State v. Norman P. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Norman Philip Browne, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000872

Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-227
Heard April 7, 2026 – Filed May 13, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Wesley Chandler Norville, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Assistant
Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, all of Columbia, all
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellant Norman Browne appeals his convictions for murder and
grand larceny, arguing the trial court erred by allowing him to proceed to trial pro se
because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Browne was indicted for murder and grand larceny. Though Browne initially
retained Michael O'Neal to represent him, O'Neal was relieved as Browne's counsel,
and Laree Hensley was subsequently appointed to represent Browne. On January
18, 2024, Hensley filed a motion to be relieved as counsel and for Browne to proceed
pro se.

The trial court heard the motion via WebEx on February 7, 2024; at the time
of the hearing, a trial was scheduled for, and ultimately held on, the week of April
15, 2024.

The following week, the trial court entered an order relieving Hensley as
counsel and allowing Browne to proceed pro se at trial. The trial court, with the
consent of Hensley and Browne, ordered Hensley to remain as stand-by counsel at
trial unless and until Browne retained other counsel.

Browne was subsequently tried before a jury, which resulted in his conviction
on both charges. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review
de novo." State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602, 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018). This
court "review[s] a [trial court's] findings of historical fact for clear error; however,
we review the denial of the right of self-representation based upon those findings of
fact de novo." Id. "In doing so, this [c]ourt must consider the defendant's testimony,
history, and the circumstances of his decision, as presented to the [trial court] at the
time the defendant made his request [to waive his right to counsel]." Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the
effective assistance of counsel; it also guarantees a defendant the right to represent
himself. A defendant must necessarily choose between these guarantees." Hines v.
State, 443 S.C. 32, 38, 902 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2024).

To expressly waive the right to counsel, a defendant must assert they do not
want counsel and do so "knowingly and intelligently." Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975). "To establish a valid waiver of counsel, Faretta requires the
accused be: (1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the
dangers of self-representation." Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423–24, 392 S.E.2d
462, 463 (1990).

Our supreme court has held that Faretta warnings are required whether the
waiver of counsel is by "an affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey v.
State, 425 S.C. 615, 619, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting State v. Roberson, 382
S.C. 185, 187, 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2009)). The United States Supreme Court,
however, has not prescribed a particular script courts must read to defendants to
comply with Faretta. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (noting "[t]he
information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent
[waiver] . . . depends on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's
education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and
the stage of the proceeding").

"[A]n important aspect of the waiver analysis is at what point in the criminal
process the warnings are given." Hines, 443 S.C. at 40, 902 S.E.2d at 381. "Where,
as in Faretta, [a] defendant is venturing to represent himself at trial, the trial court
must rigorously convey specific warnings of the pitfalls of going to trial without a
lawyer." Id. "By contrast, a waiver of counsel at earlier stages of the proceeding
need not be as exacting." Id.

Browne argues that the trial court did not adequately warn him of the dangers
of self-representation. We hold that Browne, while not sufficiently advised of the
dangers of self-representation, had sufficient background to understand the
disadvantages of representing himself at trial. See Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293,
294, 391 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990) ("While a specific inquiry by the trial judge
expressly addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense is preferred, the ultimate
test [of the waiver analysis] is not the trial judge's advice but rather the defendant's
understanding."); id. ("If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to
represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation,
the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied.").

Here, the trial judge advised Browne that: (1) Browne had a right to legal
counsel; (2) if Browne could not afford one, the court could appoint counsel; (3) that
it is not prudent or advisable to represent oneself; and (4) that self-representation
would be against Browne's interest and place him in significant jeopardy. However,
because the hearing occurred around two months before trial, the trial judge's
warnings warranted a thorough discussion of the dangers of self-representation—
warnings on the specific dangers of Browne's decision rather than general warnings
that danger typically comes with said decision. Compare Hines, 443 S.C. at 41, 902
S.E.2d at 381 ("The [United States] Supreme Court seems satisfied that at the guilty
plea stage the defendant's 'eyes are open,' so long as he is warned that some general,
undefined danger lurks ahead."), with id. at 40, 902 S.E.2d at 381 ("Where, as in
Faretta, the defendant is venturing to represent himself at trial, the trial court must
rigorously convey specific warnings of the pitfalls of going to trial without a
lawyer."); see also 3 Wayne Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c) (2025)
(listing potential pitfalls trial courts should consider reviewing with defendants
seeking to represent themselves at trial, such as the defendant being unable to "make
effective use of such rights as the voir dire of jurors").

Thus, considering the timing of Browne's request and the scope of the
warnings provided, we hold that the trial court did not provide Browne with
sufficient warnings of the dangers of self-representation.

However, our inquiry does not end with the trial court's warnings and we must
look to the record to determine whether Browne had sufficient background to
understand the dangers of representing himself at trial. See Watts v. State, 347 S.C.
399, 402, 556 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2001) (noting that appellate courts, in finding that
the trial court failed to adequately address the disadvantages of self-representation,
"look to the record to determine whether [the defendant] had sufficient background
[to understand the disadvantages of self-representation] or was apprised of his rights
by some other source" (quoting Prince, 301 S.C. at 424, 392 S.E.2d at 463)).

