Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 592 U. S. Part 2
Pages 279–305
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 8, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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TERM, 2020
279
Syllabus
UZUEGBUNAM et al. v. PRECZEWSKI et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 19–968. Argued January 12, 2021—Decided March 8, 2021
Petitioners are former students of Georgia Gwinnett College who wished
to exercise their religion by sharing their faith on campus while enrolled
there. In 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam talked with interested students
and handed out religious literature on campus grounds. Uzuegbunam
stopped after a campus police offcer informed him that campus policy
prohibited distributing written religious materials outside areas desig-
nated for that purpose. A college offcial later explained to Uzuegbu-
nam that he could speak about his religion or distribute materials only
in two designated speech areas on campus, and even then only after
securing a permit. But when Uzuegbunam obtained the required per-
mit and tried to speak in a free speech zone, a campus police offcer
again asked him to stop, this time saying that people had complained
about his speech. Campus policy at that time prohibited using the free
speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of
person(s).” The offcer told Uzuegbunam that his speech violated cam-
pus policy because it had led to complaints, and the offcer threatened
Uzuegbunam with disciplinary action if he continued. Uzuegbunam
again complied with the order to stop speaking. Another student who
shares Uzuegbunam's faith, Joseph Bradford, decided not to speak about
religion because of these events. Both Uzuegbunam and Bradford sued
certain college offcials charged with enforcement of the college's speech
policies, arguing that these policies violated the First Amendment. As
relevant here, the students sought injunctive relief and nominal dam-
ages. The college offcials ultimately chose to discontinue the chal-
lenged policies rather than to defend them, and they sought dismissal
on the ground that the policy change left the students without standing
to sue. The parties agreed that the policy change rendered the stu-
dents' request for injunctive relief moot, but disputed whether the stu-
dents had standing to maintain the suit based on their remaining claim
for nominal damages. The Eleventh Circuit held that while a request
for nominal damages can sometimes save a case from mootness, such as
where a person pleads but fails to prove an amount of compensatory
damages, the students' plea for nominal damages alone could not by
itself establish standing.

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Syllabus
Held: A request for nominal damages satisfes the redressability element
necessary
for Article III standing where a plaintiff 's claim is based on
a completed violation of a legal right. Pp. 285–293.
(a) To establish Article III standing, the Constitution requires a
plaintiff to identify an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged conduct and to seek a remedy likely to redress that injury.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 338. The dispute here concerns
whether the remedy Uzuegbunam sought—nominal damages—can re-
dress the completed constitutional violation that he alleges occurred
when campus offcials enforced the speech policies against him. The
Court looks to the forms of relief awarded at common law to determine
whether nominal damages can redress a past injury. The prevailing
rule at common law was that a party whose rights are invaded can
always recover nominal damages without furnishing evidence of actual
damage. By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages whenever
they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law avoided the oddity
of privileging small economic rights over important, but not easily quan-
tifable, nonpecuniary rights. Pp. 285–289.
(b) The common law did not require a plea for compensatory damages
as a prerequisite to an award of nominal damages. Nominal damages
are not purely symbolic. They are instead the damages awarded by
default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of
damages. A single dollar often will not provide full redress, but the
partial remedy satisfes the redressability requirement. Church of Sci-
entology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. Respondents' argu-
ment that a plea for compensatory damages is necessary to confer juris-
diction also does not square with established principles of standing.
And unlike an award of attorney's fees and costs which may be the
byproduct of a successful suit, an award of nominal damages constitutes
relief on the merits. Pp. 289–292.
(c) A request for redress in the form of nominal damages does not
guarantee entry to court. In addition to redressability, the plaintiff
must establish the other elements of standing and satisfy all other rele-
vant requirements, such as pleading a cognizable cause of action.
Uzuegbunam experienced a completed violation of his constitutional
rights when respondents enforced their speech policies against him.
Nominal damages can redress Uzuegbunam's injury even if he cannot
or chooses not to quantify that harm in economic terms. The Court
does not decide whether Bradford can pursue nominal damages and
leaves for the District Court to determine whether Bradford has estab-
lished a past, completed injury. Pp. 292–293.
781 Fed. Appx. 824, reversed and remanded.

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281
Syllabus
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Breyer, Alito,
Sotoma
yor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Kavanaugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 293. Roberts, C. J.,
fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 294.
Kristen K. Waggoner argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs were John J. Bursch, Tyson C. Lang-
hofer, David A. Cortman, Travis C. Barham, Jeremiah J.
Galus, and Katherine L. Anderson.
Hashim M. Mooppan argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Assistant Attor-
ney General Dreiband, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Clark, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maugeri, Sopan
Joshi, and Nicole Frazer Reaves.
Andrew A. Pinson, Solicitor General of Georgia, argued
the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia, Ross W.
Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor General, Drew F. Waldbeser, As-
sistant Solicitor General, and Zack W. Lindsey and Miles C.
Skedsvold, Assistant Attorneys General, Kathleen M. Pa-
cious, Deputy Attorney General, Roger Chalmers, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Ellen Cusimano, Assistant
Attorney General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Lisa S. Blatt and Sarah M. Harris; for the
American Humanist Association by Monica L. Miller; for the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty by Adèle A. Keim, Eric C. Rassbach, and Joseph C.
