Barbara L. Sarb v. Julie W. Phillips

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Barbara L. Sarb, Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Julie W. Phillips and Joseph M. Phillips,
Appellants/Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001713

Appeal From Florence County
H. Steven DeBerry, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-302
Heard May 8, 2025 – Filed August 27, 2025

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED

Valerie Garcia Giovanoli, of McCabe, Trotter & Beverly,
P.C., and Fiona R. Reed, of Miller, Dawson, Sigal &
Ward, LLC, both of Columbia, for
Respondent/Appellant.

Edward Andrew Love and Robert Thomas King, both of
King, Love & Hupfer, LLC, of Florence, for
Appellants/Respondents.
PER CURIAM: In June 2019, Dr. Barbara Sarb (Buyer) and Julie and Joseph
Phillips (collectively, Sellers) entered into a contract (the Purchase Agreement) for
the sale of a home in Florence (the Property). Paragraph 8 of the Purchase
Agreement sets forth the procedure for any repairs requested by Buyer. It also
states, "Buyer at Buyer's expense shall have the privilege and responsibility of
inspecting the structure['s] . . . plumbing systems, . . . [and] waste water systems."
Paragraph 9 of the Purchase Agreement is titled "INSPECTION/REINSPECTION
RIGHTS" and states "Buyer and SC licensed and insured inspectors ("Inspectors")
reasonably perform any reasonable ultimately non-destructive examination and
make reasonable record of the Property . . . ." It further provides that "Buyer and
persons they choose may make reasonable visual observations of Property."
Paragraph 23 of the Purchase Agreement states, in part,

If Buyer defaults in the performance of any of the
Buyer's obligations under this Contract ("Default"),
Seller may:
(i) Deliver Notice of Default to Buyer and
terminate Contract; and
(ii) Pursue any remedies available to Seller at law
or equity; and
(iii) Recover attorneys' fees and all other direct costs
of litigation if Buyer found in default/breach of
Contract.

As required by the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act (the Act),1
Sellers provided Buyer with a Residential Property Condition Disclosure Statement
(the Disclosure Statement) representing that they did not have actual knowledge of
any "defects, malfunctions, damages, conditions or characteristics" with the
Property. The Disclosure Statement contained a standard provision stating it did
not "limit the obligation of the purchaser to inspect the property and improvements
which are the subject of the real estate contract."

Prior to and shortly after moving in, Buyer experienced issues with the Property,
including (1) flooding in the basement, (2) problems with sewage disposal systems
and plumbing, and (3) an infestation of cockroaches. Buyer filed a complaint
against Sellers, claiming (1) a violation of the Act; (2) fraud; (3) constructive
fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) negligence, gross negligence, and
negligence per se; (6) breach of contract/breach of implied covenant of good faith

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-50-10 et seq. (2007 & Supp. 2024).
and fair dealing; and (7) breach of contract/breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing accompanied by a fraudulent act. Sellers filed an answer
asserting multiple defenses and counterclaims, including a claim for "Breach of
Contract—Failure to Inspect."2

At trial, Buyer testified that before entering into the Purchase Agreement, she
personally inspected the house with her realtor, John Etheridge. After entering into
the Purchase Agreement and before closing, Buyer visited the Property "[f]ive or
six" times and never noticed any issues with the house. Buyer hired two
companies to inspect the Property to ensure "there w[ere] no major structural
problems prior" to closing. She explained the first inspection was a CL-100
inspection, which is used to check for wood infestation and pests. Buyer stated the
CL-100 revealed (1) no "pest infestations or wood destroying infestations"; (2) no
"wood destroying pests"; (3) no concerns about standing water or groundwater
infiltration; and (4) that non-active wood destroying fungi were present. She
explained the CL-100 revealed some evidence of "[w]ater/moisture related"
"[w]ood/decay damage" in "various locations to sub fascia"—but this damage was
located "under the overhead of the roof" and "nowhere near the basement." The
CL-100 also revealed "[w]ood/decay damage [wa]s evident to the window trim and
window stool at the rear right side of the basement" and was "water/moisture
related."

