State v. Arkevus J. Cauthen

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Arkevus Jimon Cauthen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001268

Appeal From Lancaster County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6122
Heard June 11, 2025 – Filed September 17, 2025

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals, David
Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, all
of Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Arkevus Jimon Cauthen appeals his convictions for murder, armed
robbery, and two counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of a
violent crime. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to suppress
evidence officers dug up from a filled hole in his backyard while they were executing
a search warrant on his home, and (2) allowing witnesses to testify that bruising they
observed on Cauthen's arm resembled a bite mark. We affirm.

FACTS

On May 24, 2016, Sandra Johnson was found dead in her home by her daughter.
Johnson had been stabbed dozens of times. Officers quickly developed Cauthen as
a suspect and obtained a warrant to search his home for "[a]ny kind of sharp object
that may have been used to cause the stab wounds" along with other evidence
connecting him to the crime. The search warrant described Cauthen's home as the
premises to be searched and specified "[t]he search [wa]s to include all attics,
basements, locked or unlocked containers, outbuildings, storage sheds, trash areas
and trash containers, attached or unattached."

Officers executed the warrant on Cauthen's home the next day, which was the day
after Johnson's body was discovered. While walking around the curtilage behind the
residence, they found a recently-filled hole in the ground and a shovel leaning up
against the wall of the home several feet away. Believing the hole could contain the
murder weapon, officers moved some of the dirt to find a plastic bag containing a
gun with an apparent blood stain on it. Later that night, John Duncan (Victim) was
found murdered in his home. Officers discovered the gun found in Cauthen's yard
had a serial number matching that of a gun missing from Victim's home.
Additionally, DNA testing revealed the blood found on the gun belonged to Cauthen.
Ultimately, the State indicted Petitioner for Victim's murder, and additionally
charged him with armed robbery and two counts of possession of a weapon during
the commission of a violent crime. 1 Prior to his trial on these charges, Cauthen
moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the hole in his yard and argued the
State exceeded the scope of its search warrant when officers dug into the ground.
He averred the warrant did not contain any language indicating officers could dig
into his yard and that officers should have obtained a second warrant with such
language before penetrating the ground. The State disagreed, arguing the hole was
similar to an average "container" officers would have been permitted to search inside
the home. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the officers' search
did not exceed the scope of the search warrant.
Cauthen also moved to suppress testimony about a "bite mark" officers observed on
his arm at the time of his arrest. He explained the State had sought an odontologist
to compare Victim's "bite" with the bruising observed on Cauthen's arm, and averred

1
The State tried Petitioner separately for his charges related to Johnson's murder.
the potential prejudice from admitting the bite mark evidence exceeded its probative
value. The State countered, noting it was not utilizing an expert to demonstrate the
bruising was in fact a bite mark, but was instead asking the witnesses whether the
bruising appeared to be a bite mark to them based on their lay opinions. The trial
court reviewed photographs of the bruising and averred it had seen "many bite
marks," and that the State's witnesses could testify that the bruising "appears to be a
bite mark." However, the court indicated the defense could cross-examine the
witnesses to have them clarify their observations were not "expert" opinions and also
attack the weight and credibility of the evidence.

The gun that police found in the hole behind Cauthen's house was admitted as
evidence during the trial. Additionally, several officers testified they observed
bruising on Cauthen's arm which resembled a bite mark. The jury convicted Cauthen
as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life
imprisonment for murder, thirty years' imprisonment for armed robbery, and five
years' imprisonment for each weapons charge. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631
S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the
trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS
A. Scope of Search Warrant