Davis; for Child Evangelism Fellowship, Inc., by Mathew D. Staver, Anita
L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam; for the Christian
Legal Society by Reed N. Smith and Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Coun-
cil on American-Islamic Relations by Lena F. Masri and Justin M. Sadow-
sky; for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education et al. by Kevin
F. King, Tarek J. Austin, and Ilya Shapiro; for the Frederick Douglass
Foundation, Inc., by Eric D. McArthur; for the General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists et al. by Todd R. McFarland and Andrew G.
Schultz; for the Institute for Free Speech by Allen J. Dickerson, Zac Mor-
gan, and Owen D. Yeates; for the Islam and Religious Freedom Action
Team of the Religious Freedom Institute by Elbert Lin and Erica N.
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282 UZUEGBUN
AM v. PRECZEWSKI
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
t all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a per-
sonal interest in the dispute. The doctrine of standing gen-
erally assesses whether that interest exists at the outset,
while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists
throughout the proceedings. To demonstrate standing, the
plaintiff must not only establish an injury that is fairly trace-
able to the challenged conduct but must also seek a remedy
that redresses that injury. And if in the course of litigation
a court fnds that it can no longer provide a plaintiff with
any effectual relief, the case generally is moot. This case
Peterson; for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty by Daniel
P. Kearney, Jr.; for the Justice and Freedom Fund et al. by James L.
Hirsen and Deborah J. Dewart; for the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation, Inc., by Frank D. Garrison, Raymond J. La-
Jeunesse, Jr., and Bruce N. Cameron; for Public Citizen by Matthew A.
Seligman, Allison M. Zieve, and Scott L. Nelson; for The Rutherford
Institute by Michael J. Lockerby and John W. Whitehead; for the United
States Con ference of Catholic Bishops et al. by Michael H. McGinley,
Lincoln Davis Wilson, Carl Esbeck, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Jeffrey
Hunter Moon, and Michael F. Moses; and for Young Americans for Lib-
erty, Inc., by Scott A. Keller.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the District of
Columbia et al. by Karl A. Racine, Attorney General of the District of
Columbia, Loren L. Alikhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile,
Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor
General, and Jacqueline R. Bechara, Assistant Attorney General, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ashley
Moody of Florida, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois,
Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Gurbir S.
Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Joshua H. Stein
of North Carolina, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Sean D. Reyes of
Utah, and Mark R. Herring of Virginia; and for the National Con ference
of State Legislatures et al. by Patrick M. Kane, Kip D. Nelson, Christo-
pher J. McNamara, and Lisa Soronen.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the CatholicVote.org Education
Fund by Scott W. Gaylord; for the Foundation for Moral Law by Matthew
J. Clark and John A. Eidsmoe; and for the Pacifc Legal Foundation et al.
by Deborah J. La Fetra.

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283
Opinion of the Court
asks whether an award of nominal damages by itself can re-
dress
a past injury. We hold that it can.
I
According to the complaint, Chike Uzuegbunam is an evan-
gelical Christian who believes that an important part of
exercising his religion includes sharing his faith. In 2016,
Uzuegbunam decided to share his faith at Georgia Gwin-
nett College, a public college where he was enrolled as a
student. At an outdoor plaza on campus near the library
where students often gather, Uzuegbunam engaged in con-
versations with interested students and handed out reli-
gious literature.
A campus police offcer soon informed Uzuegbunam that
campus policy prohibited distributing written religious ma-
terials in that area and told him to stop. Uzuegbunam com-
plied with the offcer's order. To learn more about this pol-
icy, he then visited the college's Director of the Offce of
Student Integrity, who was directly responsible for promul-
gating and enforcing the policy. When asked if Uzuegbu-
nam could continue speaking about his religion if he stopped
distributing materials, the offcial said no. The offcial ex-
plained that Uzuegbunam could speak about his religion or
distribute materials only in two designated “free speech ex-
pression areas,” which together make up just 0.0015 percent
of campus. And he could do so only after securing the nec-
essary permit. Uzuegbunam then applied for and received
a permit to use the free speech zone.
Twenty minutes after Uzuegbunam began speaking on the
day allowed by his permit, another campus police offcer
again told him to stop, this time saying that people had com-
plained about his speech. Campus policy prohibited using
the free speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace
and/or comfort of person(s).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 151(a).
The offcer told Uzuegbunam that his speech violated this
policy because it had led to complaints. The offcer threat-
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Opinion of the Court
ened Uzuegbunam with disciplinary action if he continued.
Uzuegbunam
again complied with the order to stop speaking.
Another student who shares Uzuegbunam's faith, Joseph
Bradford, decided not to speak about religion because of
these events.
Both students sued a number of college offcials in charge
of enforcing the college's speech policies, arguing that those
policies violated the First Amendment. As relevant here,
they sought nominal damages and injunctive relief. Re-
spondents initially attempted to defend the policy, stating
that Uzuegbunam's discussion of his religion “arguably rose
to the level of `fghting words.' ” Id., at 155(a). But the col-
lege offcials quickly abandoned that strategy and instead de-
cided to get rid of the challenged policies. They then moved
to dismiss, arguing that the suit was moot, because of the
policy change. The students agreed that injunctive relief
was no longer available, but they disagreed that the case
was moot. They contended that their case was still live be-
cause they had also sought nominal damages. The District
Court dismissed the case, holding that the students' claim
for nominal damages was insuffcient by itself to establish
standing.
The Eleventh Circuit affir med. 781 Fed. Appx. 824
(2019). It stated that a request for nominal damages can
save a case from mootness in certain circumstances, such as
where a person pleads but fails to prove an amount of com-
pensatory damages. But, because the students did not re-
quest compensatory damages, their plea for nominal dam-
ages could not by itself establish standing.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff who
sues over a completed injury and establishes the frst two
elements of standing (injury and traceability) can establish
the third by requesting only nominal damages. 591 U. S.
