Otis Owens v. Sheriff Hunt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Otis Owens, Respondent,

v.

Sheriff Michael Hunt, the Aiken County Sheriff's Office,
Aiken County Detention Center, and Aiken County,
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000009

Appeal From Aiken County
Courtney Clyburn Pope, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-271
Heard April 9, 2025 – Filed July 30, 2025

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann Law Firm, P.A.;
and William H. Davidson, II, of Davidson & Wren, PA,
both of Columbia, for Appellants.

Whitney Boykin Harrison, of McGowan Hood Felder &
Phillips, of Columbia; Joshua Thomas Hawkins, of
Hawkins & Jedziniak, LLC, of Greenville; and Ethan Lee
Jedziniak, of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Aiken County, Aiken County Detention Center, Aiken County
Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff Michael Hunt (Appellants) appeal the trial court's
denial of their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the
alternative, a new trial. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 25, 2017, Otis Owens, an inmate at the Aiken County Detention
Center, was searched by Deputy Matthew Gibson after Deputy Gibson observed
inmates with contraband. Owens alleged he had severe groin pain following the
search.

Owens was taken to medical, informed he would need an ultrasound, and
prescribed ibuprofen and antibiotics for the pain and swelling. Owens explained
his right testicle was much larger than his left, the area was tender to the touch, and
he had a sensation of fluid on his right testicle while the left testicle felt numb.

Owens wrote a statement and filed an inmate grievance about Deputy Gibson's pat
down. A Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)1 investigation was conducted;
however, no witnesses to the pat down were interviewed and no video recording of
the pat down was saved.

Owens filed a lawsuit against Appellants, alleging causes of action for gross
negligence and negligent hiring and supervision. Following Owens's case-in-chief,
Appellants moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. The jury found
Appellants grossly negligent in their supervision and confinement of Owens and
awarded Owens $150,000 in actual damages. Appellants moved for JNOV or, in
the alternative, a new trial absolute. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for a
new trial and granted in part and denied in part Appellants' JNOV motion,
dismissing Aiken County as a defendant. Appellants filed a motion to alter or
amend, which was denied. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court err by denying Appellants' motion for JNOV?

1
34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309.
II. Did the trial court err by denying Appellants' motion for a new trial
absolute?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, an appellate court must
employ the same standard as the trial court." Byrd ex. rel Julia B. v. McLeod
Physician Assocs. II, 427 S.C. 407, 412, 831 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ct. App. 2019)
(quoting Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 18, 640 S.E.2d 486, 495 (Ct. App. 2006)).
"[W]e reverse only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when the
ruling is governed by an error of law." Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.,
387 S.C. 22, 42, 691 S.E.2d 135, 145 (2010). "Whether to grant a new trial is a
matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and this decision will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is controlled by an
error of law." Id. at 49, 691 S.E.2d at 149.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. JNOV

A. Gross Negligence and Section 15-78-60(17)

Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for JNOV because
Owens's gross negligence claim is actually an assault claim. Appellants further
argue that they are immune from liability for assault claims under section
15-78-60(17) of the South Carolina Code (2005 & Supp. 2024). We disagree.

We find the trial court properly denied Appellants' motion for JNOV as to this
claim because Owens consistently presented evidence for a gross negligence claim.
Any reference to assault in Owens's claim was used, among other factual
allegations, to characterize how Appellants were grossly negligent in their
supervision and confinement of Owens. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (2005
& Supp. 2024) (providing that a government entity is not liable for a loss resulting
from "responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection,
control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client
of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a
grossly negligent manner"); Jackson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 301 S.C. 125, 126,
390 S.E.2d 467, 468 (Ct. App. 1989) ("A defendant is guilty of gross negligence if
he is so indifferent to the consequences of his conduct as not to give slight care to
what he is doing."); Marietta Garage, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 337 S.C.
133, 139–40, 522 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Ct. App. 1999) ("South Carolina courts define
gross negligence as the intentional, conscious failure to do something which one
ought to do or the doing of something one ought not to do; a relative term which
means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances; the failure to
exercise a slight degree of care; and where a person is so indifferent to the
consequences of his conduct as not to give slight care to what he is doing."). The
following evidence supports this claim: Deputy Gibson testified he used an
unsanctioned search method in violation of detention center policy while
performing the pat down on Owens. Multiple officers testified that an injury to an
inmate can occur from excessive force during a pat down. Sheriff Hunt testified
that the detention center's failure to preserve video footage of a sexual assault and
an injury that occurs during a pat down are violations of detention center policy.
Inmates and officers who witnessed the pat down described the search as rough
and immediately noticed Owens's discomfort. Owens testified to the events
leading to his injury, the pain and swelling of his testicles, and his timeline of
recovery. Owens and his parents testified to Owens's feelings of depression and
embarrassment following the pat down. Lieutenant Bowman admitted that the
detention center's PREA investigation did not comply with agency policies.
Therefore, considering this evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, we
hold the jury could have determined Deputy Gibson's pat down was excessive,
violated detention center policy, and Appellants' actions as failing to exercise slight
care towards Owens. Further, the protection from liability under section
15-78-60(17) does not extend to gross negligence and, thus, is not applicable here.
Accordingly, we affirm. See Austin, 387 S.C. at 42, 691 S.E.2d at 145 ("[W]e
reverse only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when the ruling is
governed by an error of law.").