Buyer testified the second inspection was a home inspection by HouseMaster,
which inspected "the rooms in the house, the outside, the basement, and the crawl
space"; the inspector detailed his findings in a report (the HouseMaster report).
HouseMaster reported similar findings to those found in the CL-100. It also noted
decay in the basement windows because one window was level with the ground,
and it recommended replacing the vinyl on the window. The HouseMaster report
did not contain "any finding or indication that there was actually water in the"
basement area, but it recommended "reach[ing] out to the prior owner about
whether there was any type of water penetration." Buyer explained she requested
that Etheridge ask Sellers whether there was "any water in the" house; Sellers
responded that "water never came into the house."3

After reviewing the reports, Buyer and Etheridge created a Residential Repair

2
This was the only counterclaim heard by the jury.
3
Etheridge also testified that he called Sellers' broker to ask whether there had
been any water in the basement, and Sellers "relay[ed]" to him that there had not
been any "water problems in the house."
Addendum Agreement (the Addendum) requesting that Sellers repair some of the
issues noted in the inspections prior to closing. Sellers agreed to most of the
requested repairs and accepted the estimate from Buyer's contractor, John Sims.
Buyer testified the estimate from Sims addressed the issues noted in the
inspections and that the repairs would "cover everything." She stated she closed on
the Property, Sellers credited her the estimated cost of the repairs, and Sims
completed the repairs.

Buyer moved into the Property around August 26. She testified she purchased the
Property during a dry summer. However, Buyer presented evidence that the area
received almost two inches of rain on August 16 and August 17, and she testified
that when she went to check on the Property on August 18, the basement was
flooded with "several inches of water." Buyer claimed there was consistently
standing water in the basement over the next year and the flooding occurred "[a]ny
time there was a moderate amount of rain." She moved out of the Property in
December of that year because of the high moisture levels and the related health
issues she was experiencing.

Buyer also testified that shortly after moving in, she started noticing "mud that
came out of the drain" in the shower, the toilet water "breathing," the sinks
draining slowly, and some minor leaks in the bathrooms. She explained she called
a plumber but the issues got worse; she could not flush the toilets or drain the sinks
and everything "backed up." Buyer testified a different plumber came to inspect
and told her the sewer "pipe that went from [the Property] to the street was
clogged" and there was a "hole in the PVC pipe" that measured approximately four
inches by two inches where someone had previously attempted to clean it out. She
explained the sewer pipe was also at "a reverse slope," meaning the sewage backed
up into the Property; the plumber told her the sewer pipe needed to be replaced. In
December, the plumber replaced the sewer pipe.

Buyer explained when she moved into the Property, Sims recommended replacing
some paneling board on the walls with drywall. While removing the paneling,
Sims found "live and dead cockroaches," "cockroach feces[,] and cocoons" inside
the walls. Buyer stated it was a "severe infestation" located in multiple rooms, and
she saw "about twenty roaches a day." She hired a pest control company to treat
the infestation.

Glenn Stewart, an expert in civil engineering and building evaluation, inspected the
Property in February of 2020 and found "water staining . . . on the backside of the
crawlspace foundation wall" and discovered that the base of a door frame in the
basement was decaying because of the "presence" of water for prolonged periods.
He opined the condition existed prior to Buyer purchasing the Property. Stewart
explained neither inspection report indicated any evidence of water intrusion in the
basement.

Julie Phillips testified Sellers had "water in [their] basement on two occasions"
while they lived at the Property; however, she admitted they did not disclose this
issue on the Disclosure Statement. She further testified they had "maybe three to
four sewage issues" because of items that were improperly flushed down the toilet
while living at the Property, but she also did not disclose those issues to Buyer in
the Disclosure Statement. Julie explained they were not aware of "any pests" in
their home.

Sellers moved for a directed verdict at the close of Buyer's case, arguing there was
sufficient evidence that Buyer was made aware of any potential issues after
receiving the inspections, and because she was on notice of those issues, she could
no longer rely on the lack of information in the Disclosure Statement. The court
reserved its ruling. After Sellers rested their case, Buyer moved for a directed
verdict as to Sellers' counterclaim. Buyer argued there was insufficient evidence to
prove this claim because (1) she never had a duty—only a right—to inspect and (2)
she did any due diligence required of her by getting the "standard and customary"
inspections. Sellers argued there is a right to inspect, but once a buyer invokes the
right to inspect, the buyer "must follow the process and adequately inspect the
property." They asserted Paragraph 8 of the Purchase Agreement required Buyer
to "adequately inspect to find the issues" and she breached that duty. According to
Sellers, the Disclosure Statement was "merged into" the Purchase Agreement;
Buyer disagreed. The trial court stated whether Sellers filled out the Disclosure
Statement in a "misrepresenting way" was a question of fact for the jury to decide.