––– (2020). We now reverse.

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Opinion of the Court
II
T
o satisfy the “ `irreducible constitutional minimum' ” of
Article III standing, a plaintiff must not only establish (1) an
injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct, but he must also seek (3) a remedy that is likely to
redress that injury. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330,
338 (2016); see also Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. –––, ––– – –––
(2018). There is no dispute that Uzuegbunam has estab-
lished the frst two elements. The only question is whether
the remedy he sought—nominal damages—can redress the
constitutional violation that Uzuegbunam alleges occurred
when campus offcials enforced the speech policies against
him.
A
In determining whether nominal damages can redress a
past injury, we look to the forms of relief awarded at common
law. “Article III's restriction of the judicial power to `Cases'
and `Controversies' is properly understood to mean `cases
and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and
resolved by, the judicial process.' ” Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S.
765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Envi-
ronment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998)); cf. Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 306 (1986) (relief for
Ҥ 1983 plaintiffs . . . is ordinarily determined according to
principles derived from the common law of torts”). The par-
ties here agree that courts at common law routinely awarded
nominal damages. They, instead, dispute what kinds of
harms those damages could redress.
Both sides agree that nominal damages historically could
provide prospective relief. The award of nominal damages
was one way for plaintiffs at common law to “obtain a form
of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general declar-
atory judgment act.” D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern
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American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019). For example, a tres-
pass
to land or water rights might raise a prospective threat
to a property right by creating the foundation for a fu-
ture claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement.
Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 268 (1832) (“If an unlawful
diversion [of water] is suffered for twenty years, it ripens
into a right, which cannot be controverted”). By obtaining
a declaration of trespass, a property owner could “vindicate
his right by action” and protect against those future threats.
Ibid. Courts at common law would not declare property
boundaries in the abstract, “but the suit for nominal damages
allowed them to do so indirectly.” Laycock, supra, at 636.
The parties disagree, however, about whether nominal
damages alone could provide retrospective relief. Stressing
the declaratory function, respondents argue that nominal
damages by themselves redressed only continuing or threat-
ened injury, not past injury.
But cases at common law paint a different picture. Early
courts required the plaintiff to prove actual monetary dam-
ages in every case: “[I]njuria & damnum [injury and damage]
are the two grounds for the having [of] all actions, and with-
out these, no action lieth.” Cable v. Rogers, 3 Bulst. 311,
312, 81 Eng. Rep. 259 (K. B. 1625). Later courts, however,
reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes damage,
so they awarded nominal damages absent evidence of other
damages (such as compensatory, statutory, or punitive dam-
ages), and they did so where there was no apparent continu-
ing or threatened injury for nominal damages to redress.
See, e. g., Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317, 130 Eng. Rep. 327
(C. P. 1824) (nominal damages awarded for 1-day delay in
arrest because “if there was a breach of duty the law would
presume some damage”); Hatch v. Lewis, 2 F. & F. 467, 479,
485–486, 175 Eng. Rep. 1145, 1150, 1153 (N. P. 1861) (ineffec-
tive assistance by criminal defense attorney that does not
prejudice the client); Dods v. Evans, 15 C. B. N. S. 621, 624,
627, 143 Eng. Rep. 929, 930–931 (C. P. 1864) (breach of con-
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287
Opinion of the Court
tract); Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415, 417–418, 423–
428,
109 Eng. Rep. 842, 843, 845–847 (K. B. 1830) (bank's 1-
day delay in paying on a check); id., at 424, 109 Eng. Rep.,
at 845 (recognizing that breach of contract could create a
continuing injury but determining that the fact of breach of
contract by itself justifed nominal damages).
The latter approach was followed both before and after
ratifcation of the Constitution. An early case about voting
rights effectively illustrates this common-law understanding.
Faced with a suit pleading denial of the right to vote, the
court rejected the plaintiff 's claim because, among other
reasons, the plaintiff had not established actual damages.
Ashby v. White, 2 Raym. Ld. 938, 941–943, 948, 92 Eng. Rep.
126, 129, 130, 133 (K. B. 1703). Dissenting, Lord Holt argued
that the common law inferred damages whenever a legal
right was violated. Observing that the law recognized “not
merely pecuniary” injury but also “personal injury,” Lord
Holt stated that “every injury imports a damage” and that a
plaintiff could always obtain damages even if he “does not
lose a penny by reason of the [violation].” Id., at 955, 92
Eng. Rep., at 137. Although Lord Holt was in the minority,
the House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus
validating Lord Holt's position, 3 Salk. 17, 91 Eng. Rep. 665
(K. B. 1703), and this principle “laid down . . . by Lord Holt”
was followed “in many subsequent cases,” Embrey v. Owen,
6 Exch. 353, 368, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 (1851).
The dissent correctly notes that English courts differed in
some respects from courts under our system, but Lord Holt's
position also prevailed in courts on this side of the Atlantic.
Applying what he called Lord Holt's “incontrovertible” rea-
soning, Justice Story explained that a prevailing plaintiff “is
entitled to a verdict for nominal damages” whenever “no
other [kind of damages] be proved.” Webb v. Portland Mfg.
Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508–509 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838). Be-
cause the common law recognized that “every violation im-
ports damage,” Justice Story reasoned that “[t]he law toler-

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ates no farther inquiry than whether there has been the
v
iolation of a right.” Ibid. Justice Story also made clear
that this logic applied to both retrospective and prospective
relief. Id., at 507 (stating that nominal damages are avail-
able “wherever there is a wrong ” and that, “[a] fortiori, this
doctrine applies where there is not only a violation of a right
of the plaintiff, but the act of the defendant, if continued,
may become the foundation, by lapse of time, of an adverse
right”).
The dissent discounts Justice Story's statement, saying
that he took a potentially contradictory position elsewhere
and asserted that both actual damages and a violation of a
legal right are required. Post, at 300 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.). But in the same source the dissent cites, Justice
Story said that nominal damages are “presumed” “[w]here
the breach of duty is clear.” Commentaries on the Law of
Agency § 217, p. 211 (1839). Justice Story adopted the same
position a few years later. Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co.,
29 F. Cas. 934, 936 (No. 17,516) (CC Me. 1843) (stating that
it is “well-known and well-settled” that “wherever a wrong
is done to a right,” at minimum “nominal damages will be
given”). And other jurists declared that “[t]he principle
that every injury legally imports damage, was decisively set-
tled, in the case of Ashby.” Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn.
*288, *304–*306 (1845) (citing many cases on both sides of
the Atlantic, including Webb and Marzetti). This history is
hardly one of “indeterminate sources.” Post, at 301.
Admittedly, the rule allowing nominal damages for a viola-
tion of any legal right, though “decisively settled,” Parker,
17 Conn., at *304, was not universally followed—as is true
for most common-law doctrines. And some courts only fol-
lowed the rule in part, recognizing the availability of nominal
damages but holding that the improper denial of nominal
damages could be harmless error. Yet, even among these
courts, many adopted the rule in full whenever a person
proved that there was a violation of an “important right.”

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Opinion of the Court
E. g., Hecht v. Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279, 290, 40 P. 306, 309–310
(1895);
accord, Reid v. Johnson, 132 Ind. 416, 419, 31 N. E.
1107, 1108 (1892) (“substantial right”). Nonetheless, the
prevailing rule, “well established” at common law, was “that
a party whose rights are invaded can always recover nominal
damages without furnishing any evidence of actual damage.”
1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 71, n. a (7th ed. 1880);
see also id., at 72 (citing Lord Holt's opinion in Ashby).
That this rule developed at common law is unsurprising in
the light of the noneconomic rights that individuals had at
that time. A contrary rule would have meant, in many
cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such
as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reduc-
ible to monetary valuation. See D. Dobbs & C. Roberts,
Law of Remedies § 3.3(2) (3d ed. 2018) (nominal damages are
often awarded for a right “not economic in character and for
which no substantial non-pecuniary award is available”); see
also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266–267 (1978) (awarding
nominal damages for a violation of procedural due process).
By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages when-
ever they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law
avoided the oddity of privileging small-dollar economic
rights over important, but not easily quantifable, nonpecuni-
ary rights.
B
Respondents and the dissent attempt to discount this his-
torical line of cases by contending that something other than
nominal damages provided redressability. They argue in-
stead that courts could award nominal damages only when a
plaintiff pleaded compensatory damages but failed to prove
a specifc amount. In those circumstances, they say, the plea
for compensatory damages is what satisfed the redressabil-
ity requirement, and courts awarded nominal damages
merely as a technical matter. We do not agree.
To begin with, the cases themselves did not require a
plea for compensatory damages as a condition for receiving
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nominal damages. Lord Holt spoke in categorical terms:
“
[E]very injury imports a damage,” so a plaintiff who proved
a legal violation could always obtain some form of damages
because he “must of necessity have a means to vindicate and
maintain [the right].” Ashby, 2 Raym. Ld., at 953–955, 92
Eng. Rep., at 136–137. Justice Story's language was no
less defnitive: “The law tolerates no farther inquiry than
whether there has been the violation of a right.” Webb, 29
F. Cas., at 508. When a right is violated, that violation “im-
ports damage in the nature of it” and “the party injured is
entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.” Id., at 507.
Respondents and the dissent thus get the relationship be-
tween nominal damages and compensatory damages back-
wards. Nominal damages are not a consolation prize for the
plaintiff who pleads, but fails to prove, compensatory dam-
ages. They are instead the damages awarded by default
until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form
of damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages.
See, e. g., Dods, 15 C. B. N. S., at 621, 627, 143 Eng. Rep., at
929, 931 (prevailing plaintiff entitled to nominal damages as
a matter of law even where jury neglected to fnd them); see
also Stachura, 477 U. S., at 308 (rejecting the argument that
courts could presume, without proof, damages greater than
nominal).
The argument that a claim for compensatory damages is a
prerequisite for an award of nominal damages also rests on
the fawed premise that nominal damages are purely sym-
bolic, a mere judicial token that provides no actual beneft to
the plaintiff. That contention is not without some support.
See, e. g., Stanton v. New York & Eastern R. Co., 59 Conn.
272, 282, 22 A. 300, 303 (1890) (“Nominal damages mean no
damages at all. They exist only in name and not in
amount”); but cf. ibid. (still recognizing that nominal dam-
ages are appropriate when a right is violated). But this
view is against the weight of the history discussed above,
and we have already expressly rejected it. Despite being
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Opinion of the Court
small, nominal damages are certainly concrete. The dissent
says
that “an award of nominal damages does not change [a
plaintiff 's] status or condition at all.” Post, at 296. But we
have already held that a person who is awarded nominal
damages receives “relief on the merits of his claim” and “may
demand payment for nominal damages no less than he may
demand payment for millions of dollars in compensatory
damages.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 111, 113 (1992).
