Oshaun J. Robinson v. State

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Oshaun J. Robinson, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001361

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From Greenville County
J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6130
Heard February 11, 2025 – Filed January 14, 2026

REVERSED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Tricia A. Blanchette, of Law Office of Tricia A.
Blanchette, LLC, of Leesville, for Respondent.

VINSON, J.: We issued a writ of certiorari to review the circuit court's grant of
post-conviction relief (PCR) to Oshaun J. Robinson. The State argues the PCR
court erred by finding plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Robinson
that a concurrent sentence for the offenses to which he was pleading guilty did not
mean these offenses "merged" with Robinson's separate, prior trial convictions and
that if these trial convictions were later reversed, such reversal would not affect his
guilty plea convictions. We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2007, Robinson was charged with a total of thirty-one offenses for
incidents that occurred over the course of several non-consecutive days in
November and December 2007. The warrants alleged the offenses arose from
incidents that occurred on November 21, December 2, 6, 8, 10, and 14. In August
2008, a Greenville County Grand Jury indicted Robinson for armed robbery,
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN),1 possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and conspiracy based on the
December 10, 2007 incident. The same grand jury indicted Robinson for armed
robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK), conspiracy, and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime based on the
December 14, 2007 incident.

In January 2009,2 Robinson and his codefendant, Kenneth Workman, proceeded to
a jury trial on the charges arising from the December 10 incident, and the jury
found them guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Robinson to
twenty-five years' imprisonment, consisting of twenty-five years for armed
robbery, five years for conspiracy, five years for the weapon charge, and thirty
days for assault and battery, to run concurrently. Robinson appealed.

In March 2009, while his appeal of the trial convictions was pending, Robinson
pled guilty, as indicted, to the charges arising from the December 14, 2007
incident. The plea court sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment,
consisting of twenty-five years for armed robbery, twenty years for ABWIK, five
years for conspiracy, and five years for the possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime, to run concurrently.

1
Prior to trial, the State reduced the ABHAN charge to the lesser-included offense
of assault and battery.
2
Robinson and Workman were initially tried before a jury on December 1-2, 2008.
However, the trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a unanimous
verdict.
In January 2012, this court affirmed Robinson's trial convictions. See State v.
Robinson, 2012-UP-042 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 25, 2012). Robinson then filed a
PCR action challenging his trial convictions, which the PCR court denied
following an evidentiary hearing. Robinson appealed. In April 2015, our supreme
court reversed the PCR court's denial of relief and remanded the case for a new
trial, finding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an
unconstitutionally coercive Allen 3 charge. Workman v. State, 412 S.C. 128, 771
S.E.2d 636 (2015) (per curiam).

Upon remand, Robinson pled guilty to the trial charges on May 16, 2016. The plea
court sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment for armed robbery, five years
for criminal conspiracy, five years for the weapons charge, and thirty days for
simple assault, to run concurrently.

On April 25, 2017, Robinson filed an application for PCR challenging his 2009
guilty plea.4 The circuit court initially dismissed the application by conditional
order of dismissal. Robinson filed a reply, requesting a hearing; the circuit court
granted the request and ordered a hearing. The circuit court held a hearing on
April 15-17, 2019, to determine whether Robinson should be allowed to proceed
with a full evidentiary hearing.

During the hearing, Robinson testified that shortly before the plea, plea counsel
told him that he had reached a plea deal with the State pursuant to which Robinson
would receive a sentence that "would not be any more than [what he received] at
the jury trial," and that "the sentences would be run concurrent." When asked what
he understood at the time of his plea regarding the two sets of charges, Robinson
testified, "Basically, I pled based upon me serving [twenty-five] years. And if I
didn't plea, they were saying they w[ere] going to give me a life sentence. So that's
what made me take the plea for the [twenty-five] years ran in with the
[twenty-five] years I was already serving." PCR counsel questioned Robinson
further about the sentencing:

Q: At that point, in terms of what you were going to get
in exchange for your plea, it was your understanding that

3
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
4
The State informed the PCR court that it could not obtain a copy of the guilty
plea transcript because Robinson had not appealed his guilty plea and did not file
this PCR action until 2017.
what was going to happen? That two sets of charges
were going to be run together?

