HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 2
Pages 382–412
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 25, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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382 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, et al.
v
. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 20–472. Argued April 27, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021
When Congress created the renewable fuel program (RFP) requiring most
domestic refneries to blend renewable fuels into the transportation
fuels they produce, see 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(1)(J), (o)(1)(L), (o)(2)(A)(i),
it added features designed to lessen the impact of the program's man-
dates on small refneries. At the outset, Congress created a blanket
exemption from RFP obligations for all small refneries until 2011.
§ 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Congress also directed the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to “extend the exemption under clause (i)” for at
least two years if the RFP obligations would impose “a disproportionate
economic hardsh ip” on a g iven sma ll refi nery. § 7545(o)(9)(A)( ii).
Finally, Congress offered the possibility of further relief in future years
by providing that “[a] small refnery may at any time petition . . . for an
extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of
disproportionate economic hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
Here, three small refneries initially received an exemption, saw it
lapse for a period, and then again petitioned for an exemption under
subparagraph (B)(i). EPA granted the exemptions, and a group of re-
newable fuel producers objected. The Tenth Circuit vacated EPA's
decisions, concluding that the small refneries were ineligible for an “ex-
tension” under subparagraph (B)(i) because they had allowed previous
exemptions to lapse.
Held: A small refnery that previously received a hardship exemption may
obtain an “extension” under § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in
exemption coverage in a previous year. Pp. 388–400.
(a) The key term here—“extension”—is not defned in the statute.
Sometimes it can refer to an increase in time. 5 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 597. Other times it can refer to the act of offering or making
something available, such as the granting of a beneft. Id., at 595. Here,
three textual clues show subparagraph (B)(i) uses “extension” in its tem-
poral sense. First, subparagraph (A)(i)'s initial exemption is described
temporally (as lasting “until calendar year 2011”). Second, subparagraph
(A)(ii)'s exemption is also described temporally—authorizing EPA to
“extend the exemption under clause (i) . . . for a period of not less than
2 additional years.” Finally, subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(i) share an

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383
Syllabus
identical title—“Extension of exemption”—underscoring the likelihood
that
the two neighboring provisions use the term “extension” in one
consistent sense. Pp. 388–389.
(b) Subparagraph (B)(i)'s temporal use of “extension,” however, does
not require unbroken continuity. The Tenth Circuit erred by imposing
such a requirement here and concluding that a small refnery is perma-
nently ineligible for an extension once an exemption lapses. Pp. 389–396.
(1) The plain meaning of “extension” does not require unbroken
continuity. Dictionary defnitions contemplate the possibility of re-
sumption after an interruption. Federal rules permit litigants to seek
(and courts to grant) an “extension” of time even after a lapse. See 28
U. S. C. § 2107(c); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1). And recent federal stat-
utes provide an “extension” of benefts that previously expired months
or even years earlier. See Pub. L. 116–260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182; Pub.
L. 116–136, § 2114, 134 Stat. 281. Pp. 389–392.
(2) A different statutory context might make for a different out-
come, for example, where Congress uses modifying language requiring
an extension to be “consecutive” or “successive.” See, e. g., 8 U. S. C.
§ 1184(g)(8)(D). But the statutory context here confrms the best read-
ing of subparagraph (B)(i) does not require unbroken continuity. The
absence of any “consecutive” or “successive” language suggests exemp-
tions need not follow one another without interruption. By authorizing
small refneries to seek a hardship exemption “at any time,” sub-
paragraph (B)(i) points to an expansive meaning that invites small
refneries to seek hardship exemptions in different years as market con-
ditions change. And subparagraph (A), the immediately preceding
paragraph, contemplates extension of exemption coverage even after
interruption. See 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(1)(K), (o)(9)(A)(i), (o)(9)(A)(ii).
Before the Tenth Circuit, EPA pressed a similar argument by point-
ing to a 2014 regulation, 40 CFR § 80.1441(e)(2)(iii), and asking for defer-
ence under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837. Because “the government is not invoking Chevron”
now, the Court declines to consider whether any deference is due.
Pp. 392–394.
(3) Respondents contend the statute establishes a general sunset
scheme and that any exemptions were meant to end rapidly. They note
that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,” that it was per-
mitted to expire in 2013, and that subparagraph (B)(i) speaks of extend-
ing “the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Context, however,
suggests subparagraph (B) is not part of some sunset scheme. Subpar-
agraph (A)(ii)'s exemptions did not have to expire in 2013; they could
have lasted indefnitely. Subparagraph (B)(i)'s “at any time” language
expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013. That looks nothing
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Syllabus
like readymade examples of sunset schemes, which Congress eschewed
here
. E. g., § 247d–7f(b). Finally, even on respondents' reading, a
small refnery with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the
RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever. Pp. 395–396.
(c) In an appeal to public policy, respondents argue that subparagraph
(B) was adopted to “funnel small refneries toward compliance over
time” and that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance that
goal. Consistent with that view, the Tenth Circuit concluded the num-
ber of small refnery exemptions “should have tapered down” over time.
Petitioners counter that the statute seeks to increase production of re-
newable fuel while offering an annual “safety valve” for small
refneries. Neither the statute's text, structure, nor history affords
suffcient guidance to choose between these competing narratives
and metaphors. Instead, the analysis can be guided only by the stat-
ute's text—and that nowhere commands a continuity requirement.
Pp. 396–399.
948 F. 3d 1206, reversed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined.
Barrett, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan,
JJ., joined, post, p. 400.
Peter D. Keisler argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Ryan C. Morris, Eric D. McArthur,
and Peter C. Whitfeld.
Christopher G. Michel argued the cause for the federal
respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor
General Prelogar, Acting Assistant Attorney General Wil-
l i am s, Depu ty So l ici t o r Gene ral Stew ar t, and Mel issa
Hoffer.
Matthew W. Morrison argued the cause for private re-
spondents. With him on the brief were Cynthia Cook Rob-
ertson and Kevin M. Fong.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Wyo-
ming et al. by Bridget Hill, Attorney General of Wyoming, James Kaste,
Deputy Attorney General, and Matt VanWormer, Senior Assistant Attor-
ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Mike
Hunter of Oklahoma, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and
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Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress
requires most domestic refneries to blend a
certain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into
the transportation fuels they produce. But when it frst
adopted these mandates, Congress temporarily exempted
small refneries across the board. Looking beyond that ini-
tial period, Congress authorized individual small refneries
to apply for additional hardship “extensions” from the fed-
eral government “at any time.” The question before us is
whether a small refnery that manages to comply with re-
newable fuel mandates in one year is forever forbidden from
applying for an “extension” in any future year.
I
In 2005 and 2007, Congress created the renewable fuel pro-
gram (RFP). §§ 201, 202(a)(1), 121 Stat. 1519, 42 U. S. C.