The jury found Sellers violated the Act. They awarded Buyer $70,000 in damages.
The jury also found Buyer liable for failing to adequately inspect. At first, the jury
awarded Sellers damages of $0. The court instructed the jury that "there must be
some damage" if they found Buyer liable, and the jury returned an award of
$1,000.

Buyer filed a motion for JNOV, arguing (1) Buyer had no duty to "adequately
inspect," (2) Sellers failed to prove Buyer breached that duty, and (3) Sellers failed
to prove recoverable damages as a result of that breach. Sellers also filed a motion
for JNOV, or alternatively for a new trial, arguing that (1) the jury failed to find
Sellers made a misrepresentation, which is an "essential element of the Act;" and
(2) the verdict was unsupported by the evidence in that Buyer had no right to rely
on the Disclosure Statement. The trial court denied both motions.
Buyer filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, requesting $183,347.40 in
attorneys' fees and $6,395.84 in court costs. Her motion addressed the six Baron4
factors. Sellers also filed a motion, requesting $55,393.00 in attorneys' fees and
$2,310.11 in costs. Their motion also discussed the Baron factors.

Sellers filed a notice of appeal, arguing the trial court erred in denying their motion
for JNOV or new trial. Buyer filed a notice of cross-appeal as to the trial court's
denial of her motion for JNOV. Two weeks later, the trial court issued an order
awarding (1) Buyer attorneys' fees of $55,393 and costs of $6,395.84; and (2)
Sellers attorneys' fees of $55,393 and costs of $2,310.11. The order stated it took
"all six [Baron] factors into consideration," finding (1) the matter was not complex
and did not take "an inordinate amount of time to conclude," (2) the professional
standing of all attorneys was high, and (3) the fees and costs submitted were
reasonable. Buyer filed a notice of appeal as to the order granting fees and costs.
Sellers filed a notice of cross-appeal regarding fees and costs.

ANALYSIS

1. JNOV motions

a. Sellers's JNOV motion

First, in the light most favorable to Buyer, we hold there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to have found Sellers failed to disclose the issues they knew existed
with the Property. See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 27-28, 602
S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed
verdict or JNOV, an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial
court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party."); Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Lab., Licensing &
Regul., 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999) ("The trial court must deny
the motions when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in
doubt."). Julie testified that water infiltrated their basement on two different
occasions while they owned the Property. She admitted they did not disclose this
on the Disclosure Statement. Robin Hatchell, Sellers' neighbor when they owned

4
Baron Data Sys., Inc. vs. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 384-85, 377 S.E.2d 296, 297
(1989) (finding the court must consider six factors when awarding attorneys' fees:
(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the legal services rendered; (2) the time and
labor necessarily devoted to the case; (3) the professional standing of counsel; (4)
the contingency of compensation; (5) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services; and (6) the beneficial results obtained).
the home, testified that when she went to the Property to check on Sellers' cat
around 2016 or 2017, there was standing and flowing water in the basement. She
explained Joe Phillips was in the basement at the same time. Additionally, Julie
testified they had "maybe three to four sewage issues" while living at the Property
but they also did not disclose those issues in the Disclosure Statement. However,
Buyer testified the plumber explained the sewer pipe looked as if someone had
tried to unclog it. She further explained that the sewer pipe was reverse sloped,
and, therefore, the sewage backed up in the pipes. We find the evidence yields
more than one reasonable inference regarding whether Sellers knew about any of
these issues and failed to disclose them. See § 27-50-65 ("An owner who
knowingly violates or fails to perform any duty prescribed by any provision of [the
Act] or who discloses any material information on the disclosure statement that he
knows to be false, incomplete, or misleading is liable . . . .").