A: Correct.

Q: And in—did they use the word "concurrent"?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: With regard to sentencing?

A: Correct. Just sentencing. That's all I'm—

Q: But what—what else did they talk about that—that
they were—that it was all going to be run together? You
tell me what words were used.

A: It was explained to me that it was ran together. And
my understanding was that it was altogether, not
separate, or anything like that.

Q: Okay.

A: That was my whole understanding of the plea.

Q: And was it your understanding that as a result of that
plea that you were not ever going to have to worry about
getting more time for those charges . . . than you got on
the charges that you were facing at the jury trial?

A: Correct. That was my whole reason for pleading.

Q: . . . . And was it your understanding that that meant
that no matter what happened in the future . . . the
sentence on the things you pleaded to in March of 2009
was never going to be longer than the sentence you got
for the things you went to trial on?

A: Correct. That was the understanding I had.
Q: . . . . Did your lawyer ever explain to you that in
terms of the actual judgments and sentences that they
would remain separate legally, and that if you chose to
appeal either . . . the jury trial or the guilty plea
proceeding that you had to appeal them both?

A: No, ma'am. If I was aware of that, I would have
never t[aken] the plea to begin with.

Robinson confirmed that as part of the plea negotiations, the State agreed to
dismiss several pending charges. Robinson stated he believed law enforcement
was trying to "clear the books" with these remaining charges. Robinson believed
the State could not convict him of these charges because he "[n]ever heard of
them" and stated that he was not worried about being convicted of those charges
because he did not commit them. Robinson also represented that he was
incarcerated at the time that most of the offenses were alleged to have been
committed. Robinson further testified,

[S]erving [twenty-five] years was the purpose of me
pleading, not because I felt like I was guilty. It was my
back against the wall. . . . [Y]ou're telling me that if [I]
don't plead, [I'm] going to trial and [I'm] looking at a life
sentence. So with me being [nineteen] years old, the first
thing [I'm] going to think is [I'm] going to get a life
sentence.

Robinson also averred he was falsely accused of the offenses for which he was
convicted.

Robinson agreed that his guilty plea was "entirely reliant upon [his] belief that [he]
was not going to get any more time for those pleas than [he] got for the charges
that [he had] gone to trial [for]" and that if he had not held that belief, he would not
have pled guilty. He further testified that nothing in the legal advice his plea
counsel gave him led him to understand "that the only thing overlapping about [the
two] cases was the sentences." During cross-examination, Robinson
acknowledged that even though he thought his trial charges merged with his plea
charges, he did not list his plea charges in his application for PCR as to his trial
charges.
Plea counsel testified he represented Robinson during his trial and the 2009 guilty
plea hearing. Plea counsel testified he was able to negotiate a deal that would
allow Robinson to receive concurrent time for the charges he was pleading to. Plea
counsel noted he had not yet had a chance to obtain his file from the public
defender's office prior to the hearing, but he recalled Robinson had more than
twenty pending charges at the time of the plea. He stated there was a concern
Robinson was eligible for a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) on the pending
charges and the goal of pleading guilty to concurrent sentences was to reduce his
exposure and eliminate, to the largest extent possible, the risk that he would be
sentenced to LWOP. Plea counsel testified he would have told Robinson that his
sentences for the guilty plea and trial convictions would be served at the same time
because they were concurrent. He agreed he would have told Robinson that the
guilty plea would not result in him serving any more time than he would serve for
the trial convictions because the recommended sentence was for the same sentence
he received for his trial convictions. Plea counsel agreed he had no recollection of
telling him that "for any other purpose, if he wanted to appeal the jury trial, if he
was doing a PCR, whatever, that they still were independent cases and had to be
treated independently as far as anything he might file in the future."

On April 21, 2019, the circuit court issued an order vacating the conditional order
of dismissal and finding Robinson was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the
merits of his PCR allegations. The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing on
January 22, 2020. The State and PCR counsel agreed that the transcripts from the
April 15 and 17 hearing would be admitted as evidence for purposes of the
evidentiary hearing. However, both PCR counsel and the State elicited additional
testimony from Robinson and plea counsel.

