State v. Antone B. Ellis Tremayne Blakely

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antone B. Ellis Tremayne Blakely, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000721

Appeal From Laurens County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-394
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 3, 2025

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General William Joseph Maye, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Antone B. Ellis Tremayne Blakely appeals his convictions and
concurrent sentences of forty years' imprisonment for murder, twenty-five years'
imprisonment for kidnapping, five years' imprisonment for criminal conspiracy,
five years' imprisonment for possession of a weapon during commission of a
violent crime, and time served for third-degree assault and battery by mob. On
appeal, Blakely argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) admitting a
hearsay statement made by the victim to David Little naming Blakely as an
assailant and (2) admitting three black-and-white autopsy photos of the victim's
gunshot wounds when the cause of death was not in dispute. We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. As to issue one, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the victim's hearsay statements into evidence under the excited utterance exception.
See State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The
admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when
the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled
by an error of law."); Rule 801(c), SCRE ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."); Rule 802, SCRE (stating an excited
utterance exception to the rule against hearsay exists when a "statement relating to
a startling event or condition [was] made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition"); State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85,
94, 544 S.E.2d 30, 34 (2001) ("An excited utterance expresses the real belief of the
speaker because the utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than under reason and reflection."); State v. Sims,
348 S.C. 16, 21, 558 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2002) (explaining that under the excited
utterance exception, three elements must be met: "First, the statement must relate
to a startling event or condition. Second, the statement must have been made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement. Third, the stress of excitement
must be caused by the startling event or condition"). We find that although a short
period of time elapsed between the assault and the victim's statements: (1) the
statements pertained to the assault; (2) the statements were made under the stress
of the excitement of the assault because the victim was upset by the assault and
assailants were still in the victim's home; and (3) but for the assault, the victim
would not have made the statements. See State v. Whisonant, 335 S.C. 148, 155,
515 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The mere fact that a statement was made
some time after the incident occurred does not mean the statement cannot qualify
as an excited utterance, provided the circumstances surrounding the statement
indicate its reliability.").
2. As to issue two, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
three black-and-white autopsy photographs of the victim's gunshot wounds into
evidence. See State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 116, 716 S.E.2d 895, 903 (2011)
("The admission of evidence is within the circuit court's discretion and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208,
631 S.E.2d at 265 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial
court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); State v.
Lee, 399 S.C. 521, 527, 732 S.E.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 2012) ("A trial court has
particularly wide discretion in ruling on Rule 403 [of the South Carolina Rules of
Evidence] objections."). We hold that because the autopsy photographs
corroborated the pathologist's testimony, which refuted Blakely's self-defense
claim, the autopsy photographs were relevant. See Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."); State v. Martucci, 380 S.C. 232,
249, 669 S.E.2d 598, 607 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The State has the right to prove every
element of the crime charged and is not obligated to rely upon a defendant's
stipulation."); id. at 250, 669 S.E.2d at 607 ("Admitting photographs which serve
to corroborate testimony is not an abuse of discretion."). Further, we find the
probative value of the autopsy photographs was not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice because they did not suggest a decision on an
improper basis. See State v. Nelson, 440 S.C. 413, 420, 891 S.E.2d 508, 511
(2023) ("Under Rule 403, . . . relevant evidence may be excluded where its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.");
State v. Gray, 408 S.C. 601, 608-09, 759 S.E.2d 160, 164 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In
exercising its discretion on a Rule 403 objection to the admissibility of autopsy
photographs, the trial court 'must balance the [unfair prejudice] of graphic photos
against their probative value.'" (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dial, 405
S.C. 247, 260, 746 S.E.2d 495, 502 (Ct. App. 2013))); id. at 610, 759 S.E.2d at 165
("'Probative value' is the measure of the importance of that tendency to the
outcome of a case."); id. ("[A] court analyzing probative value considers the
importance of the evidence and the significance of the issues to which the evidence
relates."); id. at 616, 759 S.E.2d at 168 ("Prejudice that is 'unfair' is distinguished
from the legitimate impact all evidence has on the outcome of a case."); State v.
Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 290, 676 S.E.2d 690, 697 (2009) ("To constitute unfair
prejudice, the photographs must create 'an undue tendency to suggest a decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" (quoting
State v. Jackson, 364 S.C. 329, 334, 613 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2005))).
AFFIRMED.1

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.