§ 7545(o)(1)(J), (o)(1)(L), (o)(2)(A)(i). For 2006, Congress or-
dained the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in
the Nation's fuel supply. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I). By 2022, the
Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers by Andrew M. Grossman, Christopher H. Marraro, and
Richard Moskowitz; for Countrymark Refning and Logistics, LLC, by
Derek R. Molter and Jenny R. Buchheit; and for the Small Refneries
Coalition by Jonathan G. Hardin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Iowa
et al. by Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Jeffrey Thompson,
Solicitor General, and Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Solicitor General,
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General of Nebraska, James A. Campbell,
Solicitor General, and Justin D. Lavene and Joshua E. Dethlefsen, Assist-
ant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Dana Nessel of Michigan,
Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Jason R.
Ravnsborg of South Dakota, and Mark R. Herring of Virginia; for the
Advanced Biofuels Association by Rafe Petersen; for the Coalition for Re-
newable Natural Gas et al. by Sandra Franco and Jerome C. Muys, Jr.;
for Growth Energy et al. by Seth P. Waxman, David M. Lehn, Ellen Steen,
and Travis Cushman; and for the National Biodiesel Board by Ethan G.
Shenkman, Jonathan S. Martel, William Perdue, and Sally L. Pei.
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number will climb to 36 billion gallons. Ibid. For years
af
ter that, Congress has largely left it to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set the applicable volumes.
§ 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii).
From the start, EPA has apportioned the nationwide vol-
ume mandates into individualized ones for each refnery.
§ 7545(o)(3)(B); 40 CFR § 80.1407(a) (2020). The Agency po-
lices these mandates with a system of credits. Each credit
represents the blending of a certain quantity of renewable
fuel. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(A)( i); 40 CFR §§ 80.1415,
80.1429. A refnery that blends renewables may either “re-
tire” the credits it has earned (i. e., use them) to satisfy its
own RFP volume obligation—or sell those credits to a differ-
ent producer that needs them. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(B); 40
CFR §§ 80.1425–80.1427. Any given refnery may therefore
comply with the law thanks to its own blending efforts, the
purchase of credits from someone else, or a combination of
both.
Congress tempered its mandates in other ways too. For
example, if a refnery is unable to generate or purchase suf-
fcient credits in a given year, it may “carry forward” any
defcit to the following year. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(D).
But this reprieve has a snowball effect. The next year,
the refnery must offset the defcit it carried forward.
§ 7545(o)(5)(D)(ii). Elsewhere, Congress authorized more
sweeping relief: EPA may waive RFP obligations in a par-
ticular State or region if it determines they “would se-
verely harm the economy or environment” or if “there is
an inadequate domestic supply. ” § 7545(o)(7)(A). That
waiver lasts for only one year, “but [it] may be renewed.”
§ 7545(o)(7)(C).
Most important for our case, however, is a different, if re-
lated, set of tempering features. Evidently, Congress was
concerned that escalating RFP obligations could work spe-
cial burdens on small refneries that lack the “inherent scale
advantages of large refneries,” Sinclair Wyoming Refning
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Opinion of the Court
Co. v. EPA, 887 F. 3d 986, 989 (CA10 2017), and sometimes
supply
a major source of jobs in rural communities, Brief for
State of Wyoming et al. as Amici Curiae 19–25. To protect
small refneries that produce (on average) fewer than 75,000
barrels a day “for a calendar year,” § 7545(o)(1)(K), Congress
created a blanket exemption from RFP obligations “until cal-
endar year 2011,” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Congress also directed
EPA to “extend the exemption under clause (i)” for at least
two years if the Secretary of Energy determined RFP
obligations would impose “a disproportionate economic hard-
ship” on a given small refnery. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Accord-
ingly, subparagraph (A) anticipated temporary relief until
2011 or at least 2013. In the next subparagraph, the one
most squarely at issue before us, Congress offered the possi-
bility of still further relief in future years: “A small refnery
may at any time petition the Administrator for an extension
of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of
disproportionate economic hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
Here's how things played out for small refneries once the
law went into effect. Under subparagraph (A)(i), all small
refneries were exempt through 2010. See Dept. of Energy,
Offce of Policy and International Affairs, D. Vashishat et al.,
Small Refnery Exemption Study 25 (Mar. 2011). In 2011,
EPA extended that exemption for 13 small refneries under
subparagraph (A)(ii)—and it extended the exemption for an
additional 11 small refneries under subparagraph (B)(i).
Id., at 37. As time went on, and as economic conditions
fuctuated, EPA extended more exemptions under subpara-
graph (B)(i) in some years than in others. For example, EPA
granted 8 extensions in 2013, but expanded that number to 31
in 2018. EPA, RFS Small Refnery Exemptions (May 20,
2021), https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-
compliance-help/rfs-small-refnery-exemptions.
This case concerns three small refneries that initially
received an exemption, saw it lapse for a period, and then
petitioned for an exemption again under subparagraph (B)(i).
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HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refning LLC received only the
blanket
exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) through 2010.
See Renewable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1228
(CA10 2020). Wynnewood Refning Company received the
blanket exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) and a 2-year
extension under subparagraph (A)(ii) through 2012. Id., at
1229. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning LLC received sub-
paragraph (A)(i)'s blanket exemption, subparagraph (A)(ii)'s
2-year extension, and then subparagraph (B)(i)'s hardship
exemption in 2015. Id., at 1227. After a lull, all three re-
fneries petitioned for a hardship exemption under subpara-
graph (B)(i) in 2017 or 2018. EPA granted all three.
A group of renewable fuel producers objected. They peti-
tioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Tenth Circuit,
arguing the Agency acted “in excess of statutory jurisdic-
tion, authority, or limitations” by granting the petitions. 5
U. S. C. § 706(2)(C). The court vacated EPA's decisions. It
concluded the refneries were ineligible for an “extension” of
their exemptions because all three had allowed their exemp-
tions to lapse at some point in the past. 948 F. 3d, at 1249.
We granted review to consider the question for ourselves.
592 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
A
Where Congress does not furnish a defnition of its own,
we generally seek to afford a statutory term “its ordinary or
natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994).
Before us, the parties agree on one thing: The key word
here—“extension”—is nowhere defned in the statute and it
can mean different things depending on context.
Sometimes, as the renewable fuel producers observe and
the court of appeals held, an “extension” can refer to an in-
crease in time. See, e. g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 597
(2d ed. 1989) (OED) (“Enlargement in duration”); 7 U. S. C.
§ 940f(a) (“extension of the fnal maturity” of a federal loan).
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Opinion of the Court
In other settings, as the small refneries emphasize, an “ex-
tensi
on” can mean the offering or making something avail-
able to someone, such as the granting of a beneft. See, e. g.,
5 OED 595 (“[t]o hold out, accord, grant”); 15 U. S. C.
§ 1141e(a) (“extension of [intellectual property] protection”).
