Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ––– (de-
scribing two decades of delay).
Because of the prevalence of vexatious death penalty liti-
gation, a court sitting in equity “must” consider whether a
condemned criminal has made an “attempt at manipulation”
that would disqualify him from equitable relief. Gomez, 503
U. S., at 654. Federal courts faced with abusive litigation
“can and should” use their “equitable powers” to protect
state judgments and sentences. Bucklew, 587 U. S., at –––
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barr v. Lee, 591
U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (per curiam) (describing “our responsi-
bility” to ensure that lawful sentences are carried out “ `fairly
and expediti ously' ”); 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jur ispr udence
§ 397.
Today, this Court should have denied equitable relief to a
prisoner who has acted inequitably—as both the District
Court and Court of Appeals did before us. Ramirez's shift-
ing litigation position lays bare what he really wants: “to
manipulate the judicial process” to win further delay.
Gomez, 503 U. S., at 654. The record all but speaks for itself.
In August 2020, when Ramirez frst demanded that Texas
allow his pastor into the chamber, he explicitly avowed that
his pastor “need not touch” him “at any time in the execution
chamber.” App. 61. Taking Ramirez at his word, Texas
eventually acquiesced. But then Ramirez fipped his posi-
tion and fled another administrative grievance and § 1983
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453
Thomas, J., dissenting
complaint demanding what he had earlier disclaimed: touch-
i
ng in the execution chamber. See id., at 19, 52. This is a
textbook example of dilatory and abusive “piecemeal litiga-
tion” against which we have warned courts in equity to
guard. See Hill, 547 U. S., at 585. Like Chief Judge Owen,
I think that the shift in Ramirez's litigation posture alone
justifes denying equitable relief because it “indicates that
the change in position is strategic and that delay is the goal.”
10 F. 4th, at 562 (Owen, C. J., concurring).
But if any doubt remained on that score, the history of this
case dispels it. Ramirez's current RLUIPA suit is but the
latest iteration in an 18-year pattern of evasion.
First, consider the night of the murder. Rather than sur-
render and face justice, Ramirez sped away from police be-
fore abandoning his confederates and feeing on foot. Rami-
rez, 2011 WL 1196886, *3. He even went so far as to
abscond to a foreign country, delaying justice for another 3 ½
years. His evasion ended only after state and federal law
enforcement captured him on the southern border. See id.,
at *6, n. 3.
Ramirez continued to engineer delay in state court.
After a jury convicted him, his case moved to the sentencing
phase. Ramirez's lawyer intended to put on mitigation wit-
nesses. But after one witness, Ramirez instructed his
lawyer to call no more. The state court found Ramirez com-
petent and honored h is decisi on. Predic t ably, he was
sentenced to death. Yet, during state habeas proceedings,
Ramirez nonetheless brought a claim (among several others)
accusing his state trial counsel of ineffective assistance for
failing to provide an adequate mitigation defense. Ramirez,
641 Fed. Appx., at 315, 326–327. The state courts had to
take the time to adjudicate this patently meritless claim,
arising from Ramirez's own sentencing-phase decision and
subsequent about-face. Ibid.
The pattern continued in federal habeas proceedings.
Ramirez brought several claims. Among them, he again

454 RAMIREZ
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Thomas, J., dissenting
claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
for
failing to call more mitigation witnesses. The District
Court proceedings alone bought Ramirez another 20 months,
at the end of which the District Court ruled that all of his
claims were procedurally barred, lacked merit, or both. The
court also declined to issue a certifcate of appealability on
any claim, see Ramirez v. Stephens, 2015 WL 3629639, *26
(SD Tex., June 10, 2015), meaning that it thought no “reason-
able jurists” would believe its decision to deny relief was
even “debatable,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 484
(2000).
Undeterred, Ramirez sought a certifcate of appealability
in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied Ram-
irez's request, but only after those proceedings bought him
another seven months of delay. See Ramirez, 641 Fed.
