Rufus Rivers v. James Smith, Jr.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Rufus Rivers and Merle Rivers, Appellants,

v.

James Smith, Jr., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000451

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5992
Submitted March 1, 2023 – Filed June 21, 2023

REVERSED

Rufus Rivers, of Cordova, pro se.

Merle Rivers, of Cordova, pro se.

Kathleen McColl McDaniel and Sarah Jean Michaelis
Cox, both of Burnette Shutt & McDaniel, PA, of
Columbia, both for Respondent.

HEWITT, J.: Rufus and Merle Rivers appeal a circuit court order affirming a
magistrate's order of eviction. They contend the case falls within a statute
prohibiting magistrates from exercising jurisdiction when title to the property is at
issue. Based on that, they argue the magistrate erred in finding a landlord-tenant
relationship existed between them and James Smith, Jr., and in ordering them to pay
rent into the magistrate's registry to secure a stay while they appealed the eviction.
We agree and reverse.
FACTS

This case concerns property once owned by James Smith's deceased mother, Jessie
Mae Smith (Jessie Mae). The Rivers have lived on the property since 2009. There
is no record of a written lease agreement between the Rivers and either Jessie Mae
or James.

In July 2013, Jessie Mae executed a power of attorney designating James as her
authorized agent and granting him authority to spend her finances, sell or dispose of
her property, and make her healthcare decisions. In September 2014, James
transferred the property to himself, on Jessie Mae's behalf, via a quitclaim deed. This
deed was recorded the following month. James presented evidence to the magistrate
that the Orangeburg County Tax Assessor's Office has identified him as the owner
of record since September 2014. Jessie Mae died in 2016.

In July 2018, roughly two years after Jessie Mae died, James sent the Rivers a letter
demanding they vacate the property within thirty days. The Rivers refused. They
asked James to cease and desist any effort to displace them, claimed James held an
invalid power of attorney, and alleged he had breached fiduciary duties. Competing
lawsuits followed.

The Rivers sued James in the Orangeburg County Court of Common Pleas. The suit
challenged James's ownership of the property and alleged constructive fraud, unjust
enrichment, and other causes of action. The Rivers filed an amended complaint a
few days later alleging that James used an invalid power of attorney from Jessie Mae
and that Jessie Mae had orally given or promised the property to them.

Around the same time, James filed this case against the Rivers in magistrate court
seeking to evict them from the property. The magistrate conducted a hearing not
long after the case was filed.

The Rivers made various arguments to the magistrate in opposing the eviction, but
there is no disputing that the arguments involved an alleged promise by Jessie Mae
to give them the property. The record suggests the Rivers alerted the magistrate to
their circuit court lawsuit against James. The Rivers asked the magistrate to dismiss
the eviction action and allow James to add his claims to the circuit court case.

According to the magistrate's return, James's main argument was that the Rivers'
circuit court case and their claim to own the property lacked any conceivable merit
because the alleged gift from Jessie Mae would have occurred more than three years
before any lawsuits were filed. James argued the Rivers' ownership claims would
therefore be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

After the testimony and arguments concluded, the magistrate orally ruled that James
was the current and lawful owner of the property, that the Rivers were tenants, and
that the Rivers unlawfully occupied the property.

The Rivers filed a motion for reconsideration. Among other things, they argued the
magistrate lacked jurisdiction, that they had informed the magistrate both orally and
in writing of their circuit court case, and that James was using the eviction process
to circumvent the circuit court case.

The magistrate held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, at which the Rivers
presented a court record reflecting that their case against Smith had been referred to
the master-in-equity. The magistrate denied the motion based on its previous finding
that Smith owned the property. The magistrate determined the case did not involve
a question in title and that she had jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

The Rivers appealed the magistrate's decision to circuit court. The case was
continued after a first hearing based on the Rivers' contention that their circuit court
suit against James involved a challenge to his claim of title, but after that—and after
the master-in-equity dismissed the Rivers' suit against James for failing to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted—the circuit court affirmed the magistrate's
decision and ordered a writ of ejectment to be issued. The circuit court found the
Rivers' jurisdictional issue to be moot. The court stated that Smith owned the
property and that although "the Rivers attempted to challenge Smith's title to the
[p]roperty, this challenge was dismissed by the [master] for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted." This appeal followed. 1

ISSUE

Whether section 22-3-20(2) of the South Carolina Code (2007)—which bars a
magistrate from hearing a case when title to real property is in question—prohibited
the magistrate from considering this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1
The Rivers recently filed a "motion to vacate" with this court. The motion primarily
discusses events outside of the record. After careful review, the motion is denied.
We are bound by the factual findings under review as long as they are supported by
any evidence. See Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp., 280
S.C. 232, 233, 312 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ct. App. 1984). Even so, "[d]etermining the
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and [the appellate court]
reviews questions of law de novo." Palmetto Co. v. McMahon, 395 S.C. 1, 3, 716
S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Town of Summerville v. City of North
Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008)).

