John Strasswimmer v. Mary Miles

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

John Strasswimmer, David Vreeland King, and Claudia
Treyer Miles, Respondents,

v.

Mary Michelle Miles, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000599

Appeal From Horry County
B. Alex Hyman, Circuit Court Judge
Kathy G. Ward, Probate Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-374
Heard September 9, 2025 – Filed November 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Melody Joy Edelman Breeden, of Turner Padget Graham
& Laney, PA, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.

Marissa Noelle Drost, of The Floyd Law Firm PC, of
Surfside Beach, and Thomas Jarrett Bouchette, of Burr &
Forman LLP, of Myrtle Beach, both for Respondent John
Strasswimmer.

Reese R. Boyd, III, of Boyd Law Group, of Myrtle
Beach, for Respondent David Vreeland King.
PER CURIAM: Mary Michelle Miles (Michelle) appeals multiple orders of the
probate and circuit courts regarding her service as the temporary guardian for her
mother, Dr. Claudia Miles (Dr. Miles), and ordering her to repay certain
expenditures to Dr. Miles's estate (the Estate). On appeal, Michelle argues the
circuit court erred by (1) finding she was not an appropriate temporary guardian for
Dr. Miles; (2) finding she breached her fiduciary duties to Dr. Miles by improperly
disbursing Dr. Miles's assets; (3) finding she failed to submit a proper accounting;
(4) granting sanctions against her; (5) ordering her to repay various expenditures
totaling $251,931.87 to the Estate; (6) finding her jointly liable, along with her
brother John Strasswimmer (John), for attorney's fees incurred by Dr. Miles's
husband, David King (David); and (7) admitting the testimony of attorney Clifford
Tall. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. We hold the circuit court correctly found Michelle breached her fiduciary duty
to Dr. Miles due to her improper expenditures of Dr. Miles's funds; we also find
Michelle breached her duty based on other conduct that was not in Dr. Miles's best
interest—namely, her disregard for David's visitation rights and her failure to file a
complete accounting. See Bennett v. Est. of King, 436 S.C. 614, 621–22, 875
S.E.2d 46, 50 (2022) ("[A]n action for breach of fiduciary duty is either an action
at law or in equity depending on the remedy sought."); Lee v. Lee, 251 S.C. 533,
164 S.E.2d 308 (1968) ("Numerous decisions of this court are in accord with the
proposition that equity has jurisdiction 'where a fiduciary relation exists between
the parties, and the duty rests upon the defendant to render an accounting.'"
(quoting Devereux v. McCrady, 46 S.C. 133, 24 S.E. 77, 82 (1896))); Greer v.
Spartanburg Technical College, 338 S.C. 76, 79, 524 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Ct. App.
1999) ("In reviewing a proceeding in equity, this court may find facts based on its
own view of the preponderance of the evidence."). The financial records are
replete with instances of excessive spending that Michelle could not or would not
explain, such as $2,500 on restaurants and dining, $12,000 on groceries, $6,400 on
clothing and shoes, $800 on furniture reupholstery, $1,500 at FedEx, and $1,000 at
The UPS Store; additionally, there was an unknown charge for approximately
$11,600. Moreover, we find the expenditures to renovate Michelle's home were
inappropriate because Michelle was well aware that her appointment as guardian
was temporary and heavily contested and that there was a very real possibility that
Dr. Miles would ultimately return to South Carolina for care; she knew David had
also filed a petition seeking to be appointed as the permanent guardian; and she
was aware that a trial had been scheduled on the issue. Michelle also demonstrated
a blatant disregard for the probate court's orders regarding David's visitation with
Dr. Miles in contravention of Dr. Miles's best interests. Finally, Michelle
repeatedly failed to comply with the probate court's order to submit a complete
accounting to justify her spending, and the "accounting" she ultimately submitted
was insufficient as it did not contain any receipts or documentation to corroborate
the spending she reported. 1 See RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 399
S.C. 322, 335–36, 732 S.E.2d 166, 173 (2012) ("To establish a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a
breach of that duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and (3) damages
proximately resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 62-1-201(15), (18) (2022) (defining "[f]iduciary" to include a "person
appointed by the court as guardian"); Moore v. Moore, 360 S.C. 241, 253, 599
S.E.2d 467, 473 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Damages in an action for breach of a fiduciary
duty are those proximately resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant.").

