Cynthia Strong v. Jack Strong

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Cynthia Strong, Appellant,

v.

Jack W. Strong, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001517

Appeal From Williamsburg County
Thomas M. Bultman, Family Court Judge
Gordon B. Jenkinson, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-134
Submitted April 16, 2025 – Filed April 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

Mary Amanda Harrelson Shuler, of Whetstone Perkins &
Fulda, LLC, of Kingstree, for Appellant.

Michele Dahl Sturkie, of Sturkie Law, LLC, of Florence,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Cynthia Strong (Wife) appeals a family court order declining to
hold Jack W. Strong (Husband) in contempt. On appeal, Wife argues the family
court erred in (1) determining the divorce decree and final order approving an
amended property agreement (the Decree) contained inconsistent language and (2)
refusing to hold Husband in contempt for failing to abide by the Decree. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the family court did not err in determining the Decree contained
inconsistent language and refusing to hold Husband in contempt for failing to pay
Wife $2,500 in monthly payments. See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414,
709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews
factual and legal issues de novo."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384, 709 S.E.2d
650, 651 (2011) (stating an appellate court has the ability to find facts in
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence); S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-3-620 (Supp. 2024) ("An adult who wilfully violates, neglects, or
refuses to obey or perform a lawful order of the court . . . may be proceeded
against for contempt of court."). At the contempt hearing, Wife presented the
Decree, which the family court admitted into evidence without objection, and she
testified about her understanding of Husband's support obligation under the Decree
and his failure to pay. See Miller v. Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 454, 652 S.E.2d 754, 760
(Ct. App. 2007) ("In a proceeding for contempt for violation of a court order, the
moving party must show the existence of a court order and the facts establishing
the respondent's noncompliance with the order." (quoting Hawkins v. Mullins, 359
S.C. 497, 501, 597 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ct. App. 2004))).

However, also at the contempt hearing, Wife acknowledged the provisions stated
two separate things, and Husband testified he "s[aw] the problem in the order"
regarding the provisions. In the alimony portion of the Decree, the parties waived
"alimony, support and maintenance." Later, in the equitable division of the marital
assets portion of the Decree, specifically the subsection titled "Support and
Maintenance," the parties agreed Husband would "pay $2500.00 to [W]ife every
other pay period[,] which amount w[ould] include the mortgage payment on the
house and payments on [W]ife's vehicle." The parties further agreed in the same
subsection that the $2,500 payment would "be reduced by $1045.00 once the
mortgage loan on the house [was] paid off," at which time Wife would "receive a
payment of $1455.00, from . . . Husband, every other pay period." Therefore, as
the family court found, the permanent waiver of "alimony, support and
maintenance" is "totally inconsistent and diametrically opposed to the award of
spousal support and maintenance" in the later provision. Because the parties
waived "alimony, support and maintenance" in one portion of the Decree and
awarded Wife support and maintenance—the portion of the $2,500 payment not
applicable to the mortgage—in a subsequent part of the Decree, we hold the family
court did not err in determining the Decree contained inconsistent language and
refusing to hold Husband in contempt. See generally Lacke v. Lacke, 362 S.C.
302, 309, 608 S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A contract is ambiguous when it
is capable of more than one meaning or when its meaning is unclear." (quoting
Smith-Cooper v. Cooper, 344 S.C. 289, 301, 543 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Ct. App.
2001))); Wilson v. Walker, 340 S.C. 531, 538, 532 S.E.2d 19, 22 (Ct. App. 2000)
("Before a party may be found in contempt, the record must clearly and
specifically show the contemptuous conduct."); Taylor v. Taylor, 434 S.C. 307,
317, 863 S.E.2d 335, 340 (Ct. App. 2021) ("One may not be convicted of contempt
for violating a court order which fails to tell him in definite terms what he must do.
The language of the commands must be clear and certain rather than implied."
(quoting Phillips v. Phillips, 288 S.C. 185, 188, 341 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1986))); id.
at 316, 863 S.E.2d at 340 ("A willful act is one which is 'done voluntarily and
intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the
specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done . . . .'" (quoting
Widman v. Widman, 348 S.C. 97, 119, 557 S.E.2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 2001)));
Miller, 375 S.C. at 454, 652 S.E.2d at 760 ("Where a contemnor is unable, without
fault on his part, to obey an order of the court, he is not to be held in contempt."
(quoting Smith-Cooper, 344 S.C. at 301, 543 S.E.2d at 277)).

Finally, we hold Husband's alleged failure to raise the existence of the inconsistent
language argument in two prior contempt actions that were premised upon
nonpayment of support and maintenance did not preclude him from raising this
argument in the present action or the family court from making the current
determination regarding the inconsistent provisions because the family court never
ruled on this argument in the prior contempt actions. Therefore, we hold the prior
contempt orders are not the law of the case in regard to whether there is
inconsistent language in the Decree, and the family court judge did not overrule
himself. See generally Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 560,
573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and
requires affirmance." (emphasis added)); Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 459, 674
S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009) (finding that when an appellant "raised [an] issue and
argued it before the circuit court on appeal from [a] magistrate's judgment" and the
circuit court affirmed the judgment and the appellant did not file any subsequent
motion or appeal in that action, the circuit court's disposition on the issue became
the law of the case). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's order.

AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.