State v. Harold G. White, III

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Harold Gene White, III, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000579

Appeal From York County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6113
Submitted May 1, 2025 – Filed July 2, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
both of Columbia, and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of
York, for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.: Appellant Harold Gene White, III challenges his convictions for
possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone, possession of oxycodone,
possession of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. White
argues the circuit court erred by declining to suppress evidence seized during
searches of his home and his cell phone because the information in the search
warrant affidavits was insufficient to show probable cause. White also argues the
text messages extracted from his cell phone should have been excluded from
evidence because they contained inadmissible hearsay and constituted propensity
evidence prohibited by Rule 404(b), SCRE. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was precipitated by the death of White's infant daughter. During
the investigation of her death, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the only
two places where she had been on the day of her death, White's home and the home
of White's mother. During the search of White's home, law enforcement discovered
and seized evidence of the crimes with which he was charged in this case, i.e.,
possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, possession of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute
hydrocodone.

Specifically, on March 29, 2017, the Rock Hill Police Department and
Piedmont Medical Center EMS personnel responded to a 911 call from the home of
White's mother, Yolanda Adams, concerning White's nine-month-old daughter
(Infant), who was unconscious and not breathing. First responders took Infant to
Piedmont Medical Center, where she was pronounced dead. Special Agent Trista
Baird, with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), learned of
Infant's death and began an investigation the same day. She interviewed White and
Adams and received the results of Infant's autopsy approximately seventeen days
later, circa April 15, 2017. The results revealed that Infant had fentanyl and
norfentanyl in her blood at the time of her death.

On April 17, 2017, Special Agent Baird submitted to the local magistrate
affidavits to support her request for a warrant to search Adams's and White's
respective residences for

[a]ny and all evidence related to the death of [Infant]: to
include Fentanyl (a DEA Schedule II synthetic morphine
substitute anesthetic/analgesic), any substances suspected
to be Fentanyl, and any paraphernalia or items associated
with the use of Fentanyl; state issued identification card
and/or driver's license of any and all individuals at the
residence; any and all cellphones belonging to: [White,
Adams, and other individuals present in Adams's home].
In her affidavit, Special Agent Baird gave the following reasons for her belief
that the property sought was on the subject premises:

On March 29, 2017, at approximately 5:56 pm, Piedmont
Medical Center EMS and Rock Hill Police Department
(RHPD) were dispatched to xxxx Simpson Street in the
city limits of Rock Hill, South Carolina, in reference to a
9-month-old female ([Infant] dob xxxxx 2016; dod
3/29/2017) unconscious and not breathing. EMS arrived
on scene and found [Infant] supine on the living room
floor with a female performing chest compressions. She
was unresponsive, not breathing, had no pulse, and had
vomit coming from her mouth. She was transported to
Piedmont Medical Center[,] where she was pronounced
deceased. York County Coroner's Office, RHPD, and
SLED responded to the hospital.

According to [Infant]'s father (Harold Gene White III), his
mother (Yolanda Harris Adams) picked up his twins
([Infant] and [Infant 2]) from his residence (xxxx Amanda
Lane, Rock Hill, South Carolina) at approximately 11:00
am or 12:00 pm on March 29, 2017. Adams took the twins
to her residence at xxxx Simpson Street. Later in the
afternoon, [White] went to Adams'[s] house and found
[Infant] asleep in Adams'[s] bed. [Infant 2] was playing
with Adam[s]'s friend (Williette Woodard Beard) in the
living room. Adams was not home. [White] then left the
residence.

According to Adams, her neighbor (Jasmine Latasha
Rawlinson) picked the twins up from [White] and brought
them to [Adams's] house around lunchtime. Adams fed
the twins each a bottle with formula mixed with infant
cereal. Then, the three of them lay down on her bed and
went to sleep. Adams and [Infant 2] both woke up, got out
of bed, and left [Infant] sleeping in the bed. Adams got
her children ready for their doctor's appointment and asked
Amanda Jo Pettrey (who resides at her residence) and
Beard to watch [Infant] and [Infant 2] while she took her
children to the doctor. When she [got] home, Adams was
told that [Infant] was still asleep and went to check on her.
She found her unresponsive and not breathing. Adams
brought [Infant] to Julisa White, who had arrived on scene
at some point prior to Adams'[s] arrival. Amanda Pettrey
began CPR in the living room. Rawlinson, who was also
on scene, called 911. Darrell Rodney Ross, who resides at
the residence, was asleep in one of the bedrooms for most
of the day.

