State v. Donald K. Pollock

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Donald King Pollock, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000485

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Grace Gilchrist Knie, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-422
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Barry J. Barnette, of
Spartanburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donald King Pollock appeals his convictions for second-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct with a minor, and consecutive sentences of fifteen years'
imprisonment with one of the fifteen-year sentences suspended upon the service of
five years' probation. On appeal, Pollock argues the trial court erred when it found
a gender-based Batson v. Kentucky1 violation with respect to one of the defense's
peremptory juror challenges. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Initially, we hold the trial court followed the correct Batson procedure at trial. See
State v. Weatherall, 431 S.C. 485, 493, 848 S.E.2d 338, 343 (Ct. App. 2020) ("The
trial court's findings regarding purposeful discrimination are accorded great
deference and will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous." (quoting State
v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 148, 801 S.E.2d 713, 724 (2017))); State v. Cochran,
369 S.C. 308, 312, 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006) ("This standard of review,
however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a
Batson hearing."); id. ("Where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the
Batson hearing procedure, we must answer a question of law."); id. at 312-13, 631
S.E.2d at 297 ("When a question of law is presented, our standard of review is
plenary."); State v. Giles, 407 S.C. 14, 18, 754 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2014) (finding that
to evaluate a claim that a peremptory challenge violated the Equal Protection
Clause, (1) "the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie
showing that the challenge was based on race," (2) "the proponent of the challenge
provide a race[-]neutral explanation for the challenge," and (3) the "trial court must
determine whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful
discrimination").

Next, we hold the trial court did not err in granting the State's Batson motion and
quashing the jury. See State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 509, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822
(2009) ("Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by
examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."); id.
("Appellate courts give the trial [court]'s finding great deference on appeal and
review the trial [court]'s ruling with a clearly erroneous standard."); id. ("The
opponent of the strike carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court that
the challenged party exercised strikes in a discriminatory manner."). First, Pollock
exercised eight of his ten peremptory strikes against females; thus, the State made
the necessary prima facie showing. See State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124, 470
S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996) ("[T]he trial [court] must hold a Batson hearing when
members of a cognizable racial group or gender are struck and the opposing party
requests a hearing."), overruled in part by Giles, 407 S.C. at 14, 754 S.E.2d at 261.
Second, Pollock's explanation that he was concerned about the juror's

1
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (outlining a three-step process for evaluating claims that
peremptory challenges were exercised in a manner violating the Equal Protection
Clause).
comprehension of English was clear, reasonably specific, and gender neutral on its
face. See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18, 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of
the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a
gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22, 754 S.E.2d at 265
(finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and
reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill
its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v.
Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55, 579 S.E.2d 538, 542 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding the State's
explanation—that the juror had a "heavy accent" and it was "unsure as to her
command of the English language"—was a race-neutral reason), overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). Third,
the trial court determined the State met its burden to prove Pollock's reasoning was
mere pretext because the State demonstrated Pollock's explanation was
"fundamentally implausible." See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508-09, 682 S.E.2d at 823
(finding that in the third step of the Batson analysis, "[t]he opponent must show the
race or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established
by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another race or
gender"); id. ("Under some circumstances, the explanation given by the proponent
may be so fundamentally implausible the trial [court] may determine the
explanation was mere pretext, even without a showing of disparate treatment."); id.
at 509, 682 S.E.2d at 823 ("The trial [court]'s findings of purposeful discrimination
rest largely on his evaluation of demeanor and credibility."); id. ("Often the
demeanor of the challenged attorney will be the best and only evidence of
discrimination, and an 'evaluation of the [attorney's] mind lies peculiarly within a
trial [court]'s province.'" (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365
(1991))); id. ("Furthermore, a strike must be examined in light of the circumstances
under which it is exercised, including an examination of the explanations offered
for other strikes.").

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.