These defnitional differences matter too. If Congress used
the term in the second sense, everyone before us seems to
accept the court of appeals erred: Just because a small refn-
ery's frst exemption lapsed, nothing would foreclose the gov-
ernment from extending—in the sense of granting or confer-
ring—a second exemption later.
Ultimately, however, we agree with the renewable fuel
producers and the court of appeals that subparagraph (B)(i)
uses “extension” in its temporal sense—referring to the
lengthening of a period of time. We fnd three textual clues
telling. First, the initial exemption described in subpara-
graph (A)(i) is described temporally (as lasting “until calen-
dar year 2011”). 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Second, the
next exemption described in subparagraph (A)(ii) speaks
temporally too, and it does so using a variation of the very
term in dispute—authorizing EPA to “extend the exemption
under clause (i) for the small refnery for a period of not less
than 2 additional years.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis
added). Finally, subparagraph (A)(ii) and subparagraph
(B)(i) share an identical title—“Extension of exemption”—
underscoring the likelihood that the two neighboring provi-
sions use the term “extension” in one consistent sense. Nor
do we see any persuasive countervailing evidence that Con-
gress meant to adopt one meaning of the term in subparagraph
(A)(ii) and a different one next door in subparagraph (B)(i).
See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 85
(2017) (absent contrary evidence, this Court normally pre-
sumes consistent usage).
B
Resolving that much, however, does not resolve this case.
Really, it only takes us to the heart of the dispute. The
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Tenth Circuit didn't just hold that an extension means an
i
ncrease in time—it imposed a continuity requirement. On
that court's view, a small refnery becomes permanently inel-
igible for a further extension of time once its exemption
lapses. Even accepting that subparagraph (B)(i) uses the
term “extension” in its temporal sense, the small refneries
submit this was error. On their view, small refneries whose
exemptions have lapsed in one year may still seek an “exten-
sion” in a following year. Indeed, the small refneries can-
didly characterize this as their stronger argument for
reversal.
We agree. It is entirely natural—and consistent with or-
dinary usage—to seek an “extension” of time even after
some lapse. Think of the forgetful student who asks for an
“extension” for a term paper after the deadline has passed,
the tenant who does the same after overstaying his lease, or
parties who negotiate an “extension” of a contract after its
expiration. Perhaps for reasons like these, the respondents
and court of appeals are unable to point to a single dictionary
defnition of the term “extension” requiring unbroken conti-
nuity. To be sure, some defnitions speak of an extension as
a “continuation.” See, e. g., Black's Law Dictionary 703
(10th ed. 2014) (defning “extension” as “[t]he continuation
of the same contract for a specifed period” (emphasis
added)). And the dissent urges us to read “extension” to
mean “continuation.” Post, at 401 (opinion of Barrett, J.).
But even that term can denote a resumption after some
interrupting lapse. See, e. g., 3 OED 828 (defning “con-
tinuation” as “the resumption of any interrupted action
or course”); Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 220 (1936) (de-
fning “continuation” as the “[a]ct of continuing; esp. a re-
sumption”); B. Garner, Modern English Usage 214 (4th ed.
2016).
Much federal law proceeds on this same understanding.
Under certain circumstances, a court “may . . . extend”
a party's “time for appeal” even “after the expiration of
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Opinion of the Court
the time otherwise set for bringing appeal.” 28 U. S. C.
§
2107(c). In other words, the timer can start, run, fnish,
and then restart—because a court has the power to “extend”
the time allotted even after a lapse. Likewise, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe all sorts of rules about
“[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specifed time”
in trial court proceedings. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1).
And for almost all rules prescribing a deadline, a district
court may “extend the time” even “after the time has ex-
pired.” Ibid.; cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2). More than a
few lawyers and clients have taken advantage of “exten-
sions” of just these sorts.
Still other examples exist. Maybe most notably, just last
year Congress twice passed laws providing for the “exten-
sion” of public benefts that had lapsed or been interrupted.
See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116–
260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182 (providing an “extension” of unem-
ployment compensation starting on December 26, 2020, after
lapsing on July 31, 2020); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Eco-
nomic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–136, § 2114, 134 Stat. 334
(providing an “extension” of unemployment benefts starting
in 2020, after lapsing in 2013). The dissent gives these par-
ticular examples short shrift because they appear in statutes
“passed in an emergency context” a decade after the statute
at issue here. Post, at 406. We do not doubt that meaning
may change with time, but unless the dissent thinks the ordi-
nary meaning of “extension” changed in just 10 years, it's
hard to understand why these enactments don't shed at least
some light on today's question. If anything, the emergency
context in which these laws were passed—forcing legislators
to use a term on short notice—would seem to provide useful
evidence of ordinary meaning.
Beyond that, the dissent counters by attempting to recast
all these varied examples of temporal extensions after inter-
ruption. It imagines, for example, that when a teacher ex-
tends a paper deadline after a lapse, that act of grace always
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operates like a nunc pro tunc judicial decree—retroactively
deemi
ng the time originally allotted as now extending con-
tinuously to some new and future due date. But no one
thinks extensions always work this way. As the COVID–19
statutes illustrate, a previously lapsed beneft can and some-
times is “extended” for a new period without any retroactive
effect. Likewise, if a student misses the 4 p.m. deadline on
Friday, his teacher may extend the deadline by authorizing
him to hand in his paper the following Monday between 8
a.m. and 9 a.m. Besides, even looking to the nunc pro tunc
analogy, what does it prove? It cannot change the fact that,
absent time travel, a lapse or interruption has occurred.
The student cannot go back in time and turn in his paper
when it was originally due on Friday afternoon. His lapse
may be forgiven or overlooked, maybe even with a Latin
term invoked in the process, but none of that means a break
in continuity, a lapse, or an interruption never happened.
See infra, at 394, n. 2 (discussing treatment of a lapse under
subparagraph (A)).
We do not mean to suggest that every use of the word
“extension” must be read the same way. On occasion, for
example, Congress requires “extensions” to be “consecutive”
or “successive.” E. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1184(g)(8)(D); 10 U. S. C.
§ 2304a(f ); 19 U. S. C. § 2432(d)(1); 28 U. S. C. § 594(b)(3)(A).
Modifers like those may well suggest a continuity require-
ment. See, e. g., Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, at 994 (de-
fning “successive” as “following each other without inter-
ruption”). Other contextual clues in a given statute may
yield a similar conclusion. But none of that means the bare
term “extension” obviously and always includes a strict con-
tinuity requirement. If anything, the absence of any paral-
lel modifying language in the statute before us supplies one
clue that continuity is not required here.
Further statutory clues confrm this understanding. Re-
call that subparagraph (B)(i) authorizes small refneries
to seek hardship exemptions “at any time.” 42 U. S. C.
