Richard Young v. John W. Beasley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Richard Young and Jason Greene, Respondents,

v.

John W. Beasley a/k/a John W. Beasley, Sr. and Lillian
Beasley in their individual capacities and as Trustees or
as successors in trust under the Beasley Living Trust
dated August 14, 2018 and any amendments thereto, Bob
Hollow Investments, LLC, Anna Pruitt, Seaside
Plantation Property Owners Association, Inc., South
Carolina Department of Revenue, and the United States
of America by and through its agency the Internal
Revenue Service, Defendants,

Of whom John W. Beasley a/k/a John W. Beasley, Sr.
and Lillian Beasley in their individual capacities and as
Trustees or as successors in trust under the Beasley
Living Trust dated August 14, 2018 and any amendments
thereto are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001739

Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-201
Heard March 12, 2026 – Filed May 6, 2026

REVERSED
Cheryl D. Shoun and Rhett Douglas Ricard, both of
Maynard Nexsen, PC, of Charleston; and Victoria
Watson Kurtz and John Clifford Johnston, both of Mt.
Pleasant, all for Appellants.

Joey Randell Floyd, of Bruner Powell Wall & Mullins,
LLC, of Columbia; and Lindsey Marie Behnke and Ian
Douglas McVey, both of Turner Padget Graham &
Laney, PA, of Columbia, all for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: On appeal, John Beasley, Sr. and Lillian Beasley (collectively,
Appellants) argue the Master improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Richard Young and Jason Greene (collectively, Respondents) because they were
released from all of the debt owed. We agree.

Between late September and early October 2017, John Beasley, Jr. borrowed a
total of $640,000 from Respondents (the Loan) to fund Beasley Construction
Company, LLC (Beasley Construction); Beasley, Jr. promised to repay the Loan
by late October. However, he was unable to do so.1 In November 2017, Beasley,
Jr., Beasley Construction, and Appellants (collectively, Debtors) entered into the
First Settlement Agreement with Respondents and agreed to become "co-Debtors"
for the "settlement sum" of $647,500—$7,500 of which was to reimburse
Respondents for expenses paid to prepare the settlement documents. The First
Settlement Agreement required Debtors to execute a Confession of Judgment
which would not be recorded unless the Debtors were unable to repay the
settlement sum by November 21, 2018. The Confession of Judgment stated
Debtors were indebted in the amount of $647,500 plus any accruing interest and
fees.

Debtors simultaneously executed a promissory note (the Note). The Note stated
that failure to pay the settlement sum by the maturity date would result in default.
To secure the Note, Debtors executed "mortgages . . . in favor of [Respondents] on

1
Beasley, Jr. ultimately pled guilty to wire fraud. He was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $1,334,400. The restitution is payable to ten people,
two of whom are Respondents.
the [] real property owned by one or more of the Debtors" (the Mortgage),2
including the Appellants' home (the Subject Property). At the time the Mortgage
was recorded, it was junior to a mortgage in favor of First Citizens Bank & Trust
Company (First Citizens).
Debtors were unable to repay the settlement sum by the maturity date, and on May
30, 2019, Respondents filed the Confession of Judgment in Charleston County,
where the Subject Property is located. In September 2019, First Citizens filed an
action seeking to foreclose its mortgage on the Subject Property. Ultimately,
Appellants reached an agreement with First Citizens and avoided foreclosure on
the Subject Property. First Citizens filed a Satisfaction of Money Judgment on
April 20, 2022.
On November 30, 2020, while the foreclosure action was pending, Respondents
and Appellants signed the Second Settlement Agreement, whereby Appellants
agreed to pay Respondents $50,000. The recitals section of the Second Settlement
Agreement includes identical language from the First Settlement Agreement
acknowledging Appellants agreed to pledge "certain collateral" to secure
repayment of the Loan. Another paragraph of the recitals section explains that
Respondents filed the Confession of Judgment on May 30, 2019 and refers to it as
the "Judgment," which is referenced throughout the Second Settlement Agreement.
One clause states that Respondents "fully release and forego all legal, equitable,
and statutory remedies and processes available to them so long as" Appellants paid
the $50,000 required of them.

Paragraph 2 of the Second Settlement Agreement states, "The releases hereunder
shall not release any other judgment debtor, the principal balance of the judgment
shall be reduced by the [s]ettlement [s]um hereof, and the [Confession of]
Judgment shall remain in full force and effect as to any non-released debtor."
Paragraph 4 provides, in part:

It is understood and agreed that this Settlement and
Release represents the compromise by [Respondents] and
[Appellants] to resolve a variety of doubtful and disputed
claims and counterclaims, and that the amounts paid and
received hereunder are made solely for the purpose of
ending their disagreements and to buy, sell, and exchange
their individual and respective peace of mind and to

2
The Mortgage is only in the name of Beasley, Sr. and Lillian.
avoid the significant costs of protracted litigation.

Paragraph 5 states, in part, "This Settlement and Release constitutes the entire
agreement and understanding between [Respondents] and [Appellants], and it
supersedes all prior understandings or agreements, written or oral, on the subjects
contained herein, and the terms of this Settlement and Release are contractual and
not mere recitals." However, Paragraph 16 states, "Except for the release of
[Appellants] herein, this Settlement and Release shall not alter or amend the [First
Settlement Agreement] nor the [Confession of] Judgment, which shall remain in
full force and effect of record."

