State v. Channon T. Preston

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Channon Talon Preston, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001474

Appeal From Beaufort County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-399
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 3, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III,
of Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Channon Talon Preston appeals his convictions for murder,
attempted murder, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime and concurrent sentences of thirty-seven years' imprisonment for murder,
thirty years' imprisonment for attempted murder, and five years' imprisonment for
the weapon charge. On appeal, Preston argues the trial court erred by admitting (1)
the contents of a 911 call in which a witness relayed the answers of the victim
because it was inadmissible hearsay, (2) body-worn camera footage of the victim's
statements about the crime because they were hearsay and denied Preston his right
to confrontation, and (3) a video recording and still shots therefrom depicting
Preston in the presence of an assault weapon and cash because the probative value
of the images was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recording of
the 911 call. Initially, the admission of the recording was not subject to the
Confrontation Clause because the primary purpose of the 911 call was to request
assistance in an ongoing emergency; therefore, the call was nontestimonial in
nature. See State v. Brewer, 438 S.C. 37, 44, 882 S.E.2d 156, 160 (2022)
("[W]hether a statement is testimonial and therefore subject to the confrontation
clause is a question of law reviewed de novo."); State v. Brockmeyer, 406 S.C. 324,
342, 751 S.E.2d 645, 654 (2013) ("Under the primary purpose analysis required by
the Confrontation Clause, where the primary purpose of an out-of-court statement
is to serve as evidence or 'an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,' the
statement is considered testimonial." (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.
647, 671-72 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part))); id. at 342, 751 S.E.2d at
654-55 ("However, '[w]here no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a
statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the
Confrontation Clause.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562
U.S. 344, 359 (2011))); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (stating
that a 911 operator's "effort to establish the identity of the assailant" was
nontestimonial because it helped the "dispatched officers . . . know whether they
would be encountering a violent felon"). Next, both the witness's and the victim's
statements were admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception. See
State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions
of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of
law."); Rule 802, SCRE ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of this State or by
statute."); Rule 805, SCRE ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded
under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an
exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules."); Rule 803(2), SCRE (stating
an excited utterance is a "statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition" and is an exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Ladner, 373 S.C. 103,
116, 644 S.E.2d 684, 691 (2007) ("A court must consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether a statement falls within the excited
utterance exception, and that determination is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.").

2. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the body-worn
camera footage of the victim's statements. Initially, the admission of the footage
was not subject to the Confrontation Clause because the primary purpose of the
victim's statements was to assist law enforcement in addressing an ongoing
emergency; therefore, the footage was nontestimonial in nature. See Brewer, 438
S.C. at 44, 882 S.E.2d at 160 ("[W]hether a statement is testimonial and therefore
subject to the confrontation clause is a question of law reviewed de novo."); Davis,
547 U.S. at 822 ("Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.").
Next, the victim's statements were admissible under the excited utterance hearsay
exception. See Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 265 ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions
of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of
law."); Rule 802, SCRE ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of this State or by
statute."); Rule 803(2), SCRE (stating an excited utterance is a "statement relating
to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition" and is an exception to the hearsay
rule); Ladner, 373 S.C. at 116, 644 S.E.2d at 691 ("A court must consider the
totality of the circumstances when determining whether a statement falls within the
excited utterance exception, and that determination is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court.").

3. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video
recording or its still shots because their probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. McLeod, 362 S.C. 73,
81, 606 S.E.2d 215, 220 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A trial [court]'s decision regarding the
comparative probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence should be reversed
only in exceptional circumstances."); id. at 81-82, 606 S.E.2d at 220 ("[This court]
review[s] a trial [court]'s decision regarding Rule 403 pursuant to the abuse of
discretion standard and [is] obligated to give great deference to the trial court's
judgment."). The video recording depicted Preston and an accomplice in a van
consistent with the one described as the getaway vehicle, and both men were
holding guns that were later discovered concealed in Preston's home. Although the
video was taken five days before the incident, it established that Preston had access
to the weapon and the van shortly before the incident took place. See Rule 401,
SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403,
SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."); State v. Wiles,
383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009) ("Unfair prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.