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§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Far from indicating that a refnery may
apply
for an exemption in a future year only if it has always
received one in the past, this language suggests a much more
“expansive meaning.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S.
1, 5 (1997). “At any time” does not connote a demand for
some rigid continuity so much as its opposite—including
the possibility that small refneries might apply for ex-
emptions in different years in light of market fuctuations
and changing hardship conditions, whether consecutively or
otherwise.
1
We fnd another feature telling too. Next door, subpara-
graph (A) uses the term “extension” without a continuity
requirement. To see how subparagraph (A) was designed,
imagine a small refnery avails itself of the blanket exemp-
tion in 2008 and 2009 under subparagraph (A)(i). Then in
2010, because of an increase in production capacity, the re-
fnery loses “small refnery” status under § 7545(o)(1)(K) and
with it the blanket exemption that “appl[ies] to small refn-
eries.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). One year later, production ca-
pacity falls and the refnery moves back into small refnery
status for 2011. If that refnery applies for an “extension”
under subparagraph (A)(ii), the statute provides that EPA
“shall extend the exemption under clause (i),” so long as the
Secretary of Energy found the refnery would suffer a dis-
proportionate hardship. The result? A refnery may re-
ceive an “extension” despite its exemption having lapsed.
And if that's how the term is used in subparagraph (A), we
1
On the dissent's account, this language merely permits a small refnery
to seek an extension for the following year after EPA's November 30 dead-
line for publishing the coming year's RFP mandates. Post, at 409–410.
But to pursue this interpretation we would effectively have to read words
into the statute. A provision promising small refneries that they may
seek an extension “at any time” would become a provision promising them
only the chance to seek an extension “for the following year at any time
before or after EPA's November 30 deadline for publishing next year's
RFP mandates.”
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would once again expect subparagraph (B) to follow a con-
sistent
pattern of usage. See Henson, 582 U. S., at 85.
2
The refneries suggest we need to place still another point
in their column. They direct our attention to a regulation
EPA adopted in 2014 to clarify the bounds of “small refnery”
status. When EPA frst sought public comment, some sug-
gested a refnery should be eligible for exemption only if it
constantly remained “small” from 2006 onward—and EPA
expressly rejected that view in favor of revisiting annually
whether a refnery falls above or below the “small refnery”
threshold. 40 CFR § 80.1441(e)(2)(iii). Before the Tenth
Circuit, the Agency insisted this regulation sheds light on
the meaning of “extension” and underscores that it does not
include a continuity requirement. Indeed, EPA asked the
court of appeals to defer to its understanding under Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837 (1984). Although the refneries repeat that ask
here, the government does not. With the recent change in
administrations, “the government is not invoking Chevron.”
Brief for Federal Respondent 46–47. We therefore decline
to consider whether any deference might be due its
regulation.
2
Replying to our example, the dissent posits that subparagraph (A)(i)'s
exemption “existed in the year 2010 by virtue of statute, even if a particu-
lar refnery was not in a position to take advantage of it.” Post, at 410–
411. But it's hard to see how a refnery might have an “exemptio[n] cur-
rently in place” when it does not qualify for or receive its benefts. Post,
at 400. Even putting that problem aside, following the dissent's logic does
not aid its cause. What is true for subparagraph (A)(i) should likewise
be true for subparagraph (B)(i), which refers to “the exemption under
subparagraph (A).” So, following the dissent's reasoning, one might just
as easily conceive of a subparagraph (B)(i) exemption as “existing ” even
in a year when a small refnery “was not in a position to take advantage
of it.” Accordingly, on the dissent's logic, if a small refnery lacked the
exemption in one year (say, 2016) and then applied for it in a later year
(say, 2017), it would seem the exemption always “presently exist[ed]” and
can be “extended.” Post, at 403, 407.
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Against the petitioners' evidence of statutory meaning, the
respondents
ask us to consider their own. They point to the
fact that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,”
that it was permitted to expire in 2013, and that subpara-
graph (B)(i) speaks of extending “the exemption under sub-
paragraph (A).” Together, respondents say, these statutory
features suggest that the whole scheme of exemptions was
meant to end rapidly, that subparagraph (B)(i) was designed
as a narrow exception to a 2013 sunset rule, and that any
further exemptions it allows should therefore be construed
narrowly to end as quickly as possible.
But this much we do not see. In the frst place, we do not
construe subparagraph (B) as part of some sunset scheme.
To be sure, subparagraph (A)'s exemptions were permitted
to expire in 2013, but did not have to do so. In theory, EPA
could have granted a small refnery exemption under subpar-
agraph (A)(ii) that lasted many years or indefnitely. See
42 U. S. C. 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). In any case, subparagraph
(B)(i) expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013—“at
any time” hardship conditions are satisfed. If Congress
really had wanted all exemptions to cease after a temporary
period, that was surely an odd way to achieve it. Odder still
in light of the fact that Congress had before it (but es-
chewed) many readymade models for a sunset statute if
that's what it wished here. See, e. g., § 247d–7f(b) (providing
that statutory provisions authorizing a “limited antitrust ex-
emption” “shall expire at the end of [a] 17-year period” after
the Act was passed). And maybe odder yet given that sub-
paragraph (B)(i) exemptions are hardly destined to sunset
quickly even on the respondents' account, for they do not
dispute that small refneries with an unbroken record of fail-
ing to comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain
extensions forever. See Brief for Federal Respondent 43,
n. 7; Brief for Industry Respondents 39.
Additionally, even assuming (without granting) that sub-
paragraph (B) really did represent only some sort of excep-
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tion to a general 2013 deadline, we still don't see how that
wou
ld help. The respondents urge us to construe statutory
exceptions narrowly. But this Court has made clear that
statutory exceptions are to be read fairly, not narrowly, for
they “are no less part of Congress's work than its rules and
standards—and all are worthy of a court's respect.” BP
p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230,
239 (2021). And fairly read, the key phrase at issue before
us—“A small refnery may at any time petition the Adminis-
trator for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph
(A) for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship”—
simply does not contain the continuity requirement the court
of appeals supposed. Instead, more naturally, it means ex-
actly what it says: A small refnery can apply for (if not al-
ways receive) a hardship extension “at any time.”
3
III
Everything else the respondents offer in defense of the
court of appeals' judgment involves surmise about legislative
purpose and arguments from public policy. Like the Tenth
Circuit, they emphasize that, by the time the petitioners
sought new exemptions in 2017 and 2018, small refneries
already “had many years to ponder . . . whether it made
3
Rather than argue subparagraph (B)(i) is an exception that should be
construed narrowly, the dissent imagines some weakness in our position
when we observe above that the word extension “can” or “may” be used
to refer to an increase in time after a lapse. Supra, at 390. From this,
the dissent supposes that we mean to say “HollyFrontier wins because its
reading is [merely] possible.” Post, at 402. That is mistaken. As we
have sought to explain, we simply recognize that the term “extension”
may or may not convey a continuity requirement depending on context—
much as the dissent acknowledges the term can sometimes tolerate a lapse
of some sort. See supra, at 394, n. 2 (discussing subparagraph (A)(1)).