B. Duty of Care

Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the duty of
care owed. This argument is unpreserved for appellate review as Appellants did
not object to the trial court's jury instructions or argue that the trial court failed to
instruct the jury on the duty of care. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76,
497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge
to be preserved for appellate review.").

C. Negligent Hiring/Supervision
Appellants argue the trial court erred in ruling Owens presented sufficient evidence
to support his negligent hiring and supervision claim. We agree and hold the trial
court erred in failing to grant Appellants' JNOV motion as to this cause of action.
Owens's brief concedes the trial court should have granted JNOV on this cause of
action, and the verdict form did not include negligent hiring or supervision. Owens
did not argue at trial that Appellants were negligent in their hiring or supervision of
Deputy Gibson. Instead, all arguments and testimony presented concerned
Appellants' failure to adhere to proper pat down policies.

D. Failure to Provide Medical Care

Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying JNOV on Owens's failure to
provide medical care claim. We hold the trial court did not err in denying JNOV
on this issue. Owens neither pled a cause of action for failure to provide medical
care nor did he argue at trial that he received improper or deficient medical care.
Furthermore, the jury did not return a verdict for failure to provide medical care.
Thus, Appellants' argument is unavailing and there is no relief this court can
provide on a claim that was not pled or considered by the jury.

II. New Trial Absolute

A. Grossly Excessive Verdict

Appellants argue the record is devoid of evidence supporting the jury's $150,000
verdict for actual damages. Appellants contend Owens presented no evidence of
medical bills, out of pocket expenses, permanent impairment, or future medical
expenses resulting from Appellants' actions. They aver the verdict is
disproportionate to the sustained injuries and is based on bias, prejudice, or other
improper considerations due to the lack of supporting evidence. We disagree.
Although Appellants are correct that Owens did not produce evidence of medical
bills, out of pocket costs, or permanent impairment, Owens did testify and present
evidence as to severe pain and swelling of his testicles, embarrassment, and
humiliation due to the pat down. Additionally, this court has upheld a verdict over
three times the amount awarded here when the plaintiff incurred relatively low
medical bills and lost wages. See Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 501–03, 709
S.E.2d 79, 82–83 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding the trial court's denial of motions for a
new trial absolute and nisi remittitur was not erroneous when the jury awarded the
plaintiff $450,000 in actual damages and the plaintiff only claimed $4,530.98 in
medical bills and $2,615.76 in lost wages and the plaintiff's doctors believed he
had recovered from his pain). Thus, under our highly deferential standard of
review, we hold the trial court did not err in declining to grant a new trial due to an
excessive verdict. See Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35,
39–40, 351 S.E.2d 897, 900 (Ct. App. 1986) ("A motion for a new trial based on
excessiveness of the verdict is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
and is not subject to review absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 40, 351 S.E.2d
at 900 ("In a personal injury case, the amount to be awarded for the injury and any
resulting pain and suffering cannot be determined with mathematical precision and
is necessarily a matter of judgment on the facts of each case which must be left to
the jury's discretion."); id. ("Where the amount of the verdict bears a reasonable
relationship to the character and extent of the injury and the damage sustained, it is
not excessive."); Howard v. Roberson, 376 S.C. 143, 154, 654 S.E.2d 877, 883 (Ct.
App. 2007) ("The jury's determination of damages, however, is entitled to
substantial deference."); Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 57, 710 S.E.2d 84,
89 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[A]s an appellate court, we sit neither to determine whether
we agree with the verdict nor to decide whether we agree with the trial [court]'s
decision not to disturb it"); id. ("[W]e employ a highly deferential standard of
review when considering the trial [court]'s ruling on each of the grounds for a new
trial."). Thus, we affirm on this issue.