Appx., at 314. Ramirez then sought our review. We did
not deny his petition for a writ of certiorari until October 3,
2016—three years after he frst fled his federal habeas peti-
tion. See Ramirez v. Davis, 580 U. S. 833.
Reasonably thinking the litigation fnished, Texas set
Ramirez's execution for February 2, 2017. Yet Ramirez
squeezed more time out of his federal petition with a “[l]ast-
minute” motion to stay his execution, Bucklew, 587 U. S.,
at –––, fled less than a week before the execution date.
Through new counsel, Ramirez argued that his prior federal
habeas counsel suffered from a confict of interest and had
abandoned him during clemency proceedings. Ramirez sug-
gested that he needed a stay because he might try to reopen
his habeas judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). Citing the “short time remaining before Ramirez's
execution” and the “immediacy” of the situation, the District
Court granted the stay two days before the scheduled execu-
tion, Ramirez v. Davis, No. 2:12–CV–410, ECF Doc. 48, pp. 1,
9 (SD Tex., Jan. 31, 2017), which the Court of Appeals af-
frmed the next day, see Ramirez v. Davis, 675 Fed. Appx.
478 (CA5 2017) (per curiam).
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Thomas, J., dissenting
This extraordinary equitable relief did not inspire Ramirez
to
make any extraordinary effort—or, frankly, any effort—
to resolve the proceedings expeditiously. Instead, Ramirez
fled his Rule 60(b) motion on August 20, 2018—over 18
months after alerting the District Court of his intent to do
so. See ECF Doc. 74 (SD Tex., Aug. 20, 2018). The Dis-
trict Court admonished Ramirez for his “unreasonably de-
layed” motion before dismissing it on procedural and juris-
dictional grounds. ECF Doc. 80, p. 11 (SD Tex., Jan. 3,
2019). And, as before, the District Court denied him a cer-
tifcate of appealability. Id., at 17. So, too, did the Court
of Appeals after another six months had passed, see Ramirez
v. Davis, 780 Fed. Appx. 110, 120 (CA5 2019), and this Court
took several more months to deny his petition for a writ of
certiorari, see Ramirez v. Davis, 589 U. S. ––– (2020). All
told, Ramirez's eleventh-hour gambit in January 2017 bought
him more than three years of delay.
In the end, none of Ramirez's federal habeas claims mer-
ited even a single certifcate of appealability, let alone relief.
Yet, through ceaseless litigation, strategic delay, and a
“[l]ast-minute” blitz on the District Court, Bucklew, 587
U. S., at –––, Ramirez parlayed his federal habeas petition
into a 7-year deferral of his lawfully imposed sentence. We
should interpret Ramirez's actions in the instant litigation in
light of that history, recognize that his shifting in-chambers-
touching claim is just another chapter in that history, and
reject his most recent attempt to delay his execution.
2
Second, a court balancing the equities must consider that
“[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an important
interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill, 547
U. S., at 584; see also Gomez, 503 U. S., at 654. The State's
interest inheres in our form of government, given that “our
federal system” protects a State from “repeated frustration”
of its imposition of a capital sentence. Wainwright v. Spen-
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kelink, 442 U. S. 901, 903–904 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
i
ng). “[T]he question of capital punishment belongs to the
people and their representatives . . . to resolve,” and the
people are entitled to see their chosen sentence carried out.
Bucklew, 587 U. S., at –––.
Meanwhile, victims share the State's interest in the timely
execution of a lawful sentence. “Only with real fnality can
the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judg-
ment” of the State “will be carried out.” Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556 (1998). Endless delay harms
“the `powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the
guilty,' an interest shared by the State and the victims of
crime alike.” Ibid. (citation omitted). “Th[is] interes[t is]
magnifed” when the offense is of a “heinous nature.” In re
Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases, 955
F. 3d 106, 127 (CADC 2020) (Katsas, J., concurring).
The equitable balance here tilts decisively in favor of the
State and Ramirez's victims. Texans, acting through their
elected representatives, have decided that certain crimes
range so far beyond what a civilized society will accept that
only a death sentence will suffce. Ramirez long has denied
Texas its sovereign interest in seeing that sentence carried
out “fairly and expeditiously.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at –––.