Because nominal damages are in fact damages paid to the
plaintiff, they “affec[t] the behavior of the defendant towards
the plaintiff ” and thus independently provide redress.
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis deleted);
accord, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (“If there is any chance of money
changing hands, [the] suit remains live”). True, a single dol-
lar often cannot provide full redress, but the ability “to effec-
tuate a partial remedy” satisfes the redressability require-
ment. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506
U. S. 9, 13 (1992).
The next diffculty faced by respondents and the dissent
is their inability to square their argument with established
principles of standing. Because redressability is an “ `irre-
ducible' ” component of standing, Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 338, no
federal court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment unless it
provides a remedy that can redress the plaintiff 's injury.
Yet early courts routinely awarded nominal damages alone.
Certainly, no one seems to think that those judgments were
without legal effect. Those nominal damages necessarily
must have provided redress. Respondents contend that a
request for compensatory damages at the pleading stage was
what provided the basis for nominal damages at the judg-
ment stage. But a plaintiff must maintain a personal inter-
est in the dispute at every stage of litigation, including when
judgment is entered, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S. 555, 561 (1992), and must do so “separately for each
form of relief sought,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
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Opinion of the Court
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 185
(2000).
As soon as a plea for compensatory damages fails at
the factfnding stage of litigation, that plea can no longer
support jurisdiction for a favorable judgment. The dissent's
contrary assertion is unaccompanied by any citation.
Likewise, any analogy to attorney's fees and costs fails.
A request for attorney's fees or costs cannot establish stand-
ing because those awards are merely a “byproduct” of a suit
that already succeeded, not a form of redressability. Steel
Co., 523 U. S., at 107; see also Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 480 (1990). In contrast, nominal dam-
ages are redress, not a byproduct.
III
Because nominal damages were available at common law
in analogous circumstances, we conclude that a request for
nominal damages satisfes the redressability element of
standing where a plaintiff 's claim is based on a completed
violation of a legal right.
The dissent worries that after today the Judiciary will be
required to weigh in on legal questions “whenever a plaintiff
asks for a dollar.” Post, at 302. But petitioners still would
have satisfed redressability if instead of one dollar in nomi-
nal damages they sought one dollar in compensation for a
wasted bus fare to travel to the free speech zone. The dis-
sent “would place a higher value on Article III” than a dollar.
Post, at 294; but see Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC
Services, Inc., 554 U. S. 269, 305 (2008) (Roberts, C. J., dis-
senting) (“Article III is worth a dollar”). But Congress
abolished the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement
for federal-question jurisdiction in 1980. Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act, 94 Stat. 2369. And we
have never held that one applies as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
This is not to say that a request for nominal damages guar-
antees entry to court. Our holding concerns only redress-
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ability. It remains for the plaintiff to establish the other
elements
of standing (such as a particularized injury); plead
a cognizable cause of action, Planck v. Anderson, 5 T. R. 37,
40, 101 Eng. Rep. 21, 23 (K. B. 1792) (“if no [actual] damage
be sustained, the creditor has no cause of action” for some
claims); and meet all other relevant requirements. We hold
only that, for the purpose of Article III standing, nominal
damages provide the necessary redress for a completed vio-
lation of a legal right.
Applying this principle here is straightforward. For pur-
poses of this appeal, it is undisputed that Uzuegbunam expe-
rienced a completed violation of his constitutional rights
when respondents enforced their speech policies against him.
Because “every violation [of a right] imports damage,” Webb,
29 F. Cas., at 509, nominal damages can redress Uzuegbu-
nam's injury even if he cannot or chooses not to quantify that
harm in economic terms.*
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I agree with the Court that, as a matter of history and
precedent, a plaintiff 's request for nominal damages can sat-
isfy the redressability requirement for Article III standing
and can keep an otherwise moot case alive. I write sepa-
rately simply to note that I agree with The Chief Justice
and the Solicitor General that a defendant should be able to
accept the entry of a judgment for nominal damages against
it and thereby end the litigation without a resolution of the
*We do not decide whether Bradford can pursue nominal damages.
Nominal damages go only to redressability and are unavailable where a
plaintiff has failed to establish a past, completed injury. The District
Court should determine in the frst instance whether the enforcement
against Uzuegbunam also violated Bradford's constitutional rights.
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merits. Post, at 303 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); Brief for
U
nited States as Amicus Curiae 29–30.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.
Petitioners Chike Uzuegbunam and Joseph Bradford want
to challenge the constitutionality of speech restrictions at
Georgia Gwinnett College. There are just a few problems:
Uzuegbunam and Bradford are no longer students at the col-
lege. The challenged restrictions no longer exist. And the
petitioners have not alleged actual damages. The case is
therefore moot because a federal court cannot grant Uzueg-
bunam and Bradford “any effec tua l rel ief whatever. ”
Chafn v. Chafn, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Court resists this conclusion, holding that the petition-
ers can keep pressing their claims because they have asked
for “nominal damages.” In the Court's view, nominal dam-
ages can save a case from mootness because any amount of
money—no matter how trivial—“can redress a past injury.”
Ante, at 283. But an award of nominal damages does not
alleviate the harms suffered by a plaintiff, and is not in-
tended to. If nominal damages can preserve a live contro-
versy, then federal courts will be required to give advisory
opinions whenever a plaintiff tacks on a request for a dollar.