Our holding today, too, should be clear. Rather than rule for HollyFrontier
because it has advanced a permissible reading, and rather than offer asser-
tions about “common sense” or what seems “more natural” to us, post, at
402–404, we have sought to explain why this particular statute's usage, con-
text, and structure persuade us that continuity is not required here.
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sense to enter into or remain in the market.” 948 F. 3d,
at
1247. The respondents argue that subparagraph (B) was
adopted for the purpose of “funnel[ing] small refneries
toward compliance over time.” Id., at 1246. And they
submit that enforcing a continuity requirement helps ad-
vance congressional goals such as increasing “biofuel produc-
tion, energy independence, and environmental protection.”
Ibid.
The dissent seemingly agrees. It acknowledges that Con-
gress provided other ameliorating provisions to address
various challenges to the fuel market. Post, at 407–409.
For example and as we have already seen, § 7545(o)(7)(A)
grants EPA authority to waive RFP obligations at any time
across an entire State or region to address severe hardships
or shortages. Section 7545(o)(7)(E)(ii) provides a more
limited waiver with respect to biomass-based diesel fuels.
And § 7545(o)(8)(D)(i) provided a waiver authority to address
hardships for consumers “in calendar year 2006.” But
on the dissent's view, everything else in the statute aims
to “[f]unne[l] refneries toward compliance.” Post, at 408.
Indeed, the dissent fnds it “odd” that our reading would
permit hardship relief only to small refneries in existence
in 2008 and not to new ones, post, at 411—and that our read-
ing “will require EPA to examine the 2008 study” when
reviewing extension applications “decades from now,” post,
at 408.
But, as usual, the other side presents a plausible compet-
ing narrative. On the petitioners' account, the statute seeks
to increase production of renewable fuel while also offering
a “safety valve” each year for small refneries that might
otherwise face extinction. According to the small refneries,
the respondents' competing “funnel” metaphor makes little
sense because a small refnery's compliance in one year is in
no way dispositive of its ability to comply in a future year.
Instead, compliance depends on numerous factors unique to
each year and circumstances over which small refneries
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often have no control. Brief for Petitioners 42–44. In par-
ticu
lar, most small refneries cannot comply with RFP
mandates but must purchase credits from those that can.
Each year more credits are required. And the price for
those credits refect the famously volatile nature of the fuel
market—in one recent year, prices shot up by as much as
100%. See id., at 45. Aware of these market realities, the
small refneries say, a rational Congress could have created
(and did create) a means for small refneries to seek a hard-
ship exemption “at any time” rather than be forced to exit
the market.
The petitioners say their “safety valve” analogy fts better
for other reasons too. As the dissent acknowledges, Con-
gress included many other “safety valve” provisions to ad-
dress various challenges to the market that may arise at any
time, including regional shortages and economic hardships.
Post, at 407–409. Surely, Congress could have chosen to
provide similar relief targeted to small refneries. Nor is
there anything odd about the fact that Congress chose only
to protect existing small refneries rather than new entrants.
Often Congress chooses to protect existing market parti-
cipants from shifts in the law while applying new restric-
tions fully to future entrants. Maybe, too, the petitioners
suggest, Congress wasn't particularly concerned with new
entrants in 2008 because, until last year, there had not been
a new refnery of any size in this country for almost 50 years.
See Blackmon, First Major U. S. Oil Refnery Since 1977
Targets Bakken Shale Crude, Forbes (July 25, 2020), https://
www.forbes.com / sites / davidblackmon / 2020 / 07/ 25/frst-new-
us-oil-refnery-since-1977-targets-bakken-shale-crude/.
The petitioners stress as well that, even on the respond-
ents' account, Congress did create a “safety valve” rather
than a “funnel” for some small refneries: Those with an
unbroken record of failing to comply with the RFP may
continue to seek and obtain extensions forever without being
“funneled” toward compliance. Supra, at 395. Yet the

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respondents never explain why the least compliant refneries
shou
ld be the most favored in this way. Nor do they con-
front the fact that their rule would have the strange effect of
disincentivizing small refneries from ever trying to comply.
Brief for Petitioners 22; Brief for State of Wyoming et al. as
Amici Curiae 13–14. And even on the respondents' ac-
count, EPA will have to consult its 2008 study in future years
for these permanently noncompliant refneries.
Beyond that, the petitioners note, if subparagraph (B)(i)
really did create a “miss one and done” rule for small refn-
eries able to comply with RFP mandates in a single year
the statute could wind up reducing overall domestic fuel
supply—all without adding a single additional gallon of re-
newable fuel to the mix. See 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(5)(B); 40
CFR § 80.1427. Permanently shuttering existing small re-
fneries in the process could, as well, increase the Nation's
future reliance on imported fuels. Brief for Petitioners 41.
All of which sits uneasily with even the respondents' account
of the statute's purposes.
We mention all this not because we pick sides. Neither
the statute's text, structure, nor history afford us suffcient
guidance to be able to choose with confdence between the
parties' competing narratives and metaphors. We mention
this only to observe that both sides can offer plausible ac-
counts of legislative purpose and sound public policy—and
that it would therefore be a mistake to rely on appeals to
some abstract intuition that the number of small refneries
receiving exemptions “should have tapered down” over time.
948 F. 3d, at 1246 (emphasis added). Instead, our analysis
can be guided only by the statute's text—and that nowhere
commands a continuity requirement.
*
The respondents have not shown that EPA's approval of
the petitioners' extension requests was in excess of the
Agency's statutory authority. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(C). To the
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extent the court of appeals vacated EPA's orders on this
ground,
the judgment is
Reversed.
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
When Congress amended the Clean Air Act to add the
Renewable Fuel Program (RFP), it gave small refneries
a temporary exemption from compliance. Congress then
vested the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with au-
thority to grant “extension[s] of the exemption” in certain
instances. The question in this case is straightforward:
Does this provision limit EPA to prolonging exemptions cur-
rently in place, or does it enable EPA to provide exemptions
to refneries that lack them? The statute's text and struc-
ture direct a clear answer: EPA cannot “extend” an exemp-
tion that a refnery no longer has. Because the Court's
contrary conclusion caters to an outlier meaning of “extend”
and clashes with statutory structure, I respectfully dissent.
I
Refneries regulated by the RFP come in all shapes and
sizes—ranging from those run by Fortune-500 companies
like HollyFrontier to local outfts with less fuel-blending ca-
pacity and access to capital. So, as the Court notes, Con-
gress made certain accommodations for small refneries that
might otherwise struggle to satisfy their RFP obligations.
