Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 1
Pages 180–219
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 23, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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180 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT v. B. L., a minor,
by
and through her father, LEVY, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 20–255. Argued April 28, 2021—Decided June 23, 2021
Mahanoy Area High School student B. L. failed to make the school's var-
sity cheerleading squad. While visiting a local convenience store over
the weekend, B. L. posted two images on Snapchat, a social media appli-
cation for smartphones that allows users to share temporary images
with selected friends. B. L.'s posts expressed frustration with the
school and the school's cheerleading squad, and one contained vulgar
language and gestures. When school offcials learned of the posts, they
suspended B. L. from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the up-
coming year. After unsuccessfully seeking to reverse that punishment,
B. L. and her parents sought relief in federal court, arguing inter alia
that punishing B. L. for her speech violated the First Amendment. The
District Court granted an injunction ordering the school to reinstate
B. L. to the cheerleading team. Relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, to grant B. L.'s subse-
quent motion for summary judgment, the District Court found that
B. L.'s punishment violated the First Amendment because her Snapchat
posts had not caused substantial disruption at the school. The Third
Circuit affrmed the judgment, but the panel majority reasoned that
Tinker did not apply because schools had no special license to regulate
student speech occurring off campus.
Held: While public schools may have a special interest in regulating some
off-campus student speech, the special interests offered by the school
are not suffcient to overcome B. L.'s interest in free expression in this
case. Pp. 187–193.
(a) In Tinker, we indicated that schools have a special interest in
regulating on-campus student speech that “materially disrupts class-
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of oth-
ers.” 393 U. S., at 513. The special characteristics that give schools
additional license to regulate student speech do not always disappear
when that speech takes place off campus. Circumstances that may im-
plicate a school's regulatory interests include serious or severe bullying
or harassment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed at teach-
ers or other students; the failure to follow rules concerning lessons, the
writing of papers, the use of computers, or participation in other online
school activities; and breaches of school security devices. Pp. 187–189.

Cite
as: 594 U. S. 180 (2021)
181
Syllabus
(b) But three features of off-campus speech often, even if not always,
disti
nguish schools' efforts to regulate off-campus speech. First, a
school will rarely stand in loco parentis when a student speaks off cam-
pus. Second, from the student speaker's perspective, regulations of off-
campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech, in-
clude all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day. That
means courts must be more skeptical of a school's efforts to regulate off-
campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in
that kind of speech at all. Third, the school itself has an interest in
protecting a student's unpopular expression, especially when the expres-
sion takes place off campus, because America's public schools are the
nurseries of democracy. Taken together, these three features of much
off-campus speech mean that the leeway the First Amendment grants to
schools in light of their special characteristics is diminished. Pp. 189–190.
(c) The school violated B. L.'s First Amendment rights when it sus-
pended her from the junior varsity cheerleading squad. Pp. 190–194.
(1) B. L.'s posts are entitled to First Amendment protection. The
statements made in B. L.'s Snapchats refect criticism of the rules of a
community of which B. L. forms a part. And B. L.'s message did not
involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment's ordi-
nary protection. Pp. 190–191.
(2) The circumstances of B. L.'s speech diminish the school's interest
in regulation. B. L.'s posts appeared outside of school hours from a loca-
tion outside the school. She did not identify the school in her posts or
target any member of the school community with vulgar or abusive lan-
guage. B. L. also transmitted her speech through a personal cellphone,
to an audience consisting of her private circle of Snapchat friends. P. 190.
(3) The school's interest in teaching good manners and conse-
quently in punishing the use of vulgar language aimed at part of the
school community is weakened considerably by the fact that B. L. spoke
outside the school on her own time. B. L. spoke under circumstances
where the school did not stand in loco parentis. And the vulgarity in
B. L.'s posts encompassed a message of criticism. In addition, the
school has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent stu-
dents from using vulgarity outside the classroom. Pp. 191–192.
(4) The school's interest in preventing disruption is not supported
by the record, which shows that discussion of the matter took, at most,
5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class “for just a couple days” and that
some members of the cheerleading team were “upset” about the content
of B. L.'s Snapchats. App. 82–83. This alone does not satisfy Tinker's
demanding standards. Pp. 192–193.
(5) Likewise, there is little to suggest a substantial interference in,
or disruption of, the school's efforts to maintain cohesion on the school
cheerleading squad. P. 193.
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182 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Syllabus
964 F. 3d 170, affrmed.
Breyer
, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett,
JJ., joined. Alito, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J.,
joined, post, p. 194. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 211.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for petitioner. With her
on the briefs were Sarah M. Harris, Eden Schiffmann, Mi-
chael I. Levin, and David W. Brown.
Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. On the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Sopan Joshi, and Michael S. Raab.
David D. Cole argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Witold J. Walczak, Arleigh P. Helfer
III, Theresa E. Loscalzo, Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, and Seth
F. Kreimer.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Jordan
Sekulow, Colby M. May, and Walter M. Weber; for First Amendment and
Education Law Scholars by Misha Tseytlin; for the Hunstville, Alabama
City Board of Education et al. by E. Travis Ramey, Christopher M. Pape,
and William Grayson Lambert; for the National Association of Pupil
Services Administrators et al. by Christopher B. Gilbert; for the National
Education Association by Alice M. O'Brien and Jason Walta; for the Na-
tional School Boards Association et al. by Gregory G. Garre, Caroline A.
Flynn, and Francisco M. Negrón, Jr.; and for the Pennsylvania School
Boards Association et al. by Michael H. McGinley.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Louisiana et al. by Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Elizabeth
B. Murrill, Solicitor General, and Ben Wallace, Assistant Solicitor Gen-
eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Lynn Fitch of
Mississippi, Eric Schmitt of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Doug
Peterson of Nebraska, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean Reyes of Utah; for
the Advancement Project et al. by John A. Freedman, Gilda Daniels,
Marsha L. Levick, and Katherine E. Burdick; for the Alliance Defending
Freedom et al. by Kristen K. Waggoner, John J. Bursch, David A. Cort-
man, Tyson C. Langhofer, and Kenneth W. Starr; for the Americans for
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Cite
as: 594 U. S. 180 (2021)
183
Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
public high school student used, and transmitted to her
Snapchat friends, vulgar language and gestures criticizing
Prosperity Foundation et al. by Cynthia Fleming Crawford and John W.
Whitehead; for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty by Eric S. Baxter
and Nicholas R. Reaves; for College Athlete Advocates by Justin Mar-
ceau; for Current and Former Student School Board Members by Hyland
Hunt and Ruthanne M. Deutsch; for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
et al. by Naomi Gilens and Sophia Cope; for the First Liberty Institute
by Kelly J. Shackel ford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser III and David
J. Hacker; for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education et al. by
Darpana Sheth, Jeffrey A. Trexler, and Eric M. Freedman; for the HISD
Student Congress et al. by Michael J. Grygiel and Vincent H. Chieffo; for
the Independent Women's Law Center by William M. Jay and Benjamin
Hayes; for Law and Education Professors by Elisabeth S. Theodore, R.
Stanton Jones, and Anthony Franze; for the Liberty Justice Center et al.
by Daniel R. Suhr; for the National Women's Law Center et al. by Doug-
las H. Hallward-Driemeier, Stephanie A. Webster, Damon T. Hewitt, Jon
M. Greenbaum, David G. Hinojosa, David Brody, Paul D. Castillo, Fat-
ima Goss Graves, Emily J. Martin, Sunu P. Chandy, Neena Chaudhry,
Camilla B. Taylor, and Kara N. Ingelhart; for the Pacifc Legal Founda-
tion et al. by Deborah J. La Fetra, Daniel M. Ortner, and Ilya Shapiro;
for Parents Defending Education by William S. Consovoy, John Michael
Connolly, and Cameron T. Norris; for School Discipline Professors by
Richard W. Mark and Lee R. Crain; for the Student Press Law Center
et al. by David M. Zionts, Michael C. Hiestand, S. Mark Goodman, and
Therea Chmara; for Teachers et al. by Michael R. Dreeben, Samantha M.
