Ex Parte: SCDMH (Jevon K. Carter)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ex Parte: South Carolina Department of Mental Health,
Appellant.

In re:

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jevon Kenneth Carter, Respondent/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001766

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-022
Heard November 12, 2025 – Filed January 28, 2026

AFFIRMED

R. Alexander Pate, II and Logan Y. Royals, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

D. Josev Brewer, of Greenville, for
Respondent/Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, and
Solicitor W. Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, all for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jevon Carter (Carter) was found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI) for the July 4, 2020, murder of his 93-year-old great aunt.
He was committed to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health
(DMH) following a bench trial and transferred to DMH's physical custody on
August 16, 2022. DMH has twice recommended his discharge from inpatient
treatment: first at a hearing on December 8, 2022, and again during a hearing
on August 30, 2023. At both hearings, DMH's expert witnesses testified
Carter had insight and capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to
his treatment and was not likely to cause serious harm to himself or others if
he was released. On both occasions, the circuit court denied DMH's request
to discharge him to his home. Both DMH and Carter appeal the most recent
order and argue he should be discharged from inpatient treatment. We
affirm.

FACTS
Carter was nineteen years old and had no criminal record when his mental
health issues manifested. He was first admitted for inpatient psychiatric
treatment on July 2, 2020. The same day, Carter demanded to leave, jumped
over the nurse's station, barricaded the door to his room, and tried to break
out the window.
On July 4, 2020, Carter successfully eloped from inpatient treatment by
walking out of an open door to the patio area of the hospital and scaling the
surrounding fence. The same night, Carter broke into the home of his elderly
great aunt and fatally stabbed her in the neck with a knife from her own
kitchen. Carter fled the scene without being detected, but reappeared the
following day at the emergency room. He was returned to inpatient treatment
where he again attempted to elope by trying to break out his bedroom
window. On July 8, 2020, Carter successfully eloped from inpatient
treatment a second time by forcing open a glass door. Law enforcement
located him at his father's house and transported him to the ER, where he was
recommitted for inpatient treatment. His treating physicians ordered
treatment staff to observe Carter one-on-one due to his high risk of elopement
and his "poor insight and poor compliance with medications." Nurses noted
during this time that Carter was regurgitating his prescribed psychiatric
medications.
Carter stabilized enough to be discharged on July 22, 2020, with a diagnosis
of bipolar disorder "with mood congruent psychotic features." Five days
later, police brought Carter to the ER with an altered mental status after he
was pulled over for driving erratically and found in possession of cannabis.
Carter was admitted to the hospital and discharged on July 29, 2020.
Carter was arrested for the murder of his great aunt on August 28, 2020, after
police matched his palm print to a broken window and found his DNA at her
home. Carter was subsequently indicted for murder, first-degree burglary,
and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He
remained in the Greenville County Detention Center (GCDC) until he was
found NGRI at his bench trial on June 8, 2022.1 In his final six months at
GCDC, jail records indicate he refused his medications on fifty separate
occasions.
The DMH review board met on November 4, 2022, and subsequently
recommended that Carter be discharged from inpatient services and returned
home to live with his mother. On December 8, 2022, a discharge hearing was
held in front of Circuit Court Judge Perry Gravely. Dr. Jennifer Alleyne
testified as Carter's treating psychiatrist. She testified Carter had "very good
insight" into his mental illness, and demonstrated an understanding of his
symptoms, his medications, and their potential side effects. Dr. Alleyne
described Carter as kind, caring, and polite. She testified he had been
compliant with taking his medications since his admission and had not had
any incidents of aggression or behavioral disturbances either at the jail or
during his hospitalization. She further testified to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty she did not think Carter presented a danger to himself or to
others. Dr. Alleyne recommended that he be discharged to live with his
mother and receive outpatient therapy. She testified he would need a

