Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB v. Ebonee D. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB as Trustee of
Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust I, Respondent,

v.

Ebonee D. Brown; Georgia M. Brown; South Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendants,

Of whom Ebonee D. Brown and Georgia M. Brown are
the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000372

Appeal From Chester County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-305
Submitted June 1, 2026 – Filed June 24, 2026

AFFIRMED

Andrew Sims Radeker, of Radeker Law, P.A., of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Dean Anthony Hayes, of McCabe, Trotter & Beverly,
P.C., and John P. Fetner, of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn &
Prickett, LLC, both of Columbia; Kimila Lynn Wooten,
of Kenison Dudley & Crawford, LLC, of Greenville;
Meredith L. Coker, of Charleston; Matthew Samuel
Lindauer, of Johannesmeyer & Sawyer, PLLC, of Saint
Helena Island; J. Pamela Price and January N. Taylor,
both of McMichael Taylor Gray, LLC, of Peachtree
Corners, Georgia; Steven Chauncey Hippolyte, of
Brownlee Whitlow & Praet, PLLC, of Charlotte, North
Carolina; and Brian Lawrence Campbell, of Brian L.
Campbell, Attorney at Law, PC, of Wilmington, North
Carolina, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ebonee D. Brown and Georgia M. Brown (collectively,
Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as trustee of Stanwich Mortgage Loan
Trust I (Bank), and referring Bank's foreclosure action to a special referee. On
appeal, Appellants argue (1) the circuit court erred in finding the subject mobile
home (the Mobile Home) was a fixture to real property, (2) there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to their counterclaim for violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (the Act),1 (3) Bank asserted a claim and delivery action
to gain possession of the Mobile Home and failed to comply with the requisite
notice requirements, and (4) the circuit court erred in striking their jury demand.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the
circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Bank. See
Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 459, 892 S.E.2d 297, 299
(2023) ("Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the moving party is entitled to summary judgment 'if the [evidence before the
court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (alterations in
original)); USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 653, 661 S.E.2d
791, 796 (2008) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion,
appellate courts apply the same standard that governs the [circuit] court under Rule
56(c), SCRCP, which provides that summary judgment is proper when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."); Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 197, 659 S.E.2d 196, 202
(Ct. App. 2008) ("On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the

1
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692p.
appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in
and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.").

1. As to issue one, we hold Appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Mobile Home was subject to the mortgage used to secure the
subject note because Appellants failed to support their argument with any evidence
and merely relied on conclusory allegations. See Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 306 S.C. 101, 115, 410 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1991) ("Under Rule 56(c), the party
seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact."); id. ("Once [the] moving party carries
its initial burden, [the] opposing party must, under Rule 56(e), 'do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts' but
'must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."'" (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986))); id. ("Rule 56(e) specifically prohibits the nonmoving party from
resting upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings."); Town of Hollywood
v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013) ("[I]t is not sufficient for
a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not
genuine."). Further, the circuit court did not find the Mobile Home was a fixture,
but rather, it found the parties intended for the Mobile Home to be a permanent
improvement to real property.

2. As to issue two, we hold Appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Bank violated the Act because Appellants failed to support their
argument with any evidence and merely relied on conclusory allegations. See
Baughman, 306 S.C. at 115, 410 S.E.2d at 545 ("Under Rule 56(c), the party
seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact."); id. ("Once moving party carries its
initial burden, opposing party must, under Rule 56(e), 'do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts' but 'must come
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."'"
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586-87)); id. ("Rule 56(e)
specifically prohibits the nonmoving party from resting upon the mere allegations
or denials of its pleadings."); Floyd, 403 S.C. at 477, 744 S.E.2d at 166 ("[I]t is not
sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact
that is not genuine.").

3. As to issue three, we hold this issue is without merit because in its motion for
summary judgment and at the motion hearing, Bank stated it was not asserting an
action for claim and delivery, and the circuit court indicated at the hearing that it
accepted Bank's position. See Baughman, 306 S.C. at 115, 410 S.E.2d at 545
("Under Rule 56(c), the party seeking summary judgment has the initial
responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.");
id. ("Once moving party carries its initial burden, opposing party must, under Rule
56(e), 'do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts' but 'must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."'" (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586-87));
Floyd, 403 S.C. at 477, 744 S.E.2d at 166 ("[I]t is not sufficient for a party to
create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine.").

4. As to issue four, we hold the circuit court did not err in striking Appellants' jury
demand. See Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 15, 690 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2010)
("Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law."); id. at 15, 690
S.E.2d at 772-73 ("An appellate court may decide questions of law with no
particular deference to the [circuit] court."). Because Bank did not assert an action
for claim and delivery and the circuit court did not err in granting summary
judgment as to Appellants' counterclaim for violation of the Act, Bank's
foreclosure action was an action in equity; and thus, Appellants were not entitled to
a jury trial. See U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Ass'n v. Bell, 385 S.C. 364, 373, 684 S.E.2d
199, 204 (Ct. App. 2009) ("A mortgage foreclosure is an action in equity."
(quoting Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 248, 489 S.E.2d 472,
475 (1997))); Williford v. Downs, 265 S.C. 319, 321, 218 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975)
("In equity the parties are not entitled, as a matter of right, to a trial by jury.").

AFFIRMED.2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.