Goldstein, and Anton Metlitsky; for VanHo Law by Adam M. VanHo; and
for Jane Bambauer et al. by Stuart Banner and Eugene Volokh, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts et al. by Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and
Joshua Olszewski-Jubelirer, Abrisham Eshghi, and Douglas Martland,
Assistant Attorneys General, by Karl A. Racine, Attorney General of the
District of Columbia, Loren L. Alikhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van
Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Samson J. Schatz, Assistant
Attorney General, Jane E. Young, Deputy Attorney General of New
Hampshire, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Xavier Becerra of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, Kath-
leen Jennings of Delaware, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of
Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Brian E.
Frosh of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota,
Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Bald-

184 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Opinion of the Court
both the school and the school's cheerleading team. The stu-
dent'
s speech took place outside of school hours and away
from the school's campus. In response, the school sus-
pended the student for a year from the cheerleading team.
We must decide whether the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit correctly held that the school's decision violated the
First Amendment. Although we do not agree with the rea-
soning of the Third Circuit panel's majority, we do agree with
its conclusion that the school's disciplinary action violated
the First Amendment.
I
A
B. L. (who, together with her parents, is a respondent in
this case) was a student at Mahanoy Area High School, a
public school in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania. At the end of
her freshman year, B. L. tried out for a position on the
school's varsity cheerleading squad and for right felder on a
private softball team. She did not make the varsity cheer-
leading team or get her preferred softball position, but she
was offered a spot on the cheerleading squad's junior varsity
team. B. L. did not accept the coach's decision with good
grace, particularly because the squad coaches had placed an
entering freshman on the varsity team.
That weekend, B. L. and a friend visited the Cocoa Hut, a
local convenience store. There, B. L. used her smartphone
to post two photos on Snapchat, a social media application
that allows users to post photos and videos that disappear
after a set period of time. B. L. posted the images to her
Snapchat “story,” a feature of the application that allows any
eras of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North
Carolina, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania,
Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont,
Robert W. Ferguson of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin;
for the Cyberbullying Research Center et al. by David Beryl Rubin; for
the Life Legal Defense Foundation by Catherine W. Short; and for Mary
Beth Tinker et al. by Robert Corn-Revere.
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185
Opinion of the Court
person in the user's “friend” group (B. L. had about 250
“fr
iends”) to view the images for a 24-hour period.
The frst image B. L. posted showed B. L. and a friend
with middle fngers raised; it bore the caption: “Fuck school
fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” App. 20. The
second image was blank but for a caption, which read: “Love
how me and [another student] get told we need a year of jv
before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn't matter to anyone
else?” The caption also contained an upside-down smiley-
face emoji. Id., at 21.
B. L.'s Snapchat “friends” included other Mahanoy Area
High School students, some of whom also belonged to the
cheerleading squad. At least one of them, using a separate
cellphone, took pictures of B. L.'s posts and shared them with
other members of the cheerleading squad. One of the stu-
dents who received these photos showed them to her mother
(who was a cheerleading squad coach), and the images
spread. That week, several cheerleaders and other students
approached the cheerleading coaches “visibly upset” about
B. L.'s posts. Id., at 83–84. Questions about the posts per-
sisted during an Algebra class taught by one of the two
coaches. Id., at 83.
After discussing the matter with the school principal, the
coaches decided that because the posts used profanity in con-
nection with a school extracurricular activity, they violated
team and school rules. As a result, the coaches suspended
B. L. from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the up-
coming year. B. L.'s subsequent apologies did not move
school offcials. The school's athletic director, principal,
superintendent, and school board, all affrmed B. L.'s suspen-
sion from the team. In response, B. L., together with her
parents, fled this lawsuit in Federal District Court.
B
The District Court found in B. L.'s favor. It frst granted
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
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186 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Opinion of the Court
ordering the school to reinstate B. L. to the cheerleading
team.
In granting B. L.'s subsequent motion for summary
judgment, the District Court found that B. L.'s Snapchats
had not caused substantial disruption at the school. Cf.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U. S. 503 (1969). Consequently, the District Court de-
clared that B. L.'s punishment violated the First Amend-
ment, and it awarded B. L. nominal damages and attorneys'
fees and ordered the school to expunge her disciplinary
record.
On appeal, a panel of the Third Circuit affrmed the Dis-
trict Court's conclusion. See 964 F. 3d 170, 194 (2020). In
so doing, the majority noted that this Court had previously
held in Tinker that a public high school could not constitu-
tionally prohibit a peaceful student political demonstration
consisting of “ `pure speech' ” on school property during the
school day. 393 U. S., at 505–506, 514. In reaching its con-
clusion in Tinker, this Court emphasized that there was no
evidence the student protest would “substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students.” Id., at 509. But the Court also said that:
“[C]onduct by [a] student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves sub-
stantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is . . .
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.” Id., at 513.
Many courts have taken this statement as setting a
standard—a standard that allows schools considerable free-
dom on campus to discipline students for conduct that the
First Amendment might otherwise protect. But here, the
panel majority held that this additional freedom did “not
apply to off-campus speech,” which it defned as “speech that
is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels
and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the school's
imprimatur.” 964 F. 3d, at 189. Because B. L.'s speech
took place off campus, the panel concluded that the Tinker
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as: 594 U. S. 180 (2021)
187
Opinion of the Court
standard did not apply and the school consequently could not
discipl
ine B. L. for engaging in a form of pure speech.
A concurring member of the panel agreed with the majori-
ty's result but wrote that the school had not suffciently justi-
fed disciplining B. L. because, whether the Tinker standard
did or did not apply, B. L.'s speech was not substantially
disruptive.
C
The school district fled a petition for certiorari in this
Court, asking us to decide “[w]hether [Tinker], which holds
that public school offcials may regulate speech that would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school, applies to student speech that occurs off cam-
pus.” Pet. for Cert. I. We granted the petition.
II
We have made clear that students do not “shed their con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression,” even
“at the school house gate.” Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506; see
also Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S.
786, 794 (2011) (“[M]inors are entitled to a signifcant meas-
ure of First Amendment protection” (alteration in original;
internal quotation marks omitted)). But we have also made
clear that courts must apply the First Amendment “in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment.”
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 266
(1988) (internal quotation mark omitted). One such charac-
teristic, which we have stressed, is the fact that schools at
times stand in loco parentis, i. e., in the place of parents.
See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 684
(1986).
This Court has previously outlined three specifc catego-
ries of student speech that schools may regulate in certain
circumstances: (1) “indecent,” “lewd,” or “vulgar” speech
uttered during a school assembly on school grounds, see id.,
at 685; (2) speech, uttered during a class trip, that promotes
“illegal drug use,” see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 409
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188 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Opinion of the Court
(2007); and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive
as
“bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such as that ap-
pearing in a school-sponsored newspaper, see Kuhlmeier,
484 U. S., at 271.
Finally, in Tinker, we said schools have a special interest
in regulating speech that “materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of oth-
ers.” 393 U. S., at 513. These special characteristics call
for special leeway when schools regulate speech that occurs
under its supervision.
Unlike the Third Circuit, we do not believe the special
characteristics that give schools additional license to regu-
late student speech always disappear when a school regu-
lates speech that takes place off campus. The school's
regulatory interests remain signifcant in some off-campus
circumstances. The parties' briefs, and those of amici, list
several types of off-campus behavior that may call for school
regulation. These include serious or severe bullying or har-
assment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed at
teachers or other students; the failure to follow rules con-
cerning lessons, the writing of papers, the use of computers,
or participation in other online school activities; and breaches
of school security devices, including material maintained
within school computers.
Even B. L. herself and the amici supporting her would
redefne the Third Circuit's off-campus/on-campus distinc-
tion, treating as on campus: all times when the school is
responsible for the student; the school's immediate surround-
ings; travel en route to and from the school; all speech taking
place over school laptops or on a school's website; speech tak-
ing place during remote learning; activities taken for school
credit; and communications to school e-mail accounts or
phones. Brief for Respondents 36–37. And it may be that
speech related to extracurricular activities, such as team
sports, would also receive special treatment under B. L.'s
proposed rule. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 71, 85.
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189
Opinion of the Court
We are uncertain as to the length or content of any such
l
ist of appropriate exceptions or carveouts to the Third Cir-
cuit majority's rule. That rule, basically, if not entirely,
would deny the off-campus applicability of Tinker's highly
general statement about the nature of a school's special in-
terests. Particularly given the advent of computer-based
learning, we hesitate to determine precisely which of many
school-related off-campus activities belong on such a list.