Moreover, the legal uncertainty surrounding Texas' death
penalty protocols that his litigation engendered has led to
further delays in at least four other Texas cases. See Texas
Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Texas Death Penalty
Developments in 2021: The Year in Review 8 (Dec. 16, 2021).
Each of these delays “work[s] a miscarriage of justice on the
State.” Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (opinion of
Thomas, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, by evading his sentence, Ramirez has inficted
recurrent emotional injuries on the victims of his crime.
When Ramirez killed Pablo Castro, he stole more than a life
and $1.25. He stole a father from nine children. Four of
them fled a brief in this case to explain how Ramirez's mach-
inations have “ `frustrated' ” their interest in seeing what
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457
Thomas, J., dissenting
they believe to be a just execution carried out. Brief for
Pablo
Castro's Children as Amici Curiae 13 (quoting Buck-
lew, 587 U. S., at –––).
Fernando Castro has watched as Ramirez repeatedly
“ `used loopholes to delay [his] execution,' ” leaving Fernando
with a “ `lack of closure for many years, ever since [he] was
merely a child.' ” Brief for Pablo Castro's Children as
Amici Curiae 12. Roberto Castro likewise wants “ `to close
this chapter so that the healing process can continue without
being reopened every couple of years to entertain Ramirez's
appeals.' ” Id. at 15. Maria Chauvon Aguilar, who remem-
bers her father as “ `a great man,' ” also must endure “ `all
this pain and suffering ' ” each time the courts “ `put a hold
on' ” Ramirez's execution. Ibid. Her indignity and frustra-
tion grow particularly acute when Ramirez receives “ `all this
publicity' ” from sympathetic media outlets for his efforts to
delay his lawful sentence, as if “ `he just won a gold medal.' ”
Ibid. Finally, Pablo Castro, Jr., must live every day with
the fact that his father “ `was not able to witness [him] gradu-
ate school, basic training, advance individual training, or see
his grandchildren.' ” Id., at 16. He wants “ `justice and [to]
be able to close this horrible chapter' ” in his life and the
lives of his family members. Ibid.
These four siblings ask that their father “ `fnally have his
justice' ” so that “ `this nightmare [can] be over.' ” Ibid. As
their words show, delays like the kind Ramirez has pursued
here “infict further emotional trauma on the family . . . of
the murder victim.” Murphy v. Collier, 587 U. S. –––, –––
(2019) (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of application for
stay).
3
The majority does not adequately account for either Rami-
rez's inequitable conduct or the State's and his victims' inter-
est in the timely execution of his capital sentence.
Consider frst Ramirez's inequitable conduct. The ma-
jority acknowledges that “ `the doors of the court will be
shut against' ” a prisoner who engages in abusive litigation.

458 RAMIREZ
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Ante, at 434 (quoting Keystone Driller, 290 U. S., at 245).
But
it proceeds as though the abusive-litigation inquiry asks
only whether “a litigant `slept upon his rights.' ” Ante, at
435 (quoting Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 161
U. S. 573, 578 (1896)). As described above, last-minute liti-
gation is but one of several types of abusive and manipula-
tive litigation that death-row inmates employ to delay their
executions. See supra, at 451–452; see also, e. g., Hill, 547
U. S., at 584–585 (separately listing abusive claims that are
“speculative,” “fled too late in the day,” “[r]epetitive,” or
“piecemeal”). Here, Ramirez not only brought his claims
piecemeal; he executed a bait and switch. He frst demand-
ed his pastor's presence without touching, but then shifted
and demanded touching when requesting Moore's presence
alone no longer gave him an excuse for delay. The majority's
analysis simply fails to factor in Ramirez's inequitable conduct.