To start, Congress in subparagraph (A)(i) gave all small
refneries—including petitioners (HollyFrontier)—a “[t]em-
porary exemption” from the program's renewable-fuel re-
quirements; the exemption ran from the RFP's passage in
2005 until 2011. 42 U. S. C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). Then, in sub-
paragraph (A)(ii), Congress directed the Department of En-
ergy to conduct a study—to be completed no later than the
end of 2008—to determine whether compliance with the
RFP “would impose a disproportionate economic hardship on
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small refneries.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). If so, the statute
prov
ides, EPA “shall extend the exemption” initially enjoyed
by all small refneries “for a period of not less than 2 addi-
tional years.” § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
Congress also provided small refneries an avenue to peti-
tion for an “extension” of these initial exemptions. This is
the provision at the heart of this case:
“A small refnery may at any time petition [EPA] for
an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)
for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.”
§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
Deciding that this subparagraph uses “extension” to mean
“continuation” should be an easy call. Following Holly-
Frontier's lead, however, the Court forgoes the obvious
answer.
A
HollyFrontier lays its cards on the table. It does not dis-
pute that when used to refer to “an increase in the length of
time,” the word “extension” can—and commonly does—refer
to something that is prolonged without interruption. Brief
for Petitioners 29. Yet, HollyFrontier insists, the term “ex-
tension” is not always used that way. Instead, it might
sometimes refer to a “non-continuous extension”—in other
words, an extension of something that used to exist but no
longer does. Ibid. Because there is “nothing unnatural”
about reading the term this way, HollyFrontier urges us to
embrace this interpretation. Id., at 31.
One might think that this argument is an uphill climb—
after all, we do not usually pin an interpretation to “the
outer limits of a word's defnitional possibilities” at the ex-
pense of its ordinary or common meaning.
1
FCC v. AT&T
1
To be sure, in some contexts we have asked whether a term can
“permissib[ ly]” bear an asserted meaning. E. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). The
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Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 407 (2011) (alterations omitted). But the
Cour
t takes HollyFrontier's framing and runs with it.
The Court points out that the word “extension” “can” or
“may” be used to refer to post-lapse renewals. Ante, at 390.
And because the statute thus “commands” no “continuity re-
quirement,” ante, at 399, the Court concludes that Holly-
Frontier's reading must be right—which means that EPA
can provide an “extension” of an exemption that is no longer
in effect.
Boiled down, the Court's position is that HollyFrontier
wins because its reading is possible. But I would ask, as we
typically do, how the term “extension” “is most naturally
read.” Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 39 (2008) (emphasis added); see also Romag
Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. –––, –––
(2020). The Tenth Circuit's answer to that question is spot
on: The “ordinary defnitions of `extension,' along with com-
mon sense, dictate that the subject of an extension must be
in existence before it can be extended.” Renewable Fuels
Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1245 (2020).
1
In assessing the best reading of the phrase “extension of
the exemption,” the Court is of course correct that context
matters. Here, though, context cuts respondents' way.
Subparagraph (B)(i) does not use “extension” in a vacuum;
rather, it permits EPA to grant an “extension of the exemp-
tion under subparagraph (A).” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis
added). What is being “extended,” then, is “the exemption
under subparagraph (A)”—a discrete, time-limited period of
permissible noncompliance with the RFP. And when used
in this context, the noun “extension” means an “addition that
increases the . . . operation . . . of something,” “a stretching
out or stretching forth: a carrying forward,” or “a part that
is added to something to enlarge or prolong it; a continua-
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tion.”
2
The
verb “extend” is similarly defned: It means
“[t]o cause (something) to be or last longer,” to “lengthen,
elongate, prolong, protract,” or “[t]o prolong in duration.”
3
The Court acknowledges these defnitions, yet still parrots
HollyFrontier's point that no defnition of “extend” requires
“unbroken continuity.” Ante, at 390. But without some-
thing that presently exists, there is nothing to “carr[y] for-
ward” or “prolong.” The word “extension,” then, plainly
contemplates a “continuation of the same” thing as currently
exists—in contrast to the term “renewal,” for example,
which refers to a “restoring ” or “reestablishing ” of some-
thing that used to exist. Compare Black's Law Dictionary
622 (8th ed. 2004), with id., at 1322. Or, to put it slightly
differently, the word “extension” “ `[i]mports the continuance
of an existing thing.' ” Brief for Federal Respondent 21
(quoting W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 437 (1996)).
Common usage confrms as much. Consider a hotel guest
who decides to spend a few more days on vacation. That
guest likely would ask to “extend [her] visit.” Random
House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 684 (2d ed. 2001)
(emphasis deleted). Now suppose the same guest returns to
the same hotel three years later and, upon arrival, requests
to “extend” her prior stay. The hotel employee would no
doubt “scratch her head.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Why? Be-
cause it is highly unnatural to speak of “extending ” a stay
that ended years before.
Similar examples spring readily to mind. One would not
normally ask to “extend” a newspaper subscription long
after it expired. Or request, after child number two, to
2
American Heritage Dictionary 628 (4th ed. 2000); Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 804 (2002); New Oxford American Dictionary 596
(2d ed. 2005).
3
American Heritage Dictionary, at 628; Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary, at 804 (capitalization deleted); 5 Oxford English Diction-
ary 594 (2d ed. 1989).
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“extend” the parental-leave period completed after child
number
one. Or report that an athlete signed a contract
“extension” with her frst team after spending several sea-
sons with a rival squad. These examples do not derive their
force by superimposing a “continuity requirement” on the
word “extend.” Cf. ante, at 390, 392, 393, 394, 396, 397, 399.
Instead, continuity is inherent in the way that people usually
use the word “extension”—namely, to reference something
currently “in existence” such that there is a “continuing con-
nection with the thing to be extended.” Brief for Federal
Respondent 21. That is so, moreover, absent any additional
“modifying language” requiring the “extension” to be “ `con-
secutive' ” or “ `successive.' ” Ante, at 392.
By dismissing the need for a continuing connection
between the frst period and the second, the Court forgoes
the “far more natural” reading of extend. Taniguchi v. Kan
Pacifc Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 569 (2012). The upshot?
A refnery could ask to “extend” an exemption it had in 2010
in the year 2040, with no need to connect the two periods.
It defes ordinary usage to deem the second exemption “an
extension” of the frst, as opposed to a new, standalone ex-
emption. HollyFrontier recognizes as much, seeking to de-
fect this example as “extreme” and “highly unlikely.” Tr.
of Oral Arg. 28. Unlikely or not, it follows logically from
HollyFrontier's reading of “extension”—which shows just
how far this interpretation strays from the term's ordinary
meaning.