Robinson agreed that "at least part of [his] motivation in taking t[he plea] deal was
to avoid potential exposure to [an LWOP] sentence." He further agreed that
because of his jury conviction, he was eligible for LWOP at the time he pled
guilty, and he acknowledged the State was planning to seek LWOP if he did not
plead guilty. Robinson confirmed that the State's intent to seek LWOP was a
factor in deciding whether to plead guilty.

When asked what his understanding of pleading to the second set of charges would
mean in relation to the sentence he received for his prior conviction, Robinson
testified,

The knowledge I had [was] that it was merged together.
It was [to ru]n concurrent[ly]. That's all I knew as far as
the charges being together, concurrent. I didn't know
anything about if I had got it reversed on down the line
that I was going to be held accountable as I am now. I
wasn't aware of that. And I wasn't informed of that.

Plea counsel testified Robinson was eligible for LWOP because of his January
2009 jury convictions and that prior to his March 2009 guilty plea, the State
informed him that it planned to serve Robinson with notice of its intent to seek
LWOP.

When asked if he told Robinson that his jury trial convictions and his guilty plea
charges and sentences merged, plea counsel stated,

As I testified . . . in April, I cannot remember specifically
what I said to Mr. Robinson as it related to the
relationship between the charges.

. . . . [W]hat I can say is I did not tell him that charges to
which he'd pled months after a guilty verdict that his
appellate rights for those charges with the guilty pleas
and his appellate rights . . . related to the jury
convictions, that somehow they were all lumped in
together and that an appeal on conviction from the jury
trial somehow would also be an appeal on a guilty plea
that he engaged in months later. I did not affirmatively
represent that to him in any conversations we had.

On cross-examination, plea counsel further explained,

My testimony was that I never told him that . . . . I would
never have said that because that's not a correct statement
of the law. The fact that my client was found guilty in a
jury trial, that he pled months later, and the appeal related
to the convictions for the jury trial somehow would be
linked, that notion would have never occurred to me.

Plea counsel agreed that if he were to face similar circumstances in future
representation, he would cover the issue with his client "from the standpoint of
eliminating any confusion or possibility that . . . I'd be part of the litigation on this
issue in the future."
The PCR court issued an order granting Robinson's application for PCR, finding
plea counsel was deficient for failing to "fully advise [Robinson] concerning how a
reversal on the judgments and sentences entered at his earlier jury trial might
change the sentence for those offenses and thereby change the impact of the pleas
he was considering entering." The PCR court found Robinson's testimony to be
credible and not inconsistent with plea counsel's testimony concerning the advice
he gave Robinson. The PCR court found plea counsel's insufficient advice
"created [Robinson's] misunderstanding by not making it clear that if the jury trial
judgments were overturned in any subsequent appeal, the guilty plea judgments
and sentences would not be." The PCR court found Robinson "unambiguously
testified that the only reason he pleaded to these charges was [because] he believed
his [plea] charges . . . were being completely merged with the charges the jury had
found him guilty of and, therefore, stood no chance of hurting him in any[]way."
The PCR court stated plea counsel "should have recognized that his advice to
[Robinson] . . . that his guilty pleas would not result in him serving more time than
he would have to serve on the charges from his jury trial, was very much
contingent on the outcome of any appeal [on which Robinson might be successful
in the future]." Finally, the PCR court found Robinson's guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary "inasmuch as they were the product of [p]lea [c]ounsel['s]
deficient representation." This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The State argues the PCR court erred by finding plea counsel ineffective for failing
to advise Robinson that if his trial convictions were ever overturned in any
subsequent appeal, his guilty plea to separate charges would not be. We reverse.