An autopsy was completed on March 30, 2017. The
toxicology report from NMS Labs revealed that [Infant]
had 17 ng/mL of Fentanyl and 5.2 ng/mL of Norfentanyl
in her blood at the time of her death.

It is the belief of this affiant that information gained from
this search is necessary to assist investigators in
determining the cause and manner of death of [Infant], the
individuals who were present at the time and leading up to
her death, and the timeline of events surrounding her
death.

Without taking any additional testimony, the magistrate issued warrants to search
the residences, and Special Agents Jason Wells and M. Skipper Wallace executed
the warrants on that same day. 1 Special Agents Wells and Wallace seized from
White's residence ten cell phones, multiple bags of suspected marijuana, a scale,
several firearms, multiple pills of various shapes and colors, a small brown envelope
containing white powder, and a hand-tied plastic bag containing white powder.

On April 25, 2017, SLED issued a laboratory report analyzing the substances
found in White's home and identified them as hydrocodone and acetaminophen in
one sample, alprazolam in another sample, prescription ibuprofen, oxycodone,
cyclobenzaprine, cocaine, and marijuana. On that same day, Special Agent Baird
submitted to the magistrate another affidavit to support her request for a warrant to
search the cell phones seized from White's residence, seeking: "Any and all data, to
include but not limited to records, images, call logs, phone numbers, text messages,
videos, voice messages, internet history, GPS location information, wireless

1
Neither the search warrant for Adams's home nor the corresponding return appear
in the record.
networks, passwords, user accounts, and emails. All information pertaining to the
investigation regarding the death of [Infant.]"

In her affidavit, Special Agent Baird's stated reasons for her belief that the
data sought was on the subject cell phones were virtually identical to those reasons
stated in her April 17 affidavit, with the addition of the following language: "These
cellphones were obtained from a search warrant that was executed on April 18,2
2017 at xxxx Amanda Lane[,] Rock Hill, South Carolina. Extractions of these
cellphones are needed at this time." The magistrate issued the warrant, and Special
Agent Baird and Detective Brooks Felmet, of the Rock Hill Police Department,
extracted data from four of the phones.3 The data extracted from White's phone
consisted of text messages exchanged between White and other individuals in late
February, March, and April 2017 that included illegal-drug-trade parlance, e.g.,
"smoke" (marijuana); "pine" (marijuana); "blues" (oxycodone or "clandestinely
manufacture[d] Fentanyl pills"); "perkies" (prescription Percocet, a combination of
oxycodone and acetaminophen); "yaps" (MDMA, a/k/a/ ecstasy, or hydrocodone);
"white" (hydrocodone or oxycodone); and "little snow" (cocaine). 4

A grand jury indicted White for possession with intent to distribute
oxycodone, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of cocaine,
and possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone. The circuit court conducted a
bench trial in April 2022 and found White guilty of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana, possession of cocaine, possession of oxycodone, and
possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone.5 The court sentenced White to two
years for the marijuana conviction, three years for the cocaine conviction (second
offense), two years for the oxycodone conviction (second offense), and seven years
for the hydrocodone conviction (second offense), to run concurrently. This appeal
followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

2
This appears to be a typographical error as the return to the search warrant is dated
April 17, 2017.
3
They were unable to extract any data from the remainder.
4
The earliest text was dated February 19, 2017, and the latest text was dated April
12, 2017.
5
A bench trial was initially conducted in 2019 but ended in a mistrial as defense
counsel admitted he was reading a novel during the first day of trial.
1. Did the circuit court err by denying White's motion to suppress the evidence
seized from his home and cell phone when the information in the search
warrant affidavits was insufficient to establish probable cause?