2
The Court's counterexamples do not help its case. Take
its discussion of deadline “extensions”—as given, say, to a
student who seeks more time to complete a paper even after
the due date has passed or to a party who requests leave to
fle a document after the court's original deadline. See ante,
at 390–392. In this context, “extension” refers to “an addi-
tional period of time given one to meet an obligation.” Ran-
dom House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, at 684; see also
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American Heritage Dictionary, at 628 (“[a]n allowance of
extra
time, as for the repayment of a debt”); Black's Law
Dictionary, at 622 (“[a] period of additional time to take an
action, make a decision, accept an offer, or complete a task”).
Because there is nothing odd about granting an extension
even after the deadline has lapsed, the Court insists that
there is nothing odd about granting HollyFrontier an exemp-
tion “extension” even after its initial exemption period has
expired.
Put aside for the moment that this case does not involve
the extension of a deadline. The Court's reasoning still
breaks down because when a deadline “extension” is granted,
there is no “lapse”: The new deadline runs back to the old.
In other words, a post-due-date extension does not start a
new period for timely action. It forgives the missed dead-
line by retroactively prolonging the pre-existing period.
Even in the Court's deadline-extension examples, then, there
is continuity.
4
Problems likewise plague the Court's other hypotheticals
involving delay in “seek[ing] an `extension,' ” such as the ten-
ant who asks to “extend” her lease after overstaying it or
parties who negotiate to “extend” a contract after it expires.
Ante, at 390. These examples confuse the time at which one
may permissibly request an extension with what is being ex-
tended. It may be that the tenant could request an “exten-
sion” of the year-one lease at some point after the start of
year two. But, if approved, the tenant's lease would still
4
The hypothetical that the Court offers to refute this critique—a
teacher authorizing a student who missed a Friday deadline to turn in a
paper between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. on Monday—gets it nowhere. It is either
an extension of the deadline to 9 a.m. on Monday, in which case it operates
like the other deadline extensions I have described, with the teacher sim-
ply specifying when she will be present to receive the paper. Or it is
an example of something other than a deadline extension—like the start
of an entirely new window for timely conduct—in which case it is
inapposite.
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be continuous—running from year one to year two—and the
tenant
would no doubt owe rent for the intervening period.
By contrast, the Court's reading of “extend” would capture
a tenant who moves out in year one and returns in year fve.
In that scenario, no one would say that the tenant sought an
“extension” of her lease—nor would anyone expect the ten-
ant to pay back-rent for the intervening years.
The Court next reaches for recent congressional enact-
ments—or more specifcally, for their captions. The title of
two COVID–19 relief provisions, the Court notes, purported
to provide an “extension” of certain unemployment benefts
that had previously lapsed. See ante, at 391 (quoting Pub.
L. 116–260, § 203, 134 Stat. 1182; Pub. L. 116–136, § 2114, 134
Stat. 334). I will start with the obvious: Invoking captions
from “different statute[s] altogether,” passed in an emer-
gency context over a decade after the RFP, “does not have
much force.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The In-
terpretation of Legal Texts 172 (2012). The argument is
made weaker still by the fact that Congress used “extension”
the other way in the RFP statute itself. See infra, at 407.
And it is telling that apart from the COVID–19 relief provi-
sions, HollyFrontier could identify no other instance in which
Congress used “extension” in the way that HollyFrontier
proposes.
At the very most, the Court's COVID–19 examples show
that “extend” does not “always includ[e] a strict continuity
requirement.” Ante, at 392 (emphasis added). But “[t]hat
a defnition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a
word does not establish that the word is ordinarily under-
stood in that sense.” Taniguchi, 566 U. S., at 568. Because
respondents' interpretation of “extension” is “far more natu-
ral,” id., at 569, it is the presumptive favorite—barring com-
pelling evidence to the contrary in the statute's structure.
As it turns out, statutory structure favors respondents' read-
ing too.
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B
1
F
our structural features of the RFP, in particular, cut for
respondents' interpretation and against the Court's.
First, respondents' reading of “extension” tracks the only
other use of the term in the RFP. A nearby “[w]aiver” pro-
vision allows EPA to issue an “order to reduce, for up to a
60-day period,” the biomass-based diesel fuel requirements
under certain conditions. § 7545(o)(7)(E)(ii). In a related
provision entitled “[e]xtensions,” Congress authorized EPA
to reduce those requirements “for up to an additional 60-
day period” based on an assessment that the conditions are
“continuing beyond” the original “60-day period.” § 7545(o)
(7)(E)(iii). This provision, like respondents' interpretation,
uses “extension” to reference a continuation of something
that presently exists. Cf. ante, at 389 (noting that “absent
contrary evidence, this Court normally presumes consistent
usage”).
Second, the RFP is replete with express grants of waiver
authority of the type the Court reads into subparagraph
(B)(i)'s reference to “extension[s].” The statute's “general”
waiver provision specifes that EPA, under certain eco-
nomic or fuel-market conditions, “may waive the require-
ments” of the RFP “in whole or in part on petition by”
refneries, among other entities. § 7545(o)(7)(A). As dis-
cussed, EPA also has express standalone waiver authority
with respect to biomass-based diesel levels. See § 7545(o)
(7)(E)(ii) (EPA can “issue an order to reduce, for up to a
60-day period, the quantity of biomass-based diesel re-
quired . . . ”). Elsewhere, the statute authorizes EPA to
“waive, in whole or in part, the renewable fuel require-
ment[s]” following a fnding that compliance would have a
signifcant adverse impact on consumers at the outset of the
program. § 7545(o)(8)(D)(i).
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Together, these nearby RFP provisions show that Con-
gress
had an “easy way” to delegate standalone waiver au-
thority when it wished. Advocate Health Care Network v.
Stapleton, 581 U. S. 468, 477 (2017). Yet Congress “did not
adopt that ready alternative” in subparagraph (B)(i)—it in-
stead used “language whose most natural reading ” does not
contemplate freestanding waiver authority. Ibid. See also
ante, at 392 (looking to “the absence of any parallel . . . lan-
guage” as an interpretive “clue”).
Third, note that when assessing petitions for an “extension
of the exemption,” EPA must consider “the fndings of
the study under subparagraph (A)(ii)”—i. e., the Department
of Energy study to be completed by 2008. See §§ 7545(o)
(9)(B)(i)–(ii). The Court's reading will require EPA to ex-
amine the 2008 study when evaluating “extension” petitions
fled decades from now—say, in 2050—even though the re-
fnery may have had long stretches of compliance in the in-
terim. If Congress intended exemption “extension[s]”—or
waivers, as the Court treats them—to remain available for
decades, why would it instruct EPA to keep evaluating them
in light of a 2008 study? Respondents' reading makes more
sense of this instruction because it embraces the possibility,
even the likelihood, that exemptions would not be available
forever. Funneling refneries toward compliance means
that it would be surprising rather than expected for EPA to
be considering a 2008 study in 2050.