"Our standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before us. We
defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is evidence in
the record to support them." Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810 S.E.2d 836,
839 (2018). "We review questions of law de novo, with no deference to trial
courts." Id. at 180-81, 810 S.E.2d at 839. In evaluating PCR claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, courts apply the two-step analysis set forth Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under Strickland, the applicant first "must
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id. at 688. Next, he "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Id. at 694.
[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of
the . . . test is nothing more than a restatement of the
standard of attorney competence . . . . The second, or
"prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on
whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In
other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice"
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).

"[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel 'may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he
received from counsel was not within the [range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases].'" Id. at 56-57 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267 (1973)). "[T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. The prejudice inquiry "focuses on a
defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of
conviction after trial." Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). A PCR
applicant "must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would
have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
372 (2010).

We hold the PCR court erred by finding plea counsel rendered deficient
performance and that Robinson was prejudiced by such deficiency. First, counsel's
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57 (stating a defendant challenging a guilty plea on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel must show "the advice he received
from counsel was not within the [range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases]" (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267)). We are mindful of our
standard of review on questions of fact. However, we find no evidence in the
record supports a finding that plea counsel gave Robinson any advice that would
have resulted in Robinson's belief that the charges he pled guilty to somehow
"merged" with the separate charges of which a jury had convicted him after a trial.
Rather, plea counsel testified he advised Robinson that his sentences would be
concurrent such that he would not receive a greater sentence on his guilty plea
charges than that he received at trial. Robinson was sentenced to twenty-five years
at trial and he was sentenced to twenty-five years on his guilty plea charges, to be
served concurrently. Thus, the sentences for the charges to which he pled guilty
did not exceed the sentence he received on his trial charges. No evidence shows
plea counsel advised Robinson that his trial charges and guilty plea charges
merged with one another such that an appeal of one would affect the other. Rather,
plea counsel testified he "would never have said that" because it was "not a correct
statement of the law."

Further, we hold plea counsel had no duty to inform Robinson that the charges
themselves were not "merged" such that if his trial convictions were ever
overturned on appeal, that result would not also affect his plea charges. Robinson's
trial charges arose from an incident that occurred on December 10, whereas his
guilty plea charges arose from an incident that occurred on December 14 and
involved different circumstances and different victims. The record contains no
evidence that plea counsel had any knowledge that at the time Robinson entered
his guilty plea, he believed the plea would cause those charges to merge with the
prior convictions. Because plea counsel had no reason to suspect Robinson's
mistaken belief, he had no duty to advise Robinson that if his trial convictions were
ever overturned, the charges to which he was pleading guilty would not be
automatically overturned also. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57 ("[A] defendant who
pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel 'may only attack the voluntary and
intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel was not within the [range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases].'" (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
("[T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances."); id. at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."). Thus, we conclude
no evidence supports the PCR court's finding that plea counsel rendered deficient
performance for failing to advise Robinson that the charges would not merge.
Next, we hold the PCR court erred by granting PCR because Robinson failed to
show there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient
performance, Robinson would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on
going to trial. Plea counsel confirmed that Robinson's plea charges were charges
for which the State could seek LWOP and that the State had indicated it intended
to serve Robinson with notice of its intent to seek LWOP for the December 14
charges. Plea counsel testified the goal of pleading guilty with concurrent
sentences was to reduce his client's exposure and eliminate "to the largest extent
possible the possibility that he would be sentenced to [LWOP]." See S.C. Code
Ann. § 17-25-45(A)(1)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2007) ("[U]pon a conviction for a most
serious offense as defined by this section, a person must be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole if that person has . . . one or
more prior convictions for . . . a most serious offense . . . ."); see also S.C. Code
Ann. § 17-25-45(C)(1) (Supp. 2007) (setting forth offenses that constitute a most
serious offense and including armed robbery and ABWIK as most serious
offenses). Robinson's trial charges and the charges to which he pled guilty
occurred four days apart and involved different victims. Because he was convicted
of armed robbery following his January 2009 trial, Robinson had one prior
conviction for a most serious offense. Thus, the State was entitled to seek LWOP
for the offenses to which Robinson pled guilty had he chosen to proceed to trial.