1
On August 16, 2022, bed space became available, and Carter was transferred to
DMH custody.
structured and supervised living environment, meaning a "stable home with
people to support him and assist him in getting to his appointments and
making sure he is participating in treatment properly." The proposed
discharge order required Carter to remain compliant with taking his
medications, to abstain from the use of alcohol or illegal drugs, and to be
subject to random drug screens. Dr. Alleyne did not believe Carter would
benefit from remaining in inpatient treatment and she did not recommend
placing Carter in a supervised community residential care facility (CRCF)
because she felt he was higher functioning than most of the other residents.
Judge Gravely denied DMH's request to discharge, citing Carter's prior
noncompliance with prescribed medications, his history of elopements from
custody, and his commission of a violent offense during one such elopement.
Judge Gravely further noted that Carter had been housed at DMH for only
eighty days before the review board recommended his discharge, that his
mother had previously failed to supervise him, and that she had significant
mental health, substance abuse, and legal issues of her own. The order stated,
"If []DMH determines [Carter] should be released at some point in the future,
then a more appropriate treatment plan regarding supervision of [Carter] will
need to be provided, including the consideration of transitional housing and a
more stable environment with appropriate monitoring and supervision."
Following a subsequent review board meeting on June 23, 2023, DMH again
petitioned the court requesting Carter's discharge. A hearing took place on
August 30, 2023, before Circuit Court Judge Alex Kinlaw. At the second
discharge hearing, Dr. Alleyne testified substantially the same as in the first
hearing. She told the court that Carter continued to be a model patient and
remained compliant with his medications. She testified to Carter's good
insight into his mental health condition and that he would be able to treat his
mental health condition on an outpatient basis. She also testified he was not
likely to cause serious harm to himself or others if discharged.
In response to the circuit court's prior refusal to discharge Carter to his
mother, DMH recommended in the second proposed order that he be
discharged to live with his maternal grandmother, Cynthia Chapman.
Chapman lives directly next door to Carter's mother. Dr. Alleyne performed
a virtual tour of Chapman's residence and found it a fit residence for Carter.
DMH provided the court with no further information about Chapman.
Dr. Richard Frierson also testified on behalf of DMH. Dr. Frierson, a
professor of psychiatry at the University of South Carolina School of
Medicine, performed a forensic violence risk assessment on Carter. He
testified that out of any of his patients he assessed for DMH, Carter was the
least prone to violence. Dr. Frierson agreed that Carter's discharge to his
grandmother's house, rather than a CRCF, was appropriate because Carter
was very high functioning: he had social skills, could make conversation, and
could maintain his own hygiene and grooming. Dr. Frierson opined that
Carter would function better in an environment that offered him opportunities
to socialize with others who had similar social skills and allowed him to
continue his education.
Judge Kinlaw denied DMH's request for discharge and ordered Carter's
continued inpatient treatment, finding by clear and convincing evidence that
he was still in need of inpatient treatment because he was "mentally ill, needs
involuntary treatment; and because of his condition lacks insight or capacity
to make responsible decisions regarding treatment; and there is a likelihood
of serious harm to himself or others." Neither Carter nor DMH filed a
motion to alter or amend the judgment. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury, this
court will not disturb the judge's findings of fact "unless found to be without
evidence which reasonably supports the judge's findings." In re Treatment &
Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 131, 568 S.E.2d 338, 342 (2002) (quoting
Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d
773, 775 (1976)). "However, an appellate court may make its own
determination on questions of law and need not defer to the trial court's
rulings in this regard." Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 433 S.C. 206,
212, 858 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2021) (quoting South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 398 S.C. 604, 610, 730 S.E.2d 862, 864 (2012)).
LAW/ANALYSIS
"Defendants adjudicated NGRI . . . are not considered 'prisoners' as they have
not been found guilty of a crime." Interagency Protocol for Defendants
Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Admin. Order No. 2014-04-24-01
(S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated April 24, 2014). Continued hospitalization of an
individual who has been committed pursuant to a finding of NGRI is
governed by section 17-24-40 of the South Carolina Code (2014). Once a
verdict of NGRI is returned, "the trial judge must order the person . . .
committed to the South Carolina State Hospital for a period not to exceed one
hundred twenty days. During that time an examination must be made to
determine the need for hospitalization . . . ." § 17-24-40(A). "A report of the
findings must be made to the chief administrative judge of the circuit in
which the trial was held, the solicitor, the [defendant], and the [defendant's]
attorney." § 17-24-40(B). Within fifteen days of receiving the report, the
court "must hold a hearing to decide whether the person should [remain]