Fourth, other provisions help ease the burden on small
refneries in times of economic hardship. To ensure that
EPA can appropriately adjust the RFP requirements it sets,
the statute requires EPA to review “the feasibility of achiev-
ing compliance” and “impacts of ” the RFP on regulated re-
fneries. §§ 7545(o)(11)(B)–(C). And if compliance is not fea-
sible in a given year, the RFP allows individual refneries to
carry a compliance defcit into the next year. See ante, at 386
(discussing § 7545(o)(5)(D)). Recall too that in cases where
compliance would work severe economic harm on a State or
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409
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a region, the general-waiver provision allows EPA to waive
the
requirements in whole or in part. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i).
Economic concerns are at the center of other RFP waiver
provisions as well. See § 7545(o)(7)(E)(ii) (waiver based on
price of biomass-based diesel fuel); §§ 7545(o)(8)(A)–(D)
(waiver based on “signifcant adverse impacts on consumers,”
including impacts on “supplies and prices”). Congress' di-
rect concern with economic diffculties in separate provisions
further undermines HollyFrontier's argument that Congress
must have meant to vindicate such concerns by granting
EPA broad waiver power in subparagraph (B)(i).
2
The Court's structural counters are not persuasive.
First, the Court cites the statute's instruction that a small
refnery can fle a subparagraph (B)(i) petition “ `at any
time.' ” See ante, at 392–393 (quoting § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i)).
This argument falls apart on close inspection. “[A]t any time”
informs when a refnery may fle an “extension” request; it
cannot change the type of request that EPA can grant. By
using the phrase “at any time,” the statute gives a small
refnery with an exemption fexibility about when to fle a
request to extend that exemption for the following year.
This reading does not leave “at any time” without impor-
tant work to do. For one, the phrase means that refneries
need not seek exemptions before EPA's fuel standards are
due—which is November 30 in the calendar year before the
refnery must apply. § 7545(o)(3)(B). This is a “signifcant
statutory concession.” 948 F. 3d, at 1248. It allows (but
does not require) regulated refneries to see what their obli-
gations will be before deciding whether to seek an exemp-
tion; it also means that EPA may not always be able to
“ `compensate for the renewable-fuel shortfall created by
belated exemptions.' ” Ibid. (quoting American Fuel &
Petrochemical Mfrs. v. EPA, 937 F. 3d 559, 571 (CADC
2019)).
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In addition, the phrase helps account for the delayed-
request
scenarios the Court posits. See ante, at 390–391.
To see why, suppose that a refnery with an exemption in
2014 planned to ramp up its operations in 2015 and antici-
pated that it would no longer need or qualify for exempt
status. Then imagine that, halfway through 2015, the re-
fnery concluded that it would in fact need an exemption for
that year. The “at any time” provision allows it to fle for
one, thereby giving refneries the ability to adjust in the face
of “market fuctuations and changing hardship conditions.”
Ante, at 393. Unlike the Court's interpretation, this account
of “at any time” respects the ordinary meaning of “exten-
sion” by requiring the “exemptions” themselves to run con-
tinuously—in the above example, from 2014 to 2015.
Second, the Court leans on the fact that “subparagraph (A)
uses the term `extension' without a continuity requirement.”
Ibid. That must be so, according to the Court, because a
refnery could fall out of small-refnery status, say, in 2010,
yet still receive an “extension of the exemption” for 2011
under subparagraph (A)(ii).
It is hard to know quite what to make of the Court's
theory. It never played out in practice, as EPA regulations
meant that no small refnery lost exempt status during the
years in question. See 72 Fed. Reg. 23925 (2007); 75 Fed.
Reg. 14866 (2010); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 66–67. And the
theory was neither passed on by the court below nor dis-
cussed by respondents here, as it appeared for the frst time
in a footnote of HollyFrontier's reply brief. Reply Brief 10,
n. 6. But in any event, the Court's account does not seem
to prove that subparagraph (A) permits a “laps[e].” Ante,
at 393. What EPA may “extend” via subparagraph (A)(ii)
is “the exemption under clause (i)”—that is, the initial, auto-
matic exemption that excused all small refneries from com-
pliance through 2010. The “exemption under clause (i)”
thus existed in the year 2010 by virtue of statute, even if a
particular refnery was not in a position to take advantage
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Barrett, J., dissenting
of it. “Extending ” that exemption into 2011—should the re-
f
nery once again qualify for small-refnery status—would
thus appear to be consistent with respondents' reading of the
term. Regardless, any ambiguity about the functioning of
subparagraph (A) cannot save an argument that is otherwise
overwhelmed by the term's ordinary meaning and other as-
pects of the RFP's structure.
II
The Court declines to “pick sides” in the parties' dispute
over which reading of subparagraph (B)(i) best fulflls con-
gressional purpose. Ante, at 399. At the same time, the
Cour t cr itici zes respondents' readi ng for causi ng the
“strange effect” of treating the least compliant refneries
most favorably. Ibid. In the Court's telling, extensions
that function as waivers (its view) give refneries that com-
ply in some years a boost when they need help. Extensions
that prolong a grace period (respondents' view) reward re-
fneries that never manage to comply.
But respondents' argument that subparagraph (B)(i) ex-
tensions give small refneries an initial runway—rather than
a down-the-road safety valve—is not at all odd if, as respond-
ents assert, Congress intended the RFP to funnel all refn-
eries into eventual compliance.
5
Maybe respondents' story
about the statute's purpose is right; maybe it is wrong. In
all events, though, it is not “strange”—in fact, the Court
deems this account just as “plausible” as any. Ibid.
Plus, the Court's reading of subparagraph (B)(i) yields its
own odd results: It means that EPA's exemption power cov-
5
This funneling effect started to play out. Although about half of all
small refneries initially received study- or petition-based extensions,
fewer refneries sought and received such extensions as time went on.
By 2014, most small refneries, including petitioners, were meeting their
renewable-fuel obligations. The number of exempt refneries later
spiked—with EPA granting 35 petitions for compliance year 2017, and 31
for 2018—when EPA came to a new view of how to administer subpara-
graph (B)(i).
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ers only those refneries in existence at the RFP's outset.
Th
is makes little sense if one accepts HollyFrontier's account
of the provision's “safety valve” purpose. Ante, at 398
(internal quotation marks omitted). If Congress' point
was to give leeway to refneries subject to unpredictable
market fuctuations and ever-increasing compliance burdens,
then it is hard to see why the provision would distinguish
between old and new refneries facing “the same current eco-
nomic outlook” in a given year. Brief for Federal Respond-
ent 43, n. 7.
In the end, the parties' dueling accounts of purpose under-
score the wisdom of sticking to the statutory text and struc-
ture. Because, in my view, both clearly favor respondents'
reading, I respectfully dissent.
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