Neither do we now know how such a list might vary, depend-
ing upon a student's age, the nature of the school's off-campus
activity, or the impact upon the school itself. Thus, we do
not now set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment
rule stating just what counts as “off campus” speech and
whether or how ordinary First Amendment standards must
give way off campus to a school's special need to prevent,
e. g., substantial disruption of learning-related activities or
the protection of those who make up a school community.
We can, however, mention three features of off-campus
speech that often, even if not always, distinguish schools' ef-
forts to regulate that speech from their efforts to regulate
on-campus speech. Those features diminish the strength of
the unique educational characteristics that might call for spe-
cial First Amendment leeway.
First, a school, in relation to off-campus speech, will rarely
stand in loco parentis. The doctrine of in loco parentis
treats school administrators as standing in the place of stu-
dents' parents under circumstances where the children's
actual parents cannot protect, guide, and discipline them.
Geographically speaking, off-campus speech will normally
fall within the zone of parental, rather than school-related,
responsibility.
Second, from the student speaker's perspective, regula-
tions of off-campus speech, when coupled with regulations of
on-campus speech, include all the speech a student utters
during the full 24-hour day. That means courts must be
more skeptical of a school's efforts to regulate off-campus
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190 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Opinion of the Court
speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in
that
kind of speech at all. When it comes to political or
religious speech that occurs outside school or a school pro-
gram or activity, the school will have a heavy burden to
justify intervention.
Third, the school itself has an interest in protecting a stu-
dent's unpopular expression, especially when the expression
takes place off campus. America's public schools are the
nurseries of democracy. Our representative democracy only
works if we protect the “marketplace of ideas.” This free
exchange facilitates an informed public opinion, which, when
transmitted to lawmakers, helps produce laws that refect
the People's will. That protection must include the protec-
tion of unpopular ideas, for popular ideas have less need for
protection. Thus, schools have a strong interest in ensuring
that future generations understand the workings in practice
of the well-known aphorism, “I disapprove of what you say,
but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” (Al-
though this quote is often attributed to Voltaire, it was likely
coined by an English writer, Evelyn Beatrice Hall.)
Given the many different kinds of off-campus speech, the
different potential school-related and circumstance-specifc
justifcations, and the differing extent to which those justif-
cations may call for First Amendment leeway, we can, as a
general matter, say little more than this: Taken together,
these three features of much off-campus speech mean that
the leeway the First Amendment grants to schools in light
of their special characteristics is diminished. We leave for
future cases to decide where, when, and how these features
mean the speaker's off-campus location will make the critical
difference. This case can, however, provide one example.
III
Consider B. L.'s speech. Putting aside the vulgar lan-
guage, the listener would hear criticism, of the team, the
team's coaches, and the school—in a word or two, criticism
of the rules of a community of which B. L. forms a part.

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191
Opinion of the Court
This criticism did not involve features that would place it
outside
the First Amendment's ordinary protection. B. L.'s
posts, while crude, did not amount to fghting words. See
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). And
while B. L. used vulgarity, her speech was not obscene as
this Court has understood that term. See Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U. S. 15, 19–20 (1971). To the contrary, B. L. ut-
tered the kind of pure speech to which, were she an adult,
the First Amendment would provide strong protection. See
id., at 24; cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 461 (2011) (First
Amendment protects “even hurtful speech on public issues
to ensure that we do not stife public debate”); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987) (“The inappropriate . . .
character of a statement is irrelevant to the question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern”).
Consider too when, where, and how B. L. spoke. Her
posts appeared outside of school hours from a location out-
side the school. She did not identify the school in her posts
or target any member of the school community with vulgar
or abusive language. B. L. also transmitted her speech
through a personal cellphone, to an audience consisting of
her private circle of Snapchat friends. These features of
her speech, while risking transmission to the school itself,
nonetheless (for reasons we have just explained, supra, at
189–190) diminish the school's interest in punishing B. L.'s
utterance.
But what about the school's interest, here primarily an in-
terest in prohibiting students from using vulgar language
to criticize a school team or its coaches—at least when that
criticism might well be transmitted to other students, team
members, coaches, and faculty? We can break that general
interest into three parts.
First, we consider the school's interest in teaching good
manners and consequently in punishing the use of vulgar lan-
guage aimed at part of the school community. See App. 35
(indicating that coaches removed B. L. from the cheer team
because “there was profanity in [her] Snap and it was di-

192 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Opinion of the Court
rected towards cheerleading ”); see also id., at 27, 47, and
n.
9, 78, 82. The strength of this anti-vulgarity interest is
weakened considerably by the fact that B. L. spoke outside
the school on her own time. See Morse, 551 U. S., at 405
(clarifying that although a school can regulate a student's use
of sexual innuendo in a speech given within the school, if the
student “delivered the same speech in a public forum outside
the school context, it would have been protected”); see also
Fraser, 478 U. S., at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (noting that if the student in Fraser “had given the
same speech outside of the school environment, he could not
have been penalized simply because government offcials
considered his language to be inappropriate”).
B. L. spoke under circumstances where the school did not
stand in loco parentis. And there is no reason to believe
B. L.'s parents had delegated to school offcials their own
control of B. L.'s behavior at the Cocoa Hut. Moreover, the
vulgarity in B. L.'s posts encompassed a message, an expres-
sion of B. L.'s irritation with, and criticism of, the school and
cheerleading communities. Further, the school has pre-
sented no evidence of any general effort to prevent students
from using vulgarity outside the classroom. Together, these
facts convince us that the school's interest in teaching good
manners is not suffcient, in this case, to overcome B. L.'s
interest in free expression.
Second, the school argues that it was trying to prevent
disruption, if not within the classroom, then within the
bounds of a school-sponsored extracurricular activity. But
we can fnd no evidence in the record of the sort of “substan-
tial disruption” of a school activity or a threatened harm to
the rights of others that might justify the school's action.
Tinker, 393 U. S., at 514. Rather, the record shows that dis-
cussion of the matter took, at most, 5 to 10 minutes of an
Algebra class “for just a couple days” and that some mem-
bers of the cheerleading team were “upset” about the con-
tent of B. L.'s Snapchats. App. 82–83. But when one of
B. L.'s coaches was asked directly if she had “any reason to
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193
Opinion of the Court
think that this particular incident would disrupt class or
school
activities other than the fact that kids kept asking . . .
about it,” she responded simply, “No.” Id., at 84. As we
said in Tinker, “for the State in the person of school offcials
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it
must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleas-
antness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”
393 U. S., at 509. The alleged disturbance here does not
meet Tinker's demanding standard.
Third, the school presented some evidence that expresses
(at least indirectly) a concern for team morale. One of the
coaches testifed that the school decided to suspend B. L.,
not because of any specifc negative impact upon a particular
member of the school community, but “based on the fact that
there was negativity put out there that could impact stu-
dents in the school.” App. 81. There is little else, however,
that suggests any serious decline in team morale—to the
point where it could create a substantial interference in, or
disruption of, the school's efforts to maintain team cohesion.
As we have previously said, simple “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension . . . is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.” Tinker, 393 U. S., at 508.
It might be tempting to dismiss B. L.'s words as unworthy
of the robust First Amendment protections discussed herein.
But sometimes it is necessary to protect the superfuous in
order to preserve the necessary. See Tyson & Brother v.
Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 447 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
“We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise
might seem a trifing and annoying instance of individual dis-
tasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal val-
ues are truly implicated.” Cohen, 403 U. S., at 25.
***
Although we do not agree with the reasoning of the Third
Circuit's panel majority, for the reasons expressed above, re-
sembling those of the panel's concurring opinion, we nonethe-
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194 MAHANO
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Alito, J., concurring
less agree that the school violated B. L.'s First Amendment
r
ights. The judgment of the Third Circuit is therefore
affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, w ith whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to ex-
plain my understanding of the Court's decision and the
framework within which I think cases like this should be
analyzed. This is the frst case in which we have considered
the constitutionality of a public school's attempt to regulate
true off-premises student speech,
1
and therefore it is impor-
tant that our opinion not be misunderstood.
2
1
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U. S. 503 (1969), not only did the speech occur on school grounds during
the regular school day, but our opinion was specifcally directed at on-
premises speech. See id., at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students” (emphasis
added)); id., at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affrming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school offcials,
consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools” (emphasis added)); id., at 512–513 (refer-
ring to speech that occurs “in the classroom,” “in the cafeteria, or on the
playing feld, or on the campus during the authorized hours”). Tinker
makes no reference whatsoever to speech that takes place off premises
and outside “authorized hours.”