2. We hold the issues regarding Michelle's expenditures as temporary guardian—
including the findings that she must repay the Estate in the amount of $251,931.87,
that she is responsible for paying David's attorney's fees, and the grant of sanctions
against her—are not preserved for this court's review. 2 See Ulmer v. Ulmer, 369
S.C. 486, 490, 632 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2006) ("Under the Probate Code, final orders
or decrees of the probate court may be appealed to the circuit court."); id. at 490,
632 S.E.2d at 860 ("In reviewing an appeal from the probate court, the circuit court

1
Michelle also argued the probate court erred in applying section 62-5-103 of the
South Carolina Code (2022) to find that the expenditures she made as guardian
were in excess of her authority as temporary guardian. Section 63-5-103(A) states
that "[a] person under a duty to pay or deliver money or personal property to
a[n] . . . incapacitated individual may perform this duty in amounts not exceeding a
net aggregate amount of fifteen thousand dollars each year." Although we agree
that this statute was inapplicable to Michelle as temporary guardian, even without
considering this statute in relation to Michelle's management of Dr. Miles's money,
there is sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the finding that she breached
her fiduciary duty and is responsible for repaying the Estate for those improper
expenditures. Thus, we find no reversible error as to this issue. See McCall v.
Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]hatever doesn't
make any difference, doesn't matter.").
2
Michelle listed fourteen issues in her statement of issues on appeal. Our holding
in this section is applicable to all issues regarding the expenditures she was ordered
to repay and the calculation of those amounts, the sufficiency of the accounting,
David's attorney's fees, and the grant of the Guardian ad Litem's motion for
sanctions.
must apply the same rules of law as an appellate court would apply."); id. at 490,
632 S.E.2d at 861 ("Further, the circuit court has appellate jurisdiction over only
those matters which are properly appealed."); In re Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460,
502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable in the probate court to the extent they are not inconsistent
with the Probate Code or probate court rules."); id. (explaining that a motion to
alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) is not inconsistent with the
Probate Code and is therefore applicable); Nelums v. Cousins, 304 S.C. 306, 307,
403 S.E.2d 681, 681–82 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding an issue unpreserved when "the
trial court was never afforded the opportunity to rule on the clarity of its order
because [the appellant] made no motion, as she was required to do, pursuant to
Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure"). We hold Michelle
was required to file a Rule 59(e) motion seeking clarification of the probate court's
post-trial motion order (PTM Order) because the order is unclear as to the
reasoning for its mandate that Michelle repay approximately $251,000 to the Estate
and approximately $25,000 for David's attorney's fees—whether this was
reimbursement for improper spending, a sanction for violating the court's order to
submit an accounting, or some combination of the two. Although the probate court
found Michelle had breached her fiduciary duty as temporary guardian in its
interim and final orders, the PTM Order was the first time Michelle was mandated
to repay any monies to the Estate or to pay David's attorney's fees. Moreover, the
probate court did not include a detailed breakdown of the amount to be repaid to
the Estate, and there is no explanation in the PTM Order as to how the court
reached that number. 3 Additionally, as to attorney's fees, the order initially stated
that David was "entitled to reimbursement of legal fees jointly from [John] and