hospitalized . . . ." § 17-24-40(C)(1). If the judge "finds the person to be in
need of hospitalization, the judge must order the person committed to the
South Carolina State Hospital." § 17-24-40(C)(2)(b).
If his treating doctors later determine "the person is no longer in need of
hospitalization, [they] must notify the chief administrative judge, solicitor,
[defendant], and [defendant's] attorney." § 17-24-40(C)(2)(c). Within
twenty-one days of receiving the notice, the judge "must hold a hearing to
determine whether the person is in need of continued hospitalization pursuant
to the standard[s] of Section 44-17-580." Id.
If the finding of the court is that the person is in need
of continued hospitalization, the court must order his
continued confinement. If the court's finding is that
the person is not in need of continued hospitalization,
it may order the person released upon such terms or
conditions, if any, as the chief administrative judge
considers appropriate for the safety of the community
and the well-being of the person.
Id. (emphases added).
The court must order the person's continued hospitalization if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill, needs involuntary
treatment and because of his condition: "lacks sufficient insight or capacity to
make responsible decisions with respect to his treatment; or [] there is a
likelihood of serious harm to himself or others." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-17-
580(A) (2018).
Any terms or conditions of discharge from the hospital must be therapeutic
rather than punitive and must include that the person: "(1) continue taking
medication for an indefinite time and verify in writing the use of medication;
(2) receive periodic examinations and reviews by psychiatric personnel; and
(3) report periodically to the probation office for an evaluation of his reaction
to his environment and his general welfare." § 17-24-40(D). The court may
also include "provisions for the safety of the community in general and the
victim in particular, including 'no contact' strictures, specific housing
requirements, and curfew restrictions." Interagency Protocol for Defendants
Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Admin. Order No. 2014-04-24-01
(S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated April 24, 2014).
Both Carter and DMH appeal Judge Kinlaw's order denying Carter's
discharge. They argue there was clear and convincing evidence that his
hospitalization was no longer required since the only expert testimony
presented at the hearing supported his discharge. They also argue Judge
Kinlaw's order is not supported by findings of fact.
The State argues that it was not required to present expert testimony where it
vigorously cross-examined DMH's experts and pointed out Carter's previous
history of noncompliance and elopement. The State also points out the
statute contains mandatory language where the court finds the defendant in
need of continued hospitalization but contains only discretionary language
where the court finds the defendant is no longer in need of hospitalization.
Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-40(b) ("[T]he judge must order the person
committed" to the hospital) with § 17-24-40(c) (The court "may order" the
person released.). The State also argues Judge Kinlaw's order is supported by
the record and that neither Carter nor DMH filed a motion to alter or amend
the judgment requesting that he make findings of fact. See USAA Property
and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 652, 661 S.E.2d 791, 795 (2008)
(finding where trial judge's ruling was silent regarding the basis for its
decision, it was incumbent upon the aggrieved party to file a Rule 59(e)
motion requesting the court provide specific factual findings for its decision).
We find there is sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's decision.
Considering all the evidence in the record, the court's hesitation to release
Carter to his grandmother's care after only a short period of compliance is
understandable: he has a history of elopements from custody, a history of
refusing his medications, and he committed an extremely violent offense
during a previous elopement. In addition, DMH provided the court with very
little information about his grandmother. Dr. Alleyne performed only a
"virtual tour" of her residence and gave no information to the court about
how she might be equipped to provide the "stable environment" Carter
requires. The record contains no information about her age or health
condition, whether she works or is retired, or whether she has a positive
relationship with Carter. These are facts which would seem of obvious
importance to the court for both her safety and Carter's. While the State did
not present its own expert witness, the statutory scheme does not require the
State to do so. Rather, the statute contemplates that the hearing judge will
consider the expert testimony and then exercise independent discretion.
Otherwise, there would be no need for a judicial hearing and DMH would be
free to make decisions regarding treatment and release without court
approval.
CONCLUSION
Carter has clearly done well during the relatively brief period he has been
hospitalized, and he has without a doubt made a positive impression upon
hospital staff. While he is medicated, he appears to be a model patient.
However, given his history of elopements and medication noncompliance, we
find no error in the circuit court's decision to require Carter to have a longer
period of psychiatric stabilization before he is released. Given the high stakes
for both Carter and his family, we believe the court's caution was justified.
For these reasons, the order of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.