In any event, the timing of Ramirez's claims still cuts
against granting equitable relief. True, this was not an
eleventh-hour blitz of the sort that Ramirez carried out in
2017. But Ramirez should have communicated his touching
claim no later than September 2020, when he expressly dis-
claimed any need for it. Instead, he parceled out his claims
tactically to drag out the time before his sentence, fnally
asking for in-chambers touching in June 2021, mere months
before the September 2021 execution date.
Worse, the majority bypasses the “ `important interest' ”
that both the State and Ramirez's victims have in the execu-
tion. Ante, at 433 (quoting Hill, 547 U. S., at 584). It does
not mention that “the question of capital punishment belongs
to the people and their representatives, not the courts, to
resolve.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at –––. It does not discuss
the pain that every delay has inficted on Castro's family.
See supra, at 457. And it does not acknowledge that the
“heinous nature” of the offense—the brutal slaying of a
working father during a robbery spree to supply a drug
habit—“magnifed” the State's and the victims' shared inter-
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Thomas, J., dissenting
est in the prompt execution of Ramirez's capital sentence.
In
re Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases,
955 F. 3d, at 127 (Katsas, J., concurring). Texas' citizens and
Castro's family deserve more consideration and better treat-
ment than the majority gives them.
Instead, the majority discounts these considerations be-
cause it thinks it can resolve the case “without delaying or
impeding [Ramirez's] execution.” Ante, at 434. Of course,
that is self-evidently wrong. We are now many months past
what was Ramirez's third execution date. And, in the mine
run of cases, the majority's approach will not do all that it
promises. The majority proposes that when a federal court
“determines that relief is appropriate under RLUIPA, the
proper remedy is an injunction ordering the accommodation,
not a stay of the execution.” Ante, at 436. According to
the majority, “[t]his approach balances the State's interest in
carrying out capital sentences without delay and the prison-
er's interest in religious exercise.” Ibid. But if the State
has the temerity to challenge a federal court's assessment of
its execution-chamber protocols under RLUIPA, the State
must necessarily pursue “[f ]urther proceedings. ” Ibid.
Doing so “might also contribute to further delay in carrying
out the sentence,” ibid., for which the State will now be at
fault. Thus, “[t]he State will have to determine where its
interest lies in going forward.” Ibid.
Here is how the majority's test will likely play out in prac-
tice: Prisoners, ably represented by the death penalty de-
fense bar, will propose new accommodations tailored to elicit
an objection from the State. They will then have three lev-
els of federal-court review in which to litigate whether the
State has complied with RLUIPA. From the outset, many
district courts will fnd that RLUIPA demands an accommo-
dation. They will then put the State to a stark choice: capit-
ulate to the court-ordered accommodation that it thinks is
dangerous, or litigate and delay the execution, knowing that
the delay will count against it in the equitable balance. Now
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seen as the blameworthy party, the State that chooses to
l
itigate will “hardly” be able to “complain about the inequi-
ties of delay” caused by a prisoner's last-minute flings, be-
cause the court will hold that the State's “own actions were
a signifcant contributing factor.” Ante, at 435. Thereaf-
ter, the district court and court of appeals will be less likely
to dismiss a prisoner's abusive lawsuit because, after all,
both sides will have been liable for the delay. And, like
here, the result will be months or years of federally imposed
stasis. The State, its citizens, and the victims will pay the
price of that delay.
4
Equities aside, I also doubt Ramirez is likely to succeed on
the merits of his touching claim. To prevail, Ramirez will
have to show that his request is “sincerely based on a reli-
gious belief.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U. S. 352, 360–361 (2015).
“[T]he propensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubi-
ous sincerity [is] well documented.” Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 718 (2014). So, just as fed-
eral courts have a duty to deny equitable relief to prisoners
engaged in vexatious litigation, they likewise have a duty
under RLUIPA to deny religious liberty claims when prison-
ers are insincere. See ibid. (Congress passed RLUIPA
“confdent of the ability of the federal courts to weed out
insincere claims”); Holt, 574 U. S., at 369 (noting that prison
offcials may question the authenticity of a prisoner's reli-
gious belief ); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 725, n. 13
(2005) (same). The evidence that demonstrates Ramirez is
bringing abusive litigation to delay his execution also
strongly suggests that he does not sincerely believe that his
pastor needs to touch him in the execution chamber.