B. Lay Testimony of Hydrocele2 Injury

Appellants argue the trial court erred in allowing Owens to present lay testimony
that he developed a hydrocele caused by Deputy Gibson's pat down. We disagree.
Primarily, Appellants object to Owens mentioning the medical term for the injury
to his testicles—hydrocele. We find the trial court did not err in admitting the lay
testimony. Owens testified as to the nature and extent of his injury and the events
leading to it. He explained what he felt immediately after the pat down and the
days following it. See O'Leary–Payne v. R.R. Hilton Head, II, Inc., 371 S.C. 340,
349, 638 S.E.2d 96, 101 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Expert testimony is not required to
prove proximate cause if the common knowledge or experience of a layperson is
extensive enough."); Roscoe v. Grubb, 237 S.C. 590, 596, 118 S.E.2d 337, 340
(1961) ("[W]here physical injury is coincident with or immediately follows an
accident and is naturally and directly connected with it lay testimony may be
sufficient to carry to the triers of the facts the issue of whether or not the accident

2
See Hydrocele, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/hydrocele/symptoms-causes/syc-20363969 (last visited June 10, 2025)
("A hydrocele (HI-droe-seel) is a type of swelling in the scrotum, the pouch of skin
that holds the testicles.").
proximately caused it . . . ."); Wilder v. Blue Ribbon Taxicab Corp., 396 S.C. 139,
146–47, 719 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding the trial court did not err by
admitting plaintiff's "own testimony of her injuries" when "there was no expert
testimony and the only evidence that [plaintiff's] 'medical bills were a result of
injuries she sustained in the accident' was her own testimony"). Even if Owens
using the medical term was an error, any error in the use of this term was cured
because the trial court issued a curative instruction to the jury to disregard any
statements regarding "hydroceles." See State v. George, 323 S.C. 496, 510, 476
S.E.2d 903, 911–12 (1996) ("If the trial judge sustains a timely objection to
testimony and gives the jury a curative instruction to disregard the testimony, the
error is deemed to be cured.").

C. Common Plan/Scheme Testimony

Appellants argue the trial court erred in allowing other inmates to testify about
Deputy Gibson's conduct during prior pat down searches to establish proof of a
common plan or scheme. We disagree. We find the other inmates' testimony
concerning Deputy Gibson's pat downs resulting in injury was admissible under
Rule 404(b). See Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith."); id. ("It may, however, be admissible to show motive,
identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or
accident, or intent."); Judy v. Judy, 384 S.C. 634, 642, 682 S.E.2d 836, 840 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("Where the other bad acts are not the subject of conviction, they must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence."); id. ("When considering whether
there is clear and convincing evidence, this [c]ourt is bound by the trial court's
findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); id. ("Prior bad act evidence is
admissible where the evidence is of such a close similarity to the charged offense
that the previous act enhances the probative value of the evidence so as to
outweigh the prejudicial effect."). The trial court ruled this testimony was
admissible because it was "so related in character, time, and place of commission
as to show existence of common plan or system." The inmates testified Deputy
Gibson used the improper blade method of patting them down, that all experienced
injuries to their testicles, and all experienced similar symptoms as Owens and
needed medical attention. Thus, we hold this testimony had a close degree of
similarity to Owens's allegations and injuries and was admissible. Thus, we affirm.

D. Retaliation Testimony
Appellants argue the trial court erred in allowing other inmates to testify that
Deputy Gibson retaliated against Owens because Owens alleged no claim for
retaliation and the events in the testimony did not occur in "immediate temporal
proximity" to the pat down. We hold this evidence was relevant to show
Appellants did not exercise slight care in the supervision and confinement of
Owens—the main cause of action pled by Owens. See Wilder, 396 S.C. at 146,
719 S.E.2d at 707 ("On appeal, this court will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary
rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion."); Rule 402, SCRE ("All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, statutes, these rules,
or by other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.").

E. Prison Rape Reduction Act Investigation3

Appellants argue the trial court erred in allowing Owens to introduce testimony
and allegations concerning PREA. We hold the trial court did not err in permitting
this evidence. Immediately after the pat down Owens filed a grievance and a
PREA investigation ensued. The investigation was relevant and directly related to
Owens's allegations of an improper pat down search and resulting injury. Thus, we
hold the trial court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for new trial on this
ground.

F. Aiken County

Appellants argue the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Aiken County at the
directed verdict stage. However, their arguments are conclusory and unsupported
by authority. Thus, we affirm the trial court. See Mead v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor,
419 S.C. 125, 139, 796 S.E.2d 165, 172 (Ct. App. 2016) ("An issue is deemed
abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief
but not supported by authority." (quoting Bryson v. Bryson, 378 S.C. 502, 510, 662
S.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct. App. 2008))); id. at 139, 796 S.E.2d at 172–73 ("When an
appellant provides no legal authority regarding a particular argument, the argument
is abandoned and the court can decline to address the merits of the issue.").

3
PREA establishes national standards for prisons for the prevention and
punishment of prison rape. Under PREA regulations, prisons must collect and
store certain data–such as any video surveillance of the prison–and investigate
should an inmate allege a sexual assault. 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.86-89, 115.71-73
(2025).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Appellants'
motion for a new trial or JNOV with regard to Owens's claim for gross negligence.
However, we find the trial court erred in denying Appellants' JNOV motion
concerning Owens's negligent hiring and supervision cause of action.
Accordingly, the holdings of the trial court are

AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.