Because I would place a higher value on Article III, I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
In urging the ratifcation of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton famously wrote that “the judiciary, from the nature
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous” of “the
different departments of power.” The Federalist No. 78,
p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This was so, Hamilton ex-
plained, because the Judiciary “will be least in a capacity to
annoy or injure” “the political rights of the Constitution.”
Ibid. Whereas “[t]he executive not only dispenses the hon-
ors but holds the sword of the community,” and “[t]he legisla-
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ture not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules
by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated,” the Judiciary “may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.” Ibid.
But that power of judgment can nonetheless bind the Ex-
ecutive and Legislature—and the States. It is modest only
if confned to its proper sphere. As John Marshall empha-
sized during his one term in the House of Representatives,
“[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the
constitution” or “to every question under the laws and treat-
ies of the United States,” then “[t]he division of power
[among the branches of Government] could exist no longer,
and the other departments would be swallowed up by the
judiciary.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984)
(quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341
(2006)). To maintain adequate separation between the
Judiciary, on the one hand, and the political branches
and the States, on the other, Article III of the Constitution
authorizes federal courts to decide only “Cases” and “Contro-
versies”—that is, “cases of a Judiciary nature.” 2 Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (M. Farrand ed.
1966) (J. Madison).
The case-or-controversy requirement imposes fundamen-
tal restrictions on who can invoke federal jurisdiction and
what types of disputes federal courts can resolve. As perti-
nent here, “when it is impossible for a court to grant any
effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Chafn, 568
U. S., at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted), the case is
moot, and the court has no power to decide it, see Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18 (1998). To decide a moot case would
be to give an advisory opinion, in violation of “the oldest and
most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.”
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
By insisting that judges be able to provide meaningful re-
dress to litigants, Article III ensures that federal courts ex-

296 UZUEGBUN
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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
ercise their authority only “as a necessity in the determi-
nati
on of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals.” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman,
143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892); see Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471 (1982) (“The constitutional power of
federal courts cannot be defned, and indeed has no sub-
stance, without reference to the necessity `to adjudge the
legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.' ” (quoting
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commis-
sioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885))). When
plaintiffs like Uzuegbunam and Bradford allege neither ac-
tual damages nor the prospect of future injury, an award of
nominal damages does not change their status or condition
at all. Such an award instead represents a judicial determi-
nation that the plaintiffs' interpretation of the law is
correct—nothing more. The court in such a case is acting
not as an Article III court, but as a moot court, deciding
cases “in the rarifed atmosphere of a debating society.” Di-
rector, Offce of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini
North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 305 (1983) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
II
The Court sees no problem with turning judges into advice
columnists. In its view, the common law and (to a lesser
extent) our cases require that federal courts open their doors
to any plaintiff who asks for a dollar. I part ways with the
Court regarding both the framework it applies and the result
it reaches.
Begin with the framework. The Court's initial premise is
that we must “look to the forms of relief awarded at common
law” in order to decide “whether nominal damages can re-
dress a past injury.” Ante, at 285. Because the Court fnds
that “nominal damages were available at common law in
analogous circumstances” to the ones before us, it “conclude[s]
that a request for nominal damages satisfes the redress-
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ability element of standing where a plaintiff 's claim is based
on
a completed violation of a legal right.” Ante, at 292.
Any lessons that we learn from the common law, however,
must be tempered by differences in constitutional design.
The structure and function of 18th-century English courts
were in many respects irreconcilable with “the role assigned
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power.” Flast,
392 U. S., at 95. Perhaps most saliently, in England “all ju-
risdictions of courts [were] either mediately or immediately
derived from the crown,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 257 (1765), an organizational principle
the Framers explicitly rejected by separating the Executive
from the Judiciary. This difference in organization yielded a
difference in operation. To give just one example, “English
judicial practice with which early Americans were familiar
had long permitted the Crown to solicit advisory opinions
from judges.” R. Fallon, J. Manning, D. Meltzer, & D. Sha-
piro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Fed-
eral System 52 (7th ed. 2015). We would not look to such
practice for guidance today if a plaintiff came into court ar-
guing that advisory opinions were in fact an appropriate
form of Article III redress. We would know that they are
not. We likewise should know that a bare request for nomi-
nal damages is not justiciable because the plaintiff cannot
“beneft in a tangible way from the court's intervention.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
103, n. 5 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We should of course consult founding-era decisions when
discerning the boundaries of our jurisdiction, for the Fram-
ers sought to limit the judicial power to “Cases” and “Con-
troversies,” as those terms were understood at the time.
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). No question. But that does not mean that
the requirements of Article III are “satisfed merely because
a party requests a court of the United States to declare its
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298 UZUEGBUN
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historically associated with courts of law in terms that have
a
familiar ring to those trained in the legal process.” Valley
Forge, 454 U. S., at 471. A focus on common law analogues
cannot obscure the signifcance of the establishment of an
independent Judiciary—a “remarkable transformation” from
a system with courts operating as “appendages of crown
power.” Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review,
22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (1988). That transformation
carries with it the need to cabin the jurisdiction of the Judi-
ciary to ensure it does not trespass on the province of the
political branches.
It is in any event entirely unclear whether common law
courts would have awarded nominal damages in a case like
the one before us. There is no dispute that “nominal dam-
ages historically could provide prospective relief,” because
such awards allowed “plaintiffs at common law to `obtain a
form of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general
declaratory judgment act.' ” Ante, at 285 (quoting D. Lay-
cock & R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 636 (5th ed.