The majority concedes that Ramirez's “evolving litigation
positio[n]” is evidence of insincerity, but concludes that
“ample” evidence cuts the other way. Ante, at 426. The
majority's countervailing evidence, however, falls short of
showing any sincerity, let alone “a clear showing that [Rami-
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Thomas, J., dissenting
rez] is entitled to . . . relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources
De
fense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). The
majority's primary support is that the laying of hands is a
“traditional for[m] of religious exercise” and that Moore en-
gages in the practice. Ante, at 425. But whether Ramirez's
supposed belief is “traditional” is irrelevant. RLUIPA's
protection, like “[t]he protection of the First Amendment[,]
is not restricted to orthodox religious practices.” Follett v.
Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 577 (1944); see also N.
Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 Wash. L. Rev.
1185, 1197–1202 (2017). The relevant issue is whether Rami-
rez himself actually believes that it is “part of [his] faith to
have [his] spiritual advisor lay hands on [him].” App. 52.
To that point, the majority cites nothing other than Rami-
rez's bare grievance—precisely the same evidence that
shows the “evolving litigation positio[n]” that the majority
concedes is evidence of insincerity. Thus, the only relevant
evidence in this case cuts strongly in favor of fnding that
Ramirez is insincere.
B
Ramirez also asks us to intervene in his long-delayed exe-
cution because Texas will not allow his pastor to pray audi-
bly in the execution chamber. Given Ramirez's history, I
suspect that his goal in raising this claim is also to secure
delay. But his audible-prayer claim suffers from an anteced-
ent defect: Ramirez did not comply with the PLRA by ex-
hausting the administrative remedies available to him before
bringing his claim to federal court. Because he failed to
carry out this mandatory, congressionally imposed threshold
requirement, I would dismiss his claim.
1
Congress passed the PLRA “to eliminate unwarranted
federal-court interference with the administration of pris-
ons” and to allow state prisons the opportunity to address
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problems before they become federal cases. Woodford v.
Ngo
, 548 U. S. 81, 89, 93 (2006). To that end, the PLRA
requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative reme-
dies before suing. See 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a). Those reme-
dies include “prison grievance procedures.” Jones v. Bock,
549 U. S. 199, 217–218 (2007). Further, any exhaustion must
be “proper”—that is, “a prisoner must complete the [prison]
review process in accordance with the applicable procedural
rules.” Woodford, 548 U. S., at 88; see also Jones, 549 U. S.,
at 211. Ultimately, a federal court may not hear a prisoner's
claim if he has failed to comply with those “critical proce-
dural rules” that “impos[e] some orderly structure on the
course of . . . proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U. S., at 90–91.
Ramirez failed to exhaust his audible-prayer claim prop-
erly under the PLRA because he did not comply with the
administrative procedures prescribed by the Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice. Two sets of procedural require-
ments set forth in the department's prisoner handbook and
on its grievance forms are most salient. See Texas Dept. of
Criminal Justice, Offender Orientation Handbook (Feb. 2017)
(Prison Handbook); App. 52–53 (Step 1 form). First, a pris-
oner must “attempt to informally resolve [his] problem . . .
before fling a grievance,” and he must “not[e]” the informal
resolution attempt “in the space provided” on a “Step 1
grievance form.” Prison Handbook 73–75. Second, when
fling a Step 1 form, the prisoner must “[s]tate [his] griev-
ance” in the designated section, describing the “who, what,
when, [and] where” applicable to the grievance. App. 52;
see also Prison Handbook 73–75 (prisoners must make their
grievance by “completely flling out” a “Step 1 grievance
form (I–127)”).
Ramirez failed to comply with either requirement.
