State v. Eric A. Graham

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Eric Anton Graham, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000160

Appeal From Darlington County
Roger E. Henderson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-396
Submitted November 1, 2025 – Filed December 3, 2025

VACATED AND REMANDED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant
Attorney General Tommy Evans, Jr., all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Paul Michael Burch, Jr., of Bennettsville,
all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Eric Anton Graham, a juvenile offender, appeals his sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) following an Aiken v.
Byars1 hearing. On appeal, Graham argues the circuit court erred by sentencing
him to LWOP without applying the Aiken factors. We vacate and remand pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court abused its discretion when it failed to apply the Aiken
factors to Graham. See State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 423, 831 S.E.2d 158, 160
(Ct. App. 2019) ("When considering whether a sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, the appellate court's
standard of review extends only to the correction of errors of law."); id.
("Therefore, this court will not disturb the circuit court's findings absent a manifest
abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's
finding is based on an error of law or grounded in factual conclusions without
evidentiary support."); Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding "mandatory [LWOP] for
those under the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment[]"); State v. Miller, 433 S.C. 613, 626-27, 861 S.E.2d 373, 380 (Ct.
App. 2021) ("Our supreme court interpreted Miller as creating a categorical ban on
juvenile LWOP sentences 'absent individualized considerations of youth' and
establishing a duty for courts to 'fully explore the impact of the defendant's
juvenility on the sentence rendered.'" (quoting Aiken, 410 S.C. at 540-41, 543, 765
S.E.2d at 575, 577)), aff'd, 441 S.C. 106, 893 S.E.2d 306 (2023); id. at 627, 861
S.E.2d at 380 ("[T]rial courts must hold individualized sentencing hearings and
consider the mitigating factors of youth discussed in Miller before imposing an
LWOP sentence on a juvenile."); Aiken, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577
(explaining the factors a sentencing court must consider include "(1) the
chronological age of the offender and the hallmark features of youth, including
'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and consequence'; (2)
the 'family and home environment' that surrounded the offender; (3) the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the offender's
participation in the conduct and how familial and peer pressures may have affected
him; (4) the 'incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the offender's]
inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement)
or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own attorneys'; and (5) the 'possibility of
rehabilitation'" (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78)); Jones

1
410 S.C. 534, 539-45, 765 S.E.2d 572, 576-78 (2014) (applying the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), retroactively
to all juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP and requiring an individualized
resentencing hearing considering the mitigating factors of youth).
v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 120 (2021) ("States may direct sentencers to formally
explain on the record why a [LWOP] sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the
defendant's youth."); State v. Mack, 441 S.C. 526, 539, 894 S.E.2d 820, 827 (Ct.
App. 2023) ("The plain language of Jones provides that the decision is not
intended to remove state-level safeguards for juvenile sentencing."); id. ("Our
supreme court has decided that, in South Carolina, compliance should take the
shape of a review of the Aiken factors."); id. at 543-44, 894 S.E.2d at 829 ("We are
concerned only with whether the resentencing court's order shows a meaningful
consideration of the evidence about [the defendant's] home life."); id. at 540, 543,
894 S.E.2d at 827, 829 (finding the resentencing court erred when "[t]he
resentencing court's order address[ed] [the defendant's] age only as a chronological
fact and [did] not seem to consider the 'hallmark features of youth' at all"); id. at
541, 894 S.E.2d at 828 ("[A]ge is not a sliding scale that necessarily weighs
against mitigation the closer the offender is to turning eighteen years old at the
time of the crime." (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127,
145 (Iowa 2017))); id. at 544, 894 S.E.2d at 830 ("Applying the Aiken factors
involves more than repeating the words; it requires applying the substantive
content of those factors.").

Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the circuit court for a new hearing and
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Aiken.

VACATED AND REMANDED.2

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.