2. Did the text messages extracted from White's cell phone constitute
inadmissible propensity evidence?

3. Did the admission of the text messages into evidence violate Rule 403, SCRE?

4. Did the text messages contain inadmissible hearsay?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motion to Suppress

In evaluating the circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this court
reviews the factual findings for any evidentiary support, "but the ultimate legal
conclusion . . . is a question of law subject to de novo review." State v. Frasier, 437
S.C. 625, 633–34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022).

Admission of Evidence

"The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557,
564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002). Further, "[t]o warrant reversal based on the wrongful
admission of evidence, the complaining party must prove resulting prejudice." State
v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011).

Moreover, in the present case, this court's assessment of prejudice "must be
viewed from the posture of a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial." State v. Inman,
395 S.C. 539, 565, 720 S.E.2d 31, 45 (2011). "It is well-established that it is a near
insurmountable burden for a defendant to prove prejudice in the context of a bench
trial as a judge is presumed to disregard prejudicial or inadmissible evidence." Id.
See also Cole v. Commonwealth, 428 S.E.2d 303, 305 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)
(reviewing an evidentiary ruling in a bench trial and stating, "'A judge, unlike a juror,
is uniquely suited by training, experience[,] and judicial discipline to disregard
potentially prejudicial comments and to separate, during the mental process of
adjudication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though he has heard both.'
Consequently, we presume that a trial judge disregards prejudicial or inadmissible
evidence. Finally, 'this presumption will control in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary.'" (citations omitted) (first quoting Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 279
S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va. 1981), then quoting Hall v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 455,
462 (Va. Ct. App. 1992))); id. ("This is not to say that the admission of improper
evidence in a bench trial may never result in reversible error. Where the record
makes clear that the judge considered such inadmissible evidence in adjudicating the
merits of the case, reversal would be appropriate.").

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Suppress

White asserts the circuit court should have granted his motion to exclude from
evidence the items seized from his home and cell phone because the information in
the search warrant affidavits was insufficient to establish probable cause. See State
v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2002) ("Evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial."). Specifically,
White argues, "the affidavits did not state why police thought [White] exposed
[Infant] to drugs or why they believed drugs would be found at [White's] home given
the amount of time that had passed since [Infant's] death." We disagree.

The totality of the circumstances set forth in Special Agent Baird's April 17
affidavit established a fair probability that incriminating evidence related to the
cause of Infant's death, including evidence of the unlawful possession of fentanyl,
would be found in either White's or Adams's home despite the passage of nineteen
days since Infant's death. Likewise, the totality of the circumstances set forth in
Special Agent Baird's April 25 affidavit established a fair probability that
incriminating evidence related to the cause of Infant's death would be found in data
extracted from the cell phones seized in the April 17 search of White's home.
Therefore, the April 17 and 25 warrants were supported by probable cause. See State
v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 617, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014) ("A warrant is supported
by probable cause if, given the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place."); State v. Bennett, 256 S.C. 234, 240, 182 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1971)
("To justify issuance of a search warrant[,] probable cause must be shown[,] but the
term 'probable cause' does not import absolute certainty."); see also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("[P]robable cause . . . does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical, nontechnical'
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.").

II. Admission of Text Messages
A. Propensity Evidence

White contends the text messages on his phone revealing drug transactions
conducted in late February through April 2017 should have been excluded from
evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE, which prohibits the admission of evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith." White argues (1) he was not on trial for these drug
transactions, and thus, they lacked logical relevance; (2) these transactions were too
remote in time to April 17, 2017, the date of the offenses for which he was being
tried, citing State v. Ostrowski, 435 S.C. 364, 867 S.E.2d 269 (Ct. App. 2021); and
(3) the State did not prove the transactions by clear and convincing evidence.

Here, the circuit court ruled that the text messages not involving the types of
drugs for which White was indicted were inadmissible. As to the other texts, the
State offered them to show White's intent to distribute the drugs, which was
necessary to prove the charges of possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone
and oxycodone, respectively, 6 unlike the circumstances in Ostrowski. Additionally,
the presiding judge stated that he would give these texts the credibility he believed
they deserved whenever he weighed the evidence at the trial's conclusion. As we
explain below, these texts were admissible.