First, Ramirez did not attempt informal resolution of his
audible-prayer claim in accordance with Texas' procedures.
His grievance form described the informal effort he made to
resolve his touching request, but it did not mention any in-

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Thomas, J., dissenting
formal attempt to resolve any grievance related to audible
prayer
. See App. 52. Whether Ramirez made no effort to
resolve this grievance, or he simply failed to document his
efforts to do so, makes no difference under the PLRA; he
did not comply either way. And that failure is not trivial.
Several prisons have imposed a threshold requirement that
prisoners attempt to resolve their issues informally and then
document that attempt. See Woodford, 548 U. S., at 85–86
(describing California's informal resolution requirement); see
also, e. g., Little v. Jones, 607 F. 3d 1245, 1249 (CA10 2010)
(describing Oklahoma's informal frst step). This “step 0”
is critical—it reduces the administrative burden on prison
adjudicatory authorities and avoids turning minor misunder-
standings into formal adversarial proceedings. Ramirez's
failure to comply with this “critical procedural rul[e]” means
that he failed to exhaust his audible-prayer claim “properly.”
Woodford, 548 U. S., at 90.
Second, in the section of the Step 1 form where the pris-
oner is supposed to “[s]tate [his] grievance,” Ramirez said
nothing about audible prayer. App. 52. Ramirez men-
tioned only that he wanted his pastor to “lay hands” on him
in the chamber. Ibid. It was that laying of hands, alone,
that Ramirez identifed as “part of [his] faith.” Ibid. Ra-
mirez thus denied Texas “a fair and full opportunity to adjudi-
cate” his new audible-prayer claim. Woodford, 548 U. S., at
90. That failure, like his failure to seek informal resolution,
is no small matter. Absent proper presentation of a griev-
ance pursuant to procedures that “impos[e] some orderly
structure on the course of . . . proceedings,” “no adjudicative
system can function effectively.” Id., at 90–91. To avoid
that breakdown, States like Texas must be able to rely on
federal courts to decline entertaining lawsuits that do not
comply with the PLRA. Otherwise, because prisoners “do
not want to exhaust” and have no “incentive” to do so, they
will stop following prison procedures, and the beneft of ad-
ministrative adjudication will be lost. Id., at 90.
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2
The
majority does not dispute these procedural shortcom-
ings. Regarding Ramirez's failure to seek informal resolu-
tion, it says nothing. And, on Ramirez's failure to state a
grievance, the majority itself ignores Texas' procedural
rules. The majority notes that, in the section of Ramirez's
grievance where he was required to state the “[a]ction [r]e-
quested to resolve [his] [c]omplaint,” Ramirez wrote: “That
I be ALLOWED to have my Spiritual Advisor `lay hands on
me' & pray over me while I am being executed.” App. 53.
That is not enough. For one, the statement appears in the
wrong part of the grievance form. There would be a sub-
stantial loss in administrative effciency if prison offcials had
to rummage through different parts of a grievance form to
discern what the grievance actually is. For another, that
single statement is woefully imprecise. The State is free to
decide the “level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply
with the grievance procedures.” Jones, 549 U. S., at 218.
Texas defned one here—the handbook instructs that “[t]he
specifc action required to resolve the complaint shall be
clearly stated in the space provided on the I–127 form.”
Prison Handbook 75 (emphasis added). Ramirez did not
“clearly” describe the relief he now says he wants. His
feeting, general reference to prayer, lodged in the wrong
section of a form with a request for in-chambers touching,
did not put Texas offcials on notice of what he was demand-
ing. That Ramirez felt the need to amend his August 2021
§ 1983 complaint explicitly to include “audible prayers”
proves the point. App. 91 (Second Amended Complaint).
But even if he had, Ramirez would have failed to satisfy
the PLRA for yet another reason. If the grievance had, in
fact, presented two claims, neither of them would have been
properly exhausted because Texas prisoners may “[p]resent
only one issue per grievance.” Prison Handbook 74. An
“issue” is a “point in dispute between two or more parties.”
