Johnny C. Haggins v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Johnny Haggins, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000176

Appeal From Lee County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-128
Heard December 4, 2024 – Filed April 16, 2025

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellate Defender Jordan Millen Wayburn and
Appellate Defender Jessica M. Saxon, both of Columbia,
for Petitioner.

Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Johnny Haggins appeals the denial of his application for
post-conviction relief (PCR) challenging his convictions and sentences for
domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN), first-degree assault
and battery, and conspiracy. On appeal, Haggins argues the PCR court erred by (1)
dismissing his constitutional challenges because such claims are cognizable under
the PCR Act and (2) failing to grant relief when he was improperly tried in
absentia and without counsel. We reverse and remand to the court of general
sessions for a new trial.

1. We reverse the PCR court's determination that Haggins's claims were direct
appeal issues that were not cognizable in a PCR proceeding.1 A reviewing
court "defer[s] to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is
evidence in the record to support them." Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810
S.E.2d 836, 839 (2018). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo,
"with no deference to trial courts." Id. at 180-81, 810 S.E.2d at 839. "In a PCR
proceeding, a defendant collaterally attacks his conviction and may raise any
claims of constitutional violations relating to his conviction." Williams v.
Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 601 (2008). "A person who has
been convicted of a crime can initiate a PCR proceeding when he alleges his
conviction or sentence violated either the United States Constitution or South
Carolina Constitution." Jones v. State, 440 S.C. 14, 23-24, 889 S.E.2d 590, 596
(2023); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(1) (2014) (explaining that
"[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who
claims . . . [t]hat the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State" may
institute a PCR action). "[I]n most instances, a PCR claim is properly presented
as a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel." Fortune v.
State, 428 S.C. 545, 558, 837 S.E.2d 37, 44 (2019). "In some circumstances,
however, an inmate may present a claim for PCR based on constitutional
violations other than ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 559, 837 S.E.2d
at 44 (holding petitioner's claim that "the assistant solicitor's misconduct
violated his right to due process and his right to counsel" was "a claim not
based on ineffective assistance of counsel [that] is cognizable for PCR").

We note that "post-conviction hearing statutes do not afford relief in the case of
alleged errors for which remedies were available before and during the original
trial, or by review on motion for a new trial or on appeal." Simmons v. State,
264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975). However, we find Haggins's
case is one of the exceptions to the general rule. See Fortune, 428 S.C. at 559,
837 S.E.2d at 44. Haggins was not represented by counsel at his trial or
sentencing, and no objections were made; thus, his claims could not have been

1
The State conceded at oral argument that the issues raised in this case were
appropriate for PCR.
presented for direct appellate review. See Simmons, 264 S.C. at 423, 215
S.E.2d at 885 ("Errors in a petitioner's trial which could have been reviewed on
appeal may not be asserted for the first time, or reasserted, in post-conviction
proceedings." (emphasis added)); Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 41, 495 S.E.2d
426, 428 (1998) ("A petitioner may allege constitutional violations in PCR
proceedings . . . unless the issue could have been raised by direct appeal."
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the "full extent" of any potential
constitutional violations of Haggins's rights to notice and to be present for trial
were reviewable only as PCR claims for due process violations pursuant to
section 17-27-20(A)(1). See Fortune, 428 S.C. at 559, 837 S.E.2d at 44; see
also, e.g., Jones, 440 S.C. at 24, 889 S.E.2d at 596 (explaining Jones properly
raised a constitutional challenge to a statute in his PCR action because he could
not have raised the issue during his guilty plea).

2. We note that the PCR court included a footnote in its order finding that the
issue of whether Haggins "was denied his right to counsel" was not raised, but
nonetheless ruling that such a claim would fail on the merits because Haggins
had forfeited his right to counsel. The State argues these issues are not
preserved. However, Haggins pled in his application that he was denied his
right to be present at trial, the trial court erred by trying and sentencing him in
absentia without proper notice, he was denied a fair opportunity to present a
defense with the help of a lawyer, and he did not sign a waiver to represent
himself. Further, there was testimony regarding these issues—at least regarding
trial—at the PCR hearing. Therefore, it is unclear to us whether the PCR
court's footnote pertains to Haggins's allegations regarding both trial and
sentencing or sentencing only, and Haggins did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP
motion, to clarify the ruling or request reconsideration. Accordingly, we
believe "[i]t cannot be said [Haggins's] arguments are preserved," but "it also
cannot be said that [his] arguments are clearly unpreserved." Johnson v.
Roberts, 422 S.C. 406, 412, 422 S.E.2d 207, 210 (Ct. App. 2018). "In these
situations, 'where the question of issue preservation is subject to multiple
interpretations, any doubt should be resolved in favor of preservation.'" Id.
(quoting Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 333,
730 S.E.2d 282, 287 (2012) (Toal, C.J., concurring in result in part and
dissenting in part)); see also Fishburne v. State, 427 S.C. 505, 516, 832 S.E.2d
584, 589 (explaining that "because the United States Constitution's Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is
engrained in PCR cases, we cannot continue to permit a party's procedural
shortcoming—such as the failure to file a Rule 59(e) motion—to prevent"
appellate courts from relaxing preservation rules in exceptional circumstances);
Moses v. State, 442 S.C. 263, 271, 898 S.E.3d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Only
under extraordinary circumstances—such as when a PCR court fails to make
sufficiently specific findings of fact—do the interests of justice permit a court
to reach unpreserved issues."); Mangal v. State, 421 S.C. 85, 99, 805 S.E.2d
568, 575 (2017) ("[T]he interests of justice require . . . courts to be flexible with
procedural requirements before PCR applicants suffer procedural default on
substantial claims."); State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 288 n. 5, 540 S.E.2d 445,
448 n. 5 (2000) (declining to remand for a hearing on the reliability of an
identification after the court determined the show up procedure was unduly
suggestive as a matter of law because "a remand would serve no useful
purpose" when a full hearing had already been held); State v. Cash, 304 S.C.
223, 224-25, 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (stating a remand is the usual
procedure "when the record fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to counsel" except "in extraordinary cases" where "it would be almost
impossible to find a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to counsel
even if a . . . hearing were ordered").

3. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Haggins's claims that he was tried in
absentia and without counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. As to the
merits of Haggins's claim that he was improperly tried in absentia and without
counsel, we reverse the PCR court's denial of relief. A reviewing court
"defer[s] to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is
evidence in the record to support them." Smalls, 422 S.C. at 180, 810 S.E.2d at
839. However, questions of law are reviewed de novo, "with no deference to
trial courts." Id. at 180-81, 810 S.E.2d at 839.

"This court has explained that 'a defendant may surrender his right to counsel
through (1) waiver by affirmative, verbal request; (2) waiver by conduct; and
(3) forfeiture.'" State v. Fairey, 374 S.C. 92, 103, 646 S.E.2d 445, 450 (Ct.
App. 2007) (quoting State v. Thompson, 355 S.C. 255, 262, 584 S.E.2d 131,
134 (Ct. App. 2003)). "By definition, "[a] waiver is a voluntary and intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right." Osbey v. State, 425 S.C.
615, 619, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting Sanford v. S.C. State Ethics
Comm'n, 385 S.C. 483, 496, 685 S.E.2d 600, 607 (2009)). Therefore, when a
defendant waives his right to counsel, "he must do so knowingly and
intelligently." Id.at 618-19, 825 S.E.2d at 50. "For a knowing and intelligent
waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and
(2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" Id. at 619, 825
S.E.2d 50 (quoting Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24, 392 S.E.2d 462, 463
(1990)). The "requirement of warning the defendant of the dangers of self-
representation applies to waiver by conduct." Id. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51.
"[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, and do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." Thompson, 355 S.C. at 262, 584 S.E.2d at 134.

However, "[a] defendant can forfeit his right to counsel irrespective of his
knowledge of either the consequences of his actions or the dangers of self-
representation." Id. at 267, 584 S.E.2d at 137. "[B]ecause of the drastic nature
of the sanction, forfeiture would appear to require extremely dilatory conduct."
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)). "Situations
where a defendant's own conduct forfeits his right to counsel are unusual,
typically involving a manipulative or disruptive defendant." Id. Forfeiture "is a
drastic consequence, requiring more than absence from trial." Id. at 269, 584
S.E.2d at 138

In this case, the record is clear that Haggins did not waive his right to counsel
through an affirmative request; his retained counsel moved to be relieved on the
day of trial when Haggins was not present and had not been in touch for several
months. Therefore, if Haggins waived his right to counsel, it could only be
through his conduct. However, Haggins testified that he appeared at "roll call"
several times prior to the case being called for trial, and Haggins testified he
was unable to maintain contact with counsel because he was homeless,
unemployed, and did not have a working phone. Moreover, the "requirement of
warning the defendant of the dangers of self-representation applies to waiver by
conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51. The record does not
support a finding that Haggins was advised of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation. Although Haggins had prior involvement with the court
system and clearly understood the desirability of having the assistance of
counsel, it is apparent that he did not understand how his attorney could be
relieved immediately prior to trial and he could be left without representation.
Further, Haggins did not forfeit his right to counsel as there is no evidence that
he engaged in "extremely dilatory conduct" such as verbal abuse of counsel,
making threats, or misbehavior in the courtroom. See Thompson, 355 S.C. at
267-68, 584 S.E.2d at 137-38 (listing examples of conduct various courts have
found to rise to the level of forfeiture). Haggins's failure to appear, without
more, "does not rise to the level of waiver" or forfeiture. Id. at 266, 269, 584
S.E.2d at 137-38.

Because we find Haggins did not waive or forfeit his right to counsel, we hold
the PCR court erred in denying his application for post-conviction relief. See
Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412, 570 S.E.2d 184, 186 (2002) ("In a PCR
action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice
to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner did not make a knowing
and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new
trial.").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.