All our other cases involving the free-speech rights of public school stu-
dents concerned speech in school or in a school-sponsored event or publica-
tion. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 677–678
(1986) (school assembly); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S.
260, 262 (1988) (school newspaper); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 397
(2007) (display of banner on street near school at school-sponsored event).
2
This case does not involve speech by a student at a public college or
university. For several reasons, including the age, independence, and liv-
ing arrangements of such students, regulation of their speech may raise

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195
Alito, J., concurring
I
The
Court holds—and I agree—that: the First Amend-
ment permits public schools to regulate some student speech
that does not occur on school premises during the regular
school day;
3
this authority is more limited than the authority
that schools exercise with respect to on-premises speech;
4
courts should be “skeptical” about the constitutionality of the
regulation of off-premises speech;
5
the doctrine of in loco
parentis “rarely” applies to off-premises speech;
6
public
school students, like all other Americans, have the right to
express “unpopular” ideas on public issues, even when
those ideas are expressed in language that some fnd “ `inap-
propriate' ” or “ `hurtful' ”;
7
public schools have the duty to
teach students that freedom of speech, including unpopular
speech, is essential to our form of self-government;
8
the Ma-
hanoy Area High School violated B. L.'s First Amendment
rights when it punished her for the messages she posted on
her own time while away from school premises; and the judg-
ment of the Third Circuit must therefore be affrmed.
I also agree that it is not prudent for us to attempt at this
time to “set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment
rule” governing all off-premises speech. Ante, at 189. But
in order to understand what the Court has held, it is helpful to
very different questions from those presented here. I do not understand
the decision in this case to apply to such students.
3
See ante, at 188 (stating that a public school's authority to regulate
student speech does not “always disappear” when the speech “takes place
off campus” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“The school's regulatory interests
remain signifcant in some off-campus circumstances” (emphasis added)).
4
See ante, at 190 (stating that schools have “diminished” authority to
regulate off-premises speech).
5
See ante, at 189–190 (“[C]ourts must be more skeptical of a school's
efforts to regulate off-campus speech”).
6
See ante, at 189 (“[A] school, in relation to off-campus speech, will
rarely stand in loco parentis”).
7
Ante, at 190–191.
8
Ante, at 190.
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Alito, J., concurring
consider the framework within which efforts to regulate off-
premises
speech should be analyzed.
II
I start with this threshold question: Why does the First
Amendment ever allow the free-speech rights of public
school students to be restricted to a greater extent than the
rights of other juveniles who do not attend a public school?
As the Court recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 509 (1969), when
a public school regulates student speech, it acts as an arm of
the State in which it is located. Suppose that B. L. had been
enrolled in a private school and did exactly what she did
in this case—send out vulgar and derogatory messages that
focused on her school's cheerleading squad. The Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania would have had no legal basis to pun-
ish her and almost certainly would not have even tried. So
why should her status as a public school student give the
Commonwealth any greater authority to punish her speech?
Our cases involving the regulation of student speech have
not directly addressed this question. All those cases in-
volved either in-school speech or speech that was tantamount
to in-school speech. See n. 1, supra. And in those cases,
the Court appeared to take it for granted that “the special
characteristics of the school environment” justifed special
rules. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 397, 403, 405, 406,
n. 2, 408 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 266 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Tinker, 393 U. S., at
506.
Why the Court took this for granted is not hard to imag-
ine. As a practical matter, it is impossible to see how a
school could function if administrators and teachers could not
regulate on-premises student speech, including by imposing
content-based restrictions in the classroom. In a math class,
for example, the teacher can insist that students talk about
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197
Alito, J., concurring
math, not some other subject. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at
279
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The young polemic who stands
on a soapbox during calculus class to deliver an eloquent po-
litical diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of cal-
culus”). In addition, when a teacher asks a question, the
teacher must have the authority to insist that the student
respond to that question and not some other question, and a
teacher must also have the authority to speak without inter-
ruption and to demand that students refrain from interrupt-
ing one another. Practical necessity likewise dictates that
teachers and school administrators have related authority
with respect to other in-school activities like auditorium pro-
grams attended by a large audience. See Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 685 (1986) (“A high
school assembly . . . is no place for a sexually explicit mono-
logue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage
students”); id., at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)
(“In the present case, school offcials sought only to ensure
that a high school assembly proceed in an orderly manner”);
see also Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S., at 279 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he student who delivers a lewd endorsement of a
student-government candidate might so extremely distract
an impressionable high school audience as to interfere with
the orderly operation of the school”).
Because no school could operate effectively if teachers and
administrators lacked the authority to regulate in-school
speech in these ways, the Court may have felt no need to
specify the source of this authority or to explain how the
special rules applicable to in-school student speech ft into
our broader framework of free-speech case law. But when
a public school regulates what students say or write when
they are not on school grounds and are not participating in
a school program, the school has the obligation to answer the
question with which I began: Why should enrollment in a
public school result in the diminution of a student's free-
speech rights?
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The only plausible answer that comes readily to mind is
consent,
either express or implied. The theory must be that
by enrolling a child in a public school, parents consent on
behalf of the child to the relinquishment of some of the child's
free-speech rights.
This understanding is consistent with the conditions to
which an adult would implicitly consent by enrolling in an
adult education class run by a unit of state or local govern-
ment. If an adult signs up for, say, a French class, the adult
may be required to speak French, to answer the teacher's
questions, and to comply with other rules that are imposed
for the sake of orderly instruction.
When it comes to children, courts in this country have ana-
lyzed the issue of consent by adapting the common-law doc-
trine of in loco parentis. See Morse, 551 U. S., at 413–416
(Thomas, J., concurring). Under the common law, as Black-
stone explained, “[a father could] delegate part of his paren-
tal authority . . . to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child;
who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the
power of the parent committed to his charge, [namely,] that
of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer
the purposes for which he is employed.” 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1765) (some em-
phasis added).
Blackstone's explanation of the doctrine seems to treat it
primarily as an implied term in a private employment agree-
ment between a father and those with whom he contracted
for the provision of educational services for his child,
9
and
therefore the scope of the delegation that could be inferred
depended on “the purposes for which [the tutor or school-
master was] employed.” Ibid. If a child was sent to a
9
In a sensational and highly publicized mid-19th century case, there was
an express delegation, Regina v. Hopley, 2 F. & F. 202, 175 Eng. Rep. 1024
(N. P. 1860), but in other 19th century cases, the delegation was inferred.
See Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 F. & F. 656, 176 Eng. Rep. 734 (N. P. 1865);
State v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
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199
Alito, J., concurring
boarding school, the parents would not have been in a posi-
ti
on to monitor or control the child's behavior or to attend to
the child's welfare on a daily basis, and the schoolmaster
would be regarded as having implicitly received the author-
ity to perform those functions around the clock while the
child was in residence. On the other hand, if parents hired
a tutor to instruct a child in the home on certain subjects
during certain hours, the scope of the delegation would be
different. The tutor would be in charge during lessons, but
the parents would retain most of their authority. In short,
the scope of the delegation depended on the scope of the
agreed-upon undertaking.
Today, of course, the educational picture is quite different.
The education of children within a specifed age range is
compulsory,
10
and States specify the minimum number of
hours per day and the minimum number of days per year
that a student must attend classes, as well as many aspects
of the school curriculum.
11
Parents are not required to en-
roll their children in a public school. They can select a pri-
vate school if a suitable one is available and they can afford
the tuition, and they may also be able to educate their chil-
dren at home if they have the time and ability and can meet
the standards that their State imposes.
12
But by choice or
10
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 660, n. 14 (1977) (noting that
“compulsory school attendance laws were in force in all the States” by
1918).
11
See National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), State Education
Practices, Table 5.14: Number of Instructional Days and Hours in the
School Year, by State, 2018, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/
tab5_14.asp.
12
Pennsylvania, for example, requires a minimum of 180 days of instruc-
tion per year. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 13–1327.1(c) (Purdon 2016).
Students must be taught English, mathematics, science, geography, his-
tory, civics, safety education, health, physical education, music, and art.