Black's Law Dictionary 995 (11th ed. 2019). The touching
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Thomas, J., dissenting
claim and the audible-prayer claim present two independent
issues,
each of which (as this litigation demonstrates) repre-
sents a different “point of dispute” calling for independent
analysis. See Ramirez v. Collier, 594 U. S. ––– (2021) (or-
dering briefng on whether Texas rules restricting “either
audible prayer or physical contact” burdened Ramirez); com-
pare ante, at 420 (frst addressing the audible-prayer claim),
with ante, at 419–420 (then addressing the touching claim);
ante, at 433 (acknowledging multiple “claims”). If Ramirez
had raised his audible-prayer claim on the June 11 grievance
form, he would have violated Texas procedures by doing so,
meaning he would not have properly exhausted either claim
at issue here. See Woodford, 548 U. S., at 88, 93.
Finally, for his part, Ramirez raises one additional argu-
ment on which the majority does not rely. He argues that
the State's changing position over what it would permit in
the execution chamber rendered the administrative griev-
ance process “unavailable” to him, and therefore he was
under no obligation to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 643 (2016). But Ramirez's own
conduct belies that claim. He used the grievance process
twice in the lead up to the execution date. See, e. g., App.
50–55. The State responded to his concerns. The frst
time, the State acquiesced, allowing his pastor into the cham-
ber. Id., at 55. The second time, the State did not, denying
his request to allow his pastor to lay hands on him. Id., at
53. So, each time, the administrative review process was
available to him. He cannot now blame a system that his
own experience shows he was “ `capable of us[ing].' ” Ross,
578 U. S., at 642 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731,
738 (2001)).
***
This case well demonstrates why a prisoner's failure to
exhaust under the PLRA should not be excused. If Rami-
rez had pursued administrative remedies properly, the State
would have had a “fair opportunity to consider [his] griev-
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ance.” Woodford, 548 U. S., at 95. For example, an at-
tempt
at informal resolution might have allowed the prison
chaplain or other offcials to resolve his request at an earlier
juncture. Or, if Ramirez had given prison offcials any no-
tice of his request in a formal grievance, he and the State
might have been able to come up with a compromise before
federal litigation turned them into adversaries. Id., at 89
(noting the value of settling claims at the “administrative
level”). At the very least, we might have had a more robust
administrative record with which to assess the burdens, in-
terests, and state rules on which his RLUIPA claims hinge.
See id., at 95 (noting that proper exhaustion “often results
in the creation of an administrative record that is helpful to
the court”). Such a record might have obviated the need
to wait for the “[f]urther proceedings on remand” that the
majority now thinks are necessary to illuminate the State's
interests. Ante, at 436.
III
In RLUIPA, Congress created a potent tool with which
prisoners can protect their sincerely held religious beliefs.
But, like any tool, it can be wielded abusively. And few
have a greater incentive to do so than death-row inmates.
To counter such abuse, federal courts sitting in equity have
a duty to dismiss piecemeal, late-breaking, dilatory, specious,
speculative, or manipulative litigation. RLUIPA itself com-
plements that process by requiring a prisoner to demon-
strate sincerity.
Meanwhile, Congress passed the PLRA to force prisoners
to exhaust their complaints through state prisons' adminis-
trative review processes so that prison offcials might re-
solve, or at least build a record to help shed light on, an
alleged problem before it escalates to litigation. Federal
courts have a duty under the PLRA to dismiss these unex-
hausted claims.
Today, the Court shrugs off both of these duties. It
grants equitable relief for a demonstrably abusive and insin-
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Cite
as: 595 U. S. 411 (2022)
467
Thomas, J., dissenting
cere claim fled by a prisoner with an established history of
seek
ing unjustifed delay, harming the State and Ramirez's
victims in the process. The Court also forgives the same
prisoner's complete failure to exhaust another claim. Be-
cause I would deny equitable relief for the frst claim and
dismiss the second under the PLRA, I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None