While we acknowledge Sellers' reliance on McLaughlin v. Williams,5 there are key
distinctions in this case. First, McLaughlin sued Williams for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation, both of which contain a reliance element. 379 S.C. at 458-59,
665 S.E.2d at 671-72. Here, the Act does not require a similar reliance element.
Further, this court found McLaughlin was "clearly" informed of the "moisture
damage" in the house before closing. Id. at 458-59, 665 S.E.2d at 671. The
CL-100 McLaughlin obtained revealed active wood-destroying fungi6 in the house
and a high wood moisture content below the first main floor. Id. at 455, 665
S.E.2d at 669. Here, it is not as clear that Buyer was put on notice of any
groundwater infiltration in the basement before closing. We acknowledge the
HouseMaster report indicated water intrusion in the front crawl space, and the
CL-100 mentioned dry staining around the plumbing sub-structure due to past
leaks as well as "[w]ood decay/damage" to the windows and door frame in the
basement. However, the CL-100 indicated "non-active wood-destroying fungi,"
and a contractor hired by Sellers noted the fungi was "superficial in nature with no
structural damage." Stewart testified the HouseMaster report did not indicate any
evidence of moisture intrusion in the basement and indicated any wood decay near
the basement was classified "non-active." He also stated the CL-100 did not
identify any concerns about standing water or groundwater infiltration.
Additionally, Stewart—the only person who testified as to evidence of prior decay
to the basement door frame—was not involved in the action until after closing.
Further, in McLaughlin, the disclosure statement left "several items [] blank and

5
379 S.C. 451, 665 S.E.2d 667 (Ct. App. 2008).
6
McLaughlin explained "fungi damage to wood" is "commonly called water
damage." Id. at 459, 665 S.E.2d at 671.
there were no explanations for certain items, indicating possible problems." Id. at
454, 665 S.E.2d at 669. Here, the Disclosure Statement was fully completed and
affirmatively indicated there were no issues with the Property. Buyer and
Etheridge testified that, after the inspections were completed, Etheridge received
confirmation from Sellers that there were no prior issues with water in the
basement. Moreover, there was ample testimony that the basement would flood
after periods of heavy rain and that Buyer purchased the house during a dry
summer. Therefore, we find that McLaughlin can be distinguished because (1) the
Act does not require reliance, as the claims in that case did, and (2) the inspection
reports did not put Buyer notice of the specific issues she experienced, unlike the
reports in McLaughlin. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in denying
the motion, and we affirm as to this issue.

b. Buyer's JNOV motion

We hold the court erred by denying Buyer's JNOV motion as to Sellers'
counterclaim for failing to adequately inspect. See Elam, 361 S.C. at 27-28, 602
S.E.2d at 782 ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or
JNOV, an appellate court must employ the same standard as the trial court by
viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party."); id. at 28, 602 S.E.2d at 782 ("The appellate court will
reverse the trial court only where there is no evidence to support the ruling
below."). Sellers allege Buyer had a duty to adequately inspect under the Purchase
Agreement and the Disclosure Statement. They argue Buyer did not "adequately
inspect" because she only obtained the "standard home inspection[s]" without
follow-up inspections; therefore, Buyer breached the contracts. We disagree.

First, we find Buyer did not have an obligation to adequately inspect the property
under the Purchase Agreement or the Disclosure Statement and Seller did not
provide any evidence to support that claim. See Branche Builders, Inc. v. Coggins,
386 S.C. 43, 48, 686 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The elements for breach of
contract are the existence of the contract, its breach, and the damages caused by
such breach."); Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 93, 594 S.E.2d 485, 493 (Ct.
App. 2004) ("In construing a contract, the primary objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the parties."); id. at 94, 594 S.E.2d at 493 ("To
discover the intention of a contract, the court must first look to its language—if the
language is perfectly plain and capable of legal construction, it alone determines
the document[']s force and effect."). Paragraph 9 of the Purchase Agreement is
entitled "Inspection Rights." This provision affords Buyer the opportunity to
inspect the property if she so chooses. Although Paragraph 8 provides that Buyer
has the privilege and responsibility to inspect, this section sets forth the procedure
for any requested repairs and nothing in the Purchase Agreement requires Buyer to
conduct the inspection in a certain way. The Disclosure Statement explains it does
not "limit the obligation of the purchaser to inspect the property and improvements
which are the subject of the real estate contract." We do not interpret this
provision as creating a responsibility to conduct an adequate inspection—only that
the Disclosure Statement does not allow Buyer to solely rely on the disclosures
made by Sellers.