§§ 13–1327.1(c)(1)–(2). Parents are required to maintain current and
detailed records of their child's learning materials and progress, § 13–
1327.1(e)(1), and they must turn those records over to a teacher or psychol-
ogist for an annual evaluation to determine whether “an appropriate

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Alito, J., concurring
necessity, nearly 90% of the students in this country attend
publ
ic schools,
13
and parents and public schools do not enter
into a contractual relationship.
If in loco parentis is transplanted from Blackstone's Eng-
land to the 21st century United States, what it amounts to
is simply a doctrine of inferred parental consent to a public
school's exercise of a degree of authority that is commensu-
rate with the task that the parents ask the school to perform.
Because public school students attend school for only part of
the day and continue to live at home, the degree of authority
conferred is obviously less than that delegated to the head
of a late-18th century boarding school, but because public
school students are taught outside the home, the authority
conferred may be greater in at least some respects than that
enjoyed by a tutor of Blackstone's time.
So how much authority to regulate speech do parents im-
plicitly delegate when they enroll a child at a public school?
The answer must be that parents are treated as having relin-
quished the measure of authority that the schools must be
able to exercise in order to carry out their state-mandated
educational mission, as well as the authority to perform any
other functions to which parents expressly or implicitly
agree—for example, by giving permission for a child to
education is occurring,” § 13–1327.1(e)(2). The evaluation also includes an
interview of the child. Ibid. Once the evaluation is completed, it is sub-
mitted to the superintendent of the public school district of residence.
§§ 13–1327.1(e)(2), (h)(1). If the superintendent and a hearing examiner
fnd that the child is not being supplied an appropriate education, and the
parents' appeal of that decision is unsuccessful, the child will be promptly
enrolled in the public school district of residence or a private school.
§§ 13–1327.1(k)–(l).
13
See NCES, School Choice in the United States, 2019, Table 206.20:
Percentage Distribution of Students Ages 5 through 17 Attending Kinder-
garten through 12th Grade, By School Type or Participation in Home-
schooling and Selected Child, Parent, and Household Characteristics, Se-
lected Years 1999 Through 2016, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest//d19/
tables/dt19_206.20.asp.

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Alito, J., concurring
participate in an extracurricular activity or to go on a
school
trip.
III
I have already explained what this delegated authority
means with respect to student speech during standard class-
room instruction. And it is reasonable to infer that this au-
thority extends to periods when students are in school but
are not in class, for example, when they are walking in a
hall, eating lunch, congregating outside before the school day
starts, or waiting for a bus after school. During the entire
school day, a school must have the authority to protect every-
one on its premises, and therefore schools must be able to
prohibit threatening and harassing speech. An effective in-
structional atmosphere could not be maintained in a school,
and good teachers would be hard to recruit and retain, if
students were free to abuse or disrespect them. And the
school has a duty to protect students while in school because
their parents are unable to do that during those hours. See
Morse, 551 U. S., at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). But even
when students are on school premises during regular school
hours, they are not stripped of their free-speech rights.
Tinker teaches that expression that does not interfere with
a class (such as by straying from the topic, interrupting the
teacher or other students, etc.) cannot be suppressed unless
it “involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others.” 393 U. S., at 513.
IV
A
A public school's regulation of off-premises student speech
is a different matter. While the decision to enroll a student
in a public school may be regarded as conferring the author-
ity to regulate some off-premises speech (a subject I address
below), enrollment cannot be treated as a complete transfer
of parental authority over a student's speech. In our soci-
ety, parents, not the State, have the primary authority and

202 MAHANO
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duty to raise, educate, and form the character of their chil-
dren.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972)
(“The history and culture of Western civilization refect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and up-
bringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition”); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925) (discussing “the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”). Parents do not
implicitly relinquish all that authority when they send their
children to a public school. As the Court notes, it would be
far-fetched to suggest that enrollment implicitly confers the
right to regulate what a child says or writes at all times of
day and throughout the calendar year. See ante, at 189–190.
14
Any such argument would run headlong into the fundamen-
tal principle that a State “may not deny a beneft to a person
14
There is no basis for concluding that the original public meaning of
the free-speech right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
was understood by Congress or the legislatures that ratifed those Amend-
ments as permitting a public school to punish a wide swath of off-premises
student speech. Compare post, at 212–215 (Thomas, J., dissenting). At
the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, public education was
virtually unknown, and the Amendment did not apply to the States. And
as for the Fourteenth Amendment, research has found only one pre-1868
case involving a public school's regulation of a student's off-premises
speech. In Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859), an 11-year-old boy, while
driving his father's cow by the home of his teacher, called the teacher “Old
Jack Seaver” in the presence of other students. Id., at 115 (emphasis
deleted). The next day, the teacher “whipped him with a small rawhide.”
Ibid. In a tort suit against the teacher for assault and battery, the Su-
preme Court of Vermont reversed the lower court's judgment for the
teacher but opined that the teacher had the authority to punish the stu-
dent's speech because of its effect on the operation of the school. Id., at
120–121, 125. This decision is of negligible value for present purposes.
It does not appear that any claim was raised under the state constitutional
provision protecting freedom of speech. And even if finty Vermont par-
ents at the time in question could be understood to have implicitly dele-
gated to the teacher the authority to whip their son for his off-premises
speech, the same inference is wholly unrealistic today.
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Alito, J., concurring
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . .
freedom
of speech even if he has no entitlement to that bene-
ft.”
15
Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open
Society Int'l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205, 214 (2013) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). While the in-school restrictions dis-
cussed above are essential to the operation of a public school
system, any argument in favor of expansive regulation of
off-premises speech must contend with this fundamental
free-speech principle.
B
The degree to which enrollment in a public school can be re-
garded as a delegation of authority over off-campus speech de-
pends on the nature of the speech and the circumstances under
which it occurs. I will not attempt to provide a complete tax-
onomy of off-premises speech, but relevant lower court cases
tend to fall into a few basic groups. And with respect to
speech in each of these groups, the question that courts must
ask is whether parents who enroll their children in a public
school can reasonably be understood to have delegated to the
school the authority to regulate the speech in question.
One category of off-premises student speech falls easily
within the scope of the authority that parents implicitly or
explicitly provide. This category includes speech that takes
place during or as part of what amounts to a temporal or
spatial extension of the regular school program, e. g., online
instruction at home, assigned essays or other homework, and
transportation to and from school. Also included are state-
ments made during other school activities in which students
participate with their parents' consent, such as school trips,
school sports and other extracurricular activities that may
take place after regular school hours or off school premises,
and after-school programs for students who would otherwise
be without adult supervision during that time. Abusive
15
Here, the Pennsylvania Constitution required that B. L. and all other
students be offered “a thorough and effcient system of public education.”
Art. III, § 14.
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speech that occurs while students are walking to and from
school
may also fall into this category on the theory that it
is school attendance that puts students on that route and in
the company of the fellow students who engage in the abuse.
The imperatives that justify the regulation of student speech
while in school—the need for orderly and effective instruc-
tion and student protection—apply more or less equally to
these off-premises activities.
Most of the specifc examples of off-premises speech that
the Court mentions fall into this category. See ante, at 188
(speech taking place during “remote learning,” “participation
in other online school activities,” “activities taken for school
credit,” “travel en route to and from the school,” “[the time
during which] the school is responsible for the student,” and
“extracurricular activities,” as well as speech taking place on
“the school's immediate surroundings” or in the context of
“writing . . . papers”).
16
The Court's broad statements about
off-premises speech must be understood with this in mind.
16
Two other examples mentioned by the Court—“communications to
school e-mail accounts or phones” and speech “on a school's website”—may
fall into the same category if they concern school work. Ante, at 188.
The Court also mentions “breaches of school security devices,” ibid., but
such breaches may be punishable regardless of whether the perpetrator is
a student at the school. See, e. g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7611 (Cum. Supp.
2016) (“Unlawful use of computer and other computer crimes”). Another
specifc example provided by the Court is “all speech taking place over
school laptops.” Ante, at 188. I do not take this statement to apply
under all circumstances to all student speech on such laptops. In a well-
publicized case, a public high school that provided laptops to high school
students used those computers to surreptitiously monitor students' private
messages and to photograph them in their homes. See Robbins v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 2010 WL 3421026, *1 (ED Pa., Aug. 30, 2010); see
also Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certifcation and in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for
Entry of Permanent Equitable Relief in Robbins v. Lower Merion School
Dist., No. 2:10–cv–00665 (ED Pa.), pp. 4–5. I do not understand the Court
to approve such a practice. In assessing the degree to which a school can
regulate speech on a laptop that a school provides for student use outside
school, it would be important to know the terms of the agreement under
which the laptop was provided.