JURISDICTION OVER THE EVICTION

The legislature has provided that "[n]o magistrate shall have cognizance of a civil
action . . . when the title to real property shall come into question, except as provided
in Article 11 of this chapter." S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-20(2). A series of statutes—
sections 22-3-1110 to -1180—govern the procedure in cases where title is
challenged.

The reason for this rule appears to be that summary proceedings in magistrate court
are only appropriate when the conventional landlord-tenant relationship is
established. See Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, 127 S.C. 451, 455-56, 121 S.E. 374,
376 (1924) (discussing a constitutional provision that has since been substantially
codified in section 22-3-20). As one might guess from the date in the citation, there
do not appear to be many cases interpreting this rule; certainly not any modern ones.
An even older case explains that while the ejectment statute was designed to
establish an efficient means for ejecting trespassers, it was not intended to give
someone an advantage when there is a dispute over rightful possession. Richland
Drug Co. v. Moorman, 71 S.C. 236, 239, 50 S.E. 792, 793 (1905).

Precedent explains the magistrate retains jurisdiction if the defendant does not
comply with the statutory procedure for raising a question as to title or offer any
evidence drawing title into question. In Bamberg Banking Co. v. Matthews, for
example, our supreme court upheld the magistrate's jurisdiction in spite of the
defendant's claim that she owned the property and the lease she signed with the bank
was procured through fraud and duress. 132 S.C. 130, 132-33, 128 S.E. 718, 719
(1925). The court noted the defendant did not follow proper procedure, did not deny
the lease at the hearing, and offered no evidence of fraud or duress. Id. Barnes v.
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. follows the same reasoning. 106 S.C.
227, 230, 90 S.E. 1017, 1018 (1916) (noting the defendant denied the plaintiff's
allegations but did not comply with the statutory procedure and did not offer any
testimony at the foreclosure hearing).
This case is not like Bamberg Banking Co. and Barnes. This is not a situation where
a defendant feigns a challenge to title but has no actual arguments to muster. This
case also differs from those cases in that the Rivers complied with the statutory
procedures. A statute allowed them to raise questionable title as a defense in their
answer to the foreclosure suit, and they provided the magistrate and Smith with their
signed answer raising that defense at the hearing. See S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-1110
(2007). A different statute required them to file an undertaking as assurance that the
defendant will promptly file an action in circuit court over title to the property, see
S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-1120 (2007), but the Rivers cleared this bar with room to
spare—they filed their circuit court suit before Smith filed his case to evict them.
They gave the magistrate and Smith copies of the summons and complaint at the
hearing.

If this was all there was to the case, we think there would be no question as to the
outcome. Smith certainly has defenses to the Rivers' claims, and those defenses may
be good ones, but our reading of precedent convinces us the magistrate's jurisdiction
ends as soon as it becomes clear that there is a challenge to title and the traditional
landlord-tenant relationship does not exist. But, as we noted in the background, the
master-in-equity dismissed the Rivers' case against James while the Rivers' appeal
of the magistrate's decision was pending. The Rivers did not appeal the master's
decision. Absent an appeal or a proper motion under Rule 60, SCRCP, the master's
order is binding. The circuit court found this rendered any jurisdictional defect moot.

We cannot agree. If the magistrate did not have jurisdiction over the eviction case,
it lacked jurisdiction to enter the eviction order and that order is a nullity. See, e.g.,
Leviner v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 339 S.C. 492, 494, 530 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2000)
(stating an order issued without jurisdiction was a nullity). We are not presented
with any authority that subsequent events like the master-in-equity's order here can
reach back in time and ratify an order that was issued by a court that lacked
jurisdiction to do so. This case may well end in a second but successful eviction,
but we cannot say that outcome is certain.

CONCLUSION

Our holding controls the related issues regarding a landlord-tenant relationship and
the rent funds in escrow. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not
address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is
dispositive). Based on the foregoing, the magistrate's order of eviction is
REVERSED. 2

THOMAS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.