Cauthen argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress
the evidence recovered from the filled hole in the curtilage of his home because
officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant by digging into the ground without
explicit language in the warrant allowing them to do so. We respectfully disagree.
"Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have a warrant in order to
conduct a search." Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014).
"The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment
analysis, . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant." United States v.
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998). "Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property
in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry
itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression." Id.
(emphasis added). The area "immediately surrounding and associated with the
home"—the curtilage—is "part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). The curtilage of a
home includes "outbuildings, [the] yard around [the] dwelling, [and the] garden."
State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 548 n.15, 500 S.E.2d 489, 494 n.15 (1998) (citing 40
Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 168 (1968)). "A lawful search of fixed premises generally
extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not
limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to
complete the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). "When
a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been
precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the
case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and
wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the
prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." Id. at 821.
While the question of whether a search warrant authorizes officers to perform
below-ground searches has never been explicitly addressed in South Carolina, other
jurisdictions have found these areas are included within the scope of a search
warrant. In United States v. Griffin, the Seventh Circuit found officers did not
exceed the scope of a search warrant for a home when they also seized items "from
soil and rock in the back yard." 827 F.2d 1108, 1113 (7th Cir. 1987). The court
explained the reasonableness of such a search depended on whether the sought
evidence could be found in relevant areas, such as "in the yard generally, both above
and below the ground." Id. at 1114-15. Similarly, in United States v. Gorman, the
Ninth Circuit found a search warrant for a residence also applied to its curtilage,
noting that "a warrant authorizing a search of an area generally authorizes the search
of all of that area's subareas even though they are not mentioned in the warrant
itself." 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996). The court found officers did not exceed
the scope of their search warrant when they searched "a large plastic translucent jar
partly buried" in the curtilage of the home. Id. at 273-75.
In Gebhardt v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court found a warrant authorizing the
search of the curtilage of the defendant's property also authorized a search of a sealed
well within that area. 837 S.E.2d 318, 327-28 (Ga. 2019). It observed that although
the warrant did not include the word "well," further specifying the area which
officers were meant to search, the well in question "was contained on the land at the
specified address." Id. 327-28. It added the warrant also allowed the officers to dig
into the earth in that area, because "searching the well required a process of sifting
through the ground on the property." Id. at 328.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cauthen's motion to
suppress the recovered gun and DNA evidence because the search warrant in this
case is best read as authorizing officers to search the home and its curtilage. See
Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 265 ("The admission of evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.");
id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack
evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Robinson, 407 S.C. at
185, 754 S.E.2d at 870 ("Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to
have a warrant in order to conduct a search."); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (stating the
area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"—the curtilage—is
"part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes"); Wiggins, 330 S.C. at
548 n.15, 500 S.E.2d at 494 n.15 (explaining the curtilage of a home includes
"outbuildings, yard around [the] dwelling, [and] garden" (citing 40 Am. Jur.
2d Homicide § 168 (1968))); Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21 ("A lawful search of fixed
premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may
be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening
may be required to complete the search."); id. at 821 ("When a legitimate search is
under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice
distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, . . . must
give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.").
The language of this warrant was not restricted to any particular structure on the
premises, and officers executed the warrant in a reasonable manner: they did not dig
up the entirety of Cauthen's yard but instead limited their search to a seemingly
recently-filled hole which appeared large enough to hold the murder weapon for
which they were searching. See Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71 ("The general touchstone
of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, . . . governs the
method of execution of the warrant."); id. ("Excessive or unnecessary destruction of
property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression."
(emphasis added)).

Cauthen additionally argues that the gun's admission as evidence violates the South
Carolina Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable invasions of privacy. See
S.C. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. We believe this argument is foreclosed by State v.
Weaver's holding that a finding of probable cause (such as the one supporting the
warrant in this case) satisfies the constitution's requirement that any invasion of
privacy be "reasonable." 374 S.C. 313, 322, 649 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2007).
B. Bite Mark Evidence

Cauthen argues the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the bite mark
testimonies because their assertions constituted improper expert opinions. We
disagree.
"If [a] witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which (a) are
rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) do not require special knowledge, skill experience, or training." Rule 701, SCRE.
In State v. McClinton, our supreme court found a trial court did not err in admitting
officers' testimonies indicating an injury on the defendant's hand appeared to be a
bite mark. 265 S.C. 171, 176-77, 217 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1975). The court asserted
the officers' statements were the "opinions of laymen" based on their personal
observations which helped jurors understand the nature of the defendant's injury. Id.
at 176-77, 217 S.E.2d at 586.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witnesses to testify
they believed a bruise on Cauthen's arm resembled a bite mark. Here, like in
McClinton, the officers presented lay opinions that the bruise on Cauthen appeared
to be a bite mark. The officers' testimonies that the injury resembled a bite mark did
not require any specialized knowledge or training and were based on their personal
observations. Accordingly, we believe the trial court's decision to deny Cauthen's
motion to suppress is consistent with established South Carolina jurisprudence. See
Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 265 ("The admission of evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.");
id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack
evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Rule 701, SCRE ("If the
witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which (a) are rationally based
on the perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) do not require
special knowledge, skill experience, or training."); McClinton, 265 S.C. at 176-77,
217 S.E.2d at 586 (finding the trial court did not err in admitting officers' testimonies
that an injury on the defendant's hand appeared to be a bite injury because the
testimonies were the "opinions of laymen" based on their personal observations
which helped jurors understand the nature of the defendant's injury).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Cauthen's convictions and sentences are

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.