Second, even if Buyer did have an obligation to inspect under the Purchase
Agreement or Disclosure Statement, we find she conducted an adequate inspection.
Buyer personally inspected the Property numerous times with her realtor, and
Sellers indicated there were no issues with the Property in the Disclosure
Statement. Buyer hired two different companies to conduct a home inspection and
a CL-100 inspection, which Sellers admit are "standard." After one inspection
indicated Buyer should ask Sellers whether there had been previous issues with
water damage, Buyer did inquire and Sellers verbally confirmed there were no
issues. Additionally, Buyer hired Sims, a contractor, to make repairs that
"cover[ed] everything" from the inspections. Accordingly, we hold Buyer did not
breach the Purchase Agreement or the Disclosure Statement, and therefore the
court erred by denying Buyer's JNOV motion as to Sellers' counterclaim.

2. Attorneys' fees and court costs

a. Sellers' fees and costs under the Purchase Agreement

We find the trial court erred in awarding Sellers attorneys' fees and costs under the
Purchase Agreement. See Baron, 297 S.C. at 384, 377 S.E.2d at 297 ("Where there
is a contract, the award of attorney[s'] fees is left to the discretion of the trial
[court] and will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.").
Paragraph 23 of the Purchase Agreement states, in part, "If Buyer defaults in the
performance of any of the Buyer's obligations under this [Purchase Agreement]
("Default"), Seller may . . . [r]ecover attorneys' fees and all other direct costs of
litigation if Buyer found in default/breach of [Purchase Agreement]." Accordingly,
Sellers are not entitled to fees and costs unless Buyer was found to have violated
the Purchase Agreement. See Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 493, 427
S.E.2d 659, 660 (1993) ("The general rule is that attorney[s'] fees are not
recoverable unless authorized by contract or statute."). As explained above, we
hold the trial court should have granted Buyer's JNOV motion as to Sellers'
counterclaim because Buyer did not breach the Purchase Agreement; therefore,
Sellers are not entitled to fees. Accordingly, we reverse as to this issue.7 See
Myers v. Myers, 391 S.C. 308, 321, 705 S.E.2d 86, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) (explaining
"it is not improper for this court to reverse an attorney[s'] fees award when the
substantive results achieved by trial counsel are reversed on appeal"); Ex parte
Lipscomb, 398 S.C. 463, 471, 730 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App. 2012) (reversing an
award of attorneys' fees "[b]ecause the award of attorney[s'] fees was predicated on
the [trial] court's finding of contempt," which was also reversed).

b. Buyer's fees and costs under the Act

i. Sellers' cross-appeal

The Act allows the trial court to "award reasonable attorney[s'] fees incurred by the
prevailing party." § 27-50-65. We hold the trial court did not err in awarding
Buyer attorneys' fees and costs because the plain meaning of "prevailing party" in
the Act refers to the party who prevails under the Act. See Citizens for Quality
Rural Living, Inc. v. Greenville Cnty. Plan. Comm'n, 426 S.C. 97, 102, 825 S.E.2d
721, 724 (Ct. App. 2019) ("As to questions of law, this court's standard of review
is de novo."); State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) ("The
[c]ourt should give words 'their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle
or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.'" (quoting Sloan v.
S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 469, 636 S.E.2d 598, 607
(2006)), overruled on other grounds by Joseph v. S.C. Dep't of Lab., Licensing &
Regul., 417 S.C. 436, 790 S.E.2d 763, (2016)). Because the jury found Sellers
violated the Act, Buyer is the prevailing party here. Seckinger v. Vessel Excalibur,
326 S.C. 382, 388, 483 S.E.2d 775, 777-78 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[O]ur supreme court

7
Sellers argue the issue of whether the trial court properly awarded them fees and
costs is not preserved because Buyer never challenged whether the jury properly
found that Buyer breached the Purchase Agreement. However, we do not need to
address the issue of whether Buyer sufficiently raised this argument at trial and
decline to do so. As explained above, we find the trial court should have granted
Buyer's motion for JNOV as to Sellers' counterclaim. Therefore, Sellers are not
entitled to fees and an analysis regarding whether Buyer raised the issue at trial is
unnecessary. Additionally, Buyer argues the court abused its discretion in
awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Sellers because the amount was unreasonable
under Baron. Because we reverse the award of fees and costs in its entirety, we
need not reach this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
has defined a 'prevailing party' as '[t]he one who successfully prosecutes the action
or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not to
the extent of the original contention [and] is the one in whose favor the decision or
verdict is rendered and judgment entered.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Heath
v. County of Aiken, 302 S.C. 178, 182-83, 394 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1990))).