Prior drug transactions may be admitted into evidence to show intent. Rule
404(b), SCRE (stating that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts "may . . . be
admissible to show . . . intent"); State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 7, 545 S.E.2d 827, 830
(2001) ("[E]vidence of a prior drug transaction is relevant on the issue of intent when
the defendant has been charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute."); State v. King, 349 S.C. 142, 153, 561 S.E.2d 640, 645–46 (Ct. App.
2002) ("Testimony relating to a defendant's past drug distribution activities is
admissible to establish the element of intent."); id. at 146, 155, 561 S.E.2d at 642,
646 (affirming the admission of testimony of the defendant's forty prior drug
transactions dating back one year); see also State v. Gore, 299 S.C. 368, 370, 384
S.E.2d 750, 751 (1989) ("The evidence that appellant sold cocaine from [a] trailer
on two occasions only one month earlier tends to establish his intent regarding the
cocaine in his possession at the time in question." (emphasis added)).

6
SLED agents seized enough marijuana from White's home to meet the statutory
presumption of intent to distribute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(d)(5) (Supp.
2024) (twenty-eight grams).
Further, when the amount seized by law enforcement is not enough to meet a
statutory presumption of intent to distribute or there exists no such presumption for
a particular drug, the probative value of prior drug transactions showing intent to
distribute is high. Compare Wilson, 345 S.C. at 7–8, 545 S.E.2d at 830 (noting the
State was required to rely on evidence of prior drug transactions and other
circumstantial evidence to prove intent because the amount of crack seized was less
than the amount that triggered the statutory presumption of intent and concluding,
"[i]n light of the State's reliance on circumstantial evidence to prove intent, the
evidence of a prior drug transaction only two days earlier at the same location was
especially probative"), with Ostrowski, 435 S.C. at 394–96, 867 S.E.2d at 284–85
(concluding the evidence of the defendant's prior drug transactions was unnecessary
because the amount of methamphetamine found in a pair of men's pants in the
defendant's residence was enough to trigger the statutory presumption of trafficking
and distinguishing the case from Wilson and Gore).

We acknowledge our statement in Ostrowski that text messages dating back
three weeks before the date of the defendant's arrest were too remote in time to have
logical relevance to the defendant's identity as the owner of the methamphetamine
found by law enforcement. 435 S.C. at 394, 867 S.E.2d at 284. However, the court's
analysis as to proof of intent measured the probative value of the evidence by its
necessity to the State's case. Id. at 394–96, 867 S.E.2d at 284–85. The court did not
purport to overrule Wilson or Gore, which are controlling on the issue of White's
intent to distribute.

Further, we are not persuaded by White's argument that the State failed to
meet its burden of showing clear and convincing evidence of the drug transactions
referenced in the text messages. Specifically, White contends that the State did not
show the transactions referenced in the text messages actually occurred. However,
we do not view the completion of the transactions as necessary to show clear and
convincing evidence of White's intent. The testimony of Officer Dana Gatti, who
was qualified as an expert in "drug slang" assisted the circuit court in determining
the meaning of certain language used in the texts.7 Viewing the texts in light of this
testimony, we conclude the State showed clear and convincing evidence of White's
intent to distribute.

Moreover, any error in admitting the texts involving marijuana, oxycodone,
or cocaine was harmless because law enforcement seized enough marijuana to

7
White does not challenge the validity of this testimony or the qualification of
Officer Gatti as an expert on appeal.
trigger the statutory presumption of intent to distribute, see supra, n. 6, and White
was convicted of mere possession of oxycodone and cocaine, respectively.

B. Rule 403

White also contends that the admission of the text messages violated Rule
403, SCRE, 8 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. "Evidence of other crimes, even if logically relevant to prove
intent, is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice to the defendant." Wilson, 345 S.C. at 7, 545 S.E.2d at 830. "The
determination of prejudice must be based on the entire record and the result will
generally turn on the facts of each case." Id. "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it
has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, such as an
emotional one." Id. (emphasis added). Here, the circuit court ruled that the
challenged evidence was admissible under Rule 403. We agree.

