State v. Jakavis Green

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jakavis Green, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000846

Appeal From Beaufort County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-384
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed November 26, 2025
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled February 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Gary Howard Johnson, II, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie
Stone, III, of Bluffton, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jakavis Green appeals his convictions for habitual traffic
offender and driving under suspension (third offense) along with his concurrent
sentences of four years' and ninety days' imprisonment, respectively. On appeal,
Green argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because
section 56-5-2120(b) of the South Carolina Code (2018) is unconstitutionally
vague, and as a result, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the
traffic stop. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

We hold the trial court did not err by denying Green's motion to suppress because
the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop based on his good-faith
understanding of the statute and the record contains no evidence of police
misconduct that would warrant exclusion. See State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625,
633-34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) (explaining appellate courts "review the trial
court's factual findings for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal
conclusion—in this case whether reasonable suspicion exists—is a question of law
subject to de novo review"); State v. Butler, 353 S.C. 383, 389, 577 S.E.2d 498,
501 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants
constitutes a seizure and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures."); State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 108, 747
S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013) (stating violation of a motor vehicle code "provides an
officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop"); Heien v. North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) ("[R]easonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken
understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition."); Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 246 (2011) ("[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
misconduct by law enforcement."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19
(1984) (stating the exclusionary rule should not be applied "to deter objectively
reasonable law enforcement activity"); State v. German, 439 S.C. 449, 474, 887
S.E.2d 912, 925 (2023) ("Where there is no misconduct and no deterrent purpose
to be served, suppression of the evidence is an unduly harsh sanction." (quoting
State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 653, 763 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2014))). 1

1
This court need not address the constitutionality of section 56-5-2120(b) because
our determinations that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and
that the record contains no evidence of misconduct to warrant exclusion are
dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598,
613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (recognizing an appellate court need not reach the
remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive); In re the
Care & Treatment of McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 92, 551 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2001)
AFFIRMED.2

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

(recognizing the supreme court's "firm policy to decline to rule on constitutional
issues unless such a ruling is required").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.