2019); emphasis added); see Borchard, The Declaratory
Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 Yale L. J. 1,
25–29 (1918) (describing the development of declaratory
judgments in England in the second half of the 19th century).
Yet the petitioners in this case no longer seek prospective
relief. Although they initially asked for a declaratory judg-
ment and a preliminary injunction, they abandoned those re-
quests once the college rescinded the challenged policies.
The Court is correct to note that plaintiffs at common law
often received nominal damages for past violations of their
rights. Those awards, however, were generally limited to
situations in which prevailing plaintiffs tried and failed to
prove actual damages. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§ 3.3(2), p. 296 (2d ed. 1993) (describing nominal damages
awards as “a rescue operation”). Notw ithstanding the
Court's protestations to the contrary, nominal damages in
such cases were in fact a “consolation prize,” ante, at 290,
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awarded as a hook to allow prevailing plaintiffs to at least
recover
attorney's fees and costs. See W. Hale, Handbook
on the Law of Damages 30–31 (1896) (“The importance of
the right to recover nominal damages often consists in its
effect on costs.”); 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages § 96,
p. 164 (9th ed. 1912) (“[T]hey are a mere peg to hang costs
on.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The petitioners in
this case have asked to recover their fees and costs, but they
never sought actual damages, so the common law provides
little relevant support.
On this last point, the Court acknowledges in several
places that the historical record is mixed as to whether legal
violations were actionable at all without a showing of com-
pensable harm. See ante, at 286–287, 288–289. And the
Court does not cite any case in which plaintiffs sought only
nominal damages for purely retrospective injuries. The
Court instead relies on several decisions that contained live
damages claims, see Barker v. Green, 2 Bing. 317, 130 Eng.
Rep. 327 (C. P. 1824) (“actual damage was the gist of the
action”); Hatch v. Lewis, 2 F. & F. 467, 469, 175 Eng. Rep.
1145, 1146 (N. P. 1861) (defendants' ineffective assistance al-
legedly caused plaintiff to be “deprived of the profts and
emoluments he might otherwise have obtained”); Dods v.
Evans, 15 C. B. N. S. 621, 143 Eng. Rep. 929 (C. P. 1864)
(action for damages), or involved prospective harm to the
plaintiff 's reputation, see Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad.
415, 420, 109 Eng. Rep. 842, 844 (K. B. 1830) (bank's failure
to timely pay “was injurious to the character of the plaintiff
in his trade”); see also C. Addison, Law of Torts 46–47 (1860)
(defamation actionable without proof of damage).
The Court also appeals to “categorical” and “defnitive”
statements by Lord Chief Justice Holt and Justice Story, that
“every injury imports a damage,” Ashby v. White, 2 Raym.
Ld. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K. B. 1703), and that
“[t]he law tolerates no farther inquiry than whether there
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29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838). Ante, at
290.
These statements, however, bear less weight than the
Court suggests. Lord Holt was alone in dissent in Ashby
(no shame there), and although his opinion has been cited
favorably by subsequent cases and commentary, his col-
leagues disagreed with him. The Court writes that “the
House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus vali-
dating Lord Holt's position,” ante, at 287, but the House of
Lords likely paid scant attention to Lord Holt's analysis. It
appears instead that the majority decision was reversed as
collateral damage in a Whig-Tory political dispute, and “little
weight was given to reasoning or eloquence.” 2 J. Campbell,
Lives of the Chief Justices of England 160 (1849). (Ashby
had tried to vote for a Whig candidate, and his ballot had
been rejected as part of a Tory election-rigging scheme.
Id., at 156–157.) Regardless, the House of Lords held that
Ashby “should recover his damages assessed by the jury” at
trial, suggesting that the fact of injury alone did not “im-
port” them. Ashby v. White, 1 Bro. P. C. 62, 64, 1 Eng. Rep.
417, 418 (1703).
Justice Story is no more helpful to the Court—despite the
supposedly “defnitive” nature of his statement in Webb—as
he took the position elsewhere in his writings that a legal
violation alone was not suffcient to ground a lawsuit. See
Commentaries on the Law of Agency § 236, p. 200 (1839)
(“[T]he rule applies, that though it is a wrong, it is without
any damage; and, to maintain an action, both must concur;
for damnum absque injuria, and injuria absque damno, are
equally objections to any recovery.”). Perhaps Justice Sto-
ry's conficting statements can be reconciled, see ante, at 288;
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 275, 283, n. 38 (2008), but neither his com-
mentary nor Lord Holt's dissent provides frm footing for the
position that a plaintiff could seek nominal damages without
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At bottom, the Court relies on a handful of indeterminate
sources
to justify a radical expansion of the judicial power.
The Court acknowledges that “the rule allowing nominal
damages for a violation of any legal right . . . was not univer-
sally followed,” ante, at 288, but even this concession under-
states the equivocal nature of the historical record. I would
require more before bursting the bounds of Article III.
The Court spends little time trying to reconcile its analysis
with modern justiciability principles. It cites in passing our
decisions in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), Memphis
Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299 (1986),
and Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992), but those cases
made no mention of Article III, and none involved a stand-
alone claim for nominal damages. The Court also contends
that nominal damages must provide redress because courts
would otherwise lack jurisdiction to award them, even where
a plaintiff tries and fails to prove actual damages. See ante,
at 291. But a claim for actual damages preserves a live con-
troversy, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978), and a court does not lose jurisdiction just
because that claim ultimately fails.
