State v. Kenneth W. Signor, Sr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Kenneth Wayne Signor, Sr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000575

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-426
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Charles Thomas Brooks, III, of Law Office of Charles T.
Brooks, III, of Sumter, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Kenneth Wayne Signor, Sr., appeals the circuit court's order
denying his motion for an order for removal from the State of South Carolina Sex
Offender Registry (the Registry). On appeal, he argues the circuit court erred
when it failed to credit him for the time between the creation of the Registry and
when he was first notified of the requirement to register because the applicable
statutes were ambiguous and the State had an affirmative duty to notify him of the
requirement to register. Further, he argues he does not have an adequate remedy at
law and he should receive equitable relief. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.
We hold the circuit court did not err when it denied Signor's motion because the
plain language of section 23-3-462(A)(2)(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2025) requires an individual be registered for twenty-five years before they apply
to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) for removal from the
Registry and does not contemplate providing credit to an individual who received
delayed notice of the requirement to register. See Powell v. Keel, 433 S.C. 457,
462, 860 S.E.2d 344, 346 (2021) ("Determining the proper interpretation of a
statute is a question of law, which [an appellate court] reviews de novo." (quoting
Ferguson Fire & Fabrication, Inc. v. Preferred Fire Prot., L.L.C., 409 S.C. 331,
339, 762 S.E.2d 561, 565 (2014))); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d
578, 581 (2000) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature."); State v. Gordon, 414 S.C. 94, 98, 777
S.E.2d 376, 378 (2015) ("When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on
their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the
statute according to its literal meaning." (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495,
498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007))); id. ("In interpreting a statute, '[w]ords must be
given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.'" (quoting Sloan, 371 S.C. at
499, 640 S.E.2d at 459)); § 23-3-462(A)(2)(a) ("A Tier II offender may file a
request for termination of the requirement of registration with SLED in a form and
process established by the agency, if the person . . . has been registered for at least
twenty-five years[.]"). Although section 23-3-440(1) of the South Carolina Code
(2025) requires different state agencies to provide notice to individuals who are
required to register, they are instructed to do so within one day of the offender's
release. Because Signor was released from incarceration in April 1994, and the
statute went into effect in July 1994, this directive could not apply to Signor. See
§ 23-3-440(1) ("The Department of Corrections, the Department of Juvenile
Justice, the Juvenile Parole Board, and the Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services shall provide verbal and written notification to the offender that he
must register with the sheriff of the county in which he intends to reside within one
business day of his release.").
We hold equitable relief is unwarranted in light of the fact that Signor, who has
been released from prison for over thirty-one years, may apply to SLED to end his
requirement to register pursuant to section 23-3-462(A)(2)(b) of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2025). See § 23-3-462(A)(2)(b) ("A Tier II offender may file a
request for termination of the requirement of registration with SLED in a form and
process established by the agency, if the person . . . has been discharged from
incarceration without supervision for at least twenty-five years for the charge
requiring registration."); Santee Cooper Resort, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
298 S.C. 179, 185, 379 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1989) ("Equitable relief is generally
available only where there is no adequate remedy at law."); id. ("An 'adequate'
remedy at law is one which is as certain, practical, complete and efficient to attain
the ends of justice and its administration as the remedy in equity."); id. ("[T]he
court's equitable powers must yield in the face of an unambiguously worded
statute.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.