SCDSS v. Janira L. Perez

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Janira L. Perez, Trenton Lightsey, and Shelly Batiste,
Defendants,

Of whom Janira L. Perez is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000075

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Randall E. McGee, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-403
Submitted December 2, 2025 – Filed December 4, 2025

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of
Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Patrick A. McWilliams, of the South Carolina
Department of Social Services, of Orangeburg, for
Respondent.
Wendy Marlenea Bowen, of Columbia, for the Guardian
ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Janira L. Perez (Mother) appeals a family court order finding she
abused or neglected her six children (collectively, Children), relieving the
Department of Social Services (DSS) of providing reasonable efforts at
reunification, and ordering a permanent plan of termination of parental rights
(TPR) and adoption. On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in allowing
DSS to forego reasonable efforts at reunification because (1) DSS failed to
properly notice her of its intent to seek relief from further services and (2) allowing
the agency to forego reasonable efforts to reunify her with Children was not in
Children's best interests. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the family court did not err in concluding section 63-7-1640 of the
South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025) did not require DSS to provide written notice of
its intent to be relieved of offering services. See Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79,
828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2019) ("On appeal from the family court, the
appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo."). Initially, we note
section 63-7-1640 does not contain a written notice requirement, and the statutes
governing Mother's combined merits removal and permanency planning hearing
direct the family court to consider at each stage whether reunification efforts are
required. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("The
cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware, 422 S.C. 1, 8, 809 S.E.2d 223,
226 (2018) ("Appellate courts must follow a statute's plain and unambiguous
language, and when the language is clear, 'the rules of statutory interpretation are
not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.'" (quoting
Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581)); § 63-7-1640(B) ("The family court
may rule on whether reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a family should be
required in hearings regarding removal of custody, review of amendments to a
placement plan, review of the status of a child in foster care, or permanency
planning or in a separate proceeding for this purpose."); id. ("The court may
consider this issue on the motion of a named party, the child's [GAL], or the foster
care review board . . . ."); § 63-7-1640(C)(1), (8) (stating "the family court may
authorize [DSS] to terminate or forego reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a
family . . . when the family court determines that one or more of" several
conditions exist, including that "the parent has subjected the child or another child
while residing in the parent's domicile to . . . (a) severe or repeated abuse; [or] (b)
severe or repeated neglect," or "other circumstances exist that the court finds make
continuation or implementation of reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the
family inconsistent with the permanent plan for the child"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-1660(C)(3) (2010) (directing that a petition for removal not including a
petition for TPR must state that the family court may order a placement plan at the
merits removal hearing); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700(H)(4) (Supp. 2025) (stating
that if the family court does not order the return of the child at the initial
permanency planning hearing, "the court shall specify in its order . . . whether
previous services should continue"). Further, to the extent DSS may have been
required to notice Mother of its intent to be relieved of further reunification efforts,
the family court properly amended the pleadings to include such notice. See Rule
15(b), SCRCP ("If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits."); Lee v. Bunch, 373 S.C. 654, 661, 647 S.E.2d 197, 201
(2007) (finding no prejudice when there was no indication the party opposing the
amendment would have presented additional or different evidence geared towards
the new issue).

2. We find Mother failed to show the preponderance of the evidence was against
the family court's finding that allowing DSS to forego reasonable efforts at
reunification was in Children's best interests. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593,
595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to
make its own findings of fact; however, this standard does not abrogate two
long-standing principles still recognized by our courts during the de novo review
process: (1) a trial [court] is in a superior position to assess witness credibility, and
(2) an appellant has the burden of showing the appellate court that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial [court]."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-1640(F) (Supp. 2025) ("In determining whether to authorize the
department to terminate or forego reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a
family, the court must consider whether initiation or continuation of reasonable
efforts to preserve or reunify the family is in the best interests of the child.").
Children entered foster care after Child 2, who was six years old at the time,
presented at the hospital five days after she swallowed magnets, which twisted her
intestines, caused her to vomit fecal matter, and required emergency surgery.
During these five days, Mother did not seek medical treatment and instead
attempted to treat Child 2 using home remedies. Following their removal,
Children made multiple disclosures of physical abuse and physical and medical
neglect by Mother. Mother's visitation with Children was suspended by court
order in April 2024 for Children's mental health, and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
reported Children's behavioral issues improved when visitation ceased. The GAL
believed no placement plan could adequately ensure Mother would be a safe option
for placement due to the "extraordinary abuse" Children suffered. Further, Child 1
and Child 2's therapist, an expert in child abuse dynamics and child counseling,
testified that although she had been working with the children since February 1,
2024, both children continued to exhibit behavioral issues at the time of the
October 21, 2024 hearing. She testified Child 2 remained fearful of Mother and
opined that returning to Mother's care would be detrimental to the children's mental
health. Moreover, during the ten months since the case began, Mother refused to
comply with DSS's requests for information to facilitate Children's return. For
example, Mother lied to DSS about her number of children, refused to provide her
address at any point during the case, and refused to provide information about a
child she had purportedly given birth to during the pendency of the case. Thus, the
family court did not err in finding that allowing DSS to forego efforts at
reunification was in Children's best interests.

AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.