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At the other end of the spectrum, there is a category of
speech
that is almost always beyond the regulatory author-
ity of a public school. This is student speech that is not
expressly and specifcally directed at the school, school ad-
ministrators, teachers, or fellow students and that addresses
matters of public concern, including sensitive subjects like
politics, religion, and social relations. Speech on such mat-
ters lies at the heart of the First Amendment's protection,
see Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 235 (2014) (“Speech by
citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the
First Amendment”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of West-
ern N. Y., 519 U. S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafetting and com-
menting on matters of public concern are classic forms of
speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment”); Capi-
tal Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S.
753, 760 (1995) (“[A] free-speech clause without religion
would be Hamlet without the prince”); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 347 (1995) (“[A]dvocacy of
a politically controversial viewpoint . . . is the essence of
First Amendment expression”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of the free fow of ideas and opinions on matters of
public interest and concern”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S.
138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the high-
est rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), and the connection between student speech in this
category and the ability of a public school to carry out its
instructional program is tenuous.
If a school tried to regulate such speech, the most that it
could claim is that offensive off-premises speech on impor-
tant matters may cause controversy and recriminations
among students and may thus disrupt instruction and good
order on school premises. But it is a “bedrock principle”
that speech may not be suppressed simply because it ex-
presses ideas that are “offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v.
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Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Alito, J., concurring
Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Matal v. Tam,
582
U. S. 218, 223 (2017) (“Speech may not be banned on the
ground that it expresses ideas that offend”); FCC v. Pacifca
Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(“[T]he fact that society may fnd speech offensive is not a
suffcient reason for suppressing it”); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 63–64 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (“Nor may speech be curtailed because it invites dis-
pute, creates dissatisfaction with conditions the way they
are, or even stirs people to anger”); Street v. New York, 394
U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is frmly settled that under our Con-
stitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their hearers”). It is unreasonable to infer that parents
who send a child to a public school thereby authorize the
school to take away such a critical right.
To her credit, petitioner's attorney acknowledged this dur-
ing oral argument. As she explained, even if such speech is
deeply offensive to members of the school community and
may cause a disruption, the school cannot punish the student
who spoke out; “that would be a heckler's veto.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 15–16.
17
The school may suppress the disruption, but
it may not punish the off-campus speech that prompted other
students to engage in misconduct. See id., at 5–6 (“[I]f lis-
teners riot because they fnd speech offensive, schools should
punish the rioters, not the speaker. In other words, the
hecklers don't get the veto”); see also id., at 27–28.
This is true even if the student's off-premises speech on a
matter of public concern is intemperate and crude. When a
17
Counsel was asked what a school could have done during the Vietnam
War era if a student said, “[the] war is immoral, American soldiers are
baby killers, I hope there are a lot of casualties so that people will rise up.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Counsel agreed that “[e]ven if that would cause a dis-
ruption in the school,” “the school couldn't do anything about it.” Ibid.
In her words, “that would be a heckler's veto, no can do.” Id., at 15–16.
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207
Alito, J., concurring
student engages in oral or written communication of this na-
ture
, the student is subject to whatever restraints the stu-
dent's parents impose, but the student enjoys the same First
Amendment protection against government regulation as all
other members of the public. And the Court has held that
these rights extend to speech that is couched in vulgar and
offensive terms. See, e. g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. 388
(2019); Matal, 582 U. S. 218; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443
(2011); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Between these two extremes (i. e., off-premises speech
that is tantamount to on-campus speech and general state-
ments made off premises on matters of public concern) lie
the categories of off-premises student speech that appear to
have given rise to the most litigation. A survey of lower
court cases reveals several prominent categories. I will
mention some of those categories, but like the Court, I do
not attempt to set out the test to be used in judging the
constitutionality of a public school's efforts to regulate such
speech.
One group of cases involves perceived threats to school
administrators, teachers, other staff members, or students.
Laws that apply to everyone prohibit defned categories of
threats,
18
see, e. g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a);
19
Tex. Penal
18
The First Amendment permits prohibitions of “true threats,” which
are “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious ex-
pression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359
(2003).
19
This law is commonly referred to as Pennsylvania's “terrorist threat
statute.” It prohibits “communicat[ing], either directly or indirectly, a
threat to: (1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize an-
other; (2) cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of
public transportation; or (3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience,
or cause terror or serious public inconvenience with reckless disregard of
the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.”
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Alito, J., concurring
Code Ann. § 22.07(a) (West 2020),
20
but
schools have claimed
that their duties demand broader authority.
21
Another common category involves speech that criticizes
or derides school administrators, teachers, or other staff
members.
22
Schools may assert that parents who send their
children to a public school implicitly authorize the school to
demand that the child exhibit the respect that is required
for orderly and effective instruction, but parents surely do
not relinquish their children's ability to complain in an appro-
priate manner about wrongdoing, dereliction, or even plain
20
In Texas, it is a crime to “threate[n] to commit any offense involving
violence to any person or property” with specifed intent, such as the in-
tent to “place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury” or
to “interrupt the occupation or use of a . . . public place.”
21
See, e. g., McNeil v. Sherwood School Dist. 88J, 918 F. 3d 700, 704
(CA9 2019) (per curiam) (student created a “hit list” of students and drew
graphic images of violence); Wynar v. Douglas County School Dist., 728
F. 3d 1062, 1065–1066 (CA9 2013) (student spoke about committing a school
shooting); Wisniewski v. Board of Ed., 494 F. 3d 34, 36 (CA2 2007) (student
sent a message depicting a pistol fring a bullet at his English teacher's
head); Porter v. Ascension Parish School Bd., 393 F. 3d 608, 611 (CA5
2004) (student drew a picture showing his school under attack by a gaso-
line tanker, missile launcher, helicopter, and armed individuals); Doe v.
Pulaski County Special School Dist., 306 F. 3d 616, 619 (CA8 2002) (en
banc) (student drafted letters expressing a desire to molest, rape, and
murder his ex-girlfriend); but see Conroy v. Lacey Twp. School Dist., 2020
WL 528896, *1 (D NJ, Jan. 31, 2020) (two high school students posted
photos on Snapchat showing them with legally purchased guns at a shoot-
ing range on a Saturday, which another student claimed made him “ `ner-
vous to come to school' ”); see also Conroy v. Lacey Twp. School Dist.,
No. 3:19–cv–09452 (D NJ, Aug. 25, 2020) (order dismissing case with preju-
dice after settlement). The cases cited in this footnote and footnotes 22–
23 are listed to show types of claims addressed by the lower courts. I do
not express any view about the correctness of the decisions.
22
See, e. g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F. 3d 41, 45 (CA2 2008) (member
of student council posted a message on her personal blog complaining
about the administration and encouraging readers to call or e-mail the
school to complain); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (SD Fla.
2010) (student created a Facebook group “for students to voice their dis-
like” of their teacher).

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209
Alito, J., concurring
incompetence. See Brief for College Athlete Advocates as
Ami
cus Curiae 12–21; Brief for Student Press Law Center
et al. as Amici Curiae 10–11, 17–20, 30.
Perhaps the most diffcult category involves criticism or
hurtful remarks about other students.
23
Bullying and se-
vere harassment are serious (and age-old) problems, but
these concepts are not easy to defne with the precision re-
quired for a regulation of speech. See, e. g., Saxe v. State
College Area School Dist., 240 F. 3d 200, 206–207 (CA3 2001).
V
The present case does not fall into any of these categories.
Instead, it simply involves criticism (albeit in a crude man-
ner) of the school and an extracurricular activity. Unfat-
tering speech about a school or one of its programs is dif-
ferent from speech that criticizes or derides particular
individuals, and for the reasons detailed by the Court and
by Judge Ambro in his separate opinion below, the school's
justifcations for punishing B. L.'s speech were weak. She
sent the messages and image in question on her own time
while at a local convenience store. They were transmitted
via a medium that preserved the communication for only 24
hours, and she sent them to a select group of “friends.” She
did not send the messages to the school or to any administra-
tor, teacher, or coach, and no member of the school staff
would have even known about the messages if some of B. L.'s
“friends” had not taken it upon themselves to spread the
word.
