SCDSS v. Rose Pandola

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Rose Pandola and John Wallace, IV, Defendants,

Of whom Rose Pandola is the Appellant.

In the interests of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001619

Appeal From Charleston County
Michèle Patrão Forsythe, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-289
Submitted August 4, 2025 – Filed August 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Ruffin Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

William Evan Reynolds, of Kingstree, for Respondent.
Joshua Keith Roten, of Summerville; and Mary Christine
Hardee, of South Carolina Department of Children's
Advocacy, of Columbia, both for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Rose Pandola (Mother) appeals a family court order terminating
her parental rights to her two minor children (Children). On appeal, Mother argues
the family court erred in (1) denying her motion to dismiss the termination of
parental rights (TPR) action based on the failure to hold the hearing within
statutorily-prescribed timelines, (2) allowing the admission of drug test results
without expert testimony or a proper chain of custody, (3) finding clear and
convincing evidence supported TPR based on two statutory grounds, and (4)
finding TPR was in Children's best interests. We affirm.

"On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App.
2019). Under the de novo standard of review, this court may make its own
findings of fact; however, we continue to recognize the superior position of the
family court to assess witness credibility. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813
S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018). Moreover, de novo review does not relieve the appellant
of the burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
family court's findings. Id.

1. We find Mother failed to show the family court abused its discretion in denying
her motion to dismiss. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2
(explaining appellate courts review the family court's procedural and evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of the family court's discretion); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2530(C) (Supp. 2024) ("The hearing on the petition to terminate parental
rights must be held within [120] days of the date the [TPR] petition is filed."); id.
(stating the family court may, at its discretion, grant a continuance that would
result in the hearing being held more than 120 days after the filing of the petition);
id. ("If a continuance is granted, the court must issue a written order scheduling the
case for trial on a date and time certain."). In April 2023, the family court
approved a permanent plan of TPR and adoption and allowed the Department of
Social Services (DSS) to forego reasonable efforts at reunifying Mother and
Children based on Mother's lack of progress in completing her treatment services.
DSS filed its petition for TPR in July 2023, and in October 2023, the family court
continued the TPR hearing in order to appoint legal counsel or a guardian ad litem
(GAL). The October order directed the hearing to be placed on the November
2023 trial docket, but the TPR hearing did not occur until April 2024. However,
the DSS case worker testified that Mother had entirely stopped engaging in
treatment services or submitting to drug tests by December 2023. Because the
record does not indicate Mother was in a position to resume care of Children at any
point during the case, any additional time could have only been to her benefit.
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to dismiss the case.
See Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87, 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An
error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal." (quoting
Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 417, 483 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1997))).

2. We find any error in the admission of challenged drug test results was harmless
because the documents were cumulative to other evidence establishing Mother and
John Wallace, IV (Father; collectively, Parents) tested positive for drugs and failed
to submit to drug tests. See Bojilov v. Bojilov, 425 S.C. 161, 178, 819 S.E.2d 791,
800 (Ct. App. 2018) ("When evidence is merely cumulative to other evidence, its
admission is harmless and does not constitute reversible error."). Although Mother
objected to the admission of three of Father's hair follicle drug test results, prior to
their admission, the DSS case worker testified without objection that as of April
2023, Father was not producing negative drug tests despite being enrolled in
substance abuse treatment. Moreover, the case worker testified, also without
objection, that Father tested positive for drugs on hair follicle tests in August and
December 2023 and failed to comply with referrals for hair follicle tests in January
and March 2024. As to Mother's drug test results, Mother objected to hearsay and
lack of foundation when the case worker testified Mother continued to test positive
for drugs as of April 2023; however, the case worker testified without objection
that Mother never "produce[d] a negative drug screen" during the case and was
refusing to submit to drug tests by the December 2023 hearing. Accordingly, we
find any error in admitting drug test results was cumulative to the other evidence
regarding Parents' drug test results and failure to submit to drug tests.