Factors [] courts have considered in determining if an
accused had sufficient background to understand the
disadvantages of self-representation include: (1) the
accused's age, educational background, and physical and
mental health; (2) whether the accused was previously
involved in criminal trials; (3) whether he knew of the
nature of the charge and of the possible penalties; (4)
whether he was represented by counsel before trial or
whether an attorney indicated to him the difficulty of
self-representation in his particular case; (5) whether he
was attempting to delay or manipulate the proceedings; (6)
whether the court appointed stand-by counsel; (7) whether
the accused knew he would be required to comply with the
rules of procedure at trial; (8) whether he knew of legal
challenges he could raise in defense to the charges against
him; (9) whether the exchange between the accused and
the court consisted merely of pro forma answers to pro
forma questions; and (10) whether the accused's waiver
resulted from either coercion or mistreatment.

State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 43, 419 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding, after
a review of the ten factors, that a defendant representing himself during a trial for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct had sufficient background to understand the
disadvantages of self-representation).

As to the first factor, at the time of trial, Browne was fifty years old, had
completed high school, earned several automotive repair certifications for multiple
automotive brands, and worked for a friend selling automotive tools. There is no
evidence that Browne was either physically or mentally impaired.

As to the second factor, in his twenties, Browne received a fine for larceny
and convictions for forgery and grand theft in California; there is no evidence in the
record indicating whether those convictions were the result of guilty pleas or whether
Browne was represented by counsel.

As to the third factor, the trial court informed Browne of the range of penalties
for a murder conviction and the conviction's ineligibility for parole. Though there
was no discussion on the range of penalties for a grand larceny conviction, the State
informed the court at the hearing that Browne was charged with grand larceny.
Further, Browne does not contend that he did not understand the nature of his
charges. See id. at 44, 419 S.E.2d at 814 (noting that the prosecutor and pre-trial
hearing judge informed the defendant of his charge and that the defendant did not
contend that he did not understand the nature of his charge).

As to the fourth factor, Browne was previously represented by O'Neal,
followed by Hensley. Although there is no indication that either attorney advised
Browne of the difficulties of self-representation, the record shows that Browne
appreciated the difficulty of the case. At the hearing, Browne testified that he had
prepared motions for Hensley to file with the court and wanted to relieve her after
receiving purported statements from Hensley that "she works for the State, not for
[Browne]" and "[would] represent the [c]ourt and its best interest, not [Browne]."
His testimony demonstrates that he wanted to contribute to handling his case and
believed, at the time of requesting relief, that he could do better representing his
interests than his attorney would. See id. (noting that the defendant "appreciated the
difficulty of his particular case" and that the defendant's testimony demonstrated his
belief "he could do a better job of preparing his defense than [a] public defender
could").

As to the fifth factor, there is no indication Browne, when seeking to represent
himself, was attempting to delay or otherwise manipulate his criminal proceedings.

As to the sixth factor, the trial court appointed Hensley as stand-by counsel at
trial; at the hearing, the trial court informed Browne that Hensley, as stand-by
counsel, could answer any procedural questions Browne had throughout the trial.
Hensley remained stand-by counsel throughout the trial.

As to the seventh factor, the record indicates that Browne knew prior to trial
that he would have to comply with procedural rules. During the hearing, Browne
testified that he was reading the rules of evidence and criminal procedure through
the South Carolina Judicial Branch's website. Importantly, the trial judge, asking
about Browne's understanding of the rules of evidence, described the rules of
evidence as rules "that govern how a trial operates and . . . [that Browne would] have
to utilize [] in order to operate in a courtroom . . . ." See id. at 45, 419 S.E.2d at 814
(noting that a defendant "knew he would have to comply with procedural rules"
because he was "put [] on notice that he would have to follow the court's rules and
that he would be at a disadvantage for not knowing the rules").
As to the eighth factor, Browne stated he was not informed of the potential
defenses to the charges against him, but Hensley told the trial court that she discussed
defenses with Browne.

As to the ninth factor, the trial judge and Browne's exchange consisted of the
trial judge, among other things, (1) asking about Browne's age, education,
employment, and prior criminal history; (2) inquiring into Browne's understanding
of some of his constitutional rights, jury trials, rules of evidence, and range of
penalty; and (3) expressing concerns about Browne representing himself at trial.

As to the tenth factor, there is no indication Browne was declining assistance
of counsel as a result of either coercion or mistreatment.

The record demonstrates that Browne had sufficient background to understand
the risks of self-representation when he decided to represent himself at trial. See
Hines, 443 S.C. at 42, 902 S.E.2d at 382 (noting that, even if a trial judge did not
sufficiently convey the dangers of self-representation to a defendant, appellate courts
"may consider the whole picture before [them]" to determine if the defendant
"understood the nuances of having legal representation"); Wroten, 301 S.C. at 294,
391 S.E.2d at 576 ("If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent
himself was made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the
requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied."). Therefore, we hold the trial
court did not err by granting relief of counsel and allowing Browne to proceed to
trial pro se.

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.