Lisa Cruz v. Heyward Bouknight

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lisa Cruz, Respondent,

v.

Heyward Bouknight and Kathy Bouknight, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000947

Appeal From Lexington County
Brian L. Boger, Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-024
Submitted September 23, 2025 – Filed January 28, 2026

AFFIRMED

Andrew S. Radeker and Sarah Megan Larabee, of
Harrison, Radeker & Smith, P.A., of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Elizabeth Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth Frankin-Best, P.C.,
of Columbia, Susan Ranee Saunders, of Motley Rice,
LLC, of Mount Pleasant, and James Ross Snell, Jr., of
Law Offices of James R. Snell, Jr., LLC, of Lexington,
for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Lisa Cruz, a residential landowner in Brookgreen Terrace
subdivision (the Subdivision), filed an action against Heyward and Kathy
Bouknight (Appellants) seeking to enforce the Subdivision's restrictive covenants
(the Covenants) and enjoin Appellants from keeping a manufactured home on their
property. Both parties moved for summary judgment, with the central issue being
whether a manufactured home is a trailer under the Covenants. Following a
hearing, the special referee granted summary judgment in favor of Cruz. On
appeal, Appellants argue the special referee erred by (1) finding their manufactured
home fell under the Covenants' prohibition of trailers and (2) requiring Appellants
remove the home from their lot. We affirm.

1. Appellants argue the special referee erred in finding their manufactured home
was prohibited by the Covenants. We disagree and find the term "trailer" as used
in the Covenants recorded in 1954 included mobile homes, which are more
modernly called manufactured homes. Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4, 498
S.E.2d 862, 863–64 (1998) (quoting Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1,
6, 336 S.E.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1985)) ("'Restrictive covenants are contractual in
nature,' so that the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the parties as determined from the whole document."); Buffington v.
T.O.E. Enters., 383 S.C. 388, 392, 680 S.E.2d 289, 291 (2009) ("A restriction on
the use of the property must be created in express terms or by plain and
unmistakable implication, and all such restrictions are to be strictly construed, with
all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of property."); Shipyard Prop. Owners'
Ass'n v. Mangiaracina, 307 S.C. 299, 308, 414 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding when "the language imposing restrictions upon the use of property is
unambiguous, the restrictions will be enforced according to their obvious
meaning"); Taylor, 332 S.C. at 4, 498 S.E.2d at 863 ("Words of a restrictive
covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the
time of their execution."). We find the term "trailer" is unambiguous and included
the term mobile home within its meaning at the time the Covenants were recorded
in 1954. See "trailer," Thorndike-Barnhart Dictionary (1954) (defining trailer as "a
vehicle, often large, designed to be pulled along the highway by an automobile,
truck"); "house trailer," Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford UP,
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5032018329 (defining house trailer as "a caravan or .
. . mobile home"); "mobile home," Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford UP,
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5739007532 (defining a mobile home as "a large
caravan or prefabricated transportable structure that is parked in a particular place
and used as permanent living accommodation"); see also "mobile home," Oxford
English Dictionary, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5739007532 (citing that, in 1954,
the New York Herald Tribune Book Review mentioned "[b]ooks pertaining to
trailer houses – or mobile homes – published within the last five years" and in
1940, H.G. Wells' book New World Order stated, "[i]n such large open countries as
the United States there has been a considerable development of the mobile home in
recent years. People haul a trailer-home behind their cars and become seasonal
nomads"). In Heape v. Broxton, this court found that a subdivision's 1980s
covenants prohibiting "trailers" prevented a double-wide manufactured or mobile
home from being built on the lots. 293 S.C. 343, 347, 360 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ct.
App. 1987). The court found that "[c]alling a trailer a 'mobile home' does not make
it any less a 'trailer[,]'" and that the term mobile home was "simply an advertising
euphemism for the term 'house trailer.'" Id. at 346, 360 S.E.2d at 159.

We similarly find that a manufactured home is the modern version of what was
formerly known as a house trailer. See Housing and Development Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-399, 94 Stat 1614 (replacing the term "mobile homes" with
"manufactured home" in the act but not changing the definition). In addition, the
South Carolina Code frequently uses the terms mobile homes and manufactured
homes interchangeably. See generally S.C. Code Ann. § 23-43-20(5) (2025)
("'Mobile home' or 'manufactured home' means any residential dwelling unit
constructed to standards and codes as promulgated by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development."); S.C. Code Ann. § 31-17-310
(2007) (defining "mobile home" by now-repealed section 31-17-20 with an Editor's
Note directing the reader to the definition of "manufactured home" in section 40-
29-20); compare S.C. Code Ann. § 56-19-210 (requiring a certificate of title for
sale or mortgage of a "mobile home"), with S.C. Code Ann. § 56-19-500 (2018)
(describing the retirement of a title certificate of a "manufactured home").

Appellants further argue the court's ruling in Henry v. Chambron, 304 S.C. 351,
404 S.E.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1991), supports their argument that a manufactured home
is fundamentally different from a trailer. In Henry, this court found the defendant
could build a modular home in a subdivision that prohibited mobile homes and
trailers. Id. at 355, 404 S.E.2d at 520. The court found that modular homes and
mobile homes shared distinct differences:

A modular home is built off site and is transported to its
intended location in as many as twenty sections. The
South Carolina Building Code Council must certify it as a
modular home. As a prerequisite to certification it must
be inspected and found in compliance with the standard
building code applicable to homes built on site. Once the
sections are erected at the site, the modular home must be
affixed permanently to the property. A mobile home, on
the other hand, does not undergo the same certification
process as a modular home and it need not comply with
the standard building code applicable to site built homes.
Furthermore, there is no requirement that a mobile home
be permanently affixed to the property.

Id. at 352–53, 404 S.E.2d at 519.

The court rejected the subdivision's argument that "modular homes are excluded
under the restriction, but were not specifically named because modular homes were
not contemplated when the covenants were filed" and found that the property
owners "could have prohibited modular homes by a simple expression of the intent
to do so." Id. at 354, 404 S.E.2d at 520. Because "there [was] no evidence in the
record that the property owners were prevented from amending the restriction to
include modular homes at a later date[,]" the court found the defendant was not
restricted from building a modular home in the subdivision. Id.at 354–55, 404
S.E.2d at 520.

We find Henry fails to support Appellants' argument as the case shows that the
difference between a modular home and mobile home (or manufactured home or
trailer) is significant. In this case, however, trailers and manufactured homes share
similar, if not identical, characteristics.

Appellants argue their home is not a mobile home or a trailer because
manufactured homes are not intended to be transported along the roads. We
disagree. See S.C. Code § 40-29-20(9) (2011) ("'Manufactured home' means a
structure, transportable in one or more sections which . . . is built on a permanent
chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent
foundation when connected to the required utilities and includes the plumbing,
heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained in it." (emphasis
added)).

We find the special referee was correct in finding that a manufactured home is a
"trailer" and vice-versa, for various purposes, including the ban on trailers in the
Subdivision.

2. Appellants argue the special referee erred in ordering them to remove their
manufactured home from the property because the Covenants only prohibit the
home from being used as a residence, not from being on the property at all. We
find Appellants failed to preserve this issue as it was not ruled upon by the special
referee. See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642
(2011) ("At a minimum, issue preservation requires that an issue be raised to and
ruled upon by the trial judge."). Based on the foregoing, the order of the special
referee is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.