Further, we hold the trial court did not err in awarding Buyer costs because it is
permitted under Rule 54, SCRCP, and the Act expressly allows them. See Rule
54(d), SCRCP ("Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise directs[]."); § 27-50-65 ("An owner who knowingly violates or
fails to perform any duty prescribed by any provision of this article or who
discloses any material information on the disclosure statement that he knows to be
false, incomplete, or misleading is liable for actual damages proximately caused to
the purchaser and court costs." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we affirm as to
this issue.

ii. Buyer's appeal

We find the trial court abused its discretion in determining the fee amount it
awarded to Buyer. See Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 382 S.C. 8, 20,
675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009) ("[T]he specific amount of attorneys' fees awarded
pursuant to a statute authorizing reasonable attorneys' fees is left to the discretion
of the trial [court] and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting
Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008))); id. ("An abuse
of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by
an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." (quoting Layman,
376 S.C. at 444, 658 S.E.2d at 325)). While the trial court's order purported to
have taken all six Baron factors into consideration, the order consisted of a brief
discussion of only three: (1) finding the case was not "extremely complex" or time
consuming, (2) asserting the attorneys' professional standing was "exceptionally
high," and (3) finding the fees were reasonable. See Baron, 297 S.C. at 384, 377
S.E.2d at 297 ("In awarding reasonable attorney's fees, there are six factors to be
considered."); Blumberg, 310 S.C. at 494, 427 S.E.2d at 660 (explaining the six
factors are: "1) nature, extent, and difficulty of the legal services rendered; 2) time
and labor devoted to the case; 3) professional standing of counsel; 4) contingency
of compensation; 5) fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services;
and 6) beneficial results obtained"); Goethe v. Cleland, 323 S.C. 50, 55, 448
S.E.2d 574, 577 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding the court satisfied the requirements
under Blumberg when it "discussed the six factors relevant to a determination of
fees, and made findings in support of each factor"). Additionally, we did not find
evidence in the record to support the court's award. See Brawley v. Richland
County, 445 S.C. 80, 94-95, 911 S.E.2d 156, 163-64 (Ct. App. 2025) (reversing the
fee award made by a trial court when this court could not "discern how the [trial]
court came to the" award amount and the order awarding the fees "directly
contradict[ed] the record"), cert. denied (June 3, 2025); Horton v. Jasper Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 423 S.C. 325, 330-31, 815 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2018) (reversing the trial
court after it made "general findings" as to four Baron factors that appeared to
support the affidavit of Horton's counsel but "provided no explanation and cited no
evidence in the record to support its conclusion that [its awarded rate] was
reasonable"). Here, the trial court awarded Buyer and Sellers the same amount of
attorneys' fees, which was the amount Sellers requested. However, the court did
not explain the method it used to determine the amount or why it awarded the
parties equal amounts, despite the attorneys charging different hourly rates and
reporting different numbers of hours billed. It is not clear if the trial court awarded
Buyer a lesser amount because it found the hourly rate for Buyer's attorney was
excessive or the number of hours billed was excessive or for some other reason. In
fact, the court found the fees requested were reasonable. Furthermore, the parties
received different verdicts and damages awards from the jury—a factor not
seemingly contemplated by the court's fee award. Because there is no explanation
of how the trial court determined the amount and there is a lack of evidence in the
record to support the determination, we hold the court erred. See Blumberg, 310
S.C. at 494, 427 S.E.2d at 661 ("On appeal, absent sufficient evidentiary support
on the record for each factor, the award should be reversed and the issue remanded
for the trial court to make specific findings of fact."); Horton, 423 S.C. at 331, 815
S.E.2d at 445 (finding the court "provided no explanation and cited no evidence in
the record to support its conclusion that [the rate it awarded] was reasonable" and
"[i]n the absence of any evidence to support the rate," the trial court abused its
discretion). Moreover, because we reverse the award of fees to Sellers, the award
of fees to Buyer should be recalculated.8 Therefore, we reverse Buyer's fee award
and remand for the trial court's determination of the fee amount.9

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

8
Our ruling is based on the methodology of the fee award, not the award amount.
9
Buyer additionally raises a public policy argument. However, because we reverse
and remand the determination of Buyer's fees, we need not reach this issue. See
Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 (ruling an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).