Robinson agreed he was eligible for LWOP at the time he pled guilty because of
his jury trial conviction and he acknowledged the State was planning to seek
LWOP if he did not plead guilty. He further testified that one of the reasons he
pled guilty was to avoid exposure to a sentence of LWOP if he were to proceed
with a trial on those charges. The PCR court's order acknowledges that Robinson
"indicated that the only reason he pleaded to the charges before the Court [was] not
because he was guilty, but because he was getting threatened with L[W]OP if he
did not plead." Because Robinson's decision to enter a guilty plea was based in
part on avoiding a sentence of LWOP, we hold Robinson failed to show that but
for counsel's alleged deficient advice, he would not have pled guilty but would
have insisted on going to trial. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (stating a petitioner
seeking to challenge a guilty plea "must convince the court that a decision to reject
the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances"); cf. Goss v.
State, 425 S.C. 101, 108, 820 S.E.2d 373, 376 (2018) ("When a factfinder
evaluates the credibility of witnesses, the mental process employed often requires
the credibility evaluations to be based upon a consideration of all the evidence, not
simply the parts the factfinder chooses to see and hear first-hand.").
Moreover, the State's dismissal of Robinson's twenty-three other pending charges
in exchange for his guilty plea further undermines his testimony that he would not
have pled guilty had he not believed his trial charges and guilty plea charges had
merged. In exchange for Robinson's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss
twenty-three other pending charges against him. Robinson testified he was not
concerned about these charges because he had never heard of them and he was not
guilty of the charges. Each of the warrants that were included in the record for
these pending charges indicates the officer obtained a written, sworn statement of a
codefendant. We acknowledge the State had not yet obtained indictments for any
of these pending charges, but nothing in the record suggests the State lacked
evidence to prosecute them.

Further, by pleading guilty in exchange for the dismissal of these remaining
charges, Robinson also avoided any possibility the State would seek a sentence of
LWOP for those charges. The warrants for these charges were premised on
incidents that occurred on several different dates, ranging from November 21,
2007, to December 10, 2007, and included charges of armed robbery, first-degree
burglary, and ABWIK—charges that may have also exposed Robinson to a
potential LWOP sentence were the State to pursue indictments on these charges.
See § 17-25-45(C)(1) (setting forth offenses that constitute a most serious offense
and including armed robbery, first-degree burglary, and ABWIK as most serious
offenses). Based on our review of the applicable law at the time Robinson
committed the alleged offenses, the State would have been free to seek a sentence
of LWOP on any of the most serious offenses he was charged with committing on
November 21, December 6, and December 8. 5 At the time of Robinson's alleged
conduct in 2007, section 17-25-45(F) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007)
read:

5
However, as to the pending charge for the alleged armed robbery that also
occurred on December 10 (during an incident separate from the one for which
Robinson was tried), section 17-25-50 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007)
would likely have prevented the State from seeking LWOP for that offense
because it occurred on the same date as the offenses of which he was convicted at
trial. See § 17-25-50 ("In determining the number of offenses for the purpose of
imposition of sentence, the court shall treat as one offense any number of offenses
which have been committed at times so closely connected in point of time that they
may be considered as one offense, notwithstanding under the law they constitute
separate and distinct offenses.").
For the purpose of determining a prior or previous
conviction under this section and Section 17-25-50, a
prior or previous conviction shall mean the defendant has
been convicted of a most serious or serious offense, as
may be applicable, on a separate occasion, prior to the
instant adjudication. There is no requirement that the
sentence for the prior or previous conviction must have
been served or completed before a sentence of life
without parole can be imposed under this section.

(emphasis added). The statute contains no requirement that the conduct, rather
than the conviction, must have occurred prior to the subsequent conviction. See
also Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529-32, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282-83 (2009)
(plurality opinion) (noting the legislature amended section 17-25-45(F) in 2006
and discussing the legislative history of section 17-25-45(F)). Thus, by pleading
guilty and obtaining a dismissal of the remaining pending charges, Robinson also
eliminated the possibility that the State would seek a sentence of LWOP on those
charges.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the PCR court erred by finding counsel was
ineffective. Accordingly, the circuit court's order granting PCR is

REVERSED.

KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.