3
The probate court's order stated Michelle must repay the Estate for the expenses
to renovate her personal home and the costs to employ Synergy HomeCare.
However, the section of the PTM Order regarding the GAL's motion for sanctions
states Michelle must reimburse the amount spent "on her personal residence,"
including "home improvements" and "furnishings not returned to the Estate," but it
does not give a figure; the Final Order approximates this spending at $70,000 for
the renovations. The PTM Order does specify that Michelle spent $179,971.99 to
employ Synergy. Even if we were to assume the probate court contemplated
$70,000 for home renovations as approximated in the Final Order, the sum is only
$249,971.99, or approximately $2,000 less than the final amount included in the
PTM Order. Moreover, the GAL repeatedly stated Michelle misappropriated over
$350,000 and Michelle conceded that she disbursed $453,474.82 in approximately
five months as temporary guardian. Thus, it is unclear exactly why or how the
probate court arrived at the figure of $249,971.99 for repayment.
[Michelle];" however, in its mandate, it stated that John was "liable for
$77,034.00" in attorney's fees for David, without mentioning any liability or
contribution from Michelle.

Further, we find the record on appeal is insufficient for us to "make an intelligent
review" of these issues because it does not include the Statement of Issues on
appeal to the circuit court or the briefs filed in the circuit court upon which the
parties relied at the hearing; instead, the record included only the notice of intent to
appeal which simply lists the orders being appealed to the circuit court, not the
grounds. Kneece v. Kneece, 296 S.C. 28, 32, 370 S.E.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1988)
("An issue either not presented to the trial court or not properly preserved by an
exception presents no question before us on appeal."); Windham v. Honeycutt, 290
S.C. 60, 63, 348 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The burden is on the appellant
to furnish a sufficient record on appeal from which this court can make an
intelligent review."). The circuit court order states that "the appellate briefs of
[Michelle] and [John] each contain[ed] a statement of issues on appeal," and as to
Michelle, the circuit court affirmed "each and every decision made by the probate
court in connection with those issues on appeal," with the exception of the finding
that Michelle and John should be jointly liable for David's attorney's fees, which it
remanded to the probate court for a more specific apportionment. However, the
circuit court's order does not specifically set forth the issues Michelle raised to it;
the transcript of the circuit court hearing contains approximately six pages of
argument by Michelle, in which she reiterates her arguments that any funds
expended were "used for [Dr. Miles]'s interests" and she was "working with what
she was able to do under the circumstances," she had submitted a proper
accounting, there was nothing "in the record that reflect[ed] harm specifically to
Dr. Miles in this action," and the probate court was generally incorrect regarding
its findings as to Michelle. Notably, Michelle referred the circuit court to her brief
in support of her arguments raised in the appeal. Thus, without the Statement of
Issues on appeal or the briefs, we cannot be sure exactly what issues were raised to
the circuit court or the grounds argued. See State v. Franks, 432 S.C. 58, 79, 849
S.E.2d 580, 591–92 (Ct. App. 2020) (quoting State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 410, 411,
401 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1991)) ("Generally, this [c]ourt will not consider issues not
raised to or ruled upon by the trial [court]."); Bonaparte v. Floyd, 291 S.C. 427,
444, 354 S.E.2d 40, 50 (Ct. App. 1987) (declining to address the appellant's claim
of error because the appellant failed to furnish this court with a sufficient record on
appeal to permit consideration of the issue); Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors,
LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) (stating that "we are
not precluded from finding an issue unpreserved even when the parties themselves
do not argue error preservation to us").
3. We hold the remaining issues are moot because Dr. Miles has passed away and
no longer needs a guardian or legal counsel, nor is there any legal issue for this
court to resolve concerning her placement.4 See State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568,
581, 611 S.E.2d 273, 280 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A case becomes moot when a
judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy, thus making it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual
relief."); Sloan v. Greenville County, 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670 S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("Mootness also arises when some event occurs making it impossible
for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief.").

AFFIRMED.

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

4
Our holding in this section applies to all issues regarding whether Michelle was
an appropriate temporary guardian, the placement of Dr. Miles at Franke Toby
Jones, and the testimony of Clifford Tall.