3. We find clear and convincing evidence showed that at the time of the TPR
hearing, Children had been in foster care for at least fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2024) (explaining the
family court may order TPR upon finding a statutory TPR ground is met and TPR
is in the child's best interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 423 S.C. 60, 76,
814 S.E.2d 148, 156 (2018) ("The grounds for TPR must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence."); § 63-7-2570(8) (providing a statutory ground for TPR is
met when a "child has been in foster care . . . for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months"). The undisputed testimony established Children were
removed on December 13, 2021—just under twenty-eight months before the April
2024 TPR hearing. Moreover, we find the delay in reunification was caused by
Mother's failure provide a safe, drug-free environment for Children rather than any
dilatory action by DSS. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324,
336, 741 S.E.2d 739, 746 (2013) ("[S]ection 63-7-2570(8) may not be used to
sever parental rights based solely on the fact that the child has spent fifteen of the
past twenty-two months in foster care. The family court must find . . . the delay in
reunification of the family unit is attributable not to mistakes by the government,
but to the parent's inability to provide an environment where the child will be
nourished and protected."). Although Mother did not receive a placement plan
until nine months after Children were removed, the family court ordered a
permanent plan of TPR and adoption and authorized DSS to forego reasonable
efforts at reunifying Mother and Children due to her lack of progress in April
2023—six months after she was ordered to complete her placement plan and
fifteen months after Children's removal. The uncontroverted testimony by the case
worker also established that Mother never produced a negative drug test and had
stopped engaging in treatment services or submitting to drug tests by December
2023. Thus, we find clear and convincing evidence supports this statutory ground.1

4. We find TPR is in Children's best interests. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case,
the best interests of the children are the paramount consideration."); Sarah W., 402
S.C. at 343, 741 S.E.2d at 749-50. ("Appellate courts must consider the child's
perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining whether
TPR is appropriate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the
child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict.").

Initially, we acknowledge the GAL testified Parents exercised appropriate
visitation with Children; the evidence was clear that Children wanted to return to
Parents' care; and Child 1, who was fourteen years old at the time of the TPR
hearing, did not want to be adopted. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010)
("The purpose of this article is to establish procedures for the reasonable and
compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned in order
to protect the health and welfare of these children and make them eligible for
adoption by persons who will provide a suitable home environment and the love
and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive life."); S.C. Code Ann.

1
To the extent the family court found Mother's failure to remedy the conditions
that caused Children's removal was an independent ground for TPR, we decline to
address this ground. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 613,
582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a statutory ground for TPR after
concluding clear and convincing evidence supported another statutory ground).
§ 63-9-310(A)(1) (2010) (explaining an adoptee over fourteen years old must
consent to the adoption "except where the court finds that the adoptee does not
have the mental capacity to give consent, or that the best interests of the adoptee
are served by not requiring consent"). However, as we have laid out above, the
evidence is also clear that Mother had not provided a safe, drug-free home to
which Children could return, despite having well over two years to demonstrate her
abstention from drug use. The GAL believed Child 1, in particular, was
"suffering" from not knowing "what[ was] going to happen from day-to-day."
Moreover, at the time of the TPR hearing, Mother faced pending criminal charges,
and her bond conditions related to the charges prohibited unsupervised contact
with Children. The GAL, who had served in the role since Children were
removed, recommended TPR.

The GAL testified Child 1 had changed foster placements shortly before the TPR
hearing when her former foster family left the country due to military service, but
she stated Child 1 had adapted well to her new foster home, attended therapy, and
was "working really hard" and behaving well at school. Further, at the post-trial
motion hearing, the case worker informed the family court that a teacher from the
previous school year was interested in having Child 1 placed with her, and Child 1
was open to remaining in the teacher's home on a long-term basis if she could not
return to Parents' home. Thus, even if Child 1 were not ultimately adopted, TPR
could give her a level of permanency that would be difficult to achieve by
preserving Mother's parental rights without the possibility of returning to her care.

As to Child 2, who was thirteen years old at the time of the TPR hearing, testimony
showed he was open to adoption, and DSS had identified a pre-adoptive placement
for him. The GAL testified Child 2 had "blossomed" in foster care and had
expressed that he was happy with his foster parent and would be "fine to be
adopted by" him. At the post-trial motion hearing, the case worker informed the
family court that Child 2 remained willing to be adopted by his foster family if he
was not able to return to Parents' home, and Parents' counsel confirmed the foster
family was considering adoption. Thus, we find TPR is in Children's best interests.

AFFIRMED.2

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.