The circuit court conducted a bench trial at White's request, and nothing in the
record indicates the circuit court relied on inadmissible evidence in its determination
of White's guilt. To the contrary, during the trial, the presiding judge stated that his
decision on guilt would not be tainted by inadmissible evidence. He also stated that
he would give the evidence the weight and credibility he believed it deserved.
Therefore, the danger of unfair prejudice in White's bench trial was very low and
could not substantially outweigh the high probative value of the texts involving
hydrocodone and oxycodone or even the somewhat lower probative value of the
texts involving the marijuana charge. See Inman, 395 S.C. at 565, 720 S.E.2d at 45
("[I]t is a near insurmountable burden for a defendant to prove prejudice in the
context of a bench trial as a judge is presumed to disregard prejudicial or
inadmissible evidence."); see also Cole, 428 S.E.2d at 305 (reviewing an evidentiary
ruling in a bench trial and stating, "'A judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by
training, experience and judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial
comments and to separate, during the mental process of adjudication, the admissible
from the inadmissible, even though he has heard both.' Consequently, we presume
that a trial judge disregards prejudicial or inadmissible evidence. Finally, 'this
presumption will control in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.'" (citations
omitted) (first quoting Eckhart, 279 S.E.2d at 157, then quoting Hall, 421 S.E.2d at

8
Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
462)); id. ("This is not to say that the admission of improper evidence in a bench
trial may never result in reversible error. Where the record makes clear that the judge
considered such inadmissible evidence in adjudicating the merits of the case,
reversal would be appropriate.").

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the probative value of the evidence
"was not substantially outweighed by the danger of suggesting a decision on an
emotional or other improper basis."9

C. Hearsay

Finally, White maintains that the content of the texts constituted inadmissible
hearsay because the statements were made out-of-court and offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. See Rule 801(c), SCRE (defining hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted"). We disagree.

As to the statements of third parties within the texts, the State did not offer
them for the truth of the matter asserted but rather for the effect that the statements
had on White, giving context to his responsive texts. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 660 (2025) ("[A]n out-of-court statement is not hearsay when offered to prove its
effect on a listener's mind or to show why the listener subsequently acted as the
listener did." (emphasis added)); cf. Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C.
19, 30–31, 609 S.E.2d 506, 511–12 (2005), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Wallace, 440 S.C. 537, 892 S.E.2d 310 (2023) (holding that an expert's explanation
for not taking a board certification test, i.e., "And the opinion of legal counsel was
that there may be a conflict of interest if I will take the exam, which it was perceived
that I kn[e]w[] all the answers," was not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted); State v. Griffin, 277 S.C. 193, 198, 285 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) (holding
the circuit court erred in excluding as hearsay the defendant's testimony that "a friend
had told him the deceased owned a firearm" because "[i]n attempting to prove self
defense, [the defendant] offered the evidence to show he believed the deceased
owned a firearm, not to prove the deceased in fact owned a gun"); State v. White,
425 S.C. 304, 310, 821 S.E.2d 523, 527 (Ct. App. 2018) ("We find the statement
was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e.[,] . . . [the victim]
actually had a gun and knife on his moped. Instead, [the defendant] offered the
statement to show he believed [the victim] had weapons on his moped."); id. at 310

9
Wilson, 345 S.C. at 8, 545 S.E.2d at 830.
n.2, 821 S.E.2d at 527 n.2 (noting that other jurisdictions "have similarly held
statements were not hearsay when they were offered to show the effect of the
statement on the listener's state of mind when the listener's state of mind was relevant
to the case" (emphasis added)).

White also argues that his own statements within the texts, which are
admissions of a party-opponent that are not considered hearsay, 10 were inadmissible
because the State failed to show White's phone was in his possession when the texts
were received or sent from his phone. However, White has not cited any authority
to support this conclusory argument and, therefore, he has abandoned it. See State
v. Jones, 344 S.C. 48, 58–59, 543 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2001) (holding an issue is
deemed abandoned on appeal if it is argued in a short, conclusory statement without
supporting authority (citing Muir v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 336 S.C. 266, 519 S.E.2d 583
(Ct. App. 1999))).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm. 11

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and TURNER, J., concur.

10
See Rule 801(d)(2)(A), SCRE (excluding from the definition of hearsay a
statement "offered against a party [that] is . . . the party's own statement in either an
individual or a representative capacity").
11
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.