In December 2020, Appellants paid $50,000 to Respondents, and on March 17,
2021, Respondents filed the Release. The Release refers to Appellants as the
"Released Defendants" and explains that in consideration of the payment of
$50,000 "towards the reduction of the previously entered judgment," a "certain
parcel of real property owned by the Released Defendants is hereby released from
the lien of said judgment." The property description includes the Subject Property
and one other property not listed in the First Settlement Agreement. The Release
also states Appellants were "personally released from judgment in this matter" and
"the judgment entered in the above-referenced matter is hereby partially satisfied."
Finally, it states that "[n]othing in th[e] document shall affect or limit the rights of
[Respondents] in their collective or individual pursuit of collecting the remaining
balance of said judgment from any other property, real or personal, presently
owned or acquired hereafter from the Remaining Defendants [(Beasley, Jr. and
Beasley Construction)]."

Respondents filed a summons and complaint, seeking to foreclose on the
Mortgage. Respondents ultimately moved for summary judgment, and the Master
held a hearing on the motion (the Hearing). Appellants subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment. The Master then issued an order granting
Respondents' motion for summary judgment. Appellants filed a Rule 59(e),
SCRCP motion. The Master denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment as
well as their motion to reconsider. Thereafter, the Master entered an order and
judgment of foreclosure and sale of the Subject Property. This appeal followed.

We hold the Master erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents.
See Woodson v. DLI Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 528, 753 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2014)
("In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our appellate court applies the same
standard as the [Master] under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); Buonaiuto v. Town of Hilton
Head Island, 440 S.C. 144, 150, 889 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2023) ("A [Master]
may properly grant a motion for summary judgment when 'the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting Rule
56(c), SCRCP)); HK New Plan Exch. Prop. Owner I, LLC v. Coker, 375 S.C. 18,
23, 649 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding when "a motion for summary
judgment presents a question as to the construction of a written contract, if the
language employed by the agreement is plain and unambiguous, the question is one
of law"); S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. M & T Enters. of Mt. Pleasant, LLC, 379 S.C.
645, 654, 667 S.E.2d 7, 12 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Questions of law may be decided
with no particular deference to the [Master].").

We find, based on the language of the Second Settlement Agreement and the
Release, the clear intention of the parties was to release Appellants from all
indebtedness. Barnacle Broad., Inc. v. Baker Broad., Inc., 343 S.C. 140, 146-47,
538 S.E.2d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In determining the intention of the parties, a
court first looks to the language of the contract . . . ."); Abel v. S.C. Dep't of Health
& Envtl. Control, 419 S.C. 434, 441, 798 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ct. App. 2017) ("The
parties' intention must be gathered from the contents of the entire agreement and
not from any particular clause thereof." (quoting Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v.
Outparcel Assocs., LLC, 374 S.C. 483, 498, 649 S.E.2d 494, 502 (Ct. App. 2007));
Laser Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park Assocs., 382 S.C. 326, 334, 676
S.E.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When the language of a contract is clear and
unambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent is a question of law for the
court.").

Although we acknowledge Respondents' argument that the documents only release
Appellants from the Confession of Judgment, meaning they are still obligated by
the Note and Mortgage, we find the documents here clearly evince an intent to
fully release Appellants from all debt owed to Respondents through all remedies.
Paragraph 5 states, in part, "This Settlement and Release constitutes the entire
agreement and understanding between [Respondents] and [Appellants], and it
supersedes all prior understandings or agreements, written or oral, on the subjects
contained herein[.]" Further, the Second Settlement Agreement precludes any
claims or remedies that Respondents could bring against Appellants. Paragraph 9
states, in part, that "no claim or demand whatsoever should survive the making of
[the Second Settlement Agreement] and Release under any circumstances." It also
states, "Creditors fully release and forego all legal, equitable, and statutory
remedies and processes available to them." The Release states, "John Beasley, Sr.
and Lillian Beasley, the Released Defendants, are hereby personally released from
judgment in this matter." We agree with Respondents' argument that they can
pursue multiple remedies as long as there is only one satisfaction. However, we
find that Respondents chose to forego all remedies against Appellants in exchange
for the $50,000 payment, thus precluding Respondents from seeking any further
repayment from Appellants.

We find the parties' intent was to fully release Appellants, but allow Respondents
to recoup the remaining balance from the remaining debtors. The Release provides
that "[n]othing in th[e] document shall affect or limit the rights of [Respondents] in
their collective or individual pursuit of collecting the remaining balance of said
judgment from any other property, real or personal, presently owned or acquired
hereafter from the Remaining Defendants [(Beasley, Jr. and Beasley
Construction)]." Additionally, Paragraph 2 of the Second Settlement Agreement
states, "The releases hereunder shall not release any other judgment debtor, the
principal balance of the judgment shall be reduced by the [s]ettlement [s]um
hereof, and the [Confession of] Judgment shall remain in full force and effect as to
any non-released debtor." Paragraph 16 states, "Except for the release of
[Appellants] herein, this Settlement and Release shall not alter or amend the [First
Settlement Agreement] nor the [Confession of] Judgment, which shall remain in
full force and effect of record."3

We hold the Second Settlement Agreement and the Release released Appellants
from any debt that they owed to Respondents, with no release of the "Remaining
Defendants." See Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 171, 568 S.E.2d
361, 363 (2002) ("Basic contract law provides that when a contract is clear and
unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract's force and effect.").
Accordingly, we find the Master erred by granting Respondents' motion for
summary judgment and by denying Appellants' motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, we reverse as to all orders, including the Judgment of Foreclosure and
Sale.

REVERSED.4

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

3
We note the First Settlement Agreement required Appellants to execute the
Confession of Judgment, the Note, and the Mortgage.
4
Our holding on this issue is dispositive of the remaining issue on appeal. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (explaining an appellate court need not address remaining issues
when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).