23
See, e. g., S. J. W. v. Lee's Summit R–7 School Dist., 696 F. 3d 771,
773–774 (CA8 2012) (high school juniors posted a variety of offensive, rac-
ist, and sexually-explicit comments about particular female classmates);
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565, 567–568 (CA4 2011)
(student created an online discussion group accusing another student of
having a sexually-transmitted disease); Dunkley v. Board of Ed. of
Greater Egg Harbor Regional High School Dist., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 487
(NJ 2016) (student used an anonymous Twitter account to insult other
students based on their appearances and athletic abilities).
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Alito, J., concurring
The school did not claim that the messages caused any sig-
ni
fcant disruption of classes. The most it asserted along
these lines was that they “upset” some students (including
members of the cheerleading squad),
24
caused students to ask
some questions about the matter during an algebra class
taught by a cheerleading coach,
25
and put out “negativity . . .
that could impact students in the school.”
26
The freedom of
students to speak off-campus would not be worth much if it
gave way in the face of such relatively minor complaints.
Speech cannot be suppressed just because it expresses
thoughts or sentiments that others fnd upsetting, and the
algebra teacher had the authority to quell in-class discussion
of B. L.'s messages and demand that the students concen-
trate on the work of the class.
As for the messages' effect on the morale of the cheerlead-
ing squad, the coach of a team sport may wish to take group
cohesion and harmony into account in selecting members of
the team, in assigning roles, and in allocating playing time,
but it is self-evident that this authority has limits. (To take
an obvious example, a coach could not discriminate against a
student for blowing the whistle on serious misconduct.)
And here, the school did not simply take B. L.'s messages
into account in deciding whether her attitude would make
her effective in doing what cheerleaders are primarily ex-
pected to do: encouraging vocal fan support at the events
where they appear. Instead, the school imposed punish-
ment: suspension for a year from the cheerleading squad de-
spite B. L.'s apologies.
There is, fnally, the matter of B. L.'s language. There are
parents who would not have been pleased with B. L.'s lan-
guage and gesture, but whatever B. L.'s parents thought
about what she did, it is not reasonable to infer that they
gave the school the authority to regulate her choice of lan-
24
App. 82.
25
Id., at 82–84.
26
Id., at 81.

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211
Thomas, J., dissenting
guage when she was off school premises and not engaged in
any
school activity. And B. L.'s school does not claim that
it possesses or makes any effort to exercise the authority to
regulate the vocabulary and gestures of all its students 24
hours a day and 365 days a year.
There are more than 90,000 public school principals in this
country
27
and more than 13,000 separate school districts.
28
The overwhelming majority of school administrators, teach-
ers, and coaches are men and women who are deeply dedi-
cated to the best interests of their students, but it is predict-
able that there will be occasions when some will get carried
away, as did the school offcials in the case at hand. If to-
day's decision teaches any lesson, it must be that the regula-
tion of many types of off-premises student speech raises seri-
ous First Amendment concerns, and school offcials should
proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
B. L., a high school student, sent a profanity-laced message
to hundreds of people, including classmates and teammates.
The message included a picture of B. L. raising her middle
fnger and captioned “F*** school” and “f *** cheer.” This
message was juxtaposed with another, which explained that
B. L. was frustrated that she failed to make the varsity
cheerleading squad. The cheerleading coach responded by
disciplining B. L.
The Court overrides that decision—without even mention-
ing the 150 years of history supporting the coach. Using
broad brushstrokes, the majority outlines the scope of school
27
See NCES, School Principals, Table 212.08: Number and Percentage
Distribution in Public and Private Elementary and Secondary Schools,
Selec ted Years 1993 –1994 Through 2017– 2018, https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_212.08.asp?current=yes.
28
See NCES, Overview of Schools and School Districts, Table 214.10:
Number of Public School Districts and Public and Private Elementary and
Secondary Schools, Selected Years 1869–1870 Through 2018–2019, https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d20/tables/dt20_214.10.asp.
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authority. When students are on campus, the majority says,
schools
have authority in loco parentis—that is, as substi-
tutes of parents—to discipline speech and conduct. Off cam-
pus, the authority of schools is somewhat less. At that level
of generality, I agree. But the majority omits important de-
tail. What authority does a school have when it operates in
loco parentis? How much less authority do schools have
over off-campus speech and conduct? And how does a court
decide if speech is on or off campus?
Disregarding these important issues, the majority simply
posits three vague considerations and reaches an outcome.
A more searching review reveals that schools historically
could discipline students in circumstances like those pre-
sented here. Because the majority does not attempt to ex-
plain why we should not apply this historical rule and does
not attempt to tether its approach to anything stable, I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
A
While the majority entirely ignores the relevant history, I
would begin the assessment of the scope of free-speech
rights incorporated against the States by looking to “what
`ordinary citizens' at the time of [the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's] ratifcation would have understood” the right to en-
compass. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Cases and treatises from that era reveal that public schools
retained substantial authority to discipline students. As I
have previously explained, that authority was near plenary
while students were at school. See Morse v. Frederick, 551
U. S. 393, 419 (2007) (concurring opinion). Authority also
extended to when students were traveling to or from school.
See, e. g., Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 120 (1859). And,
although schools had less authority after a student returned
home, it was well settled that they still could discipline stu-
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213
Thomas, J., dissenting
dents for off-campus speech or conduct that had a proximate
tendency
to harm the school environment.
Perhaps the most familiar example applying this rule is a
case where a student, after returning home from school, used
“disrespectful language” against a teacher—he called the
teacher “old”—“in presence of the [teacher] and of some of
his fellow pupils.” Id., at 115 (emphasis deleted). The Ver-
mont Supreme Court held that the teacher could discipline a
student for this speech because the speech had “a direct and
immediate tendency to injure the school, to subvert the mas-
ter's authority, and to beget disorder and insubordination.”
Id., at 120; see also ibid. (“direct and immediate tendency to
. . . bring the master's authority into contempt”). The court
distinguished the speech at issue from speech “in no ways
connected with or affecting the school” and speech that has
“merely a remote and indirect tendency to injure.” Id., at
120–121. In requiring a “direct and immediate tendency” to
harm, id., at 120, the court used the language of proximate
causation, see Black's Law Dictionary 274 (11th ed. 2019) (de-
fning “proximate cause” as a “cause that directly produces
an event”); id., at 1481 (defning “proximate” as “[i]mmedi-
ately before or after”); see also Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1, 7 (1909) (using “proximate” cause and
“immediate” cause interchangeably).
This rule was widespread. It was consistent with “the
universal custom” in New England. Lander, 32 Vt., at 121.
Various cases, treatises, and school manuals endorsed it.*
And a justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, presiding
over a trial, declared the rule “well settled.” T. Stockwell,
*E. g., Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 488–489 (1885) (citing Lander);
F. Burke, Law of Public Schools 116, 129 (1880) (“[W]hatsoever has a direct
and immediate tendency to injure the school in its important interests, or
to subvert the authority of those in charge of it, is properly a subject for
regulation and discipline, and this is so wherever the acts may be com-
mitted” (citing Lander)); C. Bardeen, The New York School Offce's Hand-
book 158 (1910) (citing Lander).

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Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Thomas, J., dissenting
The School Manual, Containing the School Laws of Rhode
Island
236–238 (1882) (Stockwell).
So widespread was this rule that it served not only as the
basis for schools to discipline disrespectful speech but also to
regulate truancy. Although modern doctrine draws a clear
line between speech and conduct, cases in the 19th century
did not. E. g., Lander, 32 Vt., at 120 (describing speech as
“acts of misbehavior”); Stockwell 236–238 (applying the
Lander rule to “[t]he conduct of pupils”); Morse, 551 U. S., at
419 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“speech rules and other school
rules were treated identically”). Citing Lander, schools jus-
tifed regulating truancy because of its proximate tendency
to harm schools. As the Missouri Supreme Court put it, al-
though “[t]ruancy is an act committed out of the school,”
schools could regulate it because of its “subversive” effects
on the “good order and discipline of the school.” Deskins v.
Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 488–489 (1885); see also Burdick v. Bab-
cock, 31 Iowa 562, 565, 567 (1871) (“If the effects of acts done
out of school-hours reach within the schoolroom during
school hours and are detrimental to good order and the best
interest of the pupils, it is evident that such acts may be
forbidden”).