Finally, the Court argues that nominal damages provide
Article III relief because they “affec[t] the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff ” by requiring “money chang-
ing hands.” Ante, at 291 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). If this were the standard, then the prospect of attor-
ney's fees and costs would confer standing at the beginning
of a lawsuit and prevent mootness throughout—a proposition
we have squarely rejected. See Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 480 (1990). The Court posits that “nom-
inal damages are redress,” whereas fees and costs “are mere-
ly a byproduct of a suit that already succeeded.” Ante, at
292 (internal quotation marks omitted). This classifcation
just begs the question of what qualifes as redress. To sat-
isfy Article III, redress must alleviate the plaintiff 's alleged

302 UZUEGBUN
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injury in some way, either by compensating the plaintiff for
a
past loss or by preventing an ongoing or future harm.
Nominal damages do not serve these ends where a plaintiff
alleges only a completed violation of his rights. They are
not intended to approximate the value of tangible or intangi-
ble harms, or the deterrent effect required to prevent future
misconduct. And they are not calculated with reference to
either of these purposes. Because such an award performs
no remedial function—and because “[r]elief that does not
remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into
federal court,” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 107—nominal damages
cannot preserve a live controversy where a case is other-
wise moot.
III
Today's decision risks a major expansion of the judicial
role. Until now, we have said that federal courts can review
the legality of policies and actions only as a necessary inci-
dent to resolving real disputes. Going forward, the Judi-
ciary will be required to perform this function whenever a
plaintiff asks for a dollar. For those who want to know if
their rights have been violated, the least dangerous branch
will become the least expensive source of legal advice.
In an effort to downplay these consequences, the Court
argues that plaintiffs who seek nominal damages will often
be able to seek actual damages as well. In this case, for
example, the Court notes that Uzuegbunam and Bradford
“would have satisfed redressability if instead of one dollar
in nominal damages they sought one dollar in compensation
for a wasted bus fare to travel to the free speech zone.”
Ante, at 292. Maybe they would have, and maybe they
should have. The Court is mistaken, however, to equate a
small amount of actual damages with the token award of
nominal damages. The former redresses a compensable
harm and satisfes Article III, while the latter is a legal fc-
tion with “no existence in point of quantity.” J. Mayne, Law
of Damages 27 (1856) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
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Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.3(2), at 294 (“Nominal damages
are
damages in name only . . . .”).
The Court also insists that not every “request for nominal
damages guarantees entry to court.” Ante, at 292. Yet its
holding admits of no limiting principle. As then-Judge Mc-
Connell remarked in an insightful concurrence on the issue
before us, “[i]t is hard to conceive of a case in which a plain-
tiff would be unable to append a claim for nominal damages,
and thus insulate the case from the possibility of mootness.”
Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371
F. 3d 1248, 1266 (CA10 2004). The Court today reinforces
this point by emphasizing that “every violation of a right
imports damage,” ante, at 293 (emphasis added; alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted)—even though we
have defnitively and recently held that a plaintiff must al-
lege a concrete injury even where his rights have been vio-
lated, see Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020)
(“This Court has rejected the argument that `a plaintiff auto-
matically satisfes the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a
statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.' ” (quot-
ing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 341 (2016))).
The best that can be said for the Court's sweeping excep-
tion to the case-or-controversy requirement is that it may
itself admit of a sweeping exception: Where a plaintiff asks
only for a dollar, the defendant should be able to end the case
by giving him a dollar, without the court needing to pass on
the merits of the plaintiff 's claims. Although we recently
reserved the question whether a defendant can moot a case
by depositing the full amount requested by the plaintiff,
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U. S. 153, 166 (2016), our
cases have long suggested that he can, see, e. g., California
v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313–314 (1893).
The United States agrees, arguing in its brief in “support”
of the petitioners that “the defendant should be able to end
the litigation without a resolution of the constitutional mer-
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its, simply by accepting the entry of judgment for nominal
damages
against him.” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 29. The defendant can even fle an offer of judgment
for one dollar, rendering the plaintiff liable for any subse-
quent costs if he receives only nominal damages. See Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 68(d). This is a welcome caveat, and it may
ultimately save federal courts from issuing reams of advisory
opinions. But it also highlights the fimsiness of the Court's
view of the separation of powers. The scope of our jurisdic-
tion should not depend on whether the defendant decides to
fork over a buck.
***
Five years after Hamilton wrote Federalist No. 78, Secre-
tary of State Thomas Jefferson sent a letter on behalf of
President George Washington to Chief Justice John Jay and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, asking for ad-
vice about the Nation's rights and obligations regarding the
ongoing war in Europe. Washington's request must have
struck him as reasonable enough, since English sovereigns
regularly sought advice from their courts. Yet the Justices
declined the entreaty, citing “the lines of separation drawn
by the Constitution between the three departments of the
government.” 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John
Jay 488 (H. Johnston ed. 1891). For over two centuries, the
Correspondence of the Justices has stood as a reminder that
federal courts cannot give answers simply because someone
asks.
The Judiciary is authorized “to say what the law is” only
because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). To-
day's decision abandons that principle. When a plaintiff
brings a nominal damages claim in the absence of past dam-
ages or future harm, it is not “necessary to give an opinion
upon a question of law.” San Pablo, 149 U. S., at 314. It is
instead a “gratuitous” exercise of the judicial power, Simon
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v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 38
(1976),
and expanding that power encroaches on the political
branches and the States. Perhaps defendants will wise up
and moot such claims by paying a dollar, but it is diffcult to
see that outcome as a victory for Article III. Rather than
encourage litigants to fght over farthings, I would affrm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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