Rita R. Greenawalt v. Nissan North America, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Rita R. Greenawalt and James M. Greenawalt,
Appellants,

v.

Nissan North America, Inc., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001124

Appeal From Berkeley County
Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-173
Submitted March 3, 2025 – Filed May 28, 2025

AFFIRMED

C. Steven Moskos, of C. Steven Moskos, PA, of North
Charleston, and Brooks Roberts Fudenberg, of Law
Office of Brooks R. Fudenberg, LLC, of Charleston, both
for Appellants.

Sarah Theresa Eibling, Blake Terence Williams, and
Scott Douglas MacLatchie, Jr., all of Columbia; and
Ashia Bre'ana Crooms-Carpenter, of Charlotte, NC, all of
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This appeal is about an award of attorney's fees. Appellants
brought claims against Nissan North America, Inc., under several consumer
protection statutes. The claims arose out of the purchase of an automobile.

The parties ultimately reached a settlement that required Nissan to repurchase the
vehicle, stipulated Appellants were prevailing parties, and submitted the issue of
attorney's fees to the circuit court. Appellants initially sought about $97,000 in fees
based on the number of hours devoted to the case, but through the process of briefing
and arguing the fee request in the circuit court, the requested hourly fees increased
to $131,000. On top of that, Appellants proposed a 1.5 multiplier, bringing the total
fee request to roughly $197,000.

The circuit court awarded $75,000 in fees. Appellants concede the court performed
the appropriate legal analysis up until the portion of the order reducing the award.
Appellants argue this was error because they are statutorily entitled to all hours
"actually expended," or "full compensation." We respectfully disagree and affirm.

The determination of a reasonable fee award "generally rests within the circuit
court's discretion, and we will not disturb an award absent an abuse of discretion."
Brawley v. Richland County, 445 S.C. 80, 94, 911 S.E.2d 156, 163 (Ct. App. 2025);
see also Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008) ("[T]he
specific amount of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a statute authorizing
reasonable attorneys' fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on
unsupported factual conclusions." Layman, 376 S.C. at 444, 658 S.E.2d at 325.

Appellants argue, among other things, the federal Warranty Act and state Lemon
Law each mandate a fee award be "based on actual time expended" and that they
were therefore entitled to all hours submitted in this case unless Nissan demonstrated
certain time included in the request was clearly unrelated. We disagree. First, all of
the statutes involved, including the federal Warranty Act and state Lemon Law,
require a fee award to be reasonable. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110(1) (2018)
(providing for "reasonable attorney's fee[s]"); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) (2023)
(providing for an award of "reasonable attorney's fees and costs"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-28-50(D) (2018) (allowing, in the court's discretion, an award of attorney's fees
"based on actual time expended" but "determined by the court to have been
reasonably incurred"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(2) (West) (same as section
56-28-50(D)). Second, we have not located a mandate in any statute or precedent
requiring a circuit court to fully award the amount of attorney's fees requested via a
submission of hours. Precedent explains, "The award of attorney's fees is made to
the party, not his lawyer." Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 307, 486 S.E.2d 750,
759 (1997). And though looking at the hours expended multiplied by the attorney's
rate may be a "useful starting point," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983),
that number is only part of the analysis, not the end of the analysis.

As our supreme court has explained, "the overriding benchmark for awards of
attorneys' fees . . . is that attorneys' fees must be 'reasonable.'" Layman, 376 S.C. at
455, 658 S.E.2d at 331. And so, as long as "a trial court's decision is made on a
sound evidentiary basis and is adequately explained with specific findings—as the
law requires—we [will] defer to the trial court's discretion." Horton v. Jasper Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 423 S.C. 325, 331, 815 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2018); see also Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (finding it proper for trial courts to "take into account their
overall sense of a suit, and . . . use estimates in calculating and allocating an
attorney's time"). Here, we read the circuit court's order as explaining the court
found $75,000 to be a reasonable amount of fees based on the history of the case,
the ultimate outcome, and the purpose of the statutes—to protect consumers and, in
Appellants' own words, "reduce the problem of businesses not playing fair." It is
evident the circuit court considered the hours expended, and we are not aware of any
authority precluding the circuit court from determining that a lower fee is reasonable.
Because we find the circuit court's analysis and decision more than sufficient to
satisfy the discretionary standard described above, we affirm.

We believe this analysis controls all of Appellants' remaining arguments with the
exception of the argument that the circuit court erred in citing federal caselaw when
the court denied their motion to reconsider. We do not wish to minimize the error
of applying an incorrect standard to a motion to reconsider, but the motion occurred
after a hearing, extensive briefing, and was nothing more than a request that the court
reconsider arguments the court had already evaluated in detail. The order denying
reconsideration expressly noted that the court considered the issues in Appellants'
motion. We have no doubt that the highly experienced and extremely capable circuit
court judge felt free to modify the award if he believed a modification was warranted,
and given the thorough analysis in the original order and our agreement with that
analysis, we conclude the citation of federal cases does not warrant reversal. See
Judy v. Judy, 384 S.C. 634, 646, 682 S.E.2d 836, 842 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Generally,
appellate courts will not set aside judgments due to insubstantial errors not affecting
the result.").
AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.