Some courts made statements that, if read in isolation,
could suggest that schools had no authority at all to regulate
off-campus speech. E. g., Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, 297
(1877) (Norton, J., joined by a majority of the court, concur-
ring) (“neither the teacher nor directors have the authority
to follow [a student home], and govern his conduct while
under the parental eye” because that would “supersede en-
tirely parental authority”). But, these courts made it clear
that the rule against regulating off-campus speech applied
only when that speech was “nowise connected with the man-
agement or successful operation of the school.” King v.
Jefferson City School Bd., 71 Mo. 628, 630 (1880) (distin-
guishing Dritt); accord, Lander, 32 Vt., at 120–121 (similar).
In other words, they followed Lander: A school can regulate

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as: 594 U. S. 180 (2021)
215
Thomas, J., dissenting
speech when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proxi-
mate
tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or
its programs.
B
If there is a good constitutional reason to depart from this
historical rule, the majority and the parties fail to identify it.
I would thus apply the rule. Assuming that B. L.'s speech
occurred off campus, the purpose and effect of B. L.'s speech
was “to degrade the [program and cheerleading staff]” in
front of “other pupils,” thus having “a direct and immediate
tendency to . . . subvert the [cheerleading coach's] authority.”
Id., at 115, 120. As a result, the coach had authority to disci-
pline B. L.
Our modern doctrine is not to the contrary. “[T]he penal-
ties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political
viewpoint” or religious viewpoint. Bethel School Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 685 (1986). And although the
majority sugar coats this speech as “criticism,” ante, at 190–
191, it is well settled that schools can punish “vulgar”
speech—at least when it occurs on campus, e. g., Fraser, 478
U. S., at 683–684; ante, at 187–188.
The discipline here—a 1-year suspension from the team—
may strike some as disproportionate. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31,
57. But that does not matter for our purposes. State
courts have policed school disciplinary decisions for “reason-
able[ness].” E. g., Burdick, 31 Iowa, at 565. And dispro-
portionate discipline “can be challenged by parents in the
political process.” Morse, 551 U. S., at 420 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). But the majority and the parties provide no
textual or historical evidence to suggest that federal courts
generally can police the proportionality of school disciplinary
decisions in the name of the First Amendment.
II
The majority declines to consider any of this history, in-
stead favoring a few pragmatic guideposts. This is not the
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216 MAHANO
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Thomas, J., dissenting
frst time the Court has chosen intuition over history when
it
comes to student speech. The larger problem facing us
today is that our student-speech cases are untethered from
any textual or historical foundation. That failure leads the
majority to miss much of the analysis relevant to these kinds
of cases.
A
Consider the Court's longtime failure to grapple with the
historical doctrine of in loco parentis. As I have previously
explained, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed against
the background legal principle that publicly funded schools
operated not as ordinary state actors, but as delegated sub-
stitutes of parents. Id., at 411–413. This principle freed
schools from the constraints the Fourteenth Amendment
placed on other government actors. “[N]o one doubted the
government's ability to educate and discipline children as
private schools did,” including “through strict discipline . . .
for behavior the school considered disrespectful or wrong.”
Id., at 411–412. “The doctrine of in loco parentis limited
the ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms
in almost no way.” Id., at 416.
Plausible arguments can be raised in favor of departing
from that h istor ica l doc tr i ne. W hen the Four teenth
Amendment was rati fied, just three jur isdic ti ons had
compulsory-education laws. M. Katz, A History of Compul-
sory Education Laws 17 (1976). One might argue that the
delegation logic of in loco parentis applies only when delega-
tion is voluntary. But cf. id., at 11–13 (identifying analogs
to compulsory-education laws as early as the 1640s); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) (requiring States to
permit parents to send their children to nonpublic schools).
The Court, however, did not make that (or any other) argu-
ment against this historical doctrine.
Instead, the Court simply abandoned the foundational rule
without mentioning it. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). Rather
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217
Thomas, J., dissenting
than wrestle with this history, the Court declared that it
“
ha[d] been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost
50 years” that students have free-speech rights inside
schools. Id., at 506. “But the cases the Court cited in favor
of that bold proposition do not support it.” Morse, 551 U. S.,
at 420, n. 8 (Thomas, J., concurring). The cases on which
Tinker chiefy relied concerned the rights of parents and pri-
vate schools, not students. 551 U. S., at 420, n. 8. Of the
11 cases the Court cited, only one—West Virginia Bd. of Ed.
v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943)—was on point. But, like
Tinker, Barnette failed to mention the historical doctrine un-
dergirding school authority. Not until decades later did the
Court even hint at this doctrine, and, then, only as an aside.
See Fraser, 478 U. S., at 684.
The majority does no better today. At least it acknowl-
edges that schools act in loco parentis when students speak
on campus. See, e. g., ante, at 187. But the majority fails
to address the historical contours of that doctrine, whether
the doctrine applies to off-campus speech, or why the Court
has abandoned it.
B
The Court's failure to explain itself in Tinker needlessly
makes this case more diffcult. Unlike Tinker, which in-
volved a school's authority under a straightforward fact
pattern, this case involves speech made in one location but
capable of being received in countless others—an issue that
has been aggravated exponentially by recent technological
advances. The Court's decision not to create a solid founda-
tion in Tinker, and now here not to consult the relevant his-
tory, predictably causes the majority to ignore relevant
analysis.
First, the majority gives little apparent signifcance to
B. L.'s decision to participate in an extracurricular activity.
But the historical test suggests that authority of schools over
off-campus speech may be greater when students participate
in extracurricular programs. The Lander test focuses on
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218 MAHANO
Y AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.
Thomas, J., dissenting
the effect of speech, not its location. So students like B. L.
who
are active in extracurricular programs have a greater
potential, by virtue of their participation, to harm those pro-
grams. For example, a profanity-laced screed delivered on
social media or at the mall has a much different effect on a
football program when done by a regular student than when
done by the captain of the football team. So, too, here.
Second, the majority fails to consider whether schools
often will have more authority, not less, to discipline stu-
dents who transmit speech through social media. Because
off-campus speech made through social media can be re-
ceived on campus (and can spread rapidly to countless peo-
ple), it often will have a greater proximate tendency to harm
the school environment than will an off-campus in-person
conversation.
Third, and relatedly, the majority uncritically adopts the
assumption that B. L.'s speech, in fact, was off campus. But,
the location of her speech is a much trickier question than
the majority acknowledges. Because speech travels, schools
sometimes may be able to treat speech as on campus even
though it originates off campus. Nobody doubts, for exam-
ple, that a school has in loco parentis authority over a
student (and can discipline him) when he passes out vulgar
fyers on campus—even if he creates those fyers off campus.
The same may be true in many contexts when social media
speech is generated off campus but received on campus. To
be sure, this logic might not apply where the on-campus
presence of speech is not proximately connected to its off-
campus origin—as when a student “wholly accidental[ly]”
brings a sibling 's sketch to school years after it is created.
Porter v. Ascension Parish School Bd., 393 F. 3d 608, 615,
617–618 (CA5 2004). This break in proximate causation
might occur more often when a school prohibits the use of
personal devices or social media on campus. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 68–69. But where it is foreseeable and likely that
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Cite
as: 594 U. S. 180 (2021)
219
Thomas, J., dissenting
speech will travel onto campus, a school has a stronger claim
to
treating the speech as on-campus speech.
Here, it makes sense to treat B. L.'s speech as off-campus
speech. There is little evidence that B. L.'s speech was re-
ceived on campus. The cheerleading coach, in fact, did not
view B. L.'s speech. She viewed a copy of that speech (a
screenshot) created by another student. Ante, at 185. But,
the majority mentions none of this. It simply, and uncriti-
cally, assumes that B. L.'s speech was off campus. Because
it creates a test untethered from history, it bypasses this
relevant inquiry.
***
The Court transparently takes a common-law approach to
today's decision. In effect, it states just one rule: Schools
can regulate speech less often when that speech occurs off
campus. It then identifes this case as an “example” and
“leav[es] for future cases” the job of developing this new
common-law doctrine. Ante, at 190. But the Court's foun-
dation is untethered from anything stable, and courts (and
schools) will almost certainly be at a loss as to what exactly
the Court's opinion today means.
Perhaps there are good constitutional reasons to depart
from the historical rule, and perhaps this Court and lower
courts will identify and explain these reasons in the future.
But because the Court does not do so today, and because it
reaches the wrong result